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PUBLIC OPINION AND THE INTELLECTUALS*

FRANCIS G. WILSON
University of Illinois

I

A study of the relation of intellectuals to public opinion suggests the outlines of a sociology of the intellectuals as a functioning social group. The *libertas philosophandi*[1] has long been asserted by the educated elite, and in pre-democratic days the theoretical relation to public opinion was quite clear. Philosophers have had the civil liberty to criticize government, but the same right was not generously extended to the vulgar conscience, or the common men who composed the "open public." Actually, the rise of democracy has not really clarified the issue, though the mass or Gnostic movements of modern times have asserted the right to judge the government, the intellectuals, and any other group that might stand in the way of political victory. The democratic intellectual can hardly say that the revolting mass does not have the right to judge him, but he can and does say that public opinion must be reformed, purified, educated, or directed by the latest in scientific hypothesis. More especially, however, the modern selfconscious intellectuals have directed their fire against other groups or elites who have a following and who in fact provide a pluralistic leadership of public opinion.[2]

Yet in this type of discussion, the intellectuals have seldom analyzed themselves as Julien Benda attempted to do in *La Trahison des Clercs*. In general, the intellectuals have raised the question of the conditions of culture and whether or to what extent the intellectual may offer his loyalty to it. And because the *libertas philosophandi* has so often involved the assertion of revolutionary and highly negative judgments, the existing popular culture, so often permeated with Western religious ideas, has come in for harsh criticism. A moment of reflection will suggest that, on the contrary, the intellectuals should look in a scientific spirit at other groups whose traditional judgments do not agree with theirs. It is easy for the clerk to laugh satirically at the country bumpkin, who in a democracy may occupy the highest political post, but he might on occasion look at himself in all humility, without the arrogance that the possession of knowledge (not necessarily wisdom) so often induces. In any case, one of the issues of analysis in contemporary politics and culture is the examination of the intellectual; the creation, one might suggest, of an inwardly directed sociology of the intellectuals.[3]

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* This article is based on a lecture given at Emory University in the spring of 1953.

[1] Robert B. Sutton, "The Phrase *Libertas Philosophandi*," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 14, pp. 310–16 (April, 1953).

[2] See, for example, José Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, trans. from the Spanish (New York, 1932). Or, in contrast, Julien Benda, *The Treason of the Intellectuals* [*La Trahison des Clercs*], trans. Richard Aldington (New York, 1928).

In all honesty, the issue becomes finally one of philosophy. One must acquire a metaphysical focus before any such tension as that between public opinion and intellectuals can be fully understood. But in the discussion there is seldom a proper confrontation of issues, since less fundamental controversies and the praise and denunciation of personalities obscure what otherwise might be an enlightening area of discourse. In a basic sense, the issue is the liberal affirmation of various forms of empiricism against variations of theistic philosophy, or the struggle between the affirmations of scientific and religious interpretations of man.[4] It becomes the conflict between the interpretation of "secular democracy" and some modern form of a sacral or religiously influenced society. However, this is only the fundamental form of the question, since the number of secularized ideologies is large and the number of morally and religiously influenced systems of ideas is also considerable in the diverse modern political structure of the West.[5] For example, the contemporary struggle over the content of education surely involves the most fundamental of philosophical questions, but the battle is actually fought in a half-light, or with a spotlight illumination of personalities in a fog of personal recrimination and epithet.

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[3] Crane Brinton, "Something Went Wrong: Three Views of the Heritage of the Early Nineteenth Century," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 14, pp. 457–62 (June, 1953), deals with this issue by being sharply critical of Peter Viereck, who had offered criticism of the contemporary intellectuals.

[4] See J. Grimmond, "The Principles of Liberalism," *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 14, pp. 236–42 (July–Sept., 1953).

[5] Lord Acton in the nineteenth century was interested in counting the number of systems of thought which might be used to explain political movements in his time. Since Acton was attempting to reconcile British liberalism with his own religious ideas, he tended to blunt the conflict between liberalism as a secular system of thought and Christianity. See G. E. Fasnacht, *Acton's Political Philosophy* (New York, 1953), pp. 140–41.

II

Public opinion has been a subject of active discussion for more than a hundred years,[6] though it is only recently that it has become a separate study in universities. And now students of public opinion have become experts in communication, propaganda analysis, polling, and political prediction. One might add that emphasis on polling, prediction, and propaganda has all but drained away the theoretical or philosophical content of the study of public opinion. The analysis of the media of mass communication, the study of public policy in relation to radio and television, and the emergence of "sykwar," or the military application of propaganda, is a singularly barren field for those who are in search of ideas, social concepts, or philosophy in general. Moreover, the intellectuals of our time, both in Europe and America, feel themselves isolated from systems of mass communication.[7] They know little about it as a technical subject, and they have felt that the media suitable for a mass culture are unsuited for the expression of high humanistic values.

There is no standard way of defining public opinion. There are almost as many definitions as there are experts on the subject. There is no possibility in our time of a common statement of definition, but there are some common points of interest out of which most statements concerning it arise. The oldest and most important of these points is the ancient tension between those who rule and those who are ruled. Governors have had opinions about their subjects, but this has seldom been called public opinion. Subjects of a government have always had judgments about the deeds of their rulers, and this has commonly been called public opinion. Ever since the moral wisdom of man made its appearance in the great philosophical and religious literatures of the world, and ever since there has been some agreement on the moral code under which men live, there has been in elemental form some kind of public opinion. For it was possible with a moral code to approve or disapprove of the actions of rulers. It has not always been possible to do anything about what a government might do, and the victims of government generally are the least likely to leave a literary monument of their judgment. Intellectuals or clerks, let us say, have often surrounded rulers and they have taught the masses what they should think of their governors; these are the ones who have left records of what should be thought about a given political society. Yet the great sources of ancient wisdom or prudence have not always agreed that rulers were wise or beneficial, as one may find in the Confucian Classics, and among the philosophers of Greece.

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[6] See William A. Mackinnon, *On the Rise, Progress and Present State of Public Opinion in Great Britain and Other Parts of the World*, 2d ed. (London, 1828).

[7] See *Confluence*, Vol. 2, pp. 69–114 (March, 1953), for various articles on this problem.

Public opinion, then, is outside of government; it is outside of the circle of those who make decisions; it is opinion that moves from the outside in, from the great circle of functioning groups in society to the narrowing circle of those who finally make decisions about what government shall attempt to do. As public opinion, it is general and open. But this idea suggests something else. Are the opinions we keep locked in our hearts public opinion? Must not public opinion be something that people will talk about to their fellows? Tom Harrisson observed some years ago that public opinion is anything that people will say out loud; it is anything you will talk to anybody about.[8] Private opinion may be the potential public opinion of tomorrow, since a wave of general talk may emerge on any question. But private opinion may never reach the out-loud stage, since the means of communication may be closed to it, and the leaders of a society may refuse to discuss the question in a formal way. One function of a leader in a democratic society is to keep the slums of the human mind private; it is to keep such opinions from becoming public. One of the things that makes a democracy work is the insistence that many subjects people might like to talk about openly must not become public issues; that is, they must not be talked about out loud. Such opinions must not become factors in public decision. But it is an equally important function of democratic leadership to see that certain issues, long dormant in private thought, come into the clear light of day for out-loud discussion and political decision. Some public opinion must be forced back into secret and private discussion, and some private opinions must be made public and a factor in democratic decision.

Now in a democracy we say, often without thinking very much about what it means, that the people rule. In truth, any form of government can stand for long periods so long as the subjects would rather live under the government than die resisting it. Revolution is more difficult than it was in the last century because of mass communication and fire power. But the old saying goes, for there are times when men can be driven by such desperation that even the strongest government can be overthrown, especially when there is the least faltering in the exercise of political and military power. However, in a democracy we are concerned with more peaceful political action; we think of the articulate opinions of those who have some share in making public decisions as public opinion. We do not assume that all democratic citizens are very close to government, for always government is largely secret; and we do not assume that all decisions must be made finally by the people. We recognize, moreover, that in some areas the masses of the people have more power to make decisions than in others. In our democracy, we have a rather cumbersome way in which people can select some of the important rulers, but once these are elected they make their decisions with an eye to some future election, or with the avoidance of the penitentiary in mind.

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[8] "What is Public Opinion?," *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 11, pp. 374–83 (Oct.-Dec., 1940).

Modern democracy has made more effort than any other system to connect the opinions of the citizens with governmental decision, but even so government is very remote from the ordinary man and his group life. One of the most impressive things about current democracy is that practically no effort is being made to make participation more effective than it has been. The great periods of democratic reform for us seem to be over. Public opinion has probably reached its highest point of influence in history. With the increase in the importance of foreign affairs in our political life, public opinion has no doubt less influence than before the emergence of the present world crisis. We think more today of efficiency in administration and calculation by the experts of international risks than of the opinions of those who pay their taxes, or who serve in the armed forces. As participants in government, the public is an organ of the state, but it is also a series of functional groups that talk about government openly and judge as effectively as they may in the light of the things they believe.

III

Let us turn to the intellectuals. First of all, we must keep in mind a distinction that is of profound significance. There is a difference between the intellectuals and intelligence. There is intelligence throughout society, and wherever it is it should be used in private lives and in the operation of government. Intellectuals in the European sense, that is, the intelligentsia, have a special kind of intelligence. They are functioning groups of society, like any of the professionals, such as lawyers, doctors, engineers, professors, journalists, and more recently the scientist of whatever kind he may be. Intellectuals as a group are characterized by specialized study and function; they have gathered information, and by the logic of their professional status they use such information to make judgments on the world around them. For long centuries they have sat in judgment on the popular mind, and here we have an issue that was as important yesterday as it is today. The intellectual has often seemed to say: "You must forgive us if we seem a little proud, and if we feel that the power of organized society should be largely in our hands. You must forgive us if we disdain the ideas of the common man, because when the common man agrees with us we will like him. We want to remake him in our own image, if only to the extent that he is willing to accept our leadership when important questions of public policy are involved. We are not opposed to freedom, but we feel more capable than other men of defining freedom and justice."

Reflection on the rise of the modern Western intellectual class since the revival of the study of Roman Law in the twelfth century, the reintroduction of Greek or Aristotelian philosophy into the great European universities of the past, and the rise of medicine and theology as disciplines, may lead one to think there is more than a grain of truth in such a statement. Some intellectuals, like the theologians and the medical men, have generally had a large following among the "vulgar," as it was once stated. Others like the humanists with their knowledge of ancient tongues, and the philosophers who have rejected the religious beliefs of ordinary men, have been at war with society for nearly five hundred years. In our own time, the spectacular achievements of the scientists have separated them from ordinary people. The scientist has become the realization of "superman," and for the first time in American history the scientist as the aide of the military has been envisaged as the next possible destroyer of civilization, rather than its obedient servant.

The great symbolic intellectual figure, however, has been the philosopher, the lover of wisdom.[9] This symbol has been forceful ever since the beginning of Greek speculative thought. It has found its most powerful exponent in Plato, and perhaps Pythagoras as well. True knowledge was a mystery that only the initiated might savor. Others sat unhappily in Plato's den, where only shadows of philosophical reality might be seen by those whose backs were always turned against the light of dialectical knowledge. Some years ago Walter Lippmann[10] described public opinion as a set of stereotypes that partially informed men use to explain the world; the stereotype is like a shadowy picture in Plato's den; it does not include a proper range of information; it is distorted; it is merely a picture of the world, and not the reality and the truth of the world. Thus, every man who becomes in his heart an intellectual, that is, a philosopher of some kind or other, must make a great decision: he must decide whether the ordinary man sits in a cave with his back to the light. He must decide whether common opinion about the world is merely a set of stereotypes, or distorted idea forces. He must decide whether to sit in judgment on the world and all poor mortals who inhabit it. It is a profound and disturbing issue, and if one is a democrat, the issue is all the harder. To the aristocrat at heart there is no issue, because knowledge is something that only the few ever get.

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[9] Cf. Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics* (Chicago, 1952).

[10] In his *Public Opinion* (New York, 1922).

And now we reach a striking paradox. The intellectuals who are most passionately for the earthly salvation and reform of men and institutions are those who least respect what may be called the traditional values of any long-standing or operating community. For, in truth, no existing society can be called a utopia, and never somehow do men escape from the frustrations of living, or the failure of their own characters to measure up to their philosophical potential. Such an intellectual Gnostic will say in a democratic society that man can be educated to greater awareness of what ought to be done to make society better; in other words, public opinion can by education be slowly recast and loyalty for the new, transfigured society can be created. But when the tradition-bound mortal refuses the new light, the intellectual in a democracy logically can only accept defeat and start over. In a totalitarian society, those who object may be put in concentration and slave-labor camps, and others can be driven by fear into silence in order that they may survive in a world where the "social" is the enemy. Meanwhile, those who run the slave-labor camps would say that they greatly love the people, that their eyes are upon a golden future, and that the pain of today is justified by the promise of tomorrow.

Against these intellectuals there are others who might be called conservatives.[11] Somehow they respect the tradition of a people; they are willing to believe with ordinary men in their religion, and in the wisdom that ancestral experience has fed into the minds of those who are not intellectuals. Likewise, they believe that values, that good and evil, may be demonstrated with logical and reasonable methods. Science is a fact, and none denies it, but justice and morality are also facts that live in more refined statement in the intellectual traditions of religions and nations. Moreover, these conservative intellectuals may say that they do not believe that a new society is immediately possible; they may say also that men are unfortunate or evil in their deeds, not because of a lack of knowledge, but because of a lack of character. Because, in short, men are sinners. Perhaps there is more humility in such an intellectual, and there may be less of a lust for human and political power, or, let us say, less *superbia* and *pleonexia*. But these qualities are yet there, though it may be pride in the fact that men follow and love them. They may agree with St. Paul that the least of God's children may have as much moral wisdom as the philosopher; that the knowledge of the Christian, informed by his faith, may measure up against the secular and positivistic morality of an unfriendly world.

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[11] See Russell Kirk, *The Conservative Mind* (Chicago, 1953); Peter Viereck, *Conservatism Revisited* (New York, 1949).

In the extreme, then, we have two great types of intellectuals in relation to common sentiment, or the public opinion of any society. The philosopher in the Greek sense, the lover of wisdom, and the Christian thinker may agree that all can share in the transcendental aims of the human soul. There is always a higher wisdom that ordinary men keep alive and share in, and sometimes induce others to accept as the proper standard of their behavior, both private and public. Plato would call the other type of intellectual the Sophist; he teaches success in life; he has few standards and is Machiavellian,[12] and though he may exploit tradition for purposes very much like propaganda, he has a profound contempt for the traditional morality of the society in which he works.

Let us try to state now more clearly the practical and philosophical issue for democracy. How can the functioning citizen of a democracy get along with the intellectuals? On the other hand, how can the intellectuals get along with the members of a democratic society? What kind of intellectuals and what kind of citizens work best with each other? Now one thing is clear. Ever since the founding of the great Western universities, one of their functions has been the training of public servants, the teachers in the schools, and members of professions like medicine and theology. In the history of Western governments, the transitions of society can be marked by the changing character of the intellectuals who have served the government. One can almost say, indeed, that the intellectuals, of whatever kind, formulate the policies of government in any detailed or specific sense, regardless of the form of government. But the lawyer trained in the Roman Law and the Common Law who became the adviser of modern absolute rulers was different from the clerk or the cleric who preceded him before the rise of these systems.[13] Moreover, the techniques of the trained servant of government vary with different systems, but even in a democracy so much is secret that our own policies are often formulated and put into effect before there is any publicity. Immanuel Kant was facing this issue when he said that any policy of government might be accepted if it were compatible with publicity, and this was to him one of the transcendental pillars of freedom. In general, in a democracy the expert or the professional man is merely slowed down. With the idea of the career service becoming increasingly accepted by us, even a change in political regimes might not alter greatly the advice on particular policies that the President or the Congress receives.

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[12] Cf. Max Lerner's introduction to the Modern Library edition of Machiavelli's *The Prince* and *The Discourses* (New York, 1940).

[13] Christopher Saint-German's *The Doctor and Student* in 1518 may be regarded as a statement of the older position of the supremacy of the higher law, but the Student in the dialogues expresses many of the ideas of absolutism. See José Antonio Maravall, "La Formación de la Conciencia Estamental en los Letrados," *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, No. 70, pp. 53–81 (July–Aug., 1953).

Thus, the relation of public opinion and the intellectuals is not primarily a matter of the form of government, though one could hardly deny the importance of different systems of making political decisions. One can range a gamut from the Greek devices of popular participation, through the emergence of nineteenth-century democracy, and on to the corruption of traditional democratic devices in modern totalitarian systems. And it seems that the important issue is what kind of philosophy the intellectuals hold and what kind of traditional values the people believe in. Sometimes the intellectuals and the common man agree on basic propositions and sometimes they do not, though it is generally true that whether there is agreement or disagreement there is a difference between the statement of traditional belief and the manner in which the intellectuals argue their propositions. What kind of truth is sought? What reality is sought? What is involved here is not just a question of economic motivation, for all men, however they may reason, must have the necessities of life; it is not just a matter of psychoanalysis either, for men, whether intellectuals or not, have their frustrations and mental disturbances. In the end it becomes a question of values, or what kind of values should be reflected in the spirit and the policy of government. It is a question of how values are determined and sustained, and it is a question of what they are.

While the tension between intellectuals and ordinary people is always present, this tension, sometimes growing and sometimes in abeyance, has been peculiarly characteristic of the modern world. It began at the end of the middle ages or in the early Renaissance in the universities of northern Italy, and it has been the secular theory of intelligence that has increasingly dominated intellectual thought. It was not a new conflict, because it was present among the Greeks and the Romans, and, indeed, it may be found in any society that has left a literature for posterity. We sometimes call it humanism, sometimes liberalism, sometimes scientific thought; sometimes it is our modern historicism, and sometimes it is neo-Platonism as against the older medieval Aristotelianism. But it meant in essence that the human mind at its educated best is autonomous, that reason gives men their own law, that the quest of reason is more the creation of standards of justice than finding a justice that already exists in some kind of moral order in the universe.[14] Greek philosophy especially was a substitute for the great development of Christian philosophy.

In this development, which to some is the essence of modernity, there was an increasing separation between the intellectuals—that is, professors, philosophers, lawyers, and medical men—and the common man. The bridge between them had been a common Christian faith, but this was being slowly eroded away. Through many centuries one can find the intellectuals talking about the vulgar, the plebs, the unlettered, and there is in general a fear of what people in the mass can or will do. Many political philosophers, for example Jean Bodin, have considered the plebs violent and uncertain,[15] something to be guarded against rather than obeyed. From the genial *Religio Medici* of Sir Thomas Browne we read that "Every man is not a proper Champion for Truth, nor fit to take up the Gauntlet in the cause of Verity."[16] To the intellectual, whether he was a lawyer, a Catholic, a Puritan, a Lutheran, or what not, the common people were an uncertain lot, filled with superstition and unlearned, and storm was always latent behind the façades of peace. But this is also true: whenever the lettered and the learned saw that the people disagreed with them, the people were wrong. The intellectual aristocrat was always right. The common man was always wrong. This proposition has not changed through modern history, though the character of philosophy and the dominant types of intellectual effort have changed, and changed fairly frequently if one takes in a broad enough sweep of event.

Intellectuals have always been divided, of course, for by their nature one intellectual must be critical of another, this being one of the aspects of the autonomous reason, the reason emancipated from all standards save those that are self-imposed. We are concerned here, however, with the dominant form of intellectual life which sought to serve the state, and to share in the training of its civil servants. First, we may observe a shifting from Christian values to Greek philosophy, to both Plato and Aristotle, and to such of the learning of the ancient world as was available. It was literary and philosophical study independent of the

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[14] See C. N. R. McCoy, "The Turning Point in Political Philosophy," this REVIEW, Vol. 44, pp. 678–88 (Sept., 1950).

[15] Jean Bodin, *Method for the Easy Comprehension of History*, trans. Beatrice Reynolds (New York, 1945), *passim*.

[16] Modern Library edition (New York, 1943), p. 327.

Christian order that was at stake. The great values of the past, shared, indeed, with all men, were to be proved in a different way. But soon the values themselves came into question, and the revolutionary intellectual, who believed he might reshape the world around him, began to make his appearance. From the time of the development of science, the materialistic and empirical attitude of mind became stronger, and values could be proved, if at all, only by a scientific method. Finally, in the nineteenth century the social scientists began to think of values as not being provable at all, or else to be proved in a utilitarian or quantitative fashion. But the intellectual was rapidly getting to the point where, in social life, he could believe hardly anything. Values, the judgment of men and nations as in the past, were simply a relative phase of culture. From Christian and humanistic learning we moved toward a scientific treatment of what most men thought. It was possible, so it seemed, that we were approaching ethics and politics simply as a subdivision of a kind of descriptive anthropology.[17]

IV

If one seeks the fundamental cleavage between different types of intellectuals, it is no easy quest. It has been stated in various ways by many who have sought the fundamental issues of philosophy. But if one keeps in mind the relation of men to a human order, the issue may be stated like this: Is there such a thing as a transcendent order, or is all reality, including social and private experience, immanent? Is reality only the here and now? Is this the only divinity that men can know, and can it be discovered only by some application of what may be called positivism in social science? The predominant Greek philosophy that has survived as the core of many centuries of liberal education asserted the existence of a transcendent order, and so did Christian thought, whether based on Plato or Aristotle, or on a more direct examination of the implications of the Bible and Church tradition. The soul of man was open to something more than empirical data. Thus, Greek and Christian thought were looking for a spiritual reality transcendent to all men, whether they were among the learned or the vulgar. In more recent times, it is precisely the denial of such an order that has made up much of modern epistemology and metaphysics. Indeed, it has been the effort of many intellectuals to deny metaphysics by denying the existence of the spiritual and the transcendent. And it has been precisely this denial that has caused much of the conflict between the intellectuals and the democratic citizen.

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[17] Contemporary American philosophy, especially Pragmatism and Positivism, may illustrate this point. There is much valuable material on this issue in H. W. Schneider, *A History of American Philosophy* (New York, 1946), Ch. 39.

It is said that Plato's God was always busy with geometry; and that, according to some scholars,[18] is a peculiarly aristocratic and snobbish idea of science. It was a science beyond the comprehension of ordinary men; it was beyond the possibility of their participation in it. One may say, naturally, that Plato failed as a statesman or as advisor to kings and tyrants, but that in his *Laws* he seems to be trying to construct a society that would raise men to the highest level of which they are capable, and that in truth it was to a level very far from any modern idea of democracy. The dialectic that the rulers were to study in the *Republic* was only for a few, who in turn could direct the rest of society with wisdom. Here was a transcendental order clearly anti-democratic in implication. However, in Aristotle, both in the *Ethics* and in the *Politics*, the conservative mind comes closer to ordinary human habit, and there is a much more generous attitude toward what common people may think. They may still be directed by philosophers who have in mind a transcendent order, but the ordinary man participates in virtue. Moreover, the collective judgment of men is praised in Aristotle as a good standard for political behavior. One feels that the criticism of the city state in its time of decay was much milder in Aristotle than in Plato, even though Aristotle held that some men were slaves in their nature. On the other hand, Aristotle's praise of the common judgment was stated in the light of higher rational standards that were drawn from a knowledge of the purposes of nature. And some have gone so far as to assert that Aristotle had a profound influence even on the Stoic ideas of the natural equality of men. These points are emphasized because it seems that the path of reconciliation between the learned and the vulgar is the common acceptance of a transcendent order. This order may be known more intimately by those who are philosophers, but it is shared in and known to some extent by the education of all men in the habits of virtuous living. In this situation reason and faith have a common and supplemental function, and faith does not become the object of derision by those who have stressed the unlimited creativeness and autonomy of the educated reason. But it is also clear that there is a great dualism in human existence, for all men are existentially in both an immanent and a transcendent order, and the higher objectives of the transcendental are never to be realized in their fullness in that which is immanent and directly social.

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[18] See Benjamin Farrington, *Science and Politics in the Ancient World* (New York, 1939); Alban D. Winspear, *The Genesis of Plato's Thought* (New York, 1940).

It may seem paradoxical, but the intellectual who accepts a transcendental order that is above all men can be more easily reconciled to democracy and the forces of public opinion than one who does not. Such a view stands in criticism of much of the current theory of democracy. For in the intellectually predominant view of the present, democracy is almost incompatible with any standards that philosophy and religion may propose.[19] It is asserted by some that only a philosophy of pragmatism is compatible with democracy. In other words, democracy must be based on something like William James' radical empiricism, or the instrumentalism of John Dewey. Or, one might say that because no standard of human justice can be proved, the only standard is that which is approved by some majoritarian procedure.

If this proposition states the current situation, it must arise from some qualities within the intellectual himself; it must be a kind of existential statement of the tensions of his life. In a direct sense, the answer may be found in the attitude of the intellectual toward political power. Those who deny a transcendental realization must attain whatever objectives they have in mind in the organization of society, and this primarily through the force of the state. Thus, they are driven to seek power, or sometimes in futility to deride it. On the other hand, those who, like Boethius, seek the consolation of philosophy, may speak of the vanity of the world. The order of wisdom is both here and beyond, and knowledge can be its own reward and spiritual consolation. Such an intellectual's primary activities are teaching and writing, so that the *artes liberales* will become the proud possession of the coming generation. He is happiest when he is directing a school, the Lyceum or the Academy in Athens, or perhaps the cathedral schools that preceded the foundation of the Western universities. What he asks is freedom from the ruler, not freedom to direct the government.

One is driven, therefore, to the conclusion that the intellectual who rejects the higher order of human experience is existentially a seeker of power. The free commitment of his will may be to him a painful experience, but in the end he has tried to remake the world; that is, historically, he has sought to be the servant and the advisor of kings. His writings, like those of Pierre DuBois or Marsilius of Padua in the fourteenth century, become the manifestoes of the new and planned society. From the time of the rise of science and the troubles of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the idea of a utopia has been congenial to such intellectuals. From the eighteenth century to our time there has always been an intellectually-led political revolution in the making. The Tudor humanist, for example, might stress obedience to the king,[20] but he was also a dreamer of the kind of society that autonomous human knowledge might make. Humanism was far more committed to the historic belief in a divine order than was the intellectualism of the eighteenth century, but the humanist was trying to be a philosopher and a bureaucrat. Consider, for example, the controversy over the objectives of Thomas More in his *Utopia*. Some have said that he was merely justifying English imperialism, but most students have said either that he was trying to reform society or that he was deriding the possibility of any reform. More was a great servant of the king, and he finally died as a martyr for his religious faith. But in the *Utopia* he seems to be struggling with the problem of personal power.[21] Should he seek power in order to reform the world, or should he say that the injustice of the world could not be cured, owing to the corruption of men and government? Latterly, some have said that More was really arguing with himself as to whether he should be a lover of wisdom and the liberal arts or seek to reshape society nearer to the heart's desire. There is no question here of what the people may want, for the philosopher is able to say what justice is and what is proper for the people. But as a bureaucrat he would surely be at war with common opinion.

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[19] See Karl Pribram, *Conflicting Patterns of Thought* (Washington, 1949).

If we consider the seventeenth century, the picture is more clear. The ideal of science has dawned, and the literary humanism of a previous time is being pushed aside or into a darkened background where it has been ever since. Men seek now to wrest away the secrets of nature through mathematics, and through new methods that are scientific. They would, like Francis Bacon, another servant of the throne and author of the first scientific utopia, the *New Atlantis*, develop a new technology and create a kingdom governed by scientists who are continually engaged in scientific experimentation. But it is the government of a society that is at stake; it is science and politics hand in hand, and there is no room for the traditions and values of ordinary men who might turn away from the chilly efficiency of the new technology. When you do not believe in the traditional religious and humanistic values, as a modern you believe in science. And when you believe that the methods of natural and physical science can be applied to the social relations of people, you must turn to the state, for the state is the means whereby the new objectives can be attained. Likewise, one does not bother with ideas of natural rights and limitations on power when the state becomes the chief agency for the attainment of scientific results, whether those results are simple technology or the creation of a new social theory, as Robert Owen proposed.

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[20] See Irving Ribner, "Sir Philip Sidney on Civil Insurrection," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 13, pp. 257–65 (April, 1952).

[21] See Eric Voegelin, "More's Utopia," *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht*, Band III, Heft 4.

V

At this point a digression into the history of political ideas is appropriate. With the beginning of the seventeenth century, certain major and traditional views in politics had emerged. There were the Calvinists, the Lutherans, the Anglicans, the Catholics, the minor and dissenting religious sects, and there were those who against all other traditions sustained the authority of the state and who were the proponents of various doctrines of sovereignty. It is clear, of course, that all of these views were internally divided, but each one took a position on the central issue of time: the relation of religion and politics. One can generalize as follows: those who supported a religious tradition, especially when it was on the defensive, were likely to be exponents of the consent of the governed, tyrannicide, and the power of the traditional estates or parliaments of the realm. They were more inclined than the defenders of sovereignty to seek the support of the general population. On the other hand, it was a time of the emergence of the modern conception of the authority of the state, modelled not a little on the authority of the Roman Empire and the Civil Law which had been used as a support for imperial power. Those who asserted the sovereignty of the monarch were not interested in what the people thought, but only in their obedience to the law. The doctrine of sovereignty was a kind of civil theology that was to take the place of the various Christian theologies which struggled against each other in Western Europe. Under the Tudors and the Stuarts, English official doctrine might be moving toward the assertion of the divine right of kings as the civil theology of Anglicanism, and Lutheranism had similar though not so well stated doctrines. But the divine right of kings was simply a passing phase of the argument. It is not the argument upon which the power of the modern state was built.

The question involved here is the function of intellectuals in relation to what might be called the general currents of popular opinion. It is clear that the religious traditions appealed with success to the citizen body, otherwise the religious wars would not have been fought, kings would not have been assassinated, and general and violent repression of religious dissent would not have been possible. To be brief, the secular, empirical, and scientific intellectuals were on the side of political authority, and to them a strong monarchy became all too often a symbol of the denial of the power of the people. The intellectuals framed the new theory of power. Though the lawyers had long used the model of the Roman Emperor in the analysis of kingly power, the secular mind used the new mathematical and scientific theories to justify the supremacy of the state over all dissent. In other words, much of the political theory of the time that now finds itself ensconced in the standard treatises is a defense of political power. The lawyers, the humanists, the poets, the philosophers, and the writers of systematic works in political analysis were generally on the side of sovereignty. One should not underestimate the force of protest, the defense of consent, and the emergent theory of constitutional liberty. But down to the eve of the French Revolution the *philosophes* were often supporters of the monarchy and they were contemptuous of the ideas of the ordinary citizen. Ignorance, faction, and sedition comprised the treadmill of the common man. The idea of the centralized and powerful state was rationalized by the intellectuals; it is a lasting, but perhaps unhappy, contribution to the history of modern times.

In no small degree Machiavelli became the symbol of the organized power of the state, though he was denounced often by those who used him most. Sir Thomas Browne said of him: "I confess that every county hath its Machiavel, every age its Lucian, whereof common Heads must not hear, nor more advanced Judgments too rashly venture on: it is the Rhetorik of Satan and may pervert a loose or prejudicate belief."[22] In contrast, Francis Bacon, one of the great apostles of scientific method, and who was slightly senior to Browne, read avidly the Italian historians such as Paolo Sarpi, and he said: "We are much beholden to Machiavel and others that wrote what men do, and not what they ought to do."[23] Here is an essential credo of the new science of national power; here is the principle that description and not values forms the core of the effort of the student of politics. The people must be managed and prevented from organizing so that discontent can never be a force on government. Thomas Hobbes, on the other hand, had few reservations as to the action of a totalitarian state. Not only must the common people be told what to think; the preacher and the professor must be dealt with in the firmest way. But Hobbes tried his hand at theology, and he rather fancied himself as a theologian. He reduced obedience to God to obedience to the theology that was incorporated into the civil statutes of the realm. Anyone who resisted the prince or the government was not only violating a civil law and worthy of condign punishment, but was also a rebel against his God. Moreover, the sovereign could command whatever he could get away with. Religion was thus reduced to a necessary annoyance; at best it was a department of government, as under the peculiar English system. Behind Hobbes' religious ideas, moreover, was a materialistic and utilitarian philosophy that in effect left no room for natural or divine law, for under Hobbes' covenant of death each individual had conceded all to the sovereign power of the state.

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[22] *Religio Medici*, Modern Library edition (New York, 1943), p. 344.

[23] *The Essays of Francis Bacon*, ed. M. A. Scott (New York, 1908), LXXX.

Fortunately for England, the long decades of disturbance and revolution ended, and a man like Locke could take many of the same philosophical ideas and create a moderate political philosophy that even led in the direction of religious toleration. And that great skeptic Hume, like William James, insisted that we must believe, but always under a powerful government that did not allow for the religious assertiveness of other days.[24] In both Locke and Hume, the ideas of the common man get a hearing, and the stabilized custom, tradition, and public opinion of a nation may be considered in the calculations of public policy. But one of the great sources of modern liberty is the insistence on a genuine religious liberty, and though Locke moved far in that direction—farther than Milton—religious freedom was not a fact of political life. For example, Spinoza is cited for his defense of intellectual freedom, but it was the freedom of the philosopher that he defended. Spinoza's comments on religious liberty are often omitted from the books giving selections from his works. In his *Tratactus Theologico-Politicus* he argues in Chapter XIX that the right over matters spiritual lies wholly with the sovereign, and that the outward form of religion should be in accordance with public peace, if we would obey God aright. This is Hobbes all over again—the sharp Erastianism, or state supremacy over religion, that was characteristic of the critical and intellectual mind of the time. Some, like Giambattista Vico in his *New Science*, might argue that in the custom of nations the right of the common man to share in society is an embodiment of the natural law, but Vico was a forgotten figure in his Neapolitan isolation until almost the beginning of the nineteenth century.

With these ideas in mind, some comment must be made on the modern age of revolutions that began with the French Revolution. The philosophers of France in the eighteenth century played a large role in bringing about the revolution, for the intellectual origins of the French Revolution are among the most important, as Daniel Mornet has argued in his study of the subject.[25] The intellectuals, such as Rousseau, provided the ideas that a Robespierre might use, even to the establishment of the worship of reason. Ever since the eighteenth century the battle over political ideology has centered on the philosophy of the French Revolution. A liberal must believe in it, and a conservative cannot. Burke and Wellington stand against Sieyès and Napoleon, and their successors adopt similar intellectual and ideological postures. The revolutionist would destroy the things the people love in the name of the people; the conservative would preserve the things the people love in the name of duty. But the participants in ideological battle may be consoled by Alexis de Tocqueville, who believed that the French Revolution had already occurred before 1789, and that the institutions of France had long since undergone a deep-seated remodelling.

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[24] J. B. Shouse, "David Hume and William James: A Comparison," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 13, pp. 514–27 (Oct., 1952).

[25] See Daniel Mornet, *Les Origines Intellectuelles de la Révolution Française* (Paris, 1933), *passim*.

The philosophical battle over the French Revolution and its successor revolutions is different in at least one respect from the present struggle over the Russian Revolution. Those who accepted the French Revolution and those who rejected it believed that values in social life could be demonstrated or proved. Values such as justice, liberty, natural rights, were accepted by both sides; Burke and Thomas Paine were trying to prove the same thing, but with widely variant theories of how to prove them. But since then values have tended to become myths and power has tended to become technique in the atheistic humanism of the nineteenth century, as in the thought of Feuerbach, Comte, and Nietzsche. Against the relativist and pragmatic democratic intellectual, the Marxian, the supporter of the Russian regime and its expansion, insists he has a scientific answer to everything. And in the cold light of the all-encompassing ideal of science, it is hard for the intellectual to say why the values of democracy can stand against dialectical materialism. To say, as some of the followers of John Dewey have done, that group experience, the dominance of the group, will give us answers, is surely futile, when the processes of group interaction produce the irreconcilable conflicts of modern times. C. Wright Mills in his recent book *White Collar* has suggested that to many intellectuals the revolution has become vulgar and the system of democratic society is accepted in a purely mechanical manner. To resist the new revolution, there must be an alternative faith. While we have many enthusiasts for revolution like Richard Price among us, there are few of the insight of Edmund Burke.

VI

But common men still believe in many things. They are largely theistic and opposed to the secular intellectual whenever they understand what the clamor of wordy battle is all about. If the common herd, as Browne said, follows the intellectual you may have a revolution to remake society; but if the functioning citizen distrusts the intellectual leaders of important segments of society, the progress of society may be retarded, and retarded sharply in battle concerning values that are as old as the struggles between Plato and the Sophists. In a democratic society where there is a free communication of ideas and free elections, the people can at least make some sort of effective choice of what is offered them by those who edit the pharmacopoeia of the better world.

What then do the intellectuals promise? They promise a secular democracy, in which somehow spiritual values must take care of themselves. It is said that with psychology, the frustrations of the common man can be removed; with engineering and science, we can produce more worldly goods than he can consume; with economics, we can give assurance of a stable economy and high wages; with proper government policies, there can be liberty and security, and the lasting peace that poet and saint have so long prophesied. Art can be made popular and it can be appreciated; there will be plenty of novels to read, and entertainment will not lack. The great revolution, it is sometimes said, has already come and is behind us. The new frontiers of welfare beckon. But in all this there is another note: public opinion must be obedient; it must follow, and not be recalcitrant. Men must select the proper leaders and then not criticize them. It is surely uncertain whether the democratic citizen of our time is going to accept this prescription and such a leadership. It is not certain that he has accepted the secular democracy.

THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE: A CASE STUDY*

RALPH K. HUITT
University of Wisconsin

"Congressional government is Committee government" said Woodrow Wilson in 1884,[1] and political scientists since that day have seen no reason to disagree with him. It would be reasonable to suppose then that once committees ceased to meet secretly (as they did when Wilson wrote) and began to keep verbatim public records of their proceedings, the committee process would be subjected to relentless and systematic study. Such has not been the case. The frequency with which Wilson is quoted is as much a reflection of a lack of substantive research by later students as it is a tribute to his intuitive insights.

It would not be hard to make a case for close and continuous study of congressional committees. On every count, they would seem to hold as much interest for the student of politics as administrative bodies or the courts, upon which so much more attention has been lavished. They are decision-making agencies of crucial importance; it is a commonplace that they hold life-or-death power over legislation. Again, they provide a point of focus for the political process; they are "miniature legislatures," "microcosms" of their parent bodies[2]—not in the sense that they epitomize the larger houses, but rather that the committees are subject to the same influences and power drives, which are easier to intercept and analyze here than in the larger and more complex houses themselves.

A third reason for studying the committee is less obvious but no less important. Each house of Congress is a human group, with leadership, a hierarchy of influence, and a set of norms which control, more or less, the behavior of its members. The man who goes to Congress joins a going concern. He accepts and shares a group life.[3] One factor in any decision he makes is the influence on him of his house as an institutionalized group. But the group life of the congressman is exceedingly complex. Like other men he is a member of many groups, with any one of which he might identify in a particular situation; but unlike most other men he is a *representative*, under obligation consciously and deliberately to take into account the wishes of the groups which support him. As we have said, he is part of the status pattern in his legislative house, in which both formal and informal leadership patterns impose obligations and afford access to power. His success as a professional legislator depends to a large extent upon his conforming with the group norms of his colleagues. But congressmen, too, follow the election returns; prestige and influence in the internal system of the legislature are responsive to success in meeting external demands upon the member. In these respects, to be sure, the group life of a

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[1] Woodrow Wilson, *Congressional Government*, preface to 1884 edition.

[2] George B. Galloway, *Congress at the Crossroads* (New York, 1946), p. 53.

[3] See David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951), pp. 343–46.

legislative body is not different in kind from that of those small groups which have been studied with impressive results.[4] But it certainly is more complex and its members are more sophisticated. Consequently, it presents more formidable problems than do simpler groups.

A study of the group life of Congress might well begin with the standing committee. It *is* a small group, susceptible in most of its operations to close observation. Because its membership is relatively stable, its leaders men of long committee tenure, it has a continuous group life of its own. One factor in that group life, of course, is the pressure from the house whose creature it is, but the committee is worth studying as a human group in its own right. Furthermore, there is the attractive possibility that techniques so developed will be useful in the more difficult undertaking with the larger group of which it is a part. And it is relatively accessible to research: most of its hearings are open to the public and an adequate record is kept. The public hearing is only a part of the activity of a committee, but it is an important and often revealing part.

The standing committee then is a promising group with which to begin a study of the behavior of congressmen in the legislative struggle for at least four reasons. One is the greater *frequency of interaction* of individual congressmen in committees than on the floor of their house. On the floor a congressman may speak seldom, and on a particular issue may confine himself to a single prepared speech. But in a committee in which he is active he talks many times and with less formality. A second reason is that in the committee hearings a group of congressmen are subject to *common stimuli*. They hear the same witnesses and react to the same comments. The third is that the committee is a group of *manageable size* for intensive study. It is possible to observe it closely, and its members are few enough that roles can be kept straight and relationships plotted. A fourth is that it has, within limits, a *continuous life*. Its membership changes, but members are encouraged by the seniority principle to stay on a committee. And the change of membership is never complete and seldom drastic at one time; group norms can easily be transmitted to new members. Thus the committee is a subgroup of its house which is itself a going concern.

I. SOME HYPOTHESES ABOUT THE COMMITTEE

We are not without generalizations about the roles that committees—and inferentially committee members—play in the legislative process. The general literature on legislation and the political process furnishes several which might serve as hypotheses for further testing. One of the most tenacious of the basic concepts has the committee discovering, protecting, and advancing the general interest out of the welter of special interests contending for support. As Professor Chamberlain puts it: "The committee itself must be the guardian of the general public interest, too large and too vague to be organized. What is in the general interest is for the committee to determine, after hearing advocates of the special interests who appear before it."[5] After giving a number of examples of committee actions, he asserts that "the committee played principally the part of a *legislative court*, listening to the evidence of fact and law brought before it by interested parties, considering their suggestions . . . ", then deciding what should be done.[6]

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[4] See especially George C. Homans, *The Human Group* (New York, 1950), in which five distinguished studies in social behavior are examined in detail to develop both an organic theory of the human group and a system of analysis for further study of the group.

This notion of the committee's function perhaps is accepted implicitly in the recent emphasis on the committee's role as a *fact-finding agency*. Political scientists, and some congressmen, have insisted that committees need professional staff with secure tenure, capable of serving either party with equal competence.[7] To insure the non-partisan and objective character of their service, some have urged a legislative career service, perhaps with staff members to be drawn from a pool, with a professional personnel director in charge of recruitment. The argument is that the professional staff could get objective facts for the committee, thus ending the committee's dependence upon the selected facts of lobbyists and the not disinterested experts borrowed from the bureaus.

A second function, not unlike the first, is that of providing, through its public hearings, an open *public forum*.[8] The special interests still vie with each other, the general interest still must emerge from their clamor, but the stage is highlighted, and a larger audience participates in the decision.

A somewhat different set of generalizations—or hypotheses—rests upon the conception of the legislative process as simply one phase of the political struggle, in which contending groups seek access to governmental power at a number of points, the legislative committee being one.[9] The committee members are not judges, discovering the general interest; they are themselves participants in the political struggle, as indeed are all other governmental officials. No one

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[5] Joseph P. Chamberlain, *Legislative Processes: National and State* (New York, 1936), p. 79.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 72–73. Emphasis added.

[7] *The Reorganization of Congress*, A Report of the Committee on Congress of the American Political Science Association (Washington, D.C., 1945), p. 79; Galloway, *Congress at the Crossroads*, pp. 158–61; Ernest S. Griffith, *Congress: Its Contemporary Role* (New York, 1951), pp. 70–75; Estes Kefauver and Jack Levin, *A Twentieth Century Congress* (New York, 1947), pp. 167–68; *Organization of the Congress*, Report of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, pursuant to H. Con. Res. 18, H. Rep. No. 1675, 79th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 9–11; and Report from the Special Committee on the Organization of Congress, Sen. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 21–24. See also the frequent recommendations of this nature in *Organization of Congress*, Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, pursuant to H. Con. Res. 18, 79th Cong., 2d sess.; *Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946*, Hearings before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, U.S. Senate, 80th Cong., 2d sess.; *Organization and Operation of Congress*, Hearings before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, U.S. Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess.

[8] Chamberlain, p. 64.

[9] See especially Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Bloomington, Ind., 1949), first published in 1908; Truman, *The Governmental Process* (cited in note 3); and Bertram M. Gross, *The Legislative Struggle* (New York, 1953). The latter devotes three chapters (14–16) to a realistic description of the operations of congressional committees.

knows what the "general interest" is; there is none in which everyone shares. Public policy emerges from the pull and haul of groups, and the whole thing is kept from flying to pieces because overlapping memberships in groups prevent the perfect mobilization of any interest. In this frame of reference Professor Truman sees the committee using its public hearing for three purposes.[10] The first, and probably least important, is that of "*transmitting information*, both technical and political, from various actual and potential interest groups to the committee." The second use is as "a *propaganda channel* through which a public may be extended and its segments partially consolidated or reinforced." Thus the public forum is provided but the committee is not neutral; what is presented is not so much a fair debate as a set piece. The third use is to provide a *catharsis* for frustrations and grievances, "a quasi-ritualistic means of adjusting group conflicts and relieving disturbances through a safety-valve."

This is not, of course, an all-inclusive list of the general propositions about the roles of congressional committees, nor is it suggested that these propositions are mutually exclusive. But they are useful hypotheses for empirical research. The purpose of this study is to see how well these generalizations explain what took place in a series of public hearings before a particular committee on a given issue. The hearings chosen for a case study are those held before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency in the Spring of 1946 on the question whether the price control and stabilization program of 1942 should be continued, and if so, whether and what changes should be made in it.[11] No claim is made that these are "typical hearings," from which valid generalizations about all committee hearings can be made. No doubt there are numerous "types." But there are several reasons why these hearings are selected for the purposes of this study. (1) The problem is intensely political, i.e., many powerful groups have a stake in the issue and are prepared to make strong efforts to influence the outcome. (2) It is a problem which involves the "general interest"; everybody in the country will be affected in some degree by the outcome. (3) Facts would seem to have some relevance in arriving at the policy decision. There are huge quantities of data available and there are substantial bodies of politico-economic theory to which they can be related. (4) This is not a new problem. It has a history in the three years of administration of public policy in a war economy and nearly a year in a peacetime economy. It is the kind of problem, therefore, which should bring into play all the elements necessary to test the generalizations about committee behavior which we have stated.

The limitations of this kind of study are obvious. It is limited to the public hearings, although much that is important, and perhaps what is decisive, takes place elsewhere. Moreover, it is limited to the printed record of those hearings, where only what is said can be found, and that subject to editing. Inferences therefore must be made from behavior which is recorded incompletely, and perhaps inaccurately. The principal defense of a study thus restricted lies in the fact that it is made with materials which are available in profusion to the kind of people who will make most of the studies of legislative behavior. Few academic persons have data-gathering organizations at their disposal, or freedom for continuous participant-observer research. But the printed record is within the reach of the most modest seminar, making possible endless repetition and refinement. Furthermore, hypotheses which are formulated in crude studies may be used to guide studies which can employ more precise procedures.

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[10] *The Governmental Process*, pp. 372–77. Emphasis added.

[11] *1946 Extension of the Emergency Price Control and Stabilization Acts of 1942, As Amended,* Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, U.S. Senate, 79th Cong., 2d sess., on S. 2028. Cited hereafter as *Hearings.*

II. ROLES OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS

From even a casual reading of the record it would seem that these generalizations may be extended and refined by focusing on the behavior of individual members of the committee. A multiplicity of roles are played by various members, and sometimes by a single member. The status *committee chairman*, for example, can be described by formal and informal powers attributed to that status. But the human chairman is a man in space and time, interacting with other men. More than that, the human chairman occupies more than one status. He is a committee chairman, but he is also a representative of a district, and a member of a complex of groups which make claims upon him and with which he identifies from time to time. And not even the status chairman can be simply defined: at one moment the status is that of the fair presiding officer, under a moral obligation to treat all interested groups fairly; at another moment it may be that of the party leader with a commitment to a program; and again it may be that of a champion of the clientele his committee serves. The role the human chairman will play, his behavior itself, will depend upon many things: upon the constituency, sectional, and party interests in the issue; upon the size of his majority and his hold over it; upon the power and popularity and party of the man in the White House.

The concepts *status* and *role* which we are using here are neither novel nor very complicated. They are used in the sense that Professor Linton uses them in his *The Cultural Background of Personality*.[12] Every culture, no matter how simple, is organized into a number of systems which relate the individual to his culture, among the most important being those of age-sex, family, occupation, and association groups. In a complex society with a high degree of division of labor such as our own, these systems are multifold and overlapping. "The place in a particular system which a certain individual occupies at a particular time" is referred to by Linton as "his *status* with respect to that system." The term *role* he uses "to designate the sum total of the culture patterns associated with a particular status. It thus includes the attitudes, values, and behavior ascribed by the society to any and all persons occupying this status. It can even be extended to include the legitimate expectations of such persons with respect to the behavior toward them of persons in other statuses within the same system. . . . In so far as it represents overt behavior, a role is the dynamic aspect of a status: what the individual has to do in order to validate his occupation of the status." A role thus is defined by what other people expect of the person filling it. Behavior consists of what the person actually does in filling the role. An individual congressman may occupy a number of statuses: he is a middle-aged man, a father, a congressman, a Democrat, a member of the Ways and Means Committee third in seniority, and so on. In each of these statuses he has learned to play certain roles, and to expect other people to play certain roles. He cannot play all these roles simultaneously, of course; "although he occupies statuses and knows roles at all times, he operates sometimes in terms of one status and its role, sometimes in those of another." The congressional role probably is most usefully conceived not as a single role but as a multiplicity of roles, defined for the congressman by the varying expectations of the groups which he represents or with which he identifies. These roles may be and frequently are conflicting, requiring the individual congressman temporarily to abdicate one or another of his roles, or to find some way to conciliate them, or perhaps to withdraw from the conflict which he cannot resolve.

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[12] Ralph Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality* (New York, 1945), pp. 76–77.

The price control controversy in the Spring of 1946 subjected congressmen to just such conflicting demands, and by the time the issue reached the Senate Committee they were well-defined. The extensive hearings before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, which culminated in a series of proposed amendments to the existing law, made certain of that. It is easy, as a consequence, to identify a representative sample of congressional roles from the behavior of the members of the Senate Committee.[13]

The only person to play clearly the role of a national party leader was Senator Robert A. Taft, and he seemed to play it consistently. To him the price control contest was simply one round in a continuing battle with the Administration. Officials of the Administration he regarded not as individuals but as representatives of a generalized program which he was attacking on all fronts. Taft made this explicit when Chester Bowles protested that Taft was criticizing him for opinions which he (Bowles) did not hold: "Mr. Bowles, may I say this: I don't distinguish you from the administration. The administration has one policy; you are the Director of Economic Stabilization. What your particular views are make no difference to me. You are carrying on the policies of the administration. When I say 'You' I should be more explicit. I mean the administration. I am not attacking you personally on it, or anything of the sort. I am criticizing your analysis of the situation which is only affected by administration policy; not by what you personally think. That makes no difference to me."[14] The loan to Britain was a special target of Taft's frequent attacks on aspects of the Administration program not within the Committee's jurisdiction. But in his role of national leader, Taft did not hesitate to tell representatives of specific industries that he did not believe they should be decontrolled.[15] His role apparently was appreciated by the spectators; when he excused himself from the session with Bowles, Senator Millikin noted that Taft's departure cost the Committee half its audience.[16]

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[13] The Democratic members of the Committee were Robert F. Wagner, New York, Chairman; Carter Glass, Virginia; Alben W. Barkley, Kentucky; John H. Bankhead 2d, Alabama; George L. Radcliffe, Maryland; Sheridan Downey, California; Abe Murdock, Utah; Ernest W. McFarland, Arizona; Glen H. Taylor, Idaho; J. William Fulbright, Arkansas; Hugh B. Mitchell, Washington; and E. P. Carville, Nevada. The Republican members were Charles W. Tobey, New Hampshire; Robert A. Taft, Ohio; Hugh A. Butler, Nebraska; Arthur Capper, Kansas; C. Douglass Buck, Delaware; Eugene D. Millikin, Colorado; Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Iowa; and Homer E. Capehart, Indiana.

There was no Democratic counterpart of Taft. The chief burden for the Administration was carried not by the ageing and ailing chairman, Senator Wagner, but by Hugh Mitchell. It was Mitchell who apparently was forewarned of the nature of impending testimony against OPA, and so was ready to confront a hotel association's witness with the statement of a firm specializing in hotel accounting that "the hotel industry of this country is at its peak;" a meat institute's spokesman with a retail grocers' attack on the institute's market survey; the automobile dealers' representative with a court decision upholding the OPA cost absorption policy complained of; and a retail dry goods association's director with a Small Business Committee report claiming that prevailing prices were not hindering production by established firms.[17] Mitchell's favorite tactics were to call for figures and more figures, and then discredit or interpret the figures if possible. But he was content to undertake no more than his role on the Committee required, leaving a general defense of the Administration to another time and place.

Another familiar legislative role, that of representative of a sectional interest, was played with almost classic purity in these hearings by Senator Bankhead. His concern was the Southern cotton farmer and the textile industry which buys his product; like a sensitive seismograph picking up vibrations in far corners of the globe, Bankhead reacted to testimony which remotely affected his chief interest. A lumber manufacturer was asked about timber on land owned by farmers, and the price of southern pine compared with western pine. A general discussion of how OPA figured profits was turned into a specific discussion of how it was done on cotton textiles. No suggestion that the industry was doing better than during an OPA base period was acceptable.[18] A general discussion of industry advisory committees led him to point out that the 15-member committee on women's blouses had not a single member from the South, and get a promise of OPA action.[19] Bankhead's interventions were devoted almost exclusively to his one interest, and when witnesses equipped to talk about that were on the stand his usual taciturnity vanished. On one morning the Committee heard seven witnesses, three of whom represented the cotton textile industry.[20] With these three witnesses Bankhead accounted for more than one-third of all the interruptions (questions and comments). Of the other four (representing apartment owners and hotels) he asked no questions at all. Bankhead presided over the hearings on two occasions; on one, the principal witnesses represented the American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Grange, and the National Cooperative Milk Producers Federation; on the other, the witness was the Secretary of Agriculture.[21]

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[14] *Hearings*, p. 43.

[15] *Hearings*, pp. 965, 1265.

[16] *Hearings*, p. 29.

[17] *Hearings*, pp. 986–87, 1094, 1295–96, 1311.

[18] *Hearings*, pp. 704–6, 1730–31.

[19] *Hearings*, p. 325. There followed this colloquy:

Senator Tobey: That is not Senator Claghorn speaking. That is Senator Bankhead.

Senator Bankhead: What was that?

Senator Tobey: That was a joke, Senator. I said it was not Senator Claghorn, it was my friend Senator Bankhead speaking about the South.

Senator Bankhead: I am always trying to get justice for them. That is a hard task very often, I will say to my New England Senator friend.

The Committee members seemed most impressive when they were acting as representatives of specific constituency interests in their states. Here they seemed to speak as experts in their own right. The cliches fell away, the fuzziness and amateurishness disappeared; here the facts were clear and the grasp sure. As a consequence, when the senators talked details of the products and industries of their states with each other they could get together on what they meant, the frustrations of contradictory figures and shifting frames of reference relieved for the moment. Mitchell on the dairy industry in Washington, Murdock and Millikin on dairy cattle in Utah and Colorado, Hickenlooper on land prices in Iowa, Fulbright on strawberries and poultry in Arkansas[22]—these are but a few examples of members speaking easily and with authority on the interests of their states.

This role occupied Senator McFarland to the virtual exclusion of any other. He took very little part in the hearings. His interest was in the subsidies paid to the lead, copper, and zinc industries, which were important in Arizona. Early in 1942 the OPA froze the prices of these metals, and then sought to increase production by awarding subsidies for increments over base-period output on a mine-to-mine and month-to-month basis. McFarland proposed an amendment, supported by the industries, which would shift 60 per cent of the subsidies into the prices of the metals and put the remainder on a noncancelable basis. McFarland came late for Bowles' presentation and made sure the matter had not come up. In the meeting devoted to it, McFarland carefully guided the testimony of the industry representatives and answered many of the senators' questions himself. He displayed no interest in the subsidy question in regard to anything else. He took little part in the remainder of the hearings until the last day, when the OPA administrator of meat prices was called by the Committee in reference to several telegrams from Arizona meat dealers received by McFarland.[23]

There is a difference, of course, in seeking to amend a law, which is the legislative function in its primary form, and interceding with an administrative agency in behalf of a constituent. The latter is the "errand-boy" role, and by the accounts of legislators themselves a large part of their time is spent playing it.[24] There is eloquent testimony in the hearings to the importance of the role to both legislator and administrator: in the senators' complaints that OPA handled congressional mail slowly, and in Paul Porter's reply that the agency got 1500 congressional letters a week and had a rule, not always carried out; that they must be answered in three days.[25] The errand boy role was not dropped at the committee room door. Capehart brought up three wires from merchants in Indiana complaining about the trouser problem ("Do you have a trouser expert here, Mr. Porter?"); Taylor the case of a packer in Idaho; Mitchell that of a packing company in Tacoma, Washington; Buck that of a factory in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, about which he had a letter; and Bankhead that of a Mr. Flagg of Florence, Alabama.[26] Names were called and action solicited. Hickenlooper, for example, instructed Porter to "make available to me all of the records of Mr. Slotkin and his meat operations for the last 4 years and whatever investigations you have made and alleged infractions and shortcomings; all the meat quotas and his record of ceiling purchases. . . . I would like to see the file and know why something has not been done about it."[27] Tobey raised the case of a New Hampshire veteran who thought OPA was stopping him from fabricating lumber he had logged himself. The OPA man present could not answer the question, but it was later handled to Tobey's satisfaction, although, curiously enough, not to that of Millikin of Colorado.[28] Senatorial interventions in the administrative process, of which these are samples, were made frankly and the administrators commended for prompt service. Hickenlooper spoke appreciatively of Porter's alacrity in the one case the Senator asked him personally to handle, and Capehart stated: "I personally have been over to OPA on any number of occasions, and I must say that I think my batting average has been about 99 percent in the matter of getting adjustments."[29]

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[20] *Hearings*, pp. 931–1041.

[21] *Hearings*, pp. 637–777, 1043–88.

[22] *Hearings*, pp. 176, 687–88, 1046–49, 1721–23.

[23] *Hearings*, pp. 74–75, 436–95, 1733, 1791–93.

Still another role is involved when an industry brings its problems before the Committee and, in effect, gets a review of the policy and rulings of the administrative agency. This happened several times during the hearings. Typically, the industry in question was not one in which any individual senator was particularly interested; it simply was one which was not satisfied with the results it had gotten in its dealings with OPA. The senators allowed themselves to become entangled in the technical details of the industry's problems, frequently accepted the industry's version, and then called on OPA for action. A good example occurred early in the hearings, when representatives of the underwear industry appeared and complained in detail of OPA procedures and policies. It soon became obvious that their problems had a long history and that the Committee was not competent to legislate in detail for the underwear industry. An OPA man was sent for, and there followed a confrontation scene between him and the underwear maker he allegedly was driving out of business.[30]

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[24] See the statements in Galloway, *Congress at the Crossroads*, pp. 57–63.

[25] *Hearings*, pp. 1725–26. Tobey suggested that a review board be established to handle congressional cases faster.

[26] *Hearings*, pp. 175–76, 181, 182, 130–32, 110.

[27] *Hearings*, p. 1743.

[28] *Hearings*, pp. 1667, 1693.

[29] *Hearings*, pp. 132, 111.

The usual effect of the Committee's interest in a particular industry or business was that the OPA then tackled the complainant's applications with speed, giving him real service. The Committee thus constituted itself a kind of super-administrative agency, intervening capriciously and depending upon business to initiate the process. Capehart got an assurance that a price increase would be granted the cheese industry, and Taft a promise of immediate action on evaporated milk.[31] In some cases the outcome was ambiguous, as with Capehart's efforts in regard to the price of butter and oil, and Millikin's attempt to "get an airtight promise out of OPA to decontrol poultry."[32] In one instance a glove-maker under suit for alleged violation of the law brought his case to the Committee, and strong pressures were placed on the OPA enforcement chief by Committee members, apparently in an effort to persuade him to drop the case.[33]

One way to intercept the shifting roles of the Committee members is to observe the variations in their behavior when different witnesses appear before them—representatives of the Administration, of interest groups, businesses, etc. The Administration point of view, in support of extension of price control "without crippling amendments," was well represented on the Committee. Wagner, Mitchell, Barkley, Taylor, Radcliffe, Murdock, Fulbright, and Tobey (a Republican), were usually dependable, and sometimes aggressive, supporters of OPA. But it would have been hard to tell it during the testimony of Bowles or Porter, the first two witnesses before the Committee. Despite Bowles' hopeful introductory comment that he would like to read his statement through and then answer questions on it, Taft, Capehart, and Millikin promptly took charge. In his first appearance there is no page of uninterrupted testimony, in his second only three.[34] So intensive was the barrage that at one point the roles were reversed, with Bowles cross-examining Taft on the Senator's statements.[35] In all of Bowles' testimony, there are no more than four interventions by Administration senators to ask leading questions in support of the witness. In the two early appearances of Porter, who on the whole was treated more gently than Bowles, there are only three.[36] It is hard to escape the conclusion that the senators were content to let the bureaucrats take care of themselves as best they could. The role of the legislator versus the bureaucrat is an old one, rooted in an institutional jealousy never hard to arouse. Anti-OPA witnesses were well aware of it: statements that "Congress treated us fairly but OPA interpretation stripped away relief" and charges of "OPA usurpation" were staples of their testimony. And the target was well-chosen; even the gentle Barkley, staunch friend of OPA, remarked once " . . . I won in the Senate, but I lost in OPA."[37] Administration witnesses were not all treated the same, needless to say; Fred

[30] *Hearings*, pp. 229–73.

[31] *Hearings*, pp. 845–46, 1725.

[32] *Hearings*, pp. 853–58, 1087, 1724.

[33] *Hearings*, pp. 1516–38.

[34] *Hearings*, pp. 6–75.

[35] *Hearings*, pp. 25–26.

[36] *Hearings*, pp. 77–208.

[37] *Hearings*, p. 956.

Vinson was the only important witness who was allowed to read his statement through without interruption.[38] Among his many services to his country, the Secretary of the Treasury could count six terms in the House of Representatives.[39]

The lethargy of the Administration senators, which hung on through the appearances of several spokesmen of particular industries, disappeared instantly with the appearance of Robert R. Wason, president of the National Association of Manufacturers.[40] Before Wason had read two hundred words of his statement, his right to speak for the public, for industry, or even for the NAM, had been challenged. From that point on the fight seems pretty even, as it was later when James B. Carey, secretary-treasurer of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, appeared.[41] NAM and CIO were the principal ideological protagonists in the fight over the extension of price control, and this was clearly reflected in the interest group split on the Committee when their representatives appeared.[42] Neither man was allowed a page of uninterrupted testimony. The role here was that of legislator pro-or-con interest groups. The senators clearly were identifying with private interest groups in a struggle which cut across the separate branches of the government.

Other group identifications can be perceived in the hearings. For instance, the special position of farm groups in American politics was underlined. In the welter of name-calling and exaggerated charges, there is not one criticism of farmers. Everyone agreed they deserved well of the republic. On one occasion Taylor came dangerously close to a critical remark; in defending the government's paying a premium price for grain, he said: "The farmers knew that they [starving people] had to have it, but unfortunately they have held on to the wheat and corn. I don't think it is to the credit of the American farmers themselves. . . . " But Capehart forthwith restated the official congressional position: " . . . I don't agree with the Senator that the American farmer is unpatriotic. I think they are among the most patriotic people this Nation has and I want the record to so state. I don't agree with that statement at all."[43] Ed O'Neal, president of the American Farm Bureau Federation, reflected the magnificent immunity of the farmers when he blamed the inflation, with fine impartiality and without challenge, on the Congress, both parties, the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the whole Administration, as well as OPA.[44] Again, it was reflected in the lack of any interrogation of James G. Patton, president of the National Farmers Union, whose record as a political actionist might have been expected to invite cross-examination.[45]

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[38] *Hearings*, pp. 1551–78.

[39] In the 68th to 75th Congresses, except for the 71st.

[40] *Hearings*, pp. 392–428. [41] *Hearings*, pp. 573–603.

[42] Consider this fine exchange:

Mr. Carey: There are no such things as "natural economic laws."
Senator Millikin: Who repealed those?
Mr. Carey: They never existed.
Senator Millikin: My God! That is astounding information.
Mr. Carey: In the first place, economic laws are a prostitution of the *aims of nature, whose first purpose* is to fill the needs of man . . . (*Hearings*, p. 576. Emphasis added).

[43] *Hearings*, p. 800. [44] *Hearings*, pp. 668–69.

One identification any congressman is likely to make is that with his former, or other, occupation. This is borne out in the lawyer-like conduct of the legislative hearing itself, with its cross-examinations and its concern for "the record." As Ernest Griffith has remarked, "The majority of congressmen were (and still are) lawyers, and, to a lawyer, truth emerges from a battle of protagonists."[46] But other occupations also are represented, and the label "lawyer" frequently covers a variety of activities. It is a virtue of the legislature that it is made up of "general" men, and it is natural that legislators should test what they hear against the commonsense of their own experience. The senators on this committee did so; Murdock, for example, talked to a livestock man about his own grass-fed steers, and Millikin remarked: "I am speaking somewhat categorically on this because I have had considerable experience in the oil business."[47] But this is not the same thing, quite, as identifying with an occupational group and perceiving facts in their frame of reference. That is what Capehart seemed to do. A farmer and manufacturer, Capehart had been in the Senate less than two years. He made reference to both of his other occupations, but it was clear that Capehart saw price control in his role as businessman. Over a quarter of a century of experience had conditioned him to trust a businessman's judgment and resent the bureaucrat's interference in the economy. As he put it himself (objecting to questions asked of a businessman): "My observation is that anyone that comes in here from an industry knows his business. They are the people who are trying to make things and do business under all the difficulties that confront them, and trying to be honest and sincere and conscientious, and in the hope that they will be permitted to remain in business. I think that to question their integrity and honesty . . ." To which Barkley replied, in part: "We had a witness here yesterday who questioned the sincerity and honesty and integrity of everybody in the Government and you didn't complain about that."[48] But Barkley, who first went to Congress in 1913, *had* complained the day before, as he did on every occasion when government officials were attacked indiscriminately.

That Senator Capehart continued to regard price control as a businessman would, so long as he remained a minority member of the Committee, is suggested by his writing in 1951 what President Truman called "the terrible Capehart amendment," which Truman said made price control impossible. But in 1953 Capehart assumed the new status of Chairman of the Banking and Currency Committee, and with it a new role requiring him to accept primary responsibility for the legislation reported by the Committee. In his new role he advocated stand-by controls for prices, wages, and rent. He found it hard to understand the intransigence of groups which were "unalterably opposed" to any concession to the principle of controls, and understandably shocked to hear himself accused by a business lobbyist of espousing a philosophy of the "left." It would be hard to find a more striking example of the effect of a change of status.[49]

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[45] *Hearings*, pp. 691–99.

[46] *Congress: Its Contemporary Role* (cited in note 7), p. 63.

[47] *Hearings*, pp. 1205, 1718. Millikin is an example of the lawyer in Congress: his biography in the *Congressional Directory* includes law, the army, and politics, but not the oil business.

[48] *Hearings*, p. 1316.

Senator Tobey appeared briefly from time to time in his peculiarly personal role of moral prophet. He was inclined to indict the whole people for lacking the moral fiber to resist the tainted opportunities afforded by the black market. In the tones of Jeremiah, later to become familiar to the television audience of Kefauver's crime investigation, he called upon the people "to rise up and say 'Unclean, unclean'."[50]

Some of the roles which might have been anticipated were not played by anybody. That of the dictatorial chairman, sure of his power, was one. That of the subject-matter expert, whose prestige in a given field is widely accepted (e.g., O'Mahoney on economic questions[51]), was another. The hectoring-inquisitor role was not played consistently by anybody.

The limitations upon what can be done in a study of behavior from the printed record alone have already been acknowledged. The pattern of interactions among the members can be studied fully only from first-hand observation. What does it mean in the climate of the hearing for a particular member to be present? Or absent? It can be seen from the record that questions, and sometimes tempers, tended to get shorter when Senator Taft was on hand. That is tantalizingly suggestive, but not enough. Who supports, who opposes, whom? Who retreats into silence from whom? Such questions can be answered only by the observer. The item in the record which might reveal significant interactions may be the very one which is subsequently edited from it.

It is hard to evaluate the role of leadership with any method, and especially so when reliance must be placed on the printed record. On the surface, it would appear that Senator Wagner had little control over his Committee in the price control controversy. The power of the committee chairman is justly celebrated in political journalism, but it may be that like so many other concentrations of power in the Congress, it can be used most effectively against a majority only in a negative way. The chairman can prevent committee consideration, prevent a report, prevent floor consideration, much more easily than he can command a balky majority to do something positive. When Congress passes legislation requiring periodic reenactment, as it does so often now, it must counteract to some extent the power of the few to control the many. Wagner was not able to get his way with this Committee. He refused to sign the report. Barkley signed it only to get it on the floor, making clear his opposition to it. What went on in the executive sessions, where the bill was amended heavily over the opposition of the chairman, obviously is not to be learned from the record, and perhaps not in any other way.

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[49] See Robert Bendiner in "The Apostasy of Homer Capehart," *The Reporter*, May 12, 1953, pp. 30–32, for an interesting description of the Senator's discomfiting experience.

[50] *Hearings*, p. 1673.

[51] See Earl Latham, *The Group Basis of Politics* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1952).

Some elaborate studies based on role theory have been made of complex organizations,[52] and the congressional committee would seem to be an inviting subject for such research. That much, at least, seems clear from the foregoing analysis; no generalizations about the committee are valid which do not take into account the varied and complex statuses which congressmen hold, and the shifting roles which they play in filling first one and then another of them. A congressional committee is an agency for the implementation of the purposes of congressmen. Functionally, it gives to bills the detailed consideration which the full house cannot, but in other ways it is simply another point of focus of the political process, as its parent house is also. It is a part of "the legislative struggle," to use Bertram Gross's term, but, as he indicates, the struggle is a confused one in which the participants fight for different and changing purposes and represent many and sometimes opposing causes. National and parochial ends are inextricably entwined in the Congress, and so they are in the committee. Taft, holding no elective party office in the Senate and sharing eighth rank in seniority with three others, nevertheless chooses the role of national leader for himself and effectively shapes the expectations of others to that role. The committee hearing is no more than a shift of scene for him. McFarland, soon to lead the Democrats in the Senate, chooses for reasons of his own to use this time and place to plead narrowly for the industries of his state. Therein lies the value of the committee hearing for the student of political behavior: within a more manageable compass, the congressmen behave like congressmen.

III. THE COMMITTEE AS A FACT-FINDING AGENCY

The Committee's performance as a fact-finding agency is worth special consideration. Quantitatively, at least, an impressive job was done. Nineteen days were consumed in public hearings, during which 12 public officials, 38 spokesmen of business and business groups, five representatives of organized labor, eight farm group leaders, and nine persons representing other groups—72 witnesses in all—testified before the Committee. The printed record ran to 2212 pages, including 541 exhibits, charts, statements, letters, and telegrams. Thousands of questions were asked and answered. Out of this welter of facts and opinions, what did the Committee learn about the problems of economic stabilization? What kinds of questions did its members ask? What picture of the factual situation emerged from the answers they got? In the light of the Committee's performance, what might be done to make legislative committees generally more effective as fact-finders?

These questions would be easier to answer if the Committee had ever formulated a set of questions to which the hearings should supply answers. That the

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[52] See Eugene Jacobson, W. W. Charters, Jr., and Seymour Lieberman, "The Use of the Role Concept in the Study of Complex Organizations," *The Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 7, pp. 18–27 (No. 3, 1951), and the publications of the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, which are listed there.

Committee did not do. Nevertheless there were questions which, because of their pertinence, were raised again and again, by the witnesses and by the senators themselves. For the purposes of this study, several of these recurring questions were traced carefully through the hearings, to see whether any or all of them could be answered, unambiguously, from the record. Careful attention was paid to the leading questions and gratuitous statements of the senators, to see what facts they accepted, and whether their conceptions of the "facts" ever changed. From this procedure there emerged, not one picture of the factual situation, but two. The senators who supported OPA accepted one, those who opposed OPA the other. Some sharpening of details in each picture doubtless occurred, but there was no indication of a change in the general picture for either group. Each group seemed to come into the hearings with a ready-made frame of reference. Facts which were compatible were fitted into it; facts which were not compatible, even when elaborately documented, were discounted, not perceived, or ignored. This is not so hard as it sounds. A disagreeable fact is not an isolated fact, but one of a constellation of facts. Which is the relevant one? And when statistics seem accurate beyond dispute, there is the question of selecting the relevant variable or the proper base period, or perhaps of whether there is not a serious contrary trend which began too late to be reflected in the figures. Thus contradictions need not be resolved, and in these hearings they were not resolved. The hearings could be said not to have progressed. At the end the same questions were being asked as at the beginning, and were receiving the same sets of answers.

There was not necessarily agreement within either group over what should be done about price controls. The *pro forma* claim that "I don't know how I'm going to vote on this matter" was made frequently, and most of the senators would say that price controls ultimately would be extended—with modifications. What divided them was that one group would accept statements of fact which put the OPA in a good light, and receive sympathetically the claims of groups which supported the OPA and the Administration. The other group would not. The first group was made up loosely of the Democrats Wagner, Mitchell, Barkley, Taylor, Fulbright, Murdock, and Radcliffe, and the Republican Tobey. The opposing group was composed of the Republicans Capehart, Millikin, Taft, Hickenlooper, Buck, and Butler, and the Democrat Bankhead. Other members of the Committee did not participate frequently enough to be placed with any confidence. The first group's conception of the facts was shared roughly with Administration spokesmen, labor representatives, the president of the National Farmers Union, and several other group representatives purporting to speak for the "liberal" or the consumer point of view. The second group listened most receptively to business spokesmen and the representatives of the other farm groups. These classifications are rough, of course, and should be taken that way. They are not meant to indicate anything approaching complete uniformity.

Some of these questions, and the ways in which the two groups answered them, may now be considered.

What was the "lesson" of World War I? The Administration clearly thought that the experience of World War I supported the extension of price controls. Every Administration witness mentioned, it, and charts were brought in to support their story.[53] Starting back in 1914, it ran, prices rose precipitously until some voluntary controls were partially successful in checking the rise in 1917–18. After a brief post-Armistice recession, with controls off, prices rose sharply again in 1919–20, causing a snowballing of demand and a hoarding of inventories, in anticipation of even higher prices. Ultimately a buyers' strike caused collapse; deflation and depression were the result of the unchecked spiral of prices. To these witnesses and their supporters the moral seemed clear: weakening the price control program in 1946 would bring the same disastrous results.

To the other side it was not clear at all. They doubted the relevance of the earlier experience to the problem at hand. Or they were impressed with the shortness of the periods of inflation and deflation in World War I. Taking the post-Armistice figures alone (which they frequently did), neither the climb nor the subsequent drop looked so bad. They pointed out that a "flood of goods" had eventually forced prices down, forgetting that prices had gone up three times as much as industrial production, and that the "flood of goods" had been released—not produced—by deflationary dumping. Even recollections of the period fell conveniently into place; Glen Taylor remembered it as a dreadful experience, Capehart as not bad at all.[54] Millikin was perhaps the most intransigent. He could see on the government's charts only one fact, that prices had gone down. The buyers' strike had prevented an "explosive inflation"—by which he meant not the 150 per cent increase the World War I charts showed, but the kind of runaway inflation the Germans had.[55]

What causes inflation? This question caused difficulty, because whenever it was discussed seriously it took the Committee quickly outside its jurisdictional field. Farm policy, fiscal policy, the wages of labor, and many other things not the Committee's business were involved in the stabilization program. But the question had to be raised. The Administration group saw the principal inflationary threats in the economic forces OPA sought to control. The pent-up demands from the war period, supported by 225 billions in purchasing power, exceeded the total current supply of goods. Production was at a record high level, despite labor shortages and the problems of reconversion, but it would take time to "fill the pipelines" from producer to consumer and meet the demand. In this interim period, price controls were imperative to prevent a disastrous spiral. These were the bed-rock economic facts, but this group suspected more. They believed that businessmen were hoarding inventories, thus aggravating the shortages, in order to make huge profits if price controls were removed. They also believed that speculation—"betting on inflation"—made the control job harder.

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[53] The statements used in this section were all selected because they were made many times. Therefore, no attempt will be made to document them except where a particular quotation is used by way of illustration. For a representative Administration statement of the World War I experience, see the testimony of John D. Small, head of the Civilian Production Administration, at pp. 1449–50.

[54] *Hearings*, pp. 206–7.

[55] *Hearings*, pp. 1585–86.

The charge of inventory-hoarding is a good example of the influence of group ideology on the perception of facts. It was made repeatedly by pro-OPA witnesses, and apparently believed implicitly. Yet when the opposing senators demanded proof, it was sometimes promised but never furnished. Paul Porter could report an incident he knew about, and surmise that the situation, whatever it was, would get worse as the date for the expiration of controls drew near.[56] A member of a CIO local told about finding a back room full of oil at a place where he had been told there was no oil.[57] That was the extent of the proof of inventory-hoarding, but the charge would not down; it was an essential element of the version of the facts held by OPA supporters. Their opponents, curiously enough, accepted inventory-hoarding as a fact sometimes, justifying it on the grounds that the hoarders could not make a profit under OPA, or that they hoped OPA would see "the light" and treat them fairly.

Anti-OPA witnesses and senators found the chief causes of inflation in the policies of OPA itself. OPA kept prices unrealistically low, forcing producers to concentrate on high price lines or inferior substitutes. By refusing to recognize rising costs of production, OPA impeded production. OPA propaganda and "scare talk" created an inflation psychology, leading to panic buying and hoarding. Other Administration policies, including the unbalanced budget and the loan to Britain, compounded the pressures on prices. So did the wage increases which the Administration permitted. To this group, wage increase always started an inflationary spiral, just as a price increase did for the pro-OPA group. Similarly, Taft would not agree with Bowles that repeal of the excess profits tax was inflationary, but he was sure the loan to Britain was.[58]

What has been the overall effect of price controls on the economy? OPA and its friends were sure that OPA had stabilized the economy and prevented inflation. Their charts showed it; the cost-of-living index had risen only about 30 per cent since 1939.[59] They claimed that the cost-of-living had risen only about 3½ per cent since price controls became effective in 1943, and had gone up only .7 per cent since V-J day. In this time, controls had prevented neither production nor profits. Everyone knew that production had been enormous, and the charts showed that it had risen at its wartime peak nearly 140 per cent over the 1939 level. Their opponents would contest it, but OPA was prepared to support the claim that business profits had been high, too. OPA believed that it had preserved economic stability and made planning possible.

Its opponents believed that the overall effect of OPA on the economy had been bad. Some were willing to accept it as a wartime necessity, and to make a grudging admission that it had done an acceptable, even a good job, if only its powers could be terminated soon. But others would not concede that it had done a good job. The kindest view was that it was not OPA's fault: the economy was too complex for controls, and besides, price controls could only treat effects, not causes. Some argued that inflation had been serious in spite of OPA (amounting to 32 per cent over 1941)[60] but generally the figures did not seem to matter much; they did not settle the question, as they might have been expected to do. Millikin said again and again that OPA never had held a line when there was real pressure on it, that the goods simply flowed into the black market and the price line became a "fiction." OPA had made it impossible for farmers, dry goods wholesalers, retail meat dealers (and others, explicitly and by inference) to operate legally. The government's figures actually demonstrated a chief vice of OPA: the agency concentrated on controlling the cost-of-living *index*, rather than encouraging production through incentive prices where needed. The bill of particulars against OPA was a long one; in addition to hampering production, penalizing the efficient producer, and diverting goods to the black market, OPA had used its consumer subsidy program to increase the demand for the limited supply of goods. The overall effect of OPA, they believed, had been to aggravate inflationary pressures.

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[56] *Hearings*, p. 198.
[57] *Hearings*, p. 608.
[58] *Hearings*, p. 39.
[59] *Hearings*, p. 1450.

What is the administrative record of OPA? The administrative performance of OPA was under continuous attack; the agency and its friends never got off the defensive. OPA was charged with handling appeals slowly, with issuing orders that were hard to understand, with tying up business with red tape. It was not improving, or if it were, it still was not good enough. OPA was inflexible; it handled individual firms with industry-wide orders, and refused to modify those orders. These criticisms were to be expected, but there were worse. The agency had "continuously and directly violated the Price Control Act,"[61] Taft said, and Goss, master of the Grange, was even more sweeping when he said: "For four years the OPA has thumbed its nose at Congress, has violated the basic law under which it was created, and has pursued an illegal but politically expedient course which has fed the fires of inflation and then tried to control the fire by stopping up the chimney."[62] Its "vicious propaganda" had created a "scare psychology" among buyers. OPA was accused especially of refusing to grant relief in hardship cases, as provided for by law, and of holding up production by maintaining inadequate ceiling prices which they had the power to raise. This line of criticism fell into a syllogism: every increase requested is necessary to production; any delay in granting it holds up production; therefore, OPA is responsible for critical shortages (e.g., in housing for veterans).[63] Since there was no question of the righteousness of every request for an increase, if OPA held one up a year it was only because of administrative ineptitude; the fact that it was granted ultimately proved it was right all the time, without regard to any change in circumstances which might have occurred.

Under this drum-fire of criticism, OPA was pushed into defending itself by citing the number of adjustments it had made and price increases it had allowed.[64] The agency officers contended they had a "realistic" approach to price control (i.e., one which allowed prices to go up). The ambivalence in their position was resolved by claiming that, while they had held the line against general inflation, they had granted adjustments to get production or relieve hardship. The Administration group was willing to admit mistakes, but insisted that OPA's procedures had been improved and made more than reasonably efficient. A detailed account of procedures employed to reduce delay in handling individual adjustment cases was placed in the record, with statistics demonstrating their effectiveness.[65] Breakdowns in production were traced to shortages in labor and materials, not to administrative delay. But the criticisms, needless to say, were not affected in the least.

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[60] *Hearings*, p. 866.
[61] *Hearings*, p. 1243.
[62] *Hearings*, p. 674.
[63] *Hearings*, pp. 301–4.
[64] *Hearings*. See, for example, pp. 82, 155–56, 159–62, 783–84, 1580, 1727.

The influence of group ideology on fact perception was clearly reflected in the image of OPA as a human organization which each group held. The opponents of OPA saw the agency people as theorists, inexperienced in business, telling experienced businessmen what to do. The complaint that "OPA does not understand the underwear industry" (or the construction industry, or any other) was frequently heard, and doubtless it was true. As one OPA official put it, it was impossible to have an expert in every line. To a businessman involved in the unique particulars of his own business, the edicts of an agency which of necessity sought to generalize its rules were bound to seem amateurish and arbitrary. Thus the professor, whom the Congress had tried to legislate out of OPA, proved as a stereotype to be ineradicable. Consequently, the anti-OPA senators were prepared to accept assertions of industry representatives that inexperienced men were dictating terms to their particular industries. Detailed statements of the experience of men in those branches of OPA were of no avail.[66] The automobile dealers complained that there were no persons remaining in OPA who had experience in the retail automobile business; Porter listed four in the Automotive Branch, and the dealers carried the debate into the appendix of the record.[67] In answer to the lumbermen's charge, Porter listed 17 employees with a total experience in the lumber business of 400 years.[68] But Taft was sure that no retail lumberman knew anything about pricing for the industry. And so it went. That there was more involved than the legislator's stereotype of the bureaucrat is clear from the persistence with which the Administration senators defended the competence and experience of OPA administrators, whom they believed to be able and patriotic men who frequently were hired away from OPA by business.

What are the motives of OPA? The contrary images of OPA extended to the motives imputed to the administrators themselves. Their opponents saw them as enemies of capitalism, who hated profits, liked controls for their own sake, and wanted to perpetuate their own jobs. "Last year, this year, next year, the year after" was heard again and again, summing up the anti-OPA belief that

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[65] *Hearings*, pp. 138–45.

[66] See the list of OPA personnel connected with pricing of textile industries, *Hearings*, pp. 118–25.

[67] *Hearings*, pp. 1272, 1760, 1874–76.

[68] *Hearings*, p. 1713.

OPA would always ask for extension of its regulatory powers. The statements were bitter. Bowles was compared to Hitler and Mussolini, without rebuke from anti-OPA senators. OPA officials belonged to that "school of thought that believes that the wholesaler, jobber, and distributor are excrescences on the body politic." Again, " . . . the fundamental philosophy of OPA is the abolition of profits, the regulation of profits, and the stifling of private enterprise." The kindest construction put on their motives was that they were "a group of very sincere, honest young people that want to reshape the world nearer to their heart's desire . . . but they seem to disregard the effect of these regulations on legitimate established business."[69] Given this image of OPA, it was easy to believe in specific acts of duplicity and abuses of power. When a price increase was granted an industry the day before its spokesman appeared before the Committee, Capehart was sure the timing was deliberate. The OPA contention that at least two months were required to clear a price order did not move him (although usually he would accept the argument that OPA could do nothing in a hurry).[70] OPA was charged with allowing a rental 50 per cent above ceilings on some new apartment buildings in New York, just to prevent apartment owners from claiming there was no new building under OPA.[71]

OPA's own statements of its policies and practices obviously would not be acceptable to senators who saw them in this light. Porter stated the decontrol policy of OPA this way: " . . . if we can find that there is a reasonable prospect that there will not be inflationary increases to the extent that would jeopardize the general policy of stabilization, we can take [price control] off." But Millikin was sure that if OPA should take "a long look through the future and if you see some little dislocation ahead that might interfere with prices, you are not going to decontrol."[72] Some of the senators favored writing a rigid decontrol formula into the law, on the ground that OPA could not be trusted to decontrol otherwise. Perhaps the blackest picture of OPA was painted by Millikin in grilling the OPA deputy administrator for enforcement. Millikin insisted that OPA set quotas for its enforcement officers, smeared innocent business men and set traps for them with sweeping injunctions, and forced federal judges to render judments they knew to be unjust. Murdock finally was moved to protest that OPA did not write the law, nor confirm the federal judges, and "that if you go to the length that Senator Millikin wants you to, we must assume that we have a fool on the bench as well as a rather vicious fool in the OPA Enforcement Section."[73]

The Administration group could see no justification for impugning the motives of OPA officials. As they saw it, "they are all down here on loan from business enterprises and at a financial sacrifice, most of them, and they are anxious to get back."[74] OPA administrators were selfless, patriotic men, who believed in the profit system and allowed for profits in their pricing, and who were motivated by a desire to save the business system from the evil effects of an inflationary spiral.

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[69] *Hearings*, pp. 1185–86, 1356, 971, 1356. See p. 971 particularly for the contrast in the images of OPA held by the president of the National Apartment Owners' Association and by Senator Glen Taylor.

[70] *Hearings*, pp. 1311, 1319.

[71] *Hearings*, p. 1492.

[72] *Hearings*, p. 1718.

[73] *Hearings*, p. 1691. This remarkable cross-examination is worth a complete reading. See pp. 1663–1705.

How has labor fared in the postwar economy? If one question were wanted, of all those asked in the hearings, to provide an index to the whole constellation of facts accepted as true and relevant by the person answering, this one probably would serve as well as any other. The result would turn on whether the answer mentioned hourly wage rates, which generally were up, or take-home pay, which generally was down.[75] This is another way of saying that the two groups divided sharply on their attitudes toward organized labor. The pro-OPA group, senators and witnesses (including the consumer groups and the Farmers Union), was sympathetic toward it; the other was not. One brief exchange perhaps will serve to illustrate. Ed O'Neal, president of the American Farm Bureau Federation, presented a series of elaborate tables designed to show, generally, that the earnings of labor had advanced much faster than the cost-of-living, and that conversely the cost of food had advanced relatively very little.[76] Senator Mitchell pointed out that the NAM compilation showed the cost of food and the price of farm products as having gone up more than the AFBF figures did. Replied O'Neal: " . . . We farmers are getting awfully tired of the *workingmen in America* and a lot of *propagandists in the administration* blaming the farmer. We are all pretty mad about it." To which Mitchell countered: "How about the National Association of Manufacturers? Their compilation shows that the farmer is getting more out of the increase, a greater increase, than anybody else." But Mitchell could not make O'Neal criticize the NAM.[77]

Obviously, hourly wages and take-home pay are two aspects of the same thing, and both were relevant to the Committee's problem. Hourly wages are part of the cost of production and affect the price at which a producer can sell. Take-home pay is what the worker relates to the cost-of-living; together they determine whether he makes ends meet. But both groups were reluctant in the extreme to consider both factors. Taft, for instance, wanted the AFL to put in the record "a figure on the increase in *straight-time hourly earnings* since before the war." Green did not have those figures, but "I have a few figures here," he said—all showing declining earnings *since VE-day*. Taft did not want postwar figures; he wanted a simple comparison of the increase of the cost-of-living and of straight-time hourly earnings since January 1, 1940, which he believed would show that labor had done very well. Needless to say, when the figures were submitted he got a great deal more than that, but never precisely that, and the showing did not come out his way at all.[78]

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[74] *Hearings*, p. 971.

[75] See the colloquy of Taft and Bowles, *Hearings*, p. 58.

[76] *Hearings*, pp. 654–65. Significantly, the only group chosen for comparative purposes is labor.

[77] *Hearings*, p. 667. Emphasis added. Contrast the attack on NAM by James Patton, president of the Farmers Union, pp. 694–98.

The cleavage on facts related to labor never was closed. Earlier in the year a wage increase had been granted to steel-workers, followed by an increase in the price of steel. These related facts were neatly divided in the testimony; neither side willingly talked about both. To one, the wage increase meant that the government had abandoned wage controls; to the other, the "$250,000,000 bribe to the steel industry" was a hard blow at stabilization. Goss and O'Neal, like the businessmen, stressed the wage increase; Patton and Carolyn Ware (speaking for the consumer) said that their organizations had protested the price increase. One group saw labor's preferred position relative to other groups continuously being improved by a sympathetic Administration which allowed wages to rise unchecked and forced businesses to absorb increased costs without price relief. The other saw disadvantaged labor striving to meet increased costs *of living with diminished take-home pay, and forced to bargain with businesses* which could recoup strike losses from tax returns.

Other questions. Many other questions showed the same division as to what the facts were; a few, briefly treated, will have to suffice.

One of the cliches accepted by everybody was that production was the only thing that would solve the problem of inflation. What, then, was the level of production at the time of the hearings? The Administration group offered figures many times to show that production was at the highest level in our history, that only the pent-up demand of a population loaded with purchasing power made it insufficient.[79] This made the problem simply one of what to do about prices until the excess of demand could be satisfied. Higher prices, they were sure, would not increase production, when the real bottlenecks were shortages of labor and materials. There was no indication that the figures ever convinced anybody. "How do you get production?," remained the crucial question for the opponents of OPA. Even the everyday experiences of the protagonists seemed to be affected by what they thought to be true. Senator Taylor found the evidences of production in the stores; he had found tools he wanted with no trouble. A representative of the National Retail Associations, on the other hand, could not buy a little hatchet, search as he would.[80]

A related question concerned the profits of business. In an economy of hundreds of thousands of businesses, it may be doubted whether aggregates or averages could mean much; but the profits of business were part of the picture and a try had to be made. Some elaborate statistics were presented, but the Committee never really got beyond the question of how profits should be computed. Profits before, or after, taxes? Figured as a percentage of net worth, or net sales? Bowles' figures were based on net worth; Taft countered with tables showing the percentage of national income paid out to various types of recipients between 1929 and 1945, and corporate profits before and after taxes as a percentage of national income for the same period.[81] Similar difficulty was had with a question of business practice. One of the House amendments would require OPA to set a ceiling price for every product which would allow the cost of the product plus a reasonable profit for both producer and distributor. OPA argued that most industries make a variety of products, some of which make high, others low profits and still others no profit at all. What mattered to the industry was its overall profit. OPA supporters could and did buttress, with personal experience, their contention that no businessman expected to make a profit on every item. But their opponents had had contrary experience in business; they were equally sure no businessman ever willingly lost money on anything.[82]

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[78] *Hearings*, pp. 787–93. Emphasis added.

[79] *Hearings*, pp. 870–71, 1449–51, 1461–62, 1708–9.

[80] *Hearings*, p. 867.

A question with which the public was concerned in 1946 was what had happened to meat, and what should be done to get more of it. The question was extensively discussed in the hearings, by the persons best qualified to give the answers. The several levels of the meat industry all wanted price ceilings removed. They quoted Department of Agriculture figures to show a great supply of cattle, enough to meet demand, and needing to be reduced. They argued that legitimate packers had trouble getting steers because they had been diverted to small black-market operators, who wasted valuable by-products as well as overcharging the public. They estimated that the removal of controls would send prices up 15–20 per cent (again based on Agriculture figures), which was about what they thought people were currently paying in the black market. With decontrol, the industry people believed, meat would flow into legitimate channels, probably forcing prices down. If meat were not decontrolled now there never would be a better time.

The experts in OPA, and their friends on the Committee, thought the black market in meat and the wastage of by-products had been greatly exaggerated. They recognized that there had been diversion of meat into the black market, but they pointed out that a new control order put into effect on May 1 had within a week increased the volume of inspected slaughter cattle by 12 per cent to a figure only one per cent below the volume for the same time in 1945. They believed, therefore, that the problem was being solved. Some of them questioned the Agriculture Department's figures; they did not believe there was enough meat. But Patton and the CIO packinghouse workers both thought the "shortage" was deliberately engineered by the large packers.[83] They were sure that the removal of ceilings would send prices up at least 50 per cent, wreck other food controls, and end stabilization. It would be better to decontrol later, when a larger supply of durables and consumer goods would drain off purchasing power and relieve the pressure on foods.

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[81] *Hearings*, p. 42. Perhaps the most remarkable piece of statistical gymnastics was performed by James Carey, CIO, who put corporate profits during the war years at 52 billion dollars (before or after taxes?). Although he stated that 25.9 billions had been paid to stockholders, he then said: "For every dollar of these unused reserves [sic] it means one hour of unemployment for some American worker. In other words, $52,000,000,000 means 52,000,000,000 man-hours of unemployment" (p. 585).

[82] For representative examples of these exchanges, see *Hearings*, pp. 47–48, 286, 807, 987, 1589–90, 1623–25.

[83] Resolution of United Packinghouse Workers of America, CIO, *Hearings*, pp. 641–44; testimony of James Patton, pp. 698–99.

The disagreement extended even to small and ascertainable facts. What is the most efficient use of grain? Fulbright asserted that "a pound of wheat, used in bread, will produce about 2,400,000 calories, and if it is fed to a beef cow it will produce only a little over 200,000 calories." To which Hickenlooper replied: " . . . I am quite certain that the statistics show in every study that has ever been made of ultimate food values that human beings get more definite, substantial value out of grain fed through meat animals than they do from the grain itself. That is they get more proteins and more vitamins. . . . "[84] Like the large contradictions, this small one remained unresolved.

Many facts, of course, have handles on both ends. Wason, of NAM, for instance, produced newspaper advertisements to show that grocery prices had gone up more than Bowles claimed. This might seem to prove that Bowles had lied and that OPA had failed to control grocery prices, or it could show that the grocers had no reason to complain of OPA.[85] When a CIO member recited high prices he had to pay, it might demonstrate, as he thought, the laborer's need for continued protection; but perhaps it was unwitting testimony to OPA's ineffectiveness.[86] Or take the question of the level of production of any commodity. If it were conceded to be low, and not equal to demand, it could be said to prove that price control was needed until production could meet the demand, or, contrarily, that control should be abolished in order to get production. If it were conceded to be high, it might prove that production and profits could be gotten under price control, or that control could now be abolished with safety.

IV. INFLUENCE OF GROUP IDEOLOGY ON FACT PERCEPTION

What has been argued in the preceding section is that the Committee and its witnesses were made up of two loose groups of people who disagreed, not so much in their opinions upon what should be done about a known or ascertainable fact situation, as upon what the underlying facts themselves were. As advocates, neither side could afford to accept the other's conception of the facts, for that would be to concede the battle; policy is rooted in the assessment of the situation. But if common experience can be trusted, the people on both sides believed in good faith that they were stating *the* facts, and from this flowed the sincerity and even passion with which they seemed to talk. As Walter Lippmann put it, "a public opinion is a moralized and codified version of the facts."[87] The interest group orientation furnished the pattern of preconceptions through which the facts were screened. It was easy for one side to see an entrenched bureaucracy meddling with a free economy, for the other to see a democratic government protecting the helpless from exploitation. After that it was just a matter of filling in the details.

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[84] *Hearings*, pp. 1209–10.

[85] *Hearings*, pp. 395–402.

[86] *Hearings*, pp. 604–9.

[87] *Public Opinion* (New York, 1922), p. 125.

There is, to be sure, nothing new in this conception. It is at least as old as Plato, who expressed it with moving beauty in his allegory of the cave.[88] But it has a relevance for a theory of the group process in politics that has not been sufficiently appreciated. In the price control controversy (and surely in others like it) the senators were not sitting as arbiters of the group struggle, but as participants; it flowed through them. But it was not perceived so clearly and simply as that by those in the struggle. It is generally accepted that there are many opinions, but not that there are many versions of the facts—or at least, not that there is no single *true* one. This is the crucial problem of communication between social groups, as it is, to a greater degree, of intercultural communication. Given its own version of the facts, and believing it to be the only true one, each side could fight for the general interest and impute bad motives to its opponents in all sincerity. In this sense the Committee *was* concerned with promoting the general interest, but so were most of the spokesmen of special interests who appeared before it. Social conflict over group interests, clearly perceived and rightly identified, should be easy to mediate; a rough appraisal of the balance of power and frank bargaining should be enough. It is the quantum of concern for the general interest in every calculation that makes the trouble.

It should be emphasized that the price control question was highly political, with a long history. The kinds of information committee members would want, the kinds of facts they would be able to perceive, their willingness to accept relatively objective data, surely would vary with the kind of question under consideration. Nevertheless, the conception of the social nature of fact perception should be useful to political science. In regard to policy, it suggests one of the limits to the usefulness of uncommitted social intelligence to the politician. In regard to research, perception of the fact situation surely is one of the crucial variables, both in the group struggle which is the political process, and in the behavior of the individual actors in it.[89] Conversely, the perception of the fact situation by public officials might provide a useful index to their group orientations.

V. CONCLUSION

This study began with two sets of generalizations, one of which suggested that committee members sit as judges representing the general interest presiding over the public debate of the special interests; the other suggested that committee members themselves are participants in the struggle of contending groups, one phase of which is the public hearing. The analysis of the hearings conducted in 1946 by the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on the question of extending price control would seem to support the latter. The members of this Committee did not sit as legislative judges to discover an abstract general interest, nor did they seem concerned with presenting a balanced debate for public consideration. On the contrary, most of them did take sides. The Committee hearings clearly were used as a public platform for opposing groups with which the senators identified. A great deal of information was received from interested groups, which the senators accepted or rejected in accordance with their preconceived notions of the facts. What was made perfectly clear was that the groups opposing price control were more numerous and more militant than the groups supporting it. This was, of course, crucial information. The remark of Kefauver and Levin (in urging professional staff for committees), that "Congress cannot function today without lobbyists,"[90] will always be true, for only the lobbyists can tell what their groups will fight for and how hard they will fight. It is reasonable to suppose that some social catharsis was provided by the institutionalized conflict, as Professor Truman suggested, but there was no way to tell in this study.

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[88] This was the central idea of Lippmann's *Public Opinion.* See especially Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York, 1951), and Ralph K. Merton's essay, "The Sociology of Knowledge," in *Twentieth Century Sociology,* eds. G. Gurvitch and W. E. Moore (New York, 1945).

[89] See the distinction between process and behavior made by David Easton in *The Political System* (New York, 1953), pp. 203–6.

But this is not to be taken to mean that Professor Chamberlain's generalizations are wrong. What is suggested rather is that members of the Committee behaved in a variety of ways, depending upon the roles they chose to play. It seems indeed unlikely that we have exhausted the repertory of committee roles; quite the contrary. In hearings on a different issue, under other circumstances, some or all of the members surely might choose the judicial role, some or all of the time. The number and range of roles permitted by the norms of a given committee, the variations in what is acceptable which may exist between committees, are matters for further research.

Other questions should be asked. Why does a legislator choose a particular role, and not another? What is the effect of the subject matter of the hearing upon role selection? Upon the perception of facts, and the willingness of committee members to accept relatively objective data? The records of hearings of congressional committees, readily accessible in embarrassing abundance, can be used extensively to formulate hypotheses based on these and other questions, which might then be tested in more intensive research. State legislatures, which seldom keep verbatim records of committee hearings, nevertheless multiply the opportunities for studies involving close observation, interviews, and other techniques in the arsenal of behavior research. It should not be too much to hope that ultimately some general propositions might be fashioned which would contribute to a viable theory of politics.

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[90] *A Twentieth Century Congress* (cited in note 7), p. 156.

THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE BRITISH NATIONALIZED INDUSTRIES*

ELDON L. JOHNSON
University of Oregon

Great Britain's giant nationalized industries pose unprecedented problems for a free nation. Are the old governmental forms appropriate? Can the new forms be held accountable to the public? Can public accountability and business efficiency be reconciled? The five key industries, formed out of thousands of former enterprises, employ almost two million workers—almost three times the number of civil servants.[1] Even the strictly "business" problems are unprecedented. In personnel, the transport industry is double the size of American Telephone and Telegraph. Coal is three times the size of General Motors. Admitting that the final answers on accountability had not been found, Herbert Morrison, then Lord President of the Council, well stated the prevailing British attitude: "We are in the early years of novel constitutional and social experiments of great long-term significance, and we can be certain that as experience grows the methods which are in use at present will need to be modified and additional methods will be evolved."[2]

The problem of public accountability, already challenging because of the new subject matter, commercial enterprise, is greatly accentuated by the organizational form chosen for nationalization: the public corporation. The "public corporation," a combination of the governmental adjective and the business noun, spins restlessly between the worlds of government and business. It evolved from a fear of governmental power on the one hand and business irresponsibility on the other; or, conversely, from the attraction of the independent initiative of private business and the dependent accountability of public government. It understandably became the common denominator, the point of compromise, between the contending political forces which molded the nationalization of Britain's basic industries. The mere removal of the profit motive, some people thought, would enable an equilibrium of accountability to be established short of the full-fledged departmental type of organization.

While the public corporation was going into eclipse in the United States, it was emerging in Great Britain to shine with unprecedented brightness on socialism's brave new world. What the skeptical Congress was trussing up, compara-

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[1] J. H. Smith and T. E. Chester, "The Distribution of Power in Nationalized Industries," *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 2, pp. 275–93, at pp. 275–76 (Dec., 1951).

[2] "Mr. Morrison's Views on Public Accountability," *Public Administration*, Vol. 28, pp. 176–78, at p. 176 (Autumn, 1950).

tively speaking, in the Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, the optimistic Parliament was unshackling for unparalleled extensions of the public's business. It is true that the new British public corporations are held accountable in ways unknown in the prewar prototypes and that, therefore, both the United States and Great Britain have moved toward *more* control. It is significant, however, that the "more" is much less in Great Britain, where the new pattern is still the "pure" and "authentic" type of public corporation. The board form of government is used exclusively; the function is invariably business; and independence is great, with self-sufficiency the goal. It is paradoxical that the private business form which built Western capitalism has become the public form which is making socialist Britain—and making it when America, at least, seems to be less and less certain of the merits of the new mutation. In contrast, Professor William A. Robson of the London School of Economics and Political Science confidently predicts that this "most important constitutional innovation which has been worked out in Great Britain during the past 50 years" will "play as important a part in the field of nationalized industry in the twentieth century as the privately owned corporation played in the realm of capitalist organization in the nineteenth century."[3]

No thoughtful Englishman assumed that public ownership automatically guaranteed public accountability. It was taken for granted that something else, something special, needed to be done under socialism to assure sufficient accountability for a democracy so greatly changed in its responsibilities, yet the corporate form of the enterprises interposed special obstacles. Something special, in fact several things special, were done by the Labour government and Parliament—whether successfully or not is, of course, a matter of debate. Parliament is still deeply involved in the search for improvement. Some old controls were unchanged, some readapted; some new controls were added. Electoral and judicial controls remain unchanged. Relations with ministers and Parliament were recast into a new balance. Consumers' councils, joint consultation, and systematic annual reporting were introduced as new devices. These taken together constitute the public accountability mechanism for the new titans of public industry, accorded the freedom of businesses but checked by the control of government—molded neither in the cast of the autonomous government corporation, such as the British Broadcasting Corporation, nor in the cast of the regular government department, such as the Post Office. The BBC plan was too independent in the controversial phase of nationalization and the Post Office plan was too rigid, too subject to day-to-day interference both by minister and by Parliament, for creative business enterprise. Therefore, the nationalized industries were placed in a new in-between relationship with Parliament. Each was made flexible by being created a semi-independent corporation and each was made accountable by being placed under the general surveillance of a minister who could issue directions on general policy without answering to Parliament for day-to-day operations. This, as so often in politics, strikes a necessary but precarious balance, with a constant interplay of forces consciously or unconsciously threatening the equilibrium. The results of the experiment are worthy of the attention of partisans of democracy the world round.

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[3] *Problems of Nationalized Industry*, ed. William A. Robson (London, 1952), p. 53.

I. MINISTERIAL CONTROL

Proper responsibility to Parliament is the ultimate key to public accountability itself. But the relation to Parliament, as evolved, was through the minister, who, in addition to his appointive power over the industry boards, alone was given the power to make decisions binding on the industries. He in a real sense picked up the equity interest which passed from the shareholder to the general public.[4] Ministerial control, therefore, calls for attention first.

The great nationalized industries, in comparison with the prewar public corporations, are of the "public corporations, strong minister type," with less financial independence and more ministerial influence.[5] They are less free, more controlled. When public ownership was enormously extended, the bonds of accountability were tightened up. In his relations with the industry board, the minister was given several significant powers: appointment of members; issuance of general directions on matters appearing to him to affect the national interest, with its corollary of informal consultation on policy; veto or approval power over specific matters, especially involving finance and development; and solicitation of information.[6] The purpose is clearly to make the minister statutorially responsible for the general policy of the corporations but to leave the boards responsible for day-to-day administration.

The minister's control over the composition of the directing boards is great, almost complete if he cares to exercise it. He sets the tenure and conditions of appointment, either by private instrument of appointment or by a regulation laid before Parliament. Even the latter, public method ordinarily provides for appointments to be "for such term not exceeding five years as may be determined by the Minister before appointment of such member or, with his consent, *at any time.*"[7] In other words, the ministers may find, and have found, means of removing board members at will, even without stating reasons, although the statutes clearly contemplate removal for specific reasons, such as ill health, misconduct, or absence from meetings. In practice, however, removals for political or other capricious reasons are rare. The Conservative government made no effort to change boards upon entering office in 1951.

One of the techniques of accountability is found in the basis of representation on the boards. In making appointments, the minister is not confined to any pattern of sectional representation. Even the special qualifications for members set forth in the laws leave the application of the standards to the minister's judgment. But most important of all, the board member represents the general public; whatever his origins, he may not directly represent labor or management. He may have been chosen precisely because he was a corporation director or a union officer, but, after appointment, he must sell his shares or give up his office. This is in sharp contrast with the French effort to get direct trade-union representation on some boards. The British have deliberately chosen the broadest possible representation, to assure better accountability. Needless to say, theory sometimes breaks down in practice, although even the theory recognizes, and duly considers, that earlier connections may still affect official judgments. A top official in one of Great Britain's largest trade unions, speaking of a union colleague now on one of the national boards, assured the author with obvious relish in 1951: "He can always be depended upon; he knows why he is there!"

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[4] Frank Milligan, "Ministerial Control of the British Nationalized Industries," *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, Vol. 17, pp. 164–83, at p. 164 (May, 1951).

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] Charles Winter, "Parliamentary, Ministerial and Judicial Control of Nationalized Industries in Great Britain," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, Vol. 16, pp. 670–701, at pp. 684–90 (Autumn, 1951).

[7] Quoted in Robson, *op. cit.*, p. 36; italics added.

The crux of ministerial control, at least in its potentialities, is the power of giving directions of a general character on the performance of the corporations in matters appearing to the minister to affect the national interest. It should be noted that the variables—the generality of the directions and the involvement of the national interest—greatly enhance ministerial discretion. This is a far cry from the clear line of demarcation which the Conservatives originally wanted drawn between the boards and the minister, as indeed the Labour members themselves advocated for the prewar corporations. The Labour government chose for its nationalizing instrument devices which would, in its words, *keep the public monopolies from exercising power inimical to the public interest*. The minister was given the power—and a most important power it is—to see that national and social policy transcend commercial policy if necessary.[8]

Despite Conservative cries of dictatorial powers, this new weapon has been, chiefly, a stick behind the door. The ministers have the instruments of accountability at hand, but they have exercised them so cautiously that the critics have turned from cries of tyranny to complaints that the ministers are too timid. For the first six years no general directions were given the industries at all. Only one has been issued to date. In actual practice, the ministers deal with the boards on what Herbert Morrison once called the "old boy" basis: through informal relationships, telephone conversations, and unrecorded meetings. They consult and influence; they almost never order.[9] They have repeatedly resisted Parliamentary pressure to intervene and have avoided the use of general directions, preferring informal influence, even when the minister himself wanted specific action taken.[10] The Labour Minister of Fuel and Power *asked* the Area Electricity Boards to put into effect the highly controversial Clow Committee plan for seasonal variations in rates, but he did not *direct* them.[11] Indicative of the efficacy of this informal influence, the boards complied with the ministerial preference, against their own judgment, rather than be formally directed. Ministers have often made clear that they are "in constant touch" with corporation officials, that they meet with the board chairmen when necessary, and that correspondence and conversations are strictly confidential.[12] The Conservative government, in the recent railway fares controversy, asked patience for "working out an arrangement harmoniously" with the British Transport Commission to "obviate the necessity of further direction."[13] This illustrates the informal means to avoid a distasteful end.

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[8] Milligan, *op. cit.*, pp. 168–69.

[9] Acton Society Trust, *The Power of the Minister* (Claygate, 1951), pp. 6–7.

[10] See cases cited by Winter, *op. cit.*, pp. 684–86.

[11] 457 *House of Commons Debates*, Nov. 4, 1948, written answers, col. 128.

As a result of these practices, accountability procedures are gradually being driven underground in a manner not foreseen when the statutes were passed. Even sympathetic critics are beginning to feel that the ministers are finding means of circumventing Parliamentary scrutiny of their actions concerning the nationalized industries. As Ernest Davies, M.P., has said: "They may refuse to answer at the despatch box for the influence they exercise over the dinner table."[14] They answer only for that for which they are responsible. By not using the directional power, they escape having to answer. The boards are willing to collaborate because they want to preserve their independence, and they look upon directions as evidences of failure. Directions must be published in the annual reports; informal influences are recorded nowhere. As a result, "this Damocles sword swings above the Board table and need not fall to be effective."[15] After the boards have yielded to influence in this manner, the minister feels he must defend the board when attacked. Before Parliament, therefore, he may be speaking secretly as judge in his own case. Such informal integration, with formal compulsion reserved for rare occasions, has much to be said for it, however. It places less strain on the minister-board relationships, better preserves board independence, and is likely to lead to more actual policy integration in the long run. The risks do not appear excessive: the minister is, of course, a member of the government in power. Whenever the board thinks the issue is fundamental enough to make the minister face Parliament on the question, it has only to resist informal agreement and force the issuance of a formal order. This struggle for balance between compulsion and persuasion is another manifestation of the central accountability problem—the reconciliation of two apparently inconsistent principles: commercial independence and integration with national policy, social and economic.[16]

After six years of demonstration that ministerial guidance, if exercised at all, could be exercised through the mere knowledge of the possible use of the power to issue directions, the Conservative government in April, 1952 dramatically broke the reserve-power, remote-control tradition. The Minister of Transport directed the British Transport Commission to suspend its proposed new charges scheme intended to become effective May 1 on railways outside London. This was the first time a minister had used the full power given him by the nationalization statutes. Political bedlam broke loose. The Conservatives defended the use of the weapon they professed so greatly to fear in earlier days. The Labour members attacked the use of the clause they themselves inserted in the statutes. One side hailed the defense of the traveling public as a courageous blow for a stable national economy; the other side called it a cheap political trick, a threat to board autonomy, and a preposterous move to set railway fares in Parliament itself.

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[12] 452 *H. C. Deb.*, June 17, 1948, col. 643.

[13] 499 *H. C. Deb.*, April 28, 1952, col. 1037.

[14] Ernest Davies, "Ministerial Control and Parliamentary Responsibility of Nationalized Industries," in Problems of Nationalized Industry (cited in n. 3), p. 114.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 111.

[16] Herbert Morrison, "Public Control of the Socialised Industries," *Public Administration*, Vol. 28, pp. 3–9, at pp. 4–5 (Spring, 1950).

When the Passenger Charges Scheme proposed by the British Transport Commission became a volatile subject in Parliament, a month before the jarring direction was issued, the Minister of Transport showed great reluctance to use the powers the Labour members kept calling to his attention. In fact when asked to employ the general directional power under Section 4 of the Transport Act of 1947, he finally said: "I am advised it would not be proper for me to issue directions such as those to which my hon. and gallant Friend refers."[17] But in less than a month he reversed himself and issued the direction. Prime Minister Churchill made a statement to the House of Commons and set aside a full day for debate on this question requiring the "urgent attention of Parliament."[18] The real reason for the reversal of the Minister's judgment is not likely to be known. Herbert Morrison insisted that only the Conservative losses in the county council elections had intervened.[19] The government contended that the Minister's earlier denial of power referred only to the normal operations of the act, not to its "overriding power."[20] Still another interpretation arose from the statement of the Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Transport, who said the debate showed agreement on something wrong with the Transport Act of 1947, against the consequences of which the government had acted wisely.[21] This clearly was paving the way for the denationalization battle ahead for road haulage.

But whatever the reasons for the direction, the ensuing debate threw a searchlight on this instrument of public control. Who was now responsible? Clearly not the British Transport Commission, whose charges scheme had been set aside. The former Minister of Transport under the Labour government said the direction meant the "overthrow of one of our greatest public servants, Lord Hurcomb," Chairman of the British Transport Commission.[22] Was, then, the Minister of Transport to be responsible for fares hereafter? The Prime Minister said no, the existing powers of the Minister suffice to protect the public. Was the Prime Minister himself to be responsible? Mr. Morrison said: "The Prime Minister himself brusquely overrode the Minister of Transport and ordered him," with or without Cabinet decision, to issue what the Minister "would never have dreamed of issuing."[23]

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[17] 497 *H. C. Deb.*, March 17, 1952, col. 1916; see also March 10, cols. 1016–19.

[18] 499 *H. C. Deb.*, April 21, 1952, col. 38.

[19] *Ibid.*, col. 39; April 28, 1952, col. 1049.

[20] *Ibid.*, April 28, 1952, col. 1035.

[21] *Ibid.*, cols. 1163–64.

[22] *Ibid.*, col. 1080.

The unhappiness of the Labour members was worsened by this almost ironical demonstration of the two-edged character of the directional power which they themselves gave the minister over the nationalized industries. The Labour party's efforts to show wherein the direction exceeded the letter or spirit of the statutes proved feeble and futile. Yet the party could not oppose the Parliamentary motion to uphold the Minister's direction against the railway fares without being in the untenable position of showing less interest in low fares than the Tories. This prompted Mr. Morrison to observe sagely that competition for public good will on small matters such as fares could create an unwholesome "political Dutch auction" in Parliament, with everyone trying to outdo the others on "I got this, that and the other for you."[24] The use of the directional power of the minister to enforce conformity to overriding national policy was also proved a weapon not monopolized by the national planners: at least two Conservatives were jubilant over the Minister's direction because, as they said, "there are certain social considerations" and the boards "are not able to see the whole economic position of the country."[25]

As could have been predicted, the first exercise of the dormant directional power also prompted someone to advocate going all the way, returning to the Post Office system of direct responsibility.[26] What the long-range effects of this precedent will be, no one can foretell: whether the directional power will be more commonly used to keep minister-board relations out in the open, subject to Parliamentary debate, or whether it will be shunned as the cause of avoidable political headaches.

Prediction is clouded by the Conservative government's choice of an unfortunate time and subject for a test case. The proximity to the county council elections raised unnecessary political suspicions. Furthermore, among the decisions of the nationalized industries, the setting of railway fares is least likely to be subject to abuse: they must be approved after extensive hearings by the quasi-judicial Transport Tribunal. The merits of the use of this reserve power are, in some respects, therefore, more uncertain than ever. The power of general direction remains, nonetheless, the chief means by which the minister can exert influence over the boards, choosing his own preferred balance on the scale between persuasion and compulsion.

Another important ministerial power is that of the veto, or approval power, over a variety of specific board actions: the framing of programs of reorganization and development calling for large capital outlay; schemes for training, education, and research; form of accounts; and, with Treasury approval, the issuance of new stock. With Treasury approval, the minister may also give directions on the creation and management of reserve funds, redemption of stock, and disposal of surplus revenue. Other special powers are conferred by statutes for particular industries; for example, he may direct the British Transport Commission to discontinue any of its activities or dispose of any part of its business.[27] In these ways the minister may determine the broad lines along which the boards are to proceed in vital matters of internal administration. These powers, for example, enabled the Minister of Supply, pending denationalization, to direct the Iron and Steel Corporation not to alter its financial structure or management.[28] Specific directions on financial matters, unlike general directions, have been issued by ministers on many occasions. In other words, the minister does have a great deal of financial control, although it is chiefly of an approval rather than initiatory character.

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[23] *Ibid.*, col. 1049. [24] *Ibid.*, col. 1056.

[25] See remarks of Messrs. McAdden and Harris, *ibid.*, cols. 1103, 1113.

[26] Norman Cole, *ibid.*, cols. 1091–92.

To implement his other powers, the minister may also require information from the corporations. This may, in general, be designed to serve the minister's own official purposes, to aid Parliament, or to prescribe the form of the annual reports.

II. PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL

The ministers are in turn responsible to Parliament, and it is Parliament to which we must look for ultimate control, next to the people themselves. Yet every political scientist has been saying for decades that Parliament has neither the time for more duties nor the expertness for different duties. Nevertheless, the nationalized industries inevitably load on Parliament more duties and different duties. Inevitably also, Parliament tries laboriously to meet these new obligations with the old techniques of control: with questions directed to ministers under whom the industries operate; with debates; and with inquiries and reports of select committees—yet with full recognition that it must, by its own self-denying ordinance, control with a loose rein and in a different spirit.

Questions. The technique most discussed, most jealously guarded by Parliament, and probably most effective to date, is the question time. This time-honored practice has undergone some change to accommodate the new status of the public corporations. Ministers answer questions, of course, only on matters for which they are responsible. They are not responsible for day-to-day administration of the corporations. Therefore, questions on the nationalized industries are more restricted than those on the regular government departments. Questions asked concerning the Post Office, for example, always number more than those for any of the corporations.[29]

The overriding consideration is again the balance between the minister's general control and the board's day-to-day management. The question is often asked: How can the House of Commons exercise control over the administration of these industries when the admissible questions extend only to the minister's responsibility, which excludes day-to-day administration?[30] Such a question refuses to acknowledge the philosophy behind the nationalization statutes. The corporations are deliberately removed from meticulous control. But, even so, the extent of restriction on Parliament depends on what constitutes an acceptable question for ministerial answer. Acceptability is clouded by several factors: uncertainty as to what is a matter of day-to-day administration; uncertainty as to the Speaker's standard of "public importance" in accepting questions; uncertainty as to what the minister can and cannot do, as well as whether he is doing it directly or through influence on others; and, finally, uncertainty as to whether the minister will answer the question put to him, even if eligible on all counts.

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[27] Acton Society Trust, *The Power of the Minister* (cited in n. 9), Appendix, pp. 16–20.

[28] 498 *H. C. Deb.*, April 9, 1952, col. 2731.

[29] Acton Society Trust, *Accountability to Parliament* (Claygate, 1950), p. 6.

[30] See Kenneth Bradshaw, "Parliament and the Public Corporation," *Cambridge Journal*, Vol. 3, pp. 707–26, at p. 713 (Sept., 1950).

Originally, the minister determined eligibility of questions; in case of doubt, the Speaker asked the minister whether he considered himself responsible. Later, the Speaker ruled that once the minister refused to answer a question, none of the same class of questions would be accepted.[31] This ruling held off the curiosity and legitimate interest of members too much, they thought. Dissatisfaction led to the Speaker's modification of his decision in June, 1948. He agreed to direct acceptance of questions about matters on which information had previously been refused "provided that, in my opinion, the matters are of sufficient public importance to justify this concession."[32]

This by no means put an end to the controversy about eligibility of questions. Debates show a spectrum of opinion which knows no party lines. Some members of Parliament apply the test of degree; some the test of number of people affected; some the number of M.P.'s interested; some policy versus administration; some "intrinsic importance." One member thought he would not have an appropriate question if his train were an hour late one morning, but he would if it continued late every day for a month. Another insisted his question on an electricity breakdown should not be refused, because many Sunday dinners were spoiled in a large part of Southern England. Could something affecting millions of people be a detail of day-to-day management? Another did not think consideration of a closed railway station should be ruled out, particularly since he had a petition bearing 800 signatures.[33]

What ministers have actually answered and refused to answer is almost as diverse as the opinions expressed by members in the House of Commons. One minister answered many questions on dirty coal; another refused on grounds this was a management problem. A question on cheap fares on the railways was refused at one time but the issue of railway fares later led to the greatest of all controversies about ministerial and Parliamentary control. Questions on industrial disputes are usually refused. Likewise, even matters of information, such as on staffs and salaries, have been refused despite the minister's clear legal power to demand such information.

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[31] History reviewed in 508 *H. C. Deb.*, Dec. 5, 1952, col. 1994.

[32] 451 *H. C. Deb.*, June 7, 1948, col. 1636.

[33] Acton Society Trust, *Accountability to Parliament*, p. 21; see Sir Edward Boyle's standard of "intrinsic importance" and number of interested M.P.'s, 508 *H. C. Deb.*, Dec. 5, 1952, col. 1997.

Petty though these arguments and decisions may seem, they penetrate to the core of the accountability problem because they raise the question of the distribution of power among corporation, minister, and Parliament. The minister's acceptance of a question which calls for his intervention, where no intervention was countenanced before, actually changes the autonomy of the nationalized industry. His acceptance of a question of information calls for more staff, more paper work, and more centralization. The real difficulty has been that time is too short and that most of the questions do not relate to policies determining the success or failure of the industry. Questions on details, on abuses, and on constituents' complaints are most popular.[34]

That nothing much, short of abandonment of the public corporation idea itself, can be done to improve the question technique is made clear by the first report of the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, October 29, 1952. After holding seventeen meetings and hearing much testimony from members of the House of Commons and from board chairmen, the Committee made only two minor proposals: (1) that, in the hope of setting a slightly more liberal standard for placing questions on the Order Paper, "in the case of questions which are not obviously matters of repetition or matters of detailed administration the question should be allowed to appear"; and (2) that consideration be given reducing from three to two the number of questions a member may ask for oral reply each day.[35]

Those critics who wanted to open wide the eligibility of questions, to include inquiries on administrative details, received no solace. On the contrary, the Committee considered the more generous interpretation and firmly rejected it: the nationalized industries are, the report said, "constituted on different lines from the usual civil department" and "it is desirable that they should not be unduly hampered by external interference."[36] This conclusion was unanimously supported.[37] Philip Noel-Baker, Committee member and former Minister of Transport and Minister of Fuel and Power, said the case made in the testimony against detailed questions "is overwhelming." From his wealth of experience, he drew the conclusion that appropriate questions are "a very powerful instrument of public control."[38] The chairmen of the nationalized industry boards vigorously contended that the price of detailed Parliamentary control would be less managerial initiative and more centralization. As Lord Citrine, Chairman of the British Electricity Authority, put it, if Parliament exercises detailed control, "we should get the Civil Service mentality; we would never make any mistakes, but by Jove, what we did would take a devil of a long time."[39]

Debates. Accountability through debate extends to broader coverage than Parliamentary questions but efficacy is severely hampered by the shortage of

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[34] Acton Society Trust, *Accountability to Parliament*, pp. 7–8, 14.

[35] Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, *Report*, Oct. 29, 1952 (*House of Commons Papers*, 332, 1951–52), p. ix.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. viii.

[37] 508 *H. C. Deb.*, Dec. 5, 1952, col. 2002.

[38] *Ibid.;* col. 2004.

[39] *H.C.* 332, *op. cit.*, p. xxii.

Parliamentary time, the lack of technical competence, and the dominance of the political party in making final decisions. Debate need not be restricted to general policy; it may relate to questions of day-to-day management and local problems, subject to the Speaker's, rather than the minister's, opinion of propriety for discussion. An exhaustive study published by the Acton Society Trust showed that never had more than 31 hours a year been given debate on any nationalized industry; that 12 to 15 hours was more common; and that "it is very unlikely that Parliament could debate all major nationalized industries once a year."[40]

The two most important occasions for debate are the Supply Vote of the minister supervising the nationalized industry and the motions taking note of the annual reports of the industries. For the five-year period ending October, 1950, eleven supply debates, usually lasting about six hours each, were held on the nationalized industries: six on civil aviation, two on coal, one on the fuel and power industries, and two on transport. However, other debates on supply days tend to crowd out the nationalized industries because the opposition has to choose among twenty-five departments and a host of grant-in-aid agencies.[41] Debate on the annual reports is an encouraging accountability trend. Parliament has important information before it, but the discussion is fragmentary, discursive, and long after the event. It is common for the debates to occur a year or more after the closing date covered by the reports.

Other opportunities for general debate can be made by the government in laying down a substantive motion or by the opposition in attempting to amend the Queen's speech.[42] Occasions for shorter debate are found on the motion for adjournment, granting from a half hour to three hours for discussion of some action taken or failed to be taken; on a motion to approve or annul an order of a minister supervising an industry; on proposed modifications of nationalization laws; and on private bills submitted by the corporations.[43]

The whole debate technique as an instrument of control would be greatly improved if it could be kept above party controversy, a vain hope at the present stage of socialization. Illustrative of the partisan approach, when the Labour minister in 1949 made a motion worded as innocuously as possible, "That this House take note of the First Annual Report, etc." of the Transport Commission for 1948, merely as a peg on which to hang the debate, the opposition moved at once to amend by adding, "but regrets the loss sustained in 1948, the further marked deterioration disclosed in 1949, the mounting cost and the increase in fares and rates so detrimental to the public."[44] It is not hard to imagine the enlightenment which followed. Nationalization will have to gain the respectability of age before accountability in the public interest can replace control in the partisan interest.

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[40] Acton Society Trust, *Accountability to Parliament*, p. 15.

[41] Bradshaw, "Parliament and the Public Corporation" (cited in n. 30), p. 715. Mr. Crookshank, Conservative leader in the House of Commons, cites seven debates in 1950–52. See Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, *Report*, July 23, 1953 (*H.C.* 235, 1952–53), p. 115.

[42] See 457 *H. C. Deb.*, col. 683 *et seq.*

[43] Acton Society Trust, *Accountability to Parliament*, pp. 18–19; Winter, "Parliamentary, Ministerial and Judicial Control of Nationalized Industries in Great Britain" (cited in n. 6), pp. 679–81, also gives examples.

Parliamentary Committees. Parliament provides control also through the scrutiny of its existing committees and its power to appoint others to investigate and report. For the nationalized industries, this has been, until the present session of Parliament, more potentiality than reality. The new industries, like the old departments, are placed under the scrutiny of the Committee on Public Accounts. That committee, however, is deprived of expert aid for its new task. It cannot use the Comptroller and Auditor General and his staff because the socialized industries have special commercial auditors named by the minister. Already harnessed with an impossible task and deprived of expert assistance, the Committee on Public Accounts is virtually helpless. The Committee on Estimates is even more ineffectual. It has no opportunity for control unless a subsidy is involved, as in the case only of the three airways corporations. There is no means of control if the same public stake is created in some other way: by a price increase or by a government loan to the industry.[45]

Despite the debates, the questions, and the committees, the accountability of the nationalized industries to Parliament is not thoroughly pleasing to anyone. Techniques differ from those of long-standing use for government departments only in that they are more restricted in application. They are less extensive, therefore less commonly employed, and less susceptible to Parliamentary use of expert assistance. It is not surprising, therefore, that some new remedies have been sought. The most commonly proposed is a select committee especially designed to supervise the nationalized industries. Herbert Morrison, chief architect of nationalization, has objected to this scheme as destructive of initiative and overawing for non-political board members. Instead, he favors a periodic review, at seven-year intervals, somewhat like the reviews of the British Broadcasting Corporation, "not so much of a technical character but broadly, and to make recommendations on policy and structure."[46] This would provide the needed control and yet not interfere with commercial efficiency. Other proposals range from the use of quasi-judicial bodies, or House of Lords supervision, to the creation of a full-fledged industrial parliament.

Immediately after the Conservative government assumed office in 1951, it named a select committee "to consider the present methods by which the House of Commons is informed of the affairs of the Nationalised Industries, and to report what changes, having regard to the provisions laid down by Parliament in the relevant statutes, might be desirable."[47] The first report, made a year later, did more, as already noted, to confirm existing methods of accountability than to suggest new ones. The second and final report, July 23,

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[44] 470 *H. C. Deb.*, Dec. 1, 1949, cols. 1343, 1354.

[45] Bradshaw, *op. cit.*, pp. 718–19.

[46] 479 *H. C. Deb.*, Oct. 25, 1950, col. 2807.

[47] *H.C.* 332, p. iii.

1953, proposed the first major change in accountability devices since the inception of nationalization. It recommended, as so often proposed, the appointment of a Committee on Nationalised Industries in the House of Commons "for examining the reports and accounts of, and for obtaining further information as to the general policy and practice of the nationalised industries."[48] The objects and limitations were further explained as "that of informing Parliament about the aims, activities and problems of the corporations and not of controlling their work."[49] The Committee, to consist of not more than twenty-one members nominated at the beginning of each session, will be empowered to appoint subcommittees and "to send for persons, papers and records, and to report from time to time."[50] Taking over the functions of the Committee on Public Accounts so far as the industries are concerned, the new Committee will have a permanent officer "of the status of the Comptroller and Auditor General," not removable except by an address from each house of Parliament, who will peruse the reports and accounts and call the Committee's attention to matters deserving examination. At least one professional accountant and other needed staff will assist.[51]

Whether this proposed mechanism threatens the hoped-for balance between business and governmental methods depends largely on the terms of reference of the Committee. Exactly what they are to be is by no means clear. Some *Report* authors and witnesses wanted to emphasize information, others investigation; some finance, others policy; some overall aims, others managerial efficiency; some highly restricted terms of reference, others very broad terms. The area of financial accountability illustrates the ambiguity. The analogy to the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Committee on Public Accounts is repeatedly used, yet the machinery proposed falls far short of such powers financially, on the one hand, and extends to an entirely new area, policy, on the other hand. The new Committee's staff is to examine published accounts done by the statutory auditors, not themselves to audit directly in the industries. But while its effective powers of financial investigation are much less than those of the Comptroller and Auditor General's staff, the Committee might usefully, the *Report* says, extend the field of the auditors' reports "to deal with broad policy issues." Several witnesses warned that accountants should not be turned into policy scrutineers. The *Report* also cautiously commends—but no more—the suggestion that the corporations might well prepare statements of anticipated revenue and expenditure, so the new Committee could compare plans with actual outcome.[52] The whole tenor of the *Report* appears to reaffirm the commitment to avoid Parliamentary interference in day-to-day management, but the practical hazards are graphically presented in the testimony before the study committee. Repeated illustrations of "policy" turned out to be details of management in the view of others (e.g., wages, prices, manpower, capital development, depreciation, closing branch railway lines, diesel vs. steam power). This gives added weight to the warning of Lord Reith, former head of the BBC, that this is really "a sort of institutionalization of the Parliamentary Question, the very thing Parliament denied itself."[53]

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[48] *H. C.* 235, p. ix.

[49] *Ibid.*, p. xii. The word "control" here presumably connotes meticulous supervision, contrasting with the use of the term throughout this article as, chiefly, that part of the accountability relationship exercised by the body to which accountability is owed, regardless of degree.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. x.

[51] *Ibid.*, pp. xi, xii.

[52] *Ibid.*, p. xi.

However this new device may work out in actual practice, if attempted, it answers persistent demands that something more be done to insure accountability. It provides another bit of machinery—to be used in ways yet to be forged by personalities, practical politics, and a bipartisan sense of needed balance. The intention of digging deeply and continuously into the affairs of the corporations is obviously not present. It will be surprising if the independence of the corporations is seriously affected or their day-to-day management interfered with in any significant way. In fact, the passage of time has produced noticeable caution and growing reservations. During a recent six and one-half hour debate on the new plan, Mr. Crookshank, Lord Privy Seal, speaking for the government, embraced the committee idea but asked that existing rights of ministers not be touched; the way be kept open for a joint committee with the House of Lords; the size be reduced, with no subcommittees; complete evidence not be published; attention not extend to future plans and programs; and, most important of all, no steps be taken at the outset to provide a permanent officer, such as the Comptroller and Auditor General.[54] The chairman of the Select Committee, Mr. Assheton, expressed keen disappointment in this great dilution and frankly said he did not think his committee's proposal would be "worth very much" when compromised at "an absolutely key point"—the naming of a permanent officer.[55] All this meant, clearly enough, that the government now responsible for the industries did not want to risk too much control. The adjournment debate, inconclusively airing familiar hopes and suspicions, gave some point to Miss Herbison's conclusion: "I am certain that, in the mind of a great many of those who support the idea, there are fears that ultimately the setting up of the committee would not be a good thing."[56]

Whatever is done, a stabilizing influence exists in the fact that all proposals for accountability changes have heretofore failed to polarize party allegiances. The pending scheme has aroused some latent Labour fears and Mr. Morrison has represented his party as generally opposed, but the plan itself bears the unanimous endorsement of the five Labour and six Conservative members of the Select Committee.[57] Sir Herbert Williams, a Conservative member of the proposing committee, illustrated the customary evolution when he confessed: "I started off on the assumption that we ought to take the lid off, but evidence convinced me that to do so would produce an intolerable situation."[58] On the other hand, Aneurin Bevan's *Tribune* has criticized the Labour party for not doing more to guarantee the fullest accountability of the boards to Parliament through the minister.[59] Some perfection of the techniques of Parliamentary control is guaranteed by bipartisan concern and by common party experience. We are here witnessing the delicate readjustment of an old political mechanism to a challenging new problem.

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[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 75ff.

[54] 523 *H. C. Deb.*, *Daily Report*, Feb. 8, 1954, cols. 841–44.

[55] *Ibid.*, cols. 865–66.

[56] *Ibid.*, col. 918. On the same date, Feb. 8, 1954, *The Times* (p. 7) editorially advised against strapping on the harness of government departments, which could possibly give accountability and information, but never efficiency.

[57] *Ibid.*, col. 859.

If Parliamentary control was somewhat weakened when extended to the nationalized industries, it was at least supplemented in an effort to make adequate the *total* pattern of public controls. The supplementation came in three ways: special representation for consumers, consultation for employees, and special informational sources for everyone involved in public control.

III. CONSUMERS' COUNCILS

As the nationalized industries are great state monopolies, replacing the so-called sovereignty of the consumer, some special check on the new Titans of Government seemed to be in order. Parliament, therefore, created a consumers' council or system of councils in each of the nationalized industries, ranging from the simplicity of a single national council, as originally provided in iron and steel, to the complexity of 15 area consumer councils, with from 70 to 80 local councils, in electricity.[60] The members come from all walks of life, appointed by the minister for each industry on the basis of representation of the chief consumer interests involved, with from five to thirty persons on each council. Although strictly advisory, the councils have the task of serving as watchdogs of the consumers' interests in all matters of charges and services, with power to make recommendations to the minister. They may act at the urging of a consumer, on their own initiative, or at the request of the minister. Remedial action lies with the minister, who may, as we have seen, give directions to the industry. The councils, therefore, are empowered to raise the right questions, questions of the broadest scope, but their advisory function leaves the finding of the right answers to the amenability of the boards, or to the minister in the final analysis.

Despite some spottily distributed successes in consumer representation and in the settlement of grievances, the consumers' councils do not inspire much confidence among consumers. They have two serious defects: they are not sufficiently independent of the government and they are too little known and used.

They need to be independent of the industry if they are to give the consumer a vigorous voice; but, on the contrary, they are appointed by the minister, occupy offices furnished by him or the industry, use staff similarly supplied, have nationalized industry representatives as members, stand at the mercy of the government for information, and sometimes find themselves being used by the government to give testimonials for some unpopular policy. Worse yet, they have no research or investigating staffs; they cannot employ their own experts for independent study. It is not surprising that many critics have charged that the councils are merely "stooges," securely "in the pocket" of the boards; and that they have taken a strange posture deferring to the industry rather than to the consumer.[61] In the few instances in which the minister has been forced to arbitrate a showdown between a consumers' council and a nationalized industry, he has always taken his stand with the industry.[62] This is itself a commentary on the weight and independence of the councils.

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[58] 508 *H. C. Deb.*, Dec. 5, 1952, col. 2006.

[59] *The Times* (London), June 19, 1953, p. 3.

[60] For more complete analysis, see Eldon L. Johnson, "Consumer 'Control' in British Nationalized Industries," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 15, pp. 88–113 (Feb., 1953).

No one is pleased with the use to which the councils are put by consumers, by ministers, or by the nationalized industries. Despite increasing publicity efforts by the councils, members of Parliament still complain that they get too many letters which should be going to the councils. When Lord Hurcomb, Chairman of the British Transport Commission, answered 1800 Parliamentary inquiries in one year, he surely answered some which should have gone first to the consumers' council for transport.[63] Other deterrents to council use are the absence of any satisfactory organization of general consumer interests and, also, plain consumer indifference. To make matters considerably worse, all the councils have placed restrictions on their communication with the press and the public.

One has to say, in summary, that the consumers' council device has enjoyed only modest success.[64] If, however, one stops trying to make the councils a David against Goliath, which they cannot be, he must conclude that they may supply an alternative test of the public interest, provide suggestions and cautions for policy-making, and capitalize on consumer interests as they become organized. Much of each council's strength lies in the quite undramatic business of keeping the consumers' interest in the forefront of the attention of the nationalized industry or its supervising minister, and in serving as a symbol and a constant reminder of a goal always to be sought.

IV. JOINT CONSULTATION

Internal as well as external control becomes a major type of public accountability in a socialized society, because an increasing number of citizens are state employees. Industrial democracy is a primary goal.[65]

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[61] Editorial, "The Consumer's Voice," *The Times* (London), July 22, 1950, p. 5.

[62] See Central Transport Consultative Committee, *Annual Report*, 1950 (*H. C.* 126, 1950–51), pp. 5–7; Eastern Electricity Board, *Third Report and Accounts*, 1950–51 (*H. C.* 272, 1950–51), p. 17; British Electricity Authority, *Fourth Report and Accounts*, 1951–52 (*H. C.* 262, 1951–52), p. 79; The Gas Council, *Third Report and Accounts*, 1951–52 (*H. C.* 309, 1951–52), p. 5.

[63] British Transport Commission, *Report and Accounts*, 1950 (*H. C.* 210, 1950–51), p. 7.

[64] See suggested reforms through a Central Consumers' Council, armed with a research staff, for all the industries together, P. Sargant Florence and H. Maddick, "Consumers' Councils in the Nationalized Industries," *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 24, pp. 259–71 (July–Sept., 1953). Other proposed improvements are discussed in Johnson, *op. cit.*, pp. 107–11.

[65] For more complete treatment see Eldon L. Johnson, "Joint Consultation in British Nationalized Industries," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 12, pp. 181–89 (Summer, 1952).

Following this philosophy, the authors of nationalization in Great Britain wrote into their statutes the guarantee of joint machinery, between management and labor, not only for collective bargaining but also for consultation on safety, health, welfare, training, efficiency, and other matters of mutual interest. This is, however, a far cry from worker control; instead, it is merely worker participation in control. How far short this falls of management abdication is shown by the fact that the board of the nationalized industry is left with the initiative in the establishment of a consultation agreement, it is the sole judge of which employee organizations are to be dealt with, and it, not the workers, assumes full executive responsibility.

Does joint consultation concern itself with significant matters? The answer is that it certainly may. The power is there. No matters are barred, not even affairs of finance, as is so often the case in private industry. But while the untrammeled opportunity is there, obstacles to adequate use are numerous and formidable. There are trade-union fears of competing loyalties; worker apathy, as apathy afflicts all democracy; management desire to be secretive rather than sharing; and worker ignorance of technical matters and preoccupation with welfare rather than efficiency. Yet, joint consultation does add to the limitations on socialist instruments, or to public accountability, in two ways: by the power to influence policy and by the power to withhold consent. Consultation cannot make policy in the sense of taking responsibility for it, but it can influence policy. In addition to this influence, joint consultation has an important role in determining what *not* to do. Management, in all the industries, has the unquestioned power to make the final decision, but no intelligent decision is made in a vacuum. It is made with due regard to alternatives. Joint consultation is an effective means of determining such alternatives and the relative price to be paid for each in human values.

Industrial democracy, like other kinds, calls for a system of representation when the organization is large. That presents another critical problem in the British scheme. Representation on the worker side always, as a matter of fact, comes through the unions, but the unions are often quite unfitted for this task. There are too many of them, and they are neither functionally nor geographically organized to provide effective worker representation. A study recently published reveals that there are more than fifty independent trade unions to be dealt with in the five nationalized industries, with no industry having less than fifteen. Furthermore, most of the unions are chiefly concerned with membership in *private* industry and only secondarily in public industry.[66]

Even if all problems of representation could be solved, the difficult question of communication would remain—communication between the representative and the represented. This is a great unsolved problem and a serious handicap. No one is made responsible for internal communication of this kind. The constitutions of the joint consultation councils do not bother to provide either the means or the objective of "reporting back" to the employees.[67]

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[66] Acton Society Trust, *The Future of the Unions* (Claygate, 1951), pp. 2–3.

[67] Hopeful improvement is described in the 1951–52 *Report*, British Electricity Authority (cited in n. 62), p. 69.

Despite these difficulties, joint consultation as established in the nationalized industries does provide a wide-open door of opportunity for worker participation, and internal accountability. The real problem is one of utilizing the opportunity afforded. Neither management nor labor is making the most of its possibilities. This weapon of control is still clumsy and crude, but it is taking shape, with a consciously held purpose in mind. It recognizes the creativity of employees.

V. ANNUAL REPORTS

Still another means of assuring public accountability in the nationalized industries is the common requirement of annual reports, made to the minister and referred to both houses of Parliament. Accountability cannot exist without information. The annual reports for each industry are intended to provide much of that information. Each report supplies a veritable storehouse of facts and figures which would have been quite unobtainable in the days of scattered, private ownership. Nevertheless, two careful British studies of the reports conclude that they still leave much to be desired. While informative, with an impressive quantity, they lack quality at many key points, one of the studies concludes. Despite the statistics, accounts, graphs, and descriptive coverage, the reports do not sufficiently deal with the factors which make for success or failure, or with trends and improvements in efficiency. They can hardly be said to be strictly objective. It is not surprising that they put the industry's best foot forward, avoiding failures and deficiencies.[68]

The reports are most cautious, even reticent, about the boards' external relationships. They usually avoid discussing relations with Parliament and with the minister and say only tantalizingly little about the consumers' councils and employee relations.[69] This has a paradoxical effect: what was intended as a separate accountability device, supplying needed information, limits its own usefulness by avoiding information on the other accountability mechanisms. This self-limitation flows from the boards' desire to avoid outside interference. That is understandable, but the omission raises the question as to whether more information on the vital accountability relationships should not be made generally available through some source independent of the industries.

The second British study of the annual reports harshly concludes that they are badly edited, unattractive to the general public, given to "window-dressing," unclear on major issues and on steps toward improvement, and "neither detailed enough for the specialist nor sufficiently concise and clear for the layman."[70] These strictures must be judged against the realization that the acts of nationalization do not indicate the function of the reports, uncertainty exists as to whether the proper audience is the general public or the government, and Parliament seems content to go on without the kind of information it most needs.

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[68] A. H. Hanson, "Report on the Reports: The Nationalised Industries, 1950–51," *Public Administration*, Vol. 30, pp. 111–30, at pp. 177–21 (Summer, 1952).

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 113.

[70] Acton Society Trust, *Relations with the Public* (London, 1953), pp. 13–14, 18.

The release of the annual reports is the occasion for news and editorial comment and for Parliamentary debate on policies and shortcomings. In at least one case the complete and somewhat formidable report has been digested and reproduced for wide citizen appeal. These are the raw materials of accountability. At least, such is the intention—an intention which needs, and can easily have, further implementation. Perhaps, as has been implied, the boards are still too much impressed by their business character and too little aware of their public obligations.[71]

CONCLUSIONS

After seven years of experience, all sections of British political opinion are still committed to the public corporation, genuinely removed from meticulous governmental control, as the chosen instrument for operating the giant industries taken over by the public. Confidence that the right general path is being followed is as strong as the conviction that the desired balance has not yet been attained. The British have been hammering out a significant kind of accountability: power to control decisively when need be, but little use of it; power to act at the broad, vital spots rather than on the minutiae; power of accountability made effective by its presence rather than by its exercise. The unused power to block an artery may be more effective than the daily use of pinpricks on the capillaries. This is the theory of ministerial and Parliamentary control: the power to issue general directions and the power to investigate and legislate.

Yet several questions remain. Since the big weapons are rarely used, does accountability, in practice, give control over minor rather than major matters and, therefore, produce the worst of both worlds, instead of the best so confidently expected by the corporation advocates? Or does this indicate major satisfactions and minor irritations, with the general policy merely having no practical meaning except in its specific manifestations? Can business independence and the interjection of social or welfare considerations be reconciled? Yet without such interjection, what is the point to public ownership? If such considerations, irrelevant for commercial purposes, are introduced, isn't the corporation's policy *political* and, therefore, properly subject to careful Parliamentary scrutiny? Can the development of the confidential relationship between minister and board, with surreptitious ministerial intervention, be permitted without close Parliamentary control? Does the public corporation really force a choice between accountability and efficiency? These difficulties all stem from an attempted merger of the benefits of that which is private and that which is public. To what end is accountability exercised? If exercised to achieve what the public wants, the standard of success is likely to be tentative, shifting, and sometimes contradictory, less simple than the old measure of profit in the private sector. The merger merely recasts the familiar struggle: in this case, for balance between liberty to achieve one desired purpose, business initiative and efficiency, and authority to achieve another, responsibility to the public and conformity to its policies.

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[71] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

Although the proposed new Committee on Nationalised Industries could revolutionize accountability relationships, constantly "digging up the roots" and "keeping under the harrow," that prospect is quite unlikely. If established, the committee may complicate minister-board relations by supplying a dual channel of communication with Parliament, to say nothing of confusing responsibility somewhat. It could tempt the minister to delve into board matters, adding to centralization; and it might, worst of all, negate Parliament's self-denying ordinance with respect to day-to-day management of the industries. However, Mr. Crookshank, Conservative leader in the House of Commons, has clearly indicated a strong personal preference for "tight terms of reference" for the new committee, saying, "Obviously it is a question of advancing slowly and seeing where we get to."[72]

Insistent pressure for fuller accountability is likely to continue to beat upon Parliament. The temptation to move toward more and more control will be great. Even Herbert Morrison recently confessed: "I agree right off, in the case of electricity, there is a strong case to argue that it could be run by a Government Department."[73] It also remains to be seen whether the Labour party, in its zeal to nationalize, chose an instrument sufficiently amenable to the policy integration required for national planning. But while British confidence in the public corporation idea remains, the major problem is not machinery for control, but balanced use of it. A great deal of machinery now exists, far more than is effectively utilized.

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[72] *H. C.* 235, p. 113.

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE*

DAVID SPITZ
Ohio State University

I

If Sophocles were alive today to recast the dilemma of Antigone in contemporary, if less sanguine, terms, he might well seize on the problem of the citizen who refuses to answer questions put to him by a congressional investigating committee. Antigone, you will recall, was torn between two loyalties. Her religion commanded her to bury the body of her brother, while her state commanded that his body be left, unburied and unmourned, to be eaten by dogs and vultures on the open plain outside the city walls. As a loyal citizen, Antigone was required to yield her conscience to the state, to guide her conduct not by her rational moral knowledge but by the precepts of the law. As a person bound to her kin by the dictates of her religion, she was required to subordinate the instructions of Creon the king to those of her faith. She chose to obey her conscience and paid the penalty. Socrates, who—according to a traditional interpretation of the *Crito*[1]—would doubtless have counseled otherwise, was also executed by the state. Thoreau, who at a critical moment followed what has scornfully been termed "the primitive attitude of Antigone, rather than the mature comprehension of Socrates,"[2] found that refusal to obey a law resulted not in loss of life but in temporary loss of physical freedom. This moderation of punishment from ancient Greece to mid-nineteenth century America, though not a steady historical trend, reveals a greater tolerance on the part of the state toward manifestations of civil disobedience, but the state's adamance still remains, and with it the essential dimensions of the problem.

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* The substance of this paper was read at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in Washington, D. C., in September, 1953.

[1] John Dickinson, "A Working Theory of Sovereignty," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 43, pp. 32–63, at p. 50 (Mar., 1928). Taken by itself, the argument of the *Crito* (50–51) does, I think, support Dickinson's interpretation. But there are strong grounds for holding a contrary view of what Socrates actually believed. It is clearly the teaching of the *Apology* (and other Socratic dialogues of Plato) that it is never right to do wrong, regardless of personal consequences. For this reason Socrates refused to obey the command of the Thirty to bring Leon the Salaminian to Athens to be put to death by the oligarchy; and he refused to remain silent when, "as I conceive and imagine, the god orders me to fulfill the philosopher's mission of searching into myself and other men" (*Apology*, 32, 28). Plainly, Socrates would disobey a law that required him to do an unjust thing. From this standpoint, the argument in the aforesaid passage of the *Crito* can be read as no more than a demonstration to Crito that none of his arguments is sufficient to persuade Socrates to flee prison. This leaves open the question whether Socrates might not have been persuaded by other reasons—e.g., by a refutation of his own implicit thesis that death was really preferable to him than exile, in view of all the circumstances. Such a refutation might have been convincing if there were a different set of circumstances surrounding such factors as his age, the suffering he might cause his friends in Athens, the treatment he might expect in the place or places of his exile, and above all the effect that escape would have had upon Socrates' life-work, his philosophic mission, the thing which was more precious to him than life.

For another argument in support of the thesis that Socrates would have approved Antigone's action, see R. N. Cross, *Socrates: The Man and His Mission* (Chicago, no date), pp. 168–72. Aspects of the general problem are discussed in Harry V. Jaffa, *Thomism and Aristotelianism* (Chicago, 1952), pp. 29–30, 199, and Jerome Hall, *Living Law of Democratic Society* (Indianapolis, 1949), pp. 21–22.

Governments and people still contend over these old and fundamental problems of political obligation. Now as before, there are those who categorically assert that it is the duty of the citizen always to obey the law, while others insist that a citizen owes his primary obligation to his own conscience. Since it is my general conviction, with Aristotle, that "in all disputes upon government each party says something that is just,"[3] I propose to consider here those principles which, in a democratic state at least, appear to me to render valid *some* claims to the right of civil disobedience.[4]

Of such appeals to the right of civil disobedience I shall restrict myself in this paper to three: (1) the claim that the democratic state has no moral authority to make any demands on the individual because the political system (or the social order maintained by that system) is, in principle, unjust; (2) the claim that the system ideally conceived is just but that the particular state is a perverted form of democracy and is therefore unjust, and that consequently, as in the first instance, it lacks authority; (3) the claim that while the social order and the institutionalized form of democracy that seeks to maintain it are just, the particular law (or laws) is unjust in that it constitutes an attack on and a repudiation of that ideal, and that consequently disobedience to the law in question is, in the particular instance, calculated to achieve a greater good—the preservation of the system itself—than is likely to be achieved by compliance.

Since the resolution of a problem requires first that the problem be understood, it may be well to state at the outset what I conceive to be the underlying questions emerging from the present conflict over the principles of political obligation.

II

When a citizen today is summoned by a congressional investigating committee to answer questions he regards as morally reprehensible—questions, for example, that call upon him to state his political beliefs or to be an informer—he finds himself in a grave dilemma. If he answers the questions, he obeys the law but violates his moral code, and may, in addition, expose himself to certain non-legal consequences of his legal action—e.g., the loss of his job. If he refuses to answer on moral grounds, he satisfies his conscience but denies his obligation to the law, and thereby, if we are to believe certain conservative thinkers from Socrates' day to our own,[5] endangers as well the very foundations of the social order. His personal risks in such a course are even greater, entailing possible imprisonment, and his only consolation would be the knowledge that he had displayed the virtue of courage, or, with Thoreau, the thought that "under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison."[6]

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[2] Dickinson, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

[3] Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. William Ellis, Everyman's ed. (London, 1912), 1281a.

[4] It seems hardly necessary to add that while the analysis of this problem is motivated by certain consequences which have ensued from the intense activities of congressional investigating committees in recent years, I am concerned not with the specific conduct of individuals who have appeared before such committees or with the behavior of the committee members themselves, but with the *principles* of political obligation that are relevant to such conduct.

If, however, he resorts to a legal instrument—e.g., the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution—which will enable him both to satisfy his conscience and by invoking another law to stay out of jail, he invites a further dilemma. For if he invokes the Fifth Amendment knowing that it does not strictly apply to his case—e.g., if he seeks to protect someone else, although under the self-incrimination clause he is not entitled to do so—he does not tell the truth and may thereby dishonor his moral code. Nor can he enjoy the consolation of having been courageous, if he now seeks to escape the consequences of a refusal to answer based solely on moral grounds. On the other hand, if he is convinced that a lie is necessary to achieve a greater good, he may find it difficult to understand why one who acts rightly should be expected to invite wrongful punishment. To one who believes that a lie is always wrong, such conduct is inexcusable. But to men sensitive to the fact that moral dilemmas arise precisely because a particular situation offers no clearcut distinction between right and wrong, and that it is sometimes impossible to do that which is good without doing or suffering something that is bad, the performance of what under other circumstances might be evil is then right, not wrong. Moral rules are often in conflict, and a moral man may have to choose between telling the truth or lying to do good. If the greater good is right, the lie—otherwise bad but now necessary to the good—is also right. It is at least questionable whether an ambassador (or a spy) who lies, when necessary, for the good of his country, merits moral censure.

The gravity of the dilemma is compounded (a) by the failure of law, in general, to protect men from the non-legal consequences of legal action, and (b) by the deliberate use of the law, on occasion, to expose men to non-legal sanctions against actions heretofore beyond the pale of legal penalty.

Appeal to the Fifth Amendment may protect a man from certain legal penalties ensuing from his refusal to answer questions that might tend to incriminate him, but it provides no legal protection against the economic or social consequences of his refusal. Thus a man who invokes the Fifth Amendment may find himself without a job and with little likelihood of obtaining one, at least in his established field of endeavor. He may find himself and his family ostracized as well as impoverished. He may discover that his reputation and good name have been sacrificed on the altar of conscience. He may begin then to understand the element of truth in Machiavelli's cynical advice to one who would win popular approval and support—that it is often better to *seem* good than to *be* good. And he may learn, perhaps when it is too late, the awful significance of the words of Sophocles' Chorus:

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[5] For a contemporary view, see the argument by Peter Viereck in *Conservatism Revisited* (New York, 1949), pp. 10–11; but note his argument for the reverse position, pp. 20–21.

[6] Henry David Thoreau, "Civil Disobedience," in *Walden and Other Writings*, ed. Brooks Atkinson, Modern Library ed. (New York, 1937), p. 646.

> Tomorrow and for all time to come,
> As in the past,
> This law is immutable:
> For mortals greatly to live is greatly to suffer.[7]

Since it is the rare man who is willing to suffer greatly, the dire non-legal consequences of permissible legal action impose pressures that make difficult a right resolution of the moral dilemma. The citizen may obey the law not because he conceives it right to obey but because he fears the consequences of disobedience. This introduces a new element into the problem, namely, the question of the moral obligation of the state to protect a citizen from social punishment when certain legal authorities or *private* powers disapprove his act, however unobjectionable it may be on strictly legal grounds. Does the state have an obligation to guarantee to a citizen not merely the constitutional right to refuse to answer questions with an incriminating bias, but also the legal right to protection from non-legal sanctions attendant upon such refusal?

It would be futile to deny that an affirmative answer to this last question leads into patent (and perhaps insuperable) difficulties, not the least of these being the dangers involved in unduly extending the sphere of state intervention. But the question of the state's obligation is not for this reason to be avoided. For if the Constitution is the final legal norm from which all subsidiary law derives its validity, then the protection of the Constitution must be made real and not simply formal. This can be achieved only when (a) the Constitution is applied not merely against *de jure* governments but against citizens and groups who comprise *de facto* or private governments that proclaim "laws" and impose sanctions, and (b) the laws of the state and the actions of governmental authorities conform both to the letter and to the spirit of the Constitution, i.e., they avoid so maltreating men as to expose them to non-legal sanctions where no legal punishments are or have been intended.

These principles, especially the former, may appear at first blush to embody a revolutionary proposal. Clearly, they require distinctions which are not likely to admit of mathematically precise application. On the one hand, there are certain social and economic consequences of lawful action which the state cannot prevent or eliminate even if it seeks to do so—e.g., the suspicion in the minds of some people that a man acquitted of a charge of rape or murder is nonetheless

[7] "Antigone," in Sophocles, *The Theban Plays*, trans. E. F. Watling, Penguin ed. (London, 1947), pp. 142–43.

guilty.[8] On the other hand, there are certain cases in which the state should not intervene even if it could do so—e.g., the dismissal from the police force of an officer who refuses, despite the direct and obvious nexus between the information sought and the responsibilities of his position, to testify even before a non-legal but properly constituted tribunal of his superior officers concerning his alleged collaboration with dope-peddlers. But between these two extremes there still remains a vast intermediate range of instances in which governments may properly undertake to protect men from non-legal sanctions which in effect invalidate a constitutional or legal right. In line with this principle—a principle long grasped by some of our more perceptive legal and political thinkers[9] and incorporated in considerable measure into American constitutional law by the decision of the Supreme Court in *United States* v. *Classic*[10] more than a decade ago—governments have in fact sponsored legislation which, like the Wagner Act, prevented an employer from dismissing an employee for joining a labor union, or which, like fair employment practices acts, seeks to curb certain discriminatory practices by private powers. And it is in line with this same principle that governments might well prevent a university from dismissing a member of its faculty if his sole offense is that he has invoked the protection of the Constitution in refusing to answer questions put to him by a legislative investigating committee. I do not mean to imply by this that a refusal to testify under protection of the Fifth Amendment is necessarily to be condoned. But it ought not to be automatically condemned; for a decision not to testify may involve profound and complex ethical as well as legal considerations to which automatic condemnation and consequent social punishment are blind, not to mention the fact that they violate the spirit of the constitutional amendment itself.

Similar considerations support the proposition that legal authorities are to be condemned when they circumvent, and indeed violate, the Constitution in employing indirect (non-legal) sanctions to coerce an individual in cases where the law itself does not give them that power. Consider, for example, the not infrequent behavior of a congressional investigating committee. If the primary purpose of—and warrant for—such a committee is to gather information as a basis for recommending legislation, then a private or closed hearing would normally enable it to achieve this end without exposing the citizen to non-legal penalties. If the committee is not only indifferent to this last consideration but, through a second and open hearing that adds nothing but publicity to answers already vouchsafed or refused by the witness, deliberately contrives a situation that brings social and economic sanctions into play, it in effect converts such non-legal sanctions into indirect forms of legal action. This all too common effect of the sustained congressional investigations into the loyalty of university professors and others is a calculated perversion of power that raises serious questions concerning the justice of governmental behavior.

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[8] But if in such an instance the state cannot prevent moral disapprobation, and even perhaps the imposition of social and economic sanctions, by those whose sentiments may have been outraged, it can at least assume the obligation not to leave the acquitted man impoverished if in establishing his innocence he has been compelled to exhaust his funds.

[9] See, for example, Morris R. Cohen, *Law and the Social Order* (New York, 1933), especially pp. 41–68, 102–11; Edgar Bodenheimer, "Power and Law: A Study of the Concept of Law," *Ethics*, Vol. 50, pp. 127–43, at pp. 133–35 (Jan., 1940); Alexander H. Pekelis, *Law and Social Action*, ed. Milton R. Konvitz (Ithaca, N. Y., 1950), pp. 91–127; and Robert L. Hale, *Freedom through Law* (New York, 1952). On the mutual dependence of legal and non-legal social controls, there is, of course, a vast literature—e.g., the writings of Ihering and Gierke, Edward A. Ross and Max Weber, Robert M. MacIver and Bertrand Russell. Some of the juristic thinkers are considered in Julius Stone, *The Province and Function of Law*, 2d printing (Sydney, Australia, 1950), Chs. 11 and 24.

[10] 313 U.S. 299 (1940). See further the cases and discussion in Robert K. Carr, *Federal Protection of Civil Rights* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1947), Ch. 4.

What is involved, consequently, is not only the obligation of the citizen to the state but also the responsibility of the state—certainly, at least, of a constitutional state—to the citizen.

The dilemma of the citizen, then, may derive not simply from a conflict between the commands of the state and the dictates of his conscience. It may emerge as well from the incompatibility of an enacted law or of the acts of governmental authorities or of private powers with the constitution of the state, understanding by the constitution not simply the written rules that comprise a revered document but the logic or underlying principle of the system which the Constitution (written and unwritten) is supposed to represent. In this circumstance the dilemma of the citizen takes another, and perhaps more aggravated, form than Antigone's moral problem; for the citizen here believes that he is being loyal to the Constitution in rejecting the obligation to obey the law (or the bidding of a legal authority). He is not pitting simply his conscience against the law but also the law against the Constitution. He is asserting that in defending the fundamental law he is being more loyal than those who would compel him to violate it. He invokes not (or not merely) the Fifth but the First Amendment, which, while thus far rejected by the courts in such cases, nevertheless appears to him the proper ground on which to take his stand.[11]

It is easy to say, and to say rightly, that there are legal mechanisms for the resolution of a conflict between an enacted law (or the bidding of a legal authority) and the Constitution, and that it is not the business of the citizen to displace such mechanisms by self-arrogation. But such mechanisms—e.g., the Supreme Court—do not always restrict social or economic or religious power groups from attaching severe penalties to action that is legally right. What is legally right may be deemed socially or economically or morally wrong. Consequently, the moral question for the citizen remains, all the more so since there is no legal machinery to prevent coercive action by non-legal power groups, by *private* governments.

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[11] It is not without interest that even a near-absolutist like Hobbes would in the immediate circumstances seem to sanction a man's refusal to obey. "No man," Hobbes declared, "is tied by any compacts whatsoever to accuse himself, or any other, by whose damage he is like to procure himself a bitter life . . . yet in a public trial he may, by torture, be forced to make answer. But such answers are no testimony of the fact, but helps for the searching out of truth; insomuch that whether the party tortured answer true or false, or whether he answer not at all, whatsoever he doth, he doth it by right." *De Cive*, II, 19.

III

What, then, is the citizen to do? If he obeys the law, he may violate his conscience. If he obeys his conscience, he may violate the law. If he obeys his conscience and seeks to vindicate his alleged disobedience by invoking the protection of the Constitution, he exposes himself to social or economic sanctions that are sometimes more powerful than the legal penalties that might have been applied had he not claimed that protection. The state, where it is not itself the deliberate *provocateur*, is indifferent to his fate in this last circumstance. Should he then be indifferent to the state?

The answer of the state, at least, is clear. It is no. There can be no law to which obedience is optional, no command to which the state attaches an "if you please." Consequently, there can be no legal right to disobey the law. Nor will the state, customarily, recognize a moral claim to disobedience. It may be urged that conscientious objectors often escape the prescribed legal punishments by appealing to a higher law. But this is only half true. For they escape such consequences only because a court or a statute admits such a claim as a legal one. The state, so to speak, incorporates the higher law into the positive law; it proclaims that in such cases it is lawful for some men to follow a certain course of action denied to the populace at large.

The state, then, demands obedience to its laws; and while it employs (or can employ) a number of different arguments to vindicate this claim,[12] its primary justification is the ground that such obedience is essential to the maintenance of the social order. Order, it is said, is better than disorder; and if men are free to set aside the laws of the state whenever they find them in conflict with their private interests, particular religion, or individual sense of morality, anarchy will result. Disobedience to the laws, therefore, involves an attack on the state itself. It is an act of rebellion, an attempt to subvert the foundations of the entire system of order which it is the business of the state to secure. This is why Socrates rejected Crito's suggestion that he flee to escape execution. What reply could he make, Socrates asked Crito, if the Athenian government should come to him and say:

> Tell us, Socrates, . . . what are you about? are you not going by an act of yours to overturn us—the laws, and the whole state, as far as in you lies? Do you imagine that a state can subsist and not be overthrown, in which the decisions of law have no power, but are set aside and trampled upon by individuals? . . . Tell us,—What complaint have you to make against us which justifies you in attempting to destroy us and the state? . . . And because we think right to destroy you, do you think that you have any right to destroy us in return, and your country as far as in you lies?[13]

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[12] Cf. T. H. Green, *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation* (London, 1924 ed.); J. P. Plamenatz, *Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation* (London, 1938), Chs. 1–4; Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York, 1947), pp. 324–73, 382–92; and Ernest Barker, *Principles of Social and Political Theory* (Oxford, 1951), Bk. V.

[13] *Crito* (trans. Benjamin Jowett), 50–51.

He could, Crito admitted, make no answer. Since by his failure to emigrate Socrates had agreed to abide by the laws, he could not now disavow that covenant. He could not through disobedience seek to overthrow the state.[14]

Clearly there is merit in this position. Order is a necessary condition to the achievement of larger values; and if order is to be maintained there must be power, and a general readiness on the part of men to abide by the commands of power. But the merit is a relative one. Order in itself is not a *sufficient* condition for the realization of those values, and a government which merely secures order without, or at the expense of, those larger values, lacks moral vindication. Under such circumstances, it might well be argued that anarchy or disorder is to be preferred—not for its own sake but for the opportunity it provides to recreate the requisite conditions for a better human existence. Thus, while order is good, it is not necessarily the highest good. We must still distinguish the just or the decent order; we must still recognize that order is but a means to some larger end.[15] Epictetus may command our sympathy when he observes: "Did heaven owe me perfect parents?—No; it owed me parents." But, as Aristotle reminded Plato, it is surely a shallow philosophy that ignores the vast difference between a family and a state. And if we are to adhere to the principle of democracy, then not order but a certain kind of order—one based on opinion, on consent—constitutes the necessary framework of justice.

This being so, it is hard to see what absolute moral claim democracy can make on those who withhold their fundamental consent. Anarchists, communists, fascists, and others who deny—not through revolutionary action but through civil disobedience—the authority of the social order which democracy seeks to maintain, appeal instead to some alternative principle of justice. If they obey the laws of democracy, they do so for reasons of expediency, not of principle. It is true that fascists like Lawrence Dennis who affirm fidelity to the notion that might makes right are by this standard logically committed to the acceptance of democracy where it prevails; for democracy by virtue of the fact that it prevails has might and is therefore "right."[16] But democracy is not responsible for the confused arguments of its opponents. Nor can it without denying its very essence stand on any principle other than that of generalized consent. Consequently, democracy must recognize that for men who reject its values and refuse their assent to its system of order the dictates of democratic government appear as the commands of an illegitimate power. And where that power can be defied, especially with some expectation of success, opponents of democracy will claim a moral right to do so. In this regard they claim no more, on purely formalistic grounds, with respect to democratic systems than democrats do with respect to oligarchical systems. Hence the problem for democracy is not that of validating its own claim to their obedience, but that of allowing them that degree of civil disobedience which will balance the need for its own institutional preservation with its ultimate values, especially the provision for maximum free play for the individual conscience. Democracy can, to be sure, offer an opposing value judgment; but it cannot—without invoking intuition or divine or natural sanction or the proposition that might makes right—*prove* that its value system is truly best. Consequently, while democracy must, in defense of its own values, reject the scheme of justice proposed by the anti-democrats, it must at the same time face the uncomfortable fact that on intrinsic grounds it lacks an absolute moral standard in terms of which it can justly disavow the right of civil disobedience to those who deny the validity of the social order.[17]

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[14] The fact that Socrates was in prison at the very moment he was thus arguing against Crito's plea that he disobey the law, reinforces the contention in note 1 above that Socrates did not actually accept this position; that he was in fact prepared to yield only a qualified obedience to the laws.

[15] For this reason skeptics have put the argument for social order not in terms of right but in terms of convenience. The difficulty here, of course, is that it then becomes "right" to disobey whenever the social order ceases to be convenient.

[16] I do not mean to imply that Mr. Dennis accepts the logic of his own position. See my *Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought* (New York, 1949), Ch. 3. For the absurdity of the "principle" that might makes right see the classic argument in Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, Book I, Ch. 3. Compare, however, Spinoza, *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Ch. 16, and *Tractatus Politicus*, Chs. 2–4.

It may of course be argued that men who reject democracy should leave the state, that if they stay, as Socrates stayed, they assume the obligation to obey its laws.[18] And we have, in point of fact, instances in our time in which the right of egress has been exercised—e.g., T. S. Eliot, George Santayana, and Ezra Pound; even, perhaps, Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman, who rejoiced when they arrived (albeit after an unintended and involuntary voyage) in Lenin's Russia. But apart from the practical objections that the state does not always grant the right of egress and that there may not be another state which embodies the "right" political system and social order—witness the tragic tale of Emma Goldman's disenchantment with Russia[19]—I fail to comprehend the moral character of this solution. I recognize that while on intrinsic grounds democracy affirms that each man's conscience is "right," it must set instrumental limits on this "right"; that, operationally speaking, the notion that each man is entitled to have any conscience he wants does not imply that he has a right to subordinate the laws to his conscience. Nevertheless, if democracy insists that all men are subject to the laws, it must also insist that all men are protected by the laws, that all men have an equal right (say) to life and liberty. A majority under this principle has no absolute moral justification to limit this right except where it has secured the consent of the governed—not, of course, in the sense that consent is given to each particular law, but in the sense that generalized consent or consensus is accorded the system under which that majority has come to power. This being so, what moral principle justifies a democracy in going outside the area of consent to deny the right of civil disobedience to a recalcitrant individual or minority? What principle other than force gives a democratic people the right to exclude those who reject democracy from that portion of the earth possessed by the democrats? Clearly, the argument asserts only that the bulk of the people regard a particular system as just, and that those who do not accept this valuation shall nonetheless be required to submit.[20] But if consent is acknowledged to be the ultimate source of authority, the appeal to force leaves unanswered (where it does not negate) the question of justice—whether that system is good or, indeed, best. This is not to deny that even the *best* system may depend on a measure of force to maintain itself; it is only to affirm that the resort to force, even when successful, cannot of itself establish that a system is best.

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[17] Some writers have sought in intuition or in natural law an "objective" criterion in terms of which they could show that democracy is intrinsically and not merely instrumentally best—e.g., Walter T. Stace, *The Destiny of Western Man* (New York, 1942) and Mortimer J. Adler and Walter Farrell, "The Theory of Democracy," *The Thomist*, Vols. 3–7 (July, 1941–Jan., 1944)—but all such efforts rest ultimately on certain assumptions which cannot be *proved.* See further my "Power, Law, and Freedom of Inquiry," in *Educational Freedom in an Age of Anxiety*, ed. H. Gordon Hullfish (New York, 1953), pp. 52–69, at pp. 59–65.

[18] For a recent (though qualified) restatement of this position, see Gray L. Dorsey, "The Necessity of Authority to Freedom," in *Freedom and Authority in Our Time*, ed. Lyman Bryson *et al.* (New York, 1953), pp. 317–33, at pp. 329–31.

[19] See her autobiography, *Living My Life*, 2 vols. (New York, 1931), Vol. 2, pp. 726–927.

I return, therefore, to the position that where consent is withheld from the entire system of order itself, democracy's claim to obedience with respect to such dissidents rests on power, not on a universal morality. Consequently, democracy cannot insist, without denying its own framework of justice—the principle of consent—that such individuals or groups obey the law. In such cases it can only resort to the rule of expediency referred to above—namely, that of disallowing only that expression of the individual conscience which is incompatible with democracy's own ultimate values and institutional preservation.[21]

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[20] This was clearly perceived by Justice Holmes, who with typical frankness wrote to Frederick Pollock: "I do think that man at present is a predatory animal. I think that the sacredness of human life is a purely municipal ideal of no validity outside the jurisdiction. I believe that force, mitigated so far as may be by good manners, is the *ultima ratio*, and between two groups that want to make inconsistent kinds of worlds I see no remedy except force." *Holmes-Pollock Letters*, ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1942), Vol. 2, p. 36. And again, in letters to Harold J. Laski: " . . . all law means I will kill you if necessary to make you conform to my requirements." " . . . there is no superior arbiter —it is one of taste—but when men differ in taste as to the kind of world they want the only thing to do is to go to work killing." *Holmes-Laski Letters,* ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1953), Vol. 1, pp. 16, 116.

[21] I am not unaware of the objection that the state cannot regard as irrelevant the effects of such disobedience on others. There is an immense difference, it is said, between disobeying the law when it conflicts with my principles or preferences if such disobedience does not injure others, and disobeying the law at the cost of injury to others. This argument has great force, and in general I think it proper that men should obey even unjust laws when disobedience has the effect of worsening, rather than improving, the situation. But the argument seems to me also to beg two of the very questions at issue: whether the law (and more important the system itself) does in fact injure others, and whether the numerical calculus is a proper principle of justice. In disobeying the law under the circum-

IV

Of those who accept democracy as the theoretically or practically best political order, yet contemplate disobedience to the law, two classes of citizens must, I think, be distinguished. One denies the intrinsic merit or rationality of the law itself; the other challenges as well the claim of the particular form of state enacting the law to be called a democracy.

For this latter group, democracy is good but the state is not democratic; hence with respect to the principle of political obligation their attitude toward the political order is not essentially different from that of those who accept the state as democratic but deny that democracy is good. They not only argue, with Aristotle,[22] that a government democratic in form may be oligarchical in fact; they insist further that a careful examination of the American political system discloses it to be formally insufficient as well. From their point of view, the American Senate (based on a quota system that does violence to the principle of popular representation), the Supreme Court (with its power of judicial review), the staggered system of elections (which not infrequently prevents a popular majority from becoming a legal or controlling majority), the involved apparatus that separates and checks powers so as to deadlock no less than to balance them, the amending clause (which puts the Constitution itself beyond the reach of normal majorities)—all these and more (e.g., suffrage restrictions, gerrymandering, and the like) are but devices to hinder and at times effectively to block the translation of public opinion into public policy. Even the sacred rules of the game may be changed by the group in power when those rules no longer operate to that group's advantage. This is amply evidenced by the history of the Supreme Court with respect, for example, to the Fourteenth Amendment.

Knowing these things (or feeling this way), a citizen confronted by what he conceives to be a morally reprehensible law (or an action under that law) has difficulty in accepting the argument that he should express his disapproval not through civil disobedience but through the regular legal and political channels available to him. In his view, it is simply not true that these legal and political channels *are* available to him, that is, available in the way that democracy ideally requires. Such a citizen might agree that all human contrivances are imperfect. He might admit, too, that it is great folly, if not fanaticism, to insist on the perfectibility of political institutions regardless of consequences. Nevertheless, if it is not simply to evoke his blind acquiescence, a democratic system must above all be democratic; it must embody to a major degree elements of that

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stances cited here, the dissident takes the position that it is the law (and the system of order as well) which inflicts the injury, and that by disobeying the law he is calling the attention of the people to the injustice of the state. Moreover, if justice involves injury to others, then it is "just" that such injury be inflicted upon them. (In this event, of course, the dissident might well contend that the injury is apparent rather than real.) In any case, the objection does little more than return us to the fundamental issue at stake: which of the conflicting value systems is truly best or just?

[22] *Politics*, 1292b.

just political order which it purportedly represents. If it falls so far short of this ideal as to foreclose any real possibility of correcting legislative evils by (say) normal majorities, if the political mechanism obstructs public opinion by institutionalizing various forms of minority control, it is in fact not a democracy at all. It is a perverted form of democratic government and, as such, it is bound to rely on unjust laws.[23]

To the extent that there is substance in this view—in the sense that the indictment of institutional arrangements is sound—men committed to democracy are under no moral obligation to obey "undemocratic" laws. Those who place a different weight on the shortcomings of the system may deplore their judgment in this regard, but if the shortcomings are serious and real they cannot in democracy's name be asked to give absolute obedience to a less-than-democratic (and to this degree undemocratic) system. Like the good churchgoers of Concord who were taken ill when Thoreau asked them also to read the Bible, protagonists of the system might well be discomfited and silenced when confronted, for instance, by a Negro suffering political and educational discrimination in one of our states, or an interned Nisei, who to justify an act of civil disobedience asks but a single question: "Is this the content of democracy?"

V

We come, finally, to those democrats who accept the system as essentially democratic and who are prepared, on the whole, to obey the laws. They understand that government by consent means consent not to each particular law but to the entire system of order itself, and ultimately to the idea of justice which that system represents. For the sake of the greater good secured by that system through its government and its laws, they accept specific enactments which they otherwise disapprove. They obey not necessarily because they think that the law is right, but because they think it right to obey the law.[24]

For this reason they reject the individualistic ethics of a Protagoras, who would justify disobedience to the law provided you can get away with it, or of a Harold Laski or of a Thoreau, who would demand of each law that it provide "moral adequacy,"[25] or of other legal and political theorists who would measure the obligation of a citizen to the law in terms of the degree to which it serves some other end. If a man's loyalty is to the system, then obedience cannot be determined solely by immediate approbation. He cannot attempt to evaluate the law simply in terms of its expressed content;[26] nor can he separate laws from their cumulative total effect on the assumption that disobedience to a particular law leaves unaffected the system of law. Very few laws are accepted unanimously, and if the considerable number of citizens who dislike a law are literally free to disobey it, the state and the social order can hardly be expected to survive. A plea for total disobedience, or for the right of total disobedience, logically entails not a state at all but anarchy.

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[23] There is substantial though not complete truth in Aristotle's dictum that "a well-formed government will have good laws, a bad one, bad ones." *Ibid.*, 1282b.

[24] See R. M. MacIver, *The Modern State* (London, 1926), p. 154. This is not to argue that reason is the only, or the decisive, factor in leading men to obey laws which they regard as unjust. Habit, indolence, deference, fear, and the like, are in most cases the crucial determinants of obedience. See James Bryce, *Studies in History and Jurisprudence* (New York, 1901), pp. 467 ff., and R. M. MacIver, *The Web of Government* (New York, 1947), pp. 73–81.

[25] "My problem," Laski wrote to Holmes, "is to take away from the state the superior morality with which we have invested its activities and give them [*sic*] back to the individual conscience." *Holmes-Laski Letters* (cited in note 20), Vol. 1, p. 23. See further his *Authority in the Modern State* (New Haven, 1919), Ch. 1, especially pp. 43, 46, 55; *A Grammar of Politics*, 4th ed. (London, 1938), Part I; and *Studies in Law and Politics* (New Haven, 1932), Ch. 11. So also Thoreau: "Must the citizen ever for a moment, or in the

Does it follow that the citizen who admits his obligation to obey the laws must obey *all* laws *always?* Is one who rejects the extreme individualism of a Laski compelled to accept the extreme absolutism of a Hegel,[27] or the near-absolutism of a Hobbes[28] or of a John Dickinson, who join with Socrates of the *Crito* in entering an affirmative answer? If a law is disobeyed, they tell us, the social order will collapse. In their view, each law is an integral part of a coherent, corporate body of law, which in turn sustains society. Consequently, disobedience to a law is a challenge to sovereignty itself. As Dickinson put it: "It is not a question of a bare conflict between the individual and the sovereign; the conflict must be regarded as rather between the individual and all that the sovereign stands for." In disobeying the sovereign we bring "dominantly into the foreground the large issue of the desirability of preserving public authority and civil society itself." In disobeying the sovereign we strike at just this essential method of civil society.[29]

This is a plausible argument. It avoids the individualistic fallacy by emphasizing the need for order and the role of law in maintaining that order. But it is not without fallacies of its own. What holds society together, for example, is not simply law (and perhaps not even law) but the customs and moral codes, the sentiments, of the people. The classic formulation of T. H. Green

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least degree, resign his conscience to the legislator? Why has every man a conscience, then? I think that we should be men first, and subjects afterward. It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, as much as for the right. The only obligation which I have a right to assume is to do at any time what I think right." Thoreau, "Civil Disobedience" (cited in note 6), pp. 636–37.

[26] This is convincingly demonstrated in Felix S. Cohen, *Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals* (New York, 1933), pp. 62–65.

[27] There is, however, a certain ambiguity in Hegel's absolutism, stemming from his apparent insistence that Antigone in refusing to obey the law of the state was both right and wrong. Cf. Georg W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J. B. Baillie, 2 vols. (New York, 1910), Vol. 2, pp. 453 ff., and Georg W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford, 1942), pp. 3–10, 100, 114–15, 165–73, and the relevant translator's notes on pp. 299, 301, and 351. Hegel's subordination of the state (the highest reality within the realm of right) to philosophical truth (the highest reality within the whole system) is emphasized in Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution* (New York, 1941), p. 178.

[28] For Hobbes' denial that political obligation requires an absolute obedience to all laws, see for example *De Cive*, VI, 13; VIII, 1; and XV, 18.

[29] "A Working Theory of Sovereignty" (cited in note 1), pp. 50–51.

still applies: it is not the state that produces cohesive will; it is will that creates and sustains the state.[30] Political loyalties and political obligations do not exclude other loyalties and other obligations, and it is the meaning of democracy that it does not seek to command a monopoly of man's allegiances. Democracy seeks to root its fundamental unity not in the power of the state but in the sense of common interest that sustains but does not obliterate the vital differences among men.[31] So long as these differences are admitted, with respect not simply to things that do not matter much but to things that touch the very heart of the existing order as well,[32] the democratic state can find its essential solidarity not in the structure of law but in the minds of men.

Nor does the absolutist position rest on solid ground when it assumes that all laws form a coherent unity, so that disobedience to a particular law necessarily involves the destruction of the entire system of law. Evasion of the law is a normal concomitant of all legal systems, and it is doubtful that the existence of jails constitutes sufficient proof of the breakdown of the system. We are all familiar with the propensity of people not in jails to disobey laws that inconvenience them—e.g., traffic regulations, income tax laws, and prohibitions on gambling and on the traffic in liquor and women. Police and other political officials do not enforce all laws equally and at times they conspire with people who seek to disobey them. Governments too evade or disobey the law—witness the oft-cited examples of Southern states that have largely ignored the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the American Constitution; of the many Congresses that have failed to apply the constitutional provision (Sec. 2, Amend. XIV) requiring that the representation of such states in the House of Representatives be reduced; and of the refusal of the Congress in 1920 to carry out the required reapportionment of the House of Representatives. Despite these and other acts of disobedience, the system of law has not, I think, disappeared. Clearly, *some* laws are not essential to the maintenance of the social order.

If, therefore, the state is not equivalent to the whole of the social order, and if all laws are not integrated into a single coherent unity, disobedience to a particular law need not imply an attempt to overthrow the political system or the social order itself. To Dickinson's charge that the conflict is between the individual and all that the sovereign stands for, we must reply: the conflict is also between the sovereign and all that the individual stands for. It may even, in fact, be between the actual sovereign and all that the ideal sovereign stands for. In these two points, I believe, we can find a sufficient justification for *some* acts of civil disobedience.

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[30] See also Elijah Jordan, *Theory of Legislation; An Essay on the Dynamics of Public Mind* (Chicago, 1952).

[31] Cf. MacIver, *The Modern State*, p. 482; Dorothy Fosdick, *What is Liberty?* (New York, 1939), p. 128; and the writer's *Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought*, pp. 204–6, 247–48.

[32] As Mr. Justice Jackson so aptly put it in *West Virginia State Board of Education* v. *Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). See also the interesting argument of Charles R. Nixon, "Freedom vs. Unity: A Problem in the Theory of Civil Liberty," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 68, pp. 70–88 (March, 1953).

Consider, first, what is involved when the state demands that an individual obey not his conscience but the law. In a general sense, it appears to ask only that he recognize the necessity of compromise if men are to live together. But when the issue is joined so that men question the justice of the terms on which they are asked to live together, the state requires far more: it demands nothing less than that he submit to a civil theology.[33] For if action contrary to conscience is immoral, the state by insisting that the individual follow not his conscience but a command of the state contrary to his conscience thereby insists that he act immorally. Since the state will not admit that its command is immoral, it must—if it is to vindicate its claim to obedience—argue that the judgment of the individual conscience is wrong, and that by acting instead according to the state's judgment of what is right the individual will realize his true morality, his true freedom. There are many who still take seriously this teaching of Rousseau, Hegel, and Bosanquet. Nevertheless, the notion that the state embodies our real will, our true morality, our true freedom, as against our actual will, which is said to represent a false morality, is incompatible with the democratic principle. For democracy, if I understand it correctly, stands above all else for a method whereby men can resolve peacefully which of competing moralities shall temporarily prevail. It cannot—if it is to remain a democracy—maintain that it has discovered the true morality which shall henceforth bind all men. Yet when the government of a democratic state demands of a citizen that he surrender his conscience to the state—as it demanded of Jehovah's Witnesses that they (or their children) salute the flag—it in effect demands that he submit to the true morality. From this point of view, imprisonment for civil disobedience becomes, paradoxically, a prolonged appeal to the prisoner's conscience, detention being but a means of permitting his conscience time in which to adjust,[34] after the state has by putting him in prison already denied the validity of his conscience.

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[33] This, indeed, is what Lincoln frankly urged in his address in 1838 on "The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions": "Let every American, every lover of liberty, every well wisher to his prosperity, swear by the blood of the Revolution, never to violate in the least particular, the laws of the country; and never to tolerate their violation by others. . . . let every man remember that to violate the law, is to trample on the blood of his father, and to tear the character of his own, and his children's liberty. Let reverence for the laws, be breathed by every American mother, to the lisping babe, that prattles on her lap—let it be taught in schools, in seminaries, and in colleges; let it be written in primers, spelling books, and in Almanacs;—let it be preached from the pulpit, proclaimed in legislative halls, and enforced in courts of justice. And, in short, let it become the *political religion* of the nation; and let the old and the young, the rich and the poor, the grave and the gay, of all sexes and tongues, and colors and conditions, sacrifice unceasingly upon its altars." *Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings,* ed. Roy P. Basler (Cleveland, 1946), pp. 80–81.

[34] In employing here a modified phrase from Professor Stone, *The Province and Function of Law* (cited in note 9), p. 228, I do not mean to associate him with the doctrine in the text.

To escape this dilemma democracy must deny the theological sanction. It cannot assume what Eric Voegelin suggests the Oxford political philosophers have assumed: namely, that by the mystery of incarnation the principles of right political order have become historical flesh more perfectly in their country than anywhere else at any time.[35] It must recognize that the political order is not perfect and that the laws are not always just. It must affirm no more than that a law is law not because it is absolutely good or right but because a legal majority has decreed it. Democracy would, of course, insist that it is right for the majority to have this power, and that men should respect this right of the majority as a necessary condition of democracy. But if it is true that the majority may act wrongly—i.e., affront on intrinsic or instrumental grounds the notion of justice held by a dissenting individual or minority—such insistence leads to the paradoxical principle that while the system and the laws that institutionalize that system are just, particular laws emanating from the system may be wrong and therefore unjust. A just system may produce unjust laws.

Now the Aristotelian question—whether a good man can always be a good citizen—has traditionally formed the basis for the problem of political obligation. But if there is validity to the conception of citizenship that I have argued here, the mark of the good citizen—at least in a democracy—is not loyalty to the laws but loyalty to the system, to the principle of democracy itself. The good citizen is obligated not to the sovereign but to all that the sovereign stands for.[36] Consequently, law can command his allegiance not because it is law but because it serves something that is good, because it respects the system of democracy and the purposes for which the democratic state exists.[37] If he obeys simply because it is law, he worships means, not ends; and this is surely a perversion of purpose.

When, therefore, a government holding office and trust under that system so acts—whether directly through its laws or indirectly through non-legal sanctions and the cultivation of a climate of opinion characterized by suspicion and fear—as to deny or to threaten the integrity of the system itself, it creates a situation in which men loyal to democracy may be compelled to defend it against the laws.

It has been urged, not perhaps without reason, that such defense should look first to the democratic processes of persuasion and election.[38] But where it is precisely these processes that the laws attack, where the incursions of government are upon freedom of opinion and the elements of democratic procedure, this may well prove a vain hope. Men are not without warrant in saying today what men have all too often had to say before: the times are "out of joint." Once again, this is a moment when the ordinary rules of decency are to some men in power apparently unknown, when some men cloaked in the sanctity of the law seek to exorcise the spirit of free inquiry.[39] Under such circumstances, it may well be that obedience to democracy can best, and perhaps only, be served by disobedience to the laws. It may well be that men of moral sensitivity and courage will have to say, with Thoreau: "They are the lovers of law and order who observe the law when the government breaks it."[40]

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[35] Eric Voegelin, "The Oxford Political Philosophers," *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 3, pp. 97–114, at p. 100 (April, 1953).

[36] This is not, perhaps, inconsistent with Aristotle who, while he defines a citizen as "one who obeys the magistrate" (*Politics*, 1277a), also affirms that the one care common to all the citizens—that which *describes* a citizen—is "the safety of the community" (*ibid.*, 1276b).

[37] Despite certain phrases in which Professor Barker seems to argue that obedience to the law is the highest political obligation (*op. cit.*, p. 194), I take his general position to be in accord with the proposition affirmed here: that it is the state, not the law, which merits that obedience. Clearly, he concurs with the further judgment that since the state is less than society, obedience to law must be subordinate to obedience to right, the highest moral obligation. *Ibid.*, pp. 193, 221 ff.

VI

Whether laws prescribing affirmations of loyalty, or sustaining legislative inquiries into one's past or present beliefs and associations, or proscribing the expression of revolutionary ideas, are of this variety, each man must judge for himself. If he dislikes such laws but does not regard them to be a crucial violation of or threat to democracy, he will obey them. If, however, he views such measures as destructive of the very principles that constitute the system to which he has given his allegiance and which he is pledged to uphold, he may see no moral alternative to disobedience.[41] In the judgment of others, his conscience may be wrong; but if he is to retain his dignity as a man he must act upon it. He may fail by such action to impress the value of his idea on others, but in no other way can he hope to correct the tragic lesson of history which "shows that good causes are more often defeated by negligence in the pursuit of the right than by positive forces of evil."[42]

So long as a man comes to this decision honestly, in accord with moral principles to which he is firmly committed, and so long as his act of disobedience is calculated—taking the whole situation into view—to achieve a greater good than is likely to be achieved by his acquiescence, I cannot believe that he can be said to have denied his fundamental obligation either as a good man or as a good citizen.[43]

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[38] So Lincoln in the address cited earlier (note 33, above, Basler, p. 81: ". . . bad laws, if they exist, should be replaced as soon as possible, still while they continue in force, for the sake of example, they should be religiously observed."

[39] It is well to recall the insight of Spinoza: "All men are born ignorant, and before they can learn the right way of life and acquire the habit of virtue, the greater part of their life . . . has passed away." Spinoza, *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, trans. R. H. M. Elwes, Ch. 16.

[40] "Slavery in Massachusetts," in *op. cit.*, p. 669. Compare the principles and grounds of justifiable disobedience in Franz L. Neumann, "On the Limits of Justifiable Disobedience," in *Conflict of Loyalties*, ed. R. M. MacIver (New York, 1952), pp. 49–56.

[41] Apart, of course, from the submission that looks to God. So Hobbes argued (*De Cive*, XVIII, 13): "Must we resist princes, when we cannot obey them? Truly, no; for this is contrary to our civil covenant. What must we do then? Go to Christ by martyrdom. . . . " And so the author of the *Vindiciae contra tyrannos* (trans. as Hubert Languet, *A Defence of Liberty against Tyrants*, ed. Harold J. Laski [London, 1924], p. 210), who, in the silence of the magistrates and the failure of men to run away, insisted that "there are no other weapons to be used, but bended knees and humble hearts."

[42] M. R. Cohen, *The Meaning of Human History* (La Salle, Ill., 1947), p. 296.

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[43] To rely on conscience, integrity, and the capacity of man to judge rationally the probable consequences of his act of disobedience is insufficient, perhaps, to meet the objection of those who demand proof both of moral inescapability and of intellectual adequacy. But in the absence of an ethical absolutism and of a determinate aristocracy that embodies this alleged moral and intellectual superiority—and clearly democracy cannot in principle admit either alternative—I see no way to escape this trust.

NATIONALISM IN TROPICAL AFRICA*

JAMES S. COLEMAN

University of California at Los Angeles

Postwar uprisings and nationalist assertions in Tropical Africa—that part of the continent south of the Sahara and north of the Union—have directed increased attention towards the nature and implications of the awakening of the African to political consciousness. Among scholars this neglected area has long been the preserve of the scientific linguist or of the social anthropologist; only recently have American sociologists, economists, and political scientists developed an active interest in its problems.[1] As a consequence, apart from certain efforts by anthropologists to popularize their findings and insights we have been obliged to rely primarily upon the somewhat contradictory accounts of colonial governments seeking to explain imperial connections, or of African nationalists determined to achieve self-government and the good life of which national self-determination has become the symbol.[2] Thus, we have been placed in the uncomfortable position of having to formulate opinions and policy and to render judgments without sufficient knowledge, or, what could be worse, on the basis of evaluations provided by participants in the nationalist struggle. There is, therefore, a very real need for independent and objective research regarding the character and probable course of African nationalist development.

I. WHAT IS AFRICAN NATIONALISM?

Not the least burdensome of our tasks is the problem of correlating or distinguishing between the generally accepted political concepts elaborated with specific reference to developments in the Western World (i.e., state, nation, nationality, nationalism) and the conceptual tools developed by the Africanists. The latter have tended to feel that the traditional concepts and methods of the political scientist are unserviceable in the study of the political structure and life of pre-literate societies.[3] Yet notwithstanding the importance of the lineage, clan, or tribe; the role of the diviner, the chief, or the age-grade society; or the wide variations in the organization of power within such societies, the concept and the institution of the modern nation-state, towards the creation of which African nationalism tends to be directed, is distinctly Western in its form and content. It is as exotic to Africa as Professor Toynbee has suggested that it is to the rest of the non-European world.[4] Nevertheless, just as the Indian National Congress has largely created an Indian nation, so African nationalists are endeavoring to mould new nations in Africa (e.g., "Ghana," "Nigeria," and "Kamerun").

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[1] Two notable prewar exceptions were Professor Raymond Leslie Buell and Dr. Ralph J. Bunche.

[2] As an excellent example of the application of the insights of anthropology to the problems of political development in this area, see William R. Bascom, "West and Central Africa," in *Most of the World,* ed. Ralph Linton (New York, 1949), pp. 331–405. For a historian's appraisal, see Vernon McKay, "Nationalism in British West Africa," *Foreign Policy Reports,* Vol. 24, pp. 2–11 (March 15, 1948).

[3] *African Political Systems,* eds. M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (New York, 1940), pp. 4 ff. Insofar as *traditional* concepts and methods are concerned, ethnocentrism has been freely confessed by political scientists in recent self-criticism. See David Easton, *The Political System* (New York, 1953), pp. 33 ff.; also Report of the Inter-University

On the level of abstraction at which the political scientist is accustomed to roam, a nation is not a loose catch-all term denoting a larger grouping of tribes (e.g., Zulus, Basutos, Mende, Buganda, or Hausa); rather it is a post-tribal, post-feudal terminal *community* which has emerged from the shattering forces of disintegration that characterize modernity. This does not mean that the Hausa peoples of Northern Nigeria cannot become a nation, nor does it mean that the "national" consciousness of the ordinary Hausaman must reach the level of intensity of the average Frenchman before there is a nation. It does suggest, however, that there must be a much greater awareness of a closeness of contact with "national" compatriots as well as with the "national" government.[5] This closeness of contact on the horizontal and vertical levels has been a distinctly Western phenomenon, for the obvious reason that it is the result of modern technology.

Not only is a political scientist quite precise in his use of the concept "nation," but in poaching on the insights of the Africanists he also finds it difficult to place under the cover of "nationalism" all forms of past and present discontent and organizational development in Africa. Thus, it is believed useful at the outset to distinguish the following:

Summer Seminar on Comparative Politics, Social Science Research Council, this REVIEW, Vol. 47, pp. 641–57, at pp. 642–43 (Sept., 1953). Amongst the modernists in political science one finds the argument that the political scientist should not be rejected too readily since he has developed skills and acquired insights that might well shed new light on the political process and pattern of government of pre-literate societies after the anthropologist has exhausted his resources. Another argument, rather different, is that such societies might profitably be regarded as microcosms in which the political scientist can discern with greater clarity the essentials of government that might be obscured in the more complex Western systems. A final argument might be found in the recent psycho-cultural studies, especially in terms of their implications for policy formulation. See Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Who Gets Power and Why," *World Politics*, Vol. 2, pp. 120–34 (Oct., 1949).

[4] Arnold Toynbee, *The World and the West* (New York, 1953), pp. 71 ff. It is difficult to accept without qualification Professor Toynbee's argument that the "national state" was a "spontaneous native growth" in Europe. One could argue that the centrally-minded, nation-building elites of emergent Asia and Africa are but the present-day counterparts of the centralizing monarchs of early modern Europe.

[5] Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Nationalism* (London, 1939), pp. 1–7; Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York, 1953), pp. 1–14.

A. Traditionalist Movements.

1. Spontaneous movements of resistance to the initial European occupation or post-pacification revolts against the imposition of new institutions, or new forms of coercion, referred to herein as "primary resistance."

2. Nativistic, mahdistic, or messianic mass movements—usually of a magico-religious character—which are psychological or emotional outlets for tensions produced by the confusions, frustrations, or socio-economic inequalities of alien rule, referred to herein as "nativism."[6]

B. Syncretistic Movements

1. Separatist religious groups, which have seceded and declared their independence from white European churches either because of the desire for religious independence or because the white clerics were intolerant regarding certain African customs; hereafter referred to as "religious separatism."[7]

2. Kinship associations, organized and led by the Western-educated and urbanized "sons abroad" for the purposes of preserving a sense of identity with the kinfolk in the bush and "brothers" in the impersonal urban center, as well as of providing vehicles for pumping modernity—including the ideas and sentiment of nationalism—into the rural areas.[8]

3. Tribal associations, organized and led by Western-educated elements—usually in collaboration with some traditionalists—who desire to resurrect, or to create for the first time, a tribal sentiment ("tribalism"), for the purpose of establishing large-scale political units, the boundaries of which will be determined by tribal affiliation (i.e., those who accept the *assumption* of common blood and kinship) and the forms of government by a syncretism of tribal and Western institutions.[9]

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[6] Nativism is here used in its broad and universal sense, as defined by the late Professor Ralph Linton: "Any conscious, organized attempt on the part of a society's members to revive or perpetuate selected aspects of its culture." See his "Nativistic Movements," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 45, pp. 230–40, at p. 230 (April–June, 1943). The concept thus includes traditionalist movements in either the European or non-European world. This point is stressed because of the understandable sensitivity of many educated Africans to the root word "native," which as a result of the colonial experience tends to carry with it the connotation of inferiority. See also A. LeGrip, "Aspects Actuels de L'Islam en A.O.F.," *L'Afrique et l'Asie*, pp. 6–20 (No. 24, 1953); Katesa Schlosser, *Propheten in Afrika* (Albert Limbach Verlag, 1949).

[7] Daniel Thwaite, *The Seething African Pot* (London, 1926), pp. 1–70; George Shepperson, "Ethiopianism and African Nationalism," *Phylon*, Vol. 14, pp. 9–18 (1st Quarter, 1953); Hilda Kuper, "The Swazi Reaction to Missions," *African Studies*, Vol. 5, pp. 177–88 (Sept., 1946), Jomo Kenyatta, *Facing Mount Kenya* (London, 1953), pp. 269–79.

[8] James S. Coleman, "The Role of Tribal Associations in Nigeria," Proceedings of the Second Annual Conference of the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research, Ibadan, Nigeria, April, 1952. See also *East Africa and Rhodesia*, October 5, 1951, p. 106: "Nairobi is the happy hunting ground for the organizers of tribal associations, as there are to be found in the city representatives of practically every tribe in East and Central Africa." Also K. A. Busia, *Report on a Social Survey of Takoradi-Sekondi* (Accra, Government Printer, 1950).

[9] Most advanced amongst the Yoruba, Ibo, Ibibio, Ewe, Buganda, and Kikuyu peoples.

C. Modernist Movements

1. Economic-interest groups (labor unions, cooperative societies, professional and middle-class associations) organized and led by Western-educated elements for the purpose of advancing the material welfare and improving the socio-economic status of the members of those groups.

2. Nationalist movements, organized and led by the Westernized elite which is activated by the Western ideas of democracy, progress, the welfare state, and national self-determination, and which aspires *either:* (a) to create modern independent African nation-states possessing an internal state apparatus and external sovereignty and all of the trappings of a recognized member state of international society (e.g., Sudan, Gold Coast, Nigeria, and possibly Sierra Leone); *or* (b) to achieve absolute social and political equality and local autonomy within a broader Eur-African grouping (e.g., French and Portuguese Africa) or within what is manifestly a plural society (e.g., except for Uganda, the territories of British East and Central Africa).[10]

3. Pan-African or trans-territorial movements, organized and led by the Westernized elite, frequently in association with or under the stimulus of American Negroes or West Indians abroad, for the purposes of creating a global *racial* consciousness and unity, or of agitating for the advancement and welfare of members of the *African* race wherever they may be, or of devising plans for future nationalist activity in specific regions.[11]

Once these very arbitrary analytical distinctions are drawn it should be stressed that none of the categories can be treated in isolation. Each of the movements is in one way or another a response to the challenge of alien rule, or of the intrusion of the disintegrating forces—and consequently the insecurity

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[10] The difference between the goal orientations of the two categories of movements is partly the result of the objectives of differing colonial policies (i.e., the British policy of self-government and differentiation versus the French, Portuguese, and in a qualified sense the Belgian policies of assimilation and identity) and in part the result of the presence or absence of a settled white population. Confronted with the overwhelming obstacles to the full realization of *African self-government,* African leaders in the second category tend towards the extreme either of accommodation (Union of South Africa) or of violence (Kenya). In the territories of the Central African Federation the leaders of the African Congress have tended not to define their ultimate objectives, preferring to act empirically. The strength and persistence of the autonomic drive is reflected, however, in their reported attraction to the original Gore-Brown partition plan adopted by the European Confederate party. See David Cole, "How Strong is the African National Congress," *New Commonwealth,* Vol. 27, pp. 5–10, at p. 9 (Jan. 4, 1954).

[11] For a variety of reasons these movements have thus far apparently accomplished little more than to dramatize their existence at infrequent *ad hoc* conferences. Until recently the initiative tended to be taken by Americans or West Indians of African descent (e.g., Marcus Garvey, W. E. B. DuBois, and George Padmore), although in the early 1920's there was a National Congress of British West Africa organized by the late Casely Hayford of the Gold Coast. Also, M. Blaise Diagne, a Senegalese, was President of the first Pan-African Congress in Paris in 1919. For recent pan-African nationalist activity in British West Africa see *West Africa,* Dec. 12, 1953, p. 1165; and for British Central Africa see Cole, *op. cit.,* p. 9.

—of modernity. The recent so-called nationalism in Central Africa has been a mixture of "primary resistance" by the chiefs and traditionalists of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the nationalist agitation of the Westernized elite. Until the project of Federation became an active issue, African movements in this area were confined principally to religious separatist groups, tribal associations, or, in the case of Northern Rhodesia, labor unions.[12] On the West Coast, where nationalism is far more advanced, traditionalist and syncretistic movements have not been and are not absent. In some instances, kinship associations and separatist religious groups have been the antecedents of nationalist organizations; in others they have provided the principal organizational bases of the latter (e.g., the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons was first inaugurated as a federation mainly of kinship associations, and the African National Congress of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland was the product of fusion of several African welfare societies). In certain cases unrest or protest of a nativistic flavor has been instigated by nationalists for their modernist ends; in others nationalists have claimed such uncoordinated uprisings, as well as purely economic protest movements, to be manifestations of "nationalism," when in reality the participants were unaware of such implications.

One of the interesting differences between prewar and postwar nationalism on the West Coast of Africa is that in the former period nationalism tended to be—as Lord Lugard insisted—the esoteric pastime of the tiny educated minorities of Lagos, Accra, Freetown, and Dakar; whereas in the latter period these minorities—greatly expanded and dispersed in new urban centers throughout the interior—have made positive efforts to popularize and energize the nationalist crusade in two ways.[13] The first has been to preach education, welfare, progress, and the ideal of self-government among the masses, largely through the nationalist press, independent African schools, and kinship and tribal associations. The aim here has been, in the words of one of their leading prophets, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, to bring about "mental emancipation" from a servile colonial mentality.[14] The second method has been to tap all existing nativistic and religious tensions and economic grievances among the tradition-bound masses, as well as the grievances and aspirations of the urbanized clerks and artisans, and channel the energies thus unleashed into support of the nationalist drive. The technique here has been (1) to make nationalism, and in particular its objective of self-government, an integrating symbol in which even the most disparate goals could find identification, and (2) to politicize—one would like to say nationalize—all existing thought and associations. Until recently, many observers—including colonial administrators—tended to live in the prewar climate of opinion and therefore underestimated the power which had thus been harnessed to the nationalist machine.

In the case of the Mau Mau movement in Kenya we are confronted with a complex mixture of nationalism, with a strong traditional bias on the part of the Westernized leaders, and nativism, manipulated by the leaders, on the part of the masses. Both have been generated to an especially high level of intensity as a consequence of the acute and largely unassuaged sense of frustration on the part of the Westernized elite, growing out of the very bleak outlook arising from the almost total absence, until recently, of meaningful career and prestige opportunities within either the old or the new systems, and of the masses, resulting from the land shortage and the overcrowding on the reservations. The presence of a sizable Asian "third force," which virtually monopolizes the middle-class sector, and which has been and is politically conscious, provides a new variable of no little significance in the total situation. The fact that the pattern of organization and the strategy and tactics of the Mau Mau revolt indicate a higher level of sophistication than sheer nativism would imply suggests that our analytical categories need further refinement or qualification.

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[12] See Ian Cunnison, "The Watchtower Assembly in Central Africa," *International Review of Missions*, Vol. 40, pp. 456–69 (Oct., 1951).

[13] Sir F. D. Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (London, 1923), pp. 83 ff.

[14] *Renascent Africa* (Lagos, 1937).

A particularly striking feature of African nationalism has been the literary and cultural revival which has attended it. A renewed appreciation of and interest in "African" culture has been manifested, in most instances by the most sophisticated and acculturated Africans (e.g., Mazi Mbono Ojike's *My Africa,* Dr. J. B. Danquah's studies of the Akan peoples of the Gold Coast, Jomo Kenyatta's *Facing Mount Kenya,* Fily-Dabo Sissoko's *Les Noirs et la Culture,* Léopold Sédar Senghor's *Anthologie de la Nouvelle Poésie Nègre et Malgache,* the French African journal *Présence Africaine* edited by M. Alioune Diop, and the writings of Antoine Munongo in the Belgian Congolese journal *Jeune Afrique*).[15] In some cases this cultural renaissance has had a purely tribal emphasis; in others it has taken a "neo-African" form, such as the African dress of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, nationalist leader in Nigeria. It has usually been accompanied by a quest for an African history which would in general reflect glory and dignity upon the African race and in particular instill self-confidence in the Western-educated African sensitive to the prejudiced charge that he has no history or culture. In short, there has emerged a new pride in being African. In French areas, the accent until recently has been upon French culture and literature, but there are increasing signs of a shift to African themes amongst the French African literati. The important point is that African nationalism has this cultural content, which renders more difficult any effort to separate rigidly the cultural nationalism of the urban politician from the nativism of the bush peasant.

Yet the differences are important to the student of African nationalism. Primary resistance and nativism tend to be negative and spontaneous revolts or assertions of the unacculturated masses against the disruptive and disorganizing stranger-invader. They are a reflection of a persistent desire of the masses to preserve or recreate the old by protesting against the new. Syncretism is different in that it contains an element of rationality—an urge to recapture those aspects of the old which are compatible with the new, which it recognizes as inevitable and in some respects desirable. Whereas all forms of protest are politically consequential—at least to colonial administrators—only nationalism is primarily political in that it is irrevocably committed to a positive and radical alteration of the power structure. In brief, nationalism is the terminal form of colonial protest.

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[15] See Rosey E. Pool, "African Renaissance," *Phylon,* Vol. 14, pp. 5–8 (First Quarter, 1953); Albert Maurice, "Union Africaine des Arts et des Lettres," *African Affairs,* Vol. 50, pp. 233–41 (July, 1951); Alioune Diop, "Niam n'goura," *Présence Africaine* (Nov.–Dec., 1947), pp. 1–3. The cultural revival is the product of four forces: (1) reflection and introspection on the part of educated Africans, frequently those confronted with the stimulating contrasts of a foreign environment while abroad; (2) the American Negro renaissance which commenced in the 1920's; (3) encouragement and sponsorship of European governments and unofficial organizations such as the International African Institute; and (4) support of missionary societies such as the United Society for Christian Literature in the United Kingdom.

Another reason for distinguishing between the various categories of assertion, which are basically differences in goal orientation, is not only to provide some basis for judging the nature of the popular support of a nationalist movement during its buildup, but also to have some means of predicting the stability and viability of the political order established by the nationalists once they achieve self-government. The governments of Pakistan, Burma, India, and Indonesia have each been plagued by internal tensions arising from what are fundamentally South Asian variants of traditionalism and tribalism. If a colonial nationalist movement comes to power atop a wave of mass protest which is primarily or even in part nativistic in character, this would have a direct bearing upon the capacity of the Westernized leaders of that movement, not only to maintain political unity and stability but also to carry out what is at the core of most of their programs—rapid modernization by a centralized bureaucratic machine. Any thorough study of the anatomy of a nationalist movement, therefore, must seek to determine the linkages and compatibilities between the goal orientations of the several forces from which that movement derives its élan and strength.

II. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE RISE OF NATIONALISM

It is far easier to define and describe nationalism than it is to generalize about the factors which have contributed to its manifestation. Put most briefly, it is the end product of the profound and complex transformation which has occurred in Africa since the European intrusion. It is a commonplace that the imposition of Western technology, socio-political institutions, and ideology upon African societies has been violently disruptive of the old familistic order in that they have created new values and symbols, new techniques for the acquisition of wealth, status, and prestige, and new groups for which the old system had no place. The crucial point here is not that nationalism as a matter of fact happened to appear at a certain point in time after the "Western impact," but rather that the transformation the latter brought about has been an indispensable precondition for the rise of nationalism. Nationalism, as distinguished from primary resistance or nativism, requires considerable gestation. A few of the constituent elements have been:

A. Economic[16]

1. *Change from a subsistence to a money economy.* This change, consciously encouraged by colonial governments and European enterprise in order to increase the export of primary products, introduced the cash nexus and economic individualism, altered the patterns of land tenure and capital accumulation, and, in general, widened the area of both individual prosperity and insecurity.

2. *Growth of a wage-labor force.* This development has resulted in the proletarianization of substantial numbers of Africans, which has weakened communal or lineage responsibility and rendered those concerned vulnerable to economic exploitation and grievances.

3. *Rise of a new middle class.* Laissez-faire economics and African enterprise, coupled with opportunities for university and professional education, have been factors contributing to the growth of a middle class. This class is most advanced in Senegal, the Gold Coast, and Southern Nigeria, where it has developed despite successive displacement or frustration by the intrusion of Levantines and the monopolistic practices of European firms.

B. Sociological[17]

1. *Urbanization.* The concentration of relatively large numbers of Africans in urban centers to meet the labor demands of European enterprise has loosened kinship ties, accelerated social communication between "detribalized" ethnic groups, and, in general, contributed to "national" integration.

2. *Social mobility.* The European-imposed *pax* coupled with the development of communications and transport has provided the framework for travel, the growth of an internal exchange economy, and socio-political reintegration.

3. *Western education.* This has provided certain of the inhabitants of a given territory with a common lingua franca; with the knowledge and tools to acquire status and prestige and to fulfill aspirations within the new social structure; and with some of the ideas and values by which alien rule and colonialism could be attacked. It has been through Western education that the African has encountered the scientific method and the idea of progress with their activistic implications, namely, an awareness of alternatives and the conviction that man can creatively master and shape his own destiny.

C. Religious and Psychological[18]

1. *Christian evangelization.* The conscious Europeanization pursued by

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[16] L. P. Mair, "The Growth of Economic Individualism in African Society," *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 33, pp. 261–73 (July, 1934); Allan McPhee, *The Economic Revolution in British West Africa* (London, 1926); G. Wilson, *An Essay on the Economics of Detribalization in Northern Rhodesia*, Part I (Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1941). Cf. Karl Polanyi, *Origins of Our Time* (London, 1946); P. C. Lloyd, "New Economic Classes in Western Nigeria," *African Affairs*, Vol. 52, pp. 327–34 (Oct., 1953).

[17] J. D. Rheinallt Jones, "The Effects of Urbanization in South and Central Africa," *African Affairs*, Vol. 52, pp. 37–44 (Jan., 1953).

[18] William Bascom, "African Culture and the Missionary," *Civilisations*, Vol. 3, pp. 491–501 (No. 4, 1953).

Christian missionary societies has been a frontal assault upon traditional religious systems and moral sanctions. Moreover, the Christian doctrine of equality and human brotherhood challenged the ethical assumptions of imperialism.

2. *Neglect or frustration of Western-educated elements.* Susceptibility to psychological grievance is most acute among the more acculturated Africans. Social and economic discrimination and the stigma of inferiority and backwardness have precipitated a passionate quest for equality and modernity, and latterly self-government. Rankling memories of crude, arrogant, or insulting treatment by a European have frequently been the major wellspring of racial bitterness and uncompromising nationalism.

D. Political

1. *Eclipse of traditional authorities.* Notwithstanding the British policy of indirect rule, the European superstructure and forces of modernity have tended to weaken the traditional powers of indigenous authorities and thereby to render less meaningful pre-colonial socio-political units as objects of loyalty and attachment. There has been what Professor Daryll Forde calls a "status reversal"; that is, as a result of the acquisition by youth of Western education and a command over Western techniques in all fields, there has been ". . . an increasing transfer of command over wealth and authority to younger and socially more independent men at the expense of traditional heads. . . ."[19]

2. *Forging of new "national" symbols.* The "territorialization" of Africa by the European powers has been a step in the creation of new nations, not only through the erection of boundaries within which the intensity of social communication and economic interchange has become greater than across territorial borders, but also as a consequence of the imposition of a common administrative superstructure, a common legal system, and in some instances common political institutions which have become symbols of territorial individuality.[20]

These are a few of the principal factors in the European presence which have contributed to the rise of nationalism. As any casual observer of African developments is aware, however, there have been and are marked areal differences in the overt manifestation of nationalism. Such striking contrasts as the militant Convention People's party of the Gold Coast, the conservative Northern People's Congress of Nigeria, the pro-French orientation of the African editors of *Présence Africaine*, the cautious African editors of *La Voix du Congolais*, and the terroristic Mau Mau of Kenya are cases in point.

There are a number of explanations for these areal variations. One relates to the degree of acculturation in an area. This is a reflection of the duration and intensity of contact with European influences. The contrast between the advanced nationalism of the British West Coast and of Senegal and the nascent nationalism of British and French Central Afria is partly explicable on this basis.

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[19] Daryll Forde, "The Conditions of Social Development in West Africa," *Civilisations*, Vol. 3, pp. 471–85 (No. 4, 1953).

[20] See R. J. Harrison Church, *Modern Colonization* (London, 1951), pp. 104 ff.; Robert Montagne, "The 'Modern State' in Africa and Asia," *The Cambridge Journal*, Vol. 5, pp. 583–602 (July, 1952).

A second explanation lies in the absence or presence of alien settlers. On this score the settler-free British West Coast is unique when contrasted to the rest of Africa. The possibility of a total fulfillment of nationalist objectives (i.e., *African* self-government) has been a powerful psychological factor which partly explains the confident and buoyant expectancy of West Coast nationalists. On the other hand, as previously noted, the tendencies toward accommodation or terrorism in the white-settler areas is a reflection of the absence of such moderating expectancy.

Certain African groups exposed to the same forces of acculturation and the same provocation have demonstrated radically different reactions. The Kikuyu versus the Masai peoples of Kenya, the Ibo versus the Hausa peoples of Nigeria, and the Creole and Mende of Sierra Leone are cases in point. It is suggested that the dynamism, militancy, and nationalist élan of the Ibo peoples of Nigeria are rooted partly in certain indigenous Ibo culture traits (general absence of chiefs, smallness in scale and the democratic character of indigenous political organization, emphasis upon achieved status, and individualism). Much of the same might be said for the Kikuyu peoples of Kenya.

Differing colonial policies constitute another cause of these areal differences. Nationalism is predominantly a phenomenon of British Africa, and to a lesser extent of French Africa. Apart from the influence of the foregoing historical, sociological, and cultural variables, this fact, in the case of British Africa, is explained by certain unique features of British colonial policy.

It was inevitable that Britain, one of the most liberal colonial powers in Africa, should have reaped the strongest nationalist reaction. A few of the principal features of British policy which have stimulated nationalism deserve mention:

1. *Self-government as the goal of policy.* Unlike the French and Portuguese who embrace their African territories as indivisible units of the motherland, or the Belgians who until recently have been disinclined to specify the ultimate goals of policy, the British have remained indiscriminately loyal to the Durham formula.[21] In West Africa, this has enthroned the African nationalists; in Central and East Africa, the white settlers.

2. *Emphasis upon territorial individuality.* More than any other colonial

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[21] Regarding Belgian policy, see Pierre Wigny, "Methods of Government in the Belgian Congo," *African Affairs*, Vol. 50, pp. 310–17 (Oct., 1951). Wigny remarks (p. 311) that "... Belgians are reluctant to define their colonial policy. They are proud of their first realisations, and sure of the rightness of their intentions." Since this was written, there have been some very dramatic changes in Belgian policy, especially regarding the educated elite, the potential nationalists. The great debate in Belgian colonial circles on "le statut des Congolais civilisés" was terminated by four decrees of May 17, 1952 according to which educated Congolese are assimilated to Europeans in civil law. Regarding Portuguese policy, see Marcelo Caetano, *Colonizing Traditions, Principles and Methods of the Portuguese* (Lisbon, 1951). The keynote of the policy is the "spiritual assimilation" of the Africans to a "Portuguese nation dwelling in European, African, Asiatic and Indonesian Provinces." The African *civilisado* is thus a citizen of Portugal.

power, the British have provided the institutional and conceptual framework for the emergence of nations. Decentralization of power, budgetary autonomy, the institution of territorial legislative councils and other "national" symbols—all have facilitated the conceptualization of a "nation."[22]

3. *Policy on missionaries and education.* The comparative freedom granted missionaries and the laissez-faire attitude toward education, and particularly post-primary education, has distinguished and continues to distinguish British policy sharply from non-British Africa.

4. *Neglect, frustration, and antagonism of educated elite.* Not only have more British Africans been exposed to higher education, but the British government until recently remained relatively indifferent to the claims and aspirations of this class, which forms the core of the nationalist movements.

5. *Freedom of nationalist activity.* The *comparative* freedom of activity (speech, association, press, and travel abroad) which British Africans have enjoyed—within clearly defined limits and varying according to the presence of white settlers—has been of decisive importance. It is doubtful whether such militant nationalists as Wallace-Johnson of Sierra Leone, Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah of the Gold Coast, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, and Dauti Yamba of the Central African Federation, could have found the same continuous freedom of movement and activity in Belgian, Portuguese, and French Africa as has been their lot in British Africa.[23]

All of this suggests that African nationalism is not merely a peasant revolt. In fact, as already noted, nationalism where it is most advanced has been sparked and led by the so-called detribalized, Western-educated, middle-class intellectuals and professional Africans; by those who in terms of improved status and material standards of living have benefitted most from colonialism; in short, by those who have come closest to the Western World but have been denied entry on full terms of equality. From this comparatively affluent—but psychologically aggrieved—group have come the organizers of tribal associations, labor unions, cooperative groups, farmers' organizations, and—more recently—nationalist movements. They are the Africans whom British policy has done most to create and least to satiate.[24]

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[22] Partly in response to nationalist pressures, the French Government has recently initiated certain measures of financial devolution to French West Africa. See G. Gayet, "Autonomies financières Française," *Civilisations*, Vol. 3, pp. 343–47 (No. 3, 1953). These measures may enhance the powers of the territorial assemblies to the point that the latter might ultimately become the foci for territorial nationalisms.

[23] The stringent police measures adopted recently in Kenya and Nyasaland, the special press laws which have long been in effect in British East and Central Africa, and the obstacles to nationalist activity which have existed in the Muslim areas of Northern Nigeria, do not necessarily invalidate this *comparative* historical generalization.

[24] The thesis here is that there are at least four ingredients in the psychology of colonial nationalism, and that British policy in Africa has come closest towards inculcating or providing them: (a) an awareness of the existence or possibility of alternatives to the status quo, a state of mind produced by Western education and particularly by study and travel abroad; (b) an intense desire to change the status quo; (c) a system within which the major alternative to the status quo—self-government—has the status of legitimacy; and (d) an area of relative freedom in which that legitimate alternative may be pursued.

This brief and selective treatment of a few of the factors which have contributed to the African nationalist awakening suggests certain avenues which might be profitably explored and more fully developed by subsequent research. Specifically, what is the relationship between the nature and intensity of nationalism and the degree of urbanization, the degree of commercialization of agriculture, and the size and geographical distribution of the wage-labor force and salariat? In short, what is the causal connection between "detribalization" and nationalism? Certain aspects of such an inquiry could be subjected to statistical analysis, but the results could only be suggestive, and in some instances might be positively deceptive. In the case of urbanization, for example, the highly urbanized and acculturated Yoruba peoples of Nigeria for nearly a decade lagged far behind the Ibo peoples in nationalist vigor and élan. Ibadan, the largest urban center in tropical Africa, has been until recently one of the most politically inert towns of Nigeria. Again, in terms of the proletarianization of labor and urbanization resulting from European industrialism and commercial activity, the Belgian Congo is one of the most advanced territories, but one in which nationalism is least in evidence.[25] Freetown, Sierra Leone, one of the oldest non-traditional urban centers, became a haven of respectability and conservatism, being eclipsed by the less-developed Protectorate in the push towards nationalist objectives. Urbanization has been an important ingredient in the nationalist awakening, but it has been a certain type of urban development—mainly the impersonal and heterogeneous "new towns"—which has occurred in conjunction with other equally decisive factors.

In the case of the relationship between the degree of commercialization of land and labor and the degree of nationalism, the figures set forth for the Gold Coast in Table I suggest either a causal connection or a parallel development. Yet in turning to similar figures for other territories—especially the Belgian Congo and Nigeria—it is clear that the relationship between commercialization and nationalism, important though it may be, must be considered and interpreted in the light of other variables.

Again, the fact that the nationalist movements have been organized and led by intellectuals and the so-called middle class suggests a relationship between nationalism and the number of Africans with higher education, the size of per capita income, the degree of the individualization of land tenure, the size of middle-class and professional groups (i.e., independent traders, produce middlemen, farmers employing labor, druggists, lorry owners, lawyers, doctors, etc.), and the degree of vertical mobility within the emergent socio-economic structure. In any event, the insights of an economist are indispensable for a complete anatomy of African nationalism.

The Christian missionaries have been blamed frequently for their ruthless assault upon native religious systems and the thoroughgoing Europeanization, conscious or implicit, in their evangelization. This has suggested the formula: missionaries = detribalization = nationalism. Yet the postwar figures shown in

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[25] The Belgian policy of stabilization of labor in the urban centers of the Congo, in which 83% of the men have their families with them, is one of the several factors which may help to explain this.

TABLE I. COMMERCIALIZATION AND NATIONALISM IN CERTAIN AFRICAN TERRITORIES

Territory	Percentage of Cultivated Land Used by Africans for Commercial Production (1947–1950)*	African Wage Earners as Percentage of Total African Population (1950)†	Degree of Overt Nationalism
Gold Coast	75%	9.0%	Advanced
Belgian Congo	42	7.6	None
Nigeria	41	1.2	Advanced
Uganda	33	3.9	Nascent
Kenya	7	7.6	Nascent

* E. A. Keukjian, "Commercializing Influence of the Development of Exports on Indigenous Agricultural Economics in Tropical Africa," unpub. diss. (Harvard Univ., June, 1953); United Nations, Economic and Social Council (15th session). *World Economic Situation. Aspects of Economic Development in Africa.* New York, Document E/2377, March 20, 1953.

† United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs. *Review of Economic Conditions in Africa* (*Supplement to World Economic Report, 1949–50*). New York, Document E/1910/Add.1 Rev.1-ST/ECA/9/Add.1, April, 1951, p. 76.

Table II do not bear out this assumption.[26] Missionaries have been important catalytic agents in the transformation of African societies, but the causal connection between their activities and nationalist assertion cannot be established by mere quantitative analysis. The figures in Table II hint at a possible causal relationship between preponderant Protestant evangelization and advanced nationalism (viz., Gold Coast and Nigeria) and preponderant Catholic evangelization and the absence of nationalism (viz., Portuguese Angola and the Belgian Congo). Yet this connection must be examined in the light of other relevant factors, such as the degree of control and direction extended to missionary societies by colonial governments; the freedom allowed such societies to establish schools—particularly secondary schools—and to determine the curriculum; the tolerance accorded anti-white or anti-colonial sects (e.g., the Jehovah's Witnesses are permitted in most of British Africa but proscribed in non-British

TABLE II. CHRISTIANITY AND NATIONALISM IN CERTAIN AFRICAN TERRITORIES

Territory	Percentage of Christians to Total Population	Percentage of Protestants to All Christians	Percentage of Catholics to All Christians	Degree of Overt Nationalism
Belgian Congo	37%	29%	71%	None
Nyasaland	26	49	51	Nascent
Gold Coast	15	58	42	Advanced
Angola	15	22	78	None
Kenya	10	51	49	Nascent
Nigeria	5	67	33	Advanced

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[26] *World Christian Handbook* (London, 1949).

Africa); the latitude allowed African sects of a syncretistic, revivalistic, or puritanical character; the extent to which evangelical bodies have *Africanized* their church organization, the priesthood, and the propagation of the gospel; and, finally, the strength of Islam.

The corrosive influence of Western education has been a significant ingredient in the rise of nationalism. Yet the Belgian Congo claims a higher percentage of literacy than any other colonial territory in Africa.[27] In order to establish a relationship we must move beyond the superficial analysis of literacy statistics and ask the following questions:

1. *The nature of the curriculum.* Has it been and is it literary and based upon the model of a European grammar school, or is it practical and designed to train the student to be a good farmer, artisan, or clerk in European employ, and incidentally to limit his sophistication and contact with unsettling ideas? Is instruction conducted in the vernacular or in a European language?

2. *Opportunities for post-primary education.* Are secondary schools (particularly those operated by missionary societies or by enterprising and nationalist-minded Africans such as Eyo Ita in Nigeria or Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya) allowed to mushroom into existence, or are they carefully planned and rigidly controlled by the colonial government as to both number and curriculum? What are the opportunities for study in universities abroad? What is the latitude granted students to determine their own careers? Here we touch upon a crucial factor—in 1945, Freetown, Sierra Leone, and Lagos, Nigeria, each had more Western-type secondary schools than all of the non-British territories in Africa combined. In 1952 over 4,000 Africans from British territories were studying in universities and technical schools abroad and nearly 1,000 in territorial universities in Africa, whereas only a handful had such opportunity or inclination in Belgian and Portuguese Africa. This is in part a reflection of the existence of a larger African middle-class in British Africa, but it is also the result of the unique British attitude regarding the relationship between higher education and emergent African leadership. French policy and practice, despite differing assumptions, most closely approximate those of the British.[28]

3. *Openings of careers for the talented.* The stability of any political or social order is determined by this factor. Is there any planned relationship between the output of the schools and opportunities for satisfying employment or

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[27] United Nations, *Non-Self-Governing Territories.* Vol. III: *Special Study on Education.* New York, Document ST/TRI/SER.A./5/Add. 2, January, 1951.

[28] By decree of April 16, 1950, the *Institut des Hautes Études* was established at Dakar; and on January 1, 1952, there were 1,640 scholarship holders in continental France, of whom 572 were pursuing higher education. *Civilisations*, Vol. 3, pp. 575–83 (No. 4, 1953). On British educational policy in tropical Africa see *African Education* (Oxford: The Nuffield Foundation and the Colonial Office, 1953). The Belgians within the past few years have dramatically reoriented their policy regarding higher education for the Congolese. Since 1952 Congo students have been admitted to the Albert I College at Léopoldville; the first Negro University of the Congo is scheduled for opening in 1954; and recently the Belgian press has drawn attention to the admission to Louvain University of a Negro student from the Congo. *Civilisations*, Vol. 3, pp. 599–602 (No. 4, 1953).

careers? In French and Belgian Africa, colonial governments have maintained a stringent control over the supply-demand situation as between *post-primary* schools and the requirements of government and the developing economy. In British Africa there are hundreds of thousands of unemployed or underemployed "Standard VI" boys clustered in the coastal towns and urban centers of the interior.

The most potent instrument used in the propagation of nationalist ideas and racial consciousness has been the *African-owned* nationalist press. In Nigeria alone nearly 100 newspapers or periodicals have been published by Africans since the British intrusion, of which 12 dailies and 14 weeklies—all African owned—are currently in circulation. The crucial role performed in the nationalist awakening by African journalistic enterprise on the British West Coast is well known.[29] Until the publication of *Afrique Noire* (organ of the *Rassemblement Dêmocratique Africaine* of French West Africa) there was nothing in non-British Africa which even closely approximated this development. And even this journal is no match for the pungent criticism and racial consciousness one finds in the pages of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe's *West African Pilot* in Nigeria.[30] Needless to say, the nationalist press is one of our major sources of data regarding nationalist motivation, objectives, and organization. It is not the number of newspapers published which is significant, but rather the volume of circulation and areal distribution, the news and editorial content and the nature of the appeal, the types of readers, the existence of competitive papers sponsored by colonial governments, the financial stability of the paper, and other factors which would reflect its impact and influence upon the ideas, aspirations, and activities of those literate groups predisposed towards nationalism.

These are but a few of the more important factors in the rise of nationalism which require evaluation and weighting before the student of comparative colonial nationalism can go beyond the mere description of the history and anatomy of a particular nationalist movement. There is great danger in doing a disservice to scholarly research in Africa if one generalizes on the basis of observations made and data assembled in one territory. As has been suggested, there are certain general predisposing and precipitating causes of modern nationalism which are applicable to the whole continent; yet once these are mentioned, it is necessary to examine each area of nationalist activity for that special combination of factors which explains the origin, strength, and orientation of its nationalist movement.

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[29] Compare with the number of *African-owned-and-edited* dailies and weeklies (combined total) in the following territories: *British Africa*: Gold Coast (17), Uganda (8), Sierra Leone (7), Gambia (3); *French West Africa* (10); and none, insofar as is known, in Belgian, Portuguese, or Spanish Africa; or in Kenya, the territories of the Central African Federation, or in the Union of South Africa.

[30] On the other hand, there appears to be no newspaper in British West Africa comparable with the European-owned-and-edited journal of French West Africa entitled *Les Echos de l'A.O.F.*, which "week after week passionately attacks the administration. . . ." See Thomas Hodgkin, "The Metropolitan Axis," *West Africa*, January 9, 1954, at p. 6.

III. FACTORS CONDITIONING NATIONALIST DEVELOPMENT

Normally, a colonial nationalist movement directs its efforts towards the attainment of two main objectives: (1) the achievement of self-government, and (2) the creation of a cultural or political sense of nationality and unity within the boundaries of the area of the nation to be. Nationalists are obliged to adopt the second objective because imperial powers either did not or could not establish political boundaries which embraced only one self-conscious cultural unit; and certainly those powers made no conscious effort to build nations. The nationalist dilemma is that in most cases pursuit of the primary goal (self-government) lessens the likelihood of achieving the secondary goal (cultural and political unity). Put another way, the drive behind African nationalism in many instances is not the consciousness of belonging to a distinct politico-cultural unit which is seeking to protect or assert itself, but rather it is the movement of racially-conscious modernists seeking to create new political and cultural nationalities out of the heterogeneous peoples living within the artificial boundaries imposed by the European master. Their task is not only to conduct a successful political revolution and capture power, but also the painful job of national political integration. And as Professor Crane Brinton has shown, the lessons of history are that nation-building is the product of both consent and coercion, and usually the latter.[31] It is the colonial power, of course, which has had a monopoly over the means of coercion.

The major factor conditioning the development of a particular nationalist movement, therefore, is the degree of internal politico-cultural unity, tolerance, or compatibility amongst the peoples of the area moving into its national era. Disunities can exist in a given territory for a variety of reasons:

1. Traditional pre-colonial hostilities and cultural incompatibilities such as exist between the Kikuyu and Masai peoples of Kenya, or the Ibo and the Tiv peoples of Nigeria. In some instances these have been exacerbated as a result of imperial policies; in others as a consequence of the mere fact of lumping them together and endeavoring to impose territorial uniformity.

2. Tensions between groups resulting from unevenness in development, acculturation, and the acquisition of modernity. These can be the product of original cultural differences (i.e., the variations between groups in their receptivity and adaptability to modernity—e.g., the Ibo and Hausa); historical circumstances (i.e., differences in the duration and intensity of the European impact—e.g., the Creoles of Freetown vs. the Mende peoples of the Protectorate of Sierra Leone); or of constitutional reforms pointing towards African self-government. One could argue that Ibo-Yoruba hostility in Nigeria is the product of all three factors. Just as the advance towards independence precipitated a cleavage between Muslims and Hindus in India, so has the development of nationalism and the move towards self-government in Africa brought to light a multitude of disunities. Fear of domination by the more advanced and acculturated groups—European or African—is one obvious explanation.

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[31] Crane Brinton, *From Many One* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948).

3. Tensions between the Westernized elite—the nationalists—and the traditionalists and the masses. This nationalist disability has tended to be exaggerated in the past, usually by imperial spokesmen endeavoring to repudiate the nationalists or to isolate them from the traditionalists. The intensity of the cleavage varies widely according to circumstances. In several areas such as the Protectorate of Sierra Leone, the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, Western and Northern Nigeria, amongst the Kikuyu in Kenya, and in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland the educated nationalists and some leading traditionalists have cooperated in varying degrees.

4. Differences within the ranks of the Westernized elite. These disagreements—and one is struck by their persistence, strength, and virulence—may arise from several causes, including normal competition for power and prestige or honest differences over aims, timing, or methods to be employed in the nationalist drive. Such differences as separate Messrs. Fily-Dabo Sissoko and Mamadou Konaté in the French Sudan; Lamine Gueye and Léopold Senghor in Senegal; Felix Houphouet-Boigny and Kouame Binzème in the Ivory Coast; Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah and Dr. J. B. Danquah in the Gold Coast; the Sardauna of Sokoto, Obafemi Awolowo, and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe in Nigeria; Eliud Mathu and Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya; and Harry Nkumbula and Godwin Lewanika in Central Africa, have very materially affected the course and strength of nationalism in the territories concerned.

These nationalist disabilities are the product of a complex mixture of hard historical and cultural facts, of changes introduced and differentials created by the Western intrusion, as well as of the provocations of the nationalist drive itself. The success of any nationalist movement will in a large measure depend upon the extent to which these internal tensions are softened or dissipated. The latter will depend, in turn, upon the degree of repressive opposition, or unwitting or intentional cooperation, of colonial governments; upon the development of pan-territorial political associations, the membership of which is rooted in all ethnic groups and in which there is free vertical mobility into the "upper crust" which that membership constitutes; upon the emergence of pan-territorial economic-interest groups (e.g., middle-class associations or labor oganizations); and upon many other sociological processes (out-group marriages, commonsality, etc.) which Professor Karl W. Deutsch has suggested are essential building blocks of any new national community.[32]

It would be naive and unhistorical to argue that a large measure of politico-cultural integration is required—as distinguished from being desirable—in order for a nationalist movement to succeed in wresting self-government from an imperial power. Most successful colonial nationalist movements have been organized and led by small minorities which have been able either to gain the support of the masses or to capitalize upon their inertia and apathy. It would be unrealistic, however, to contemplate the success of a movement which did not have at least a minimum of unity or tolerance within the "upper crust," even though it be of the sort displayed by the unstable truces negotiated from time to time between the Sardauna of Sokoto, Mr. Obafemi Awolowo, and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the regional leaders in Nigeria.

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[32] "The Growth of Nations," *World Politics*, Vol. 5, pp. 168–96 (Jan., 1953).

Some of these forces contributing towards integration are measurable and provide rough indices upon which the research scholar can base predictions of the development of a particular nationalist movement. In an interesting new theory regarding the growth of nations, Professor Deutsch has suggested certain criteria which might be profitably employed in seeking to determine the prospects of success of a nationalist movement in its nation-building endeavors.[33] His central thesis is that cases of successful political integration in history show a number of patterns which seem to recur. As he puts it, a nation "is the result of the transformation of people, or of several ethnic elements, in the process of social mobilization." The prospects of success are indicated by the completeness of that transformation and the intensity of social mobilization around the symbols of the new national community. A nation is not only a subjective affirmation of will of zealous nationalists; it is also the product of the operation of powerful objective forces, several of which have been mentioned.

Thus far it has been assumed that the leaders of nationalist movements in Africa will seek to build new national communities out of the diverse human materials located within the artificial boundaries of the existing colonial territories. This was precisely what happened in Latin America (Spanish imperial provinces), in the Middle East (European and Turkish regions), and in Southeast Asia (Dutch Indonesia, Burma, and in a qualified way, British India). In the case of British Africa, where nationalism is most advanced, this same tendency for nationalism to follow boundaries established by the imperial power rather than those coincident with pre-colonial socio-political groups is in evidence (e.g., Gold Coast and Nigeria). On the other hand, in many areas the situation is still relatively fluid. Togoland nationalism has been predominantly an Ewe affair, and the Ewes are a trans-territorial group stretching from the Gold Coast to Dahomey. Separatist sentiment in Northern Nigeria is an example, *par excellence*, of incomplete social mobilization. This, when coupled with growing Yoruba and Ibo self-consciousness, suggests that earlier pan-Nigerian nationalism may be eclipsed and Nigeria may ultimately become three or more states. Until the recent decision to give the Southern Cameroons greater autonomy within the emergent Federation of Nigeria, Cameroonian nationalists were wavering between remaining an integral part of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, or seceding and joining with the nationalists in the French Cameroons in an endeavor to create a Kamerun nation based upon the artificial boundaries of the short-lived German Kamerun.[34] In Kenya, Mau Mau and all earlier proto-nationalist movements have been predominantly Kikuyu endeavors, even though the name Kenya has been employed. In Tanganyika, the Chagga Cooperative movement may be the basis for a Chagga separatism; and in Uganda, it is questionable whether pan-Uganda integrative forces can erase the "national" separatism implicit in the Buganda Kingdom. Again, in Central Africa, will the territorial separatism symbolized by the Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland National Congresses be eclipsed by the common sentiment and institutions growing out of the new Federation?

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[33] *Ibid.* See also Deutsch's *Nationalism and Social Communication* (cited in note 5), pp. 81 ff.

[34] *West Africa,* January 30, 1954, p. 87.

In the case of French Africa, dissimilarities in colonial policy (i.e., assimilation and direct rule) have tended to produce a somewhat different situation. Yet since the reforms of 1946, as a result of which each of the territories of the two federations of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa received their own representative assemblies, territorial nationalist movements have tended to eclipse the pan-French African *Rassemblement Dêmocratique Africain* in much the same fashion as Nigerian, Gold Coastian, and Sierra Leonian nationalist movements have replaced the earlier National Congress of British West Africa. Thus one finds the *Parti Rêpublicain de Dahomey, Parti Progressiste Sudanaise, Union Dêmocratique du Tchad,* and similar organizations in each of the territories. The future "national" orientation of nationalist forces in French Africa would seem to depend upon the extent to which pan-Federation forces and institutions, such as the *Grand Conseils,* or the assimilationist forces of the French Union, such as the metropolitan parties and labor movements projected overseas, operate to retard the growth of territorial symbols and sentiment. One thing, however, seems certain: French Africa—because of the French policy of assimilation and direct rule—is less likely to encounter such movements as the *Egbe Omo Oduduwa* of the Nigerian Yorubas, the Kikuyu Central Association in Kenya, and the *Bataka* movement of Uganda.

In general, it would seem that where nationalism manifests itself in considerable strength it is evidence that disintegration of the old and social mobilization around the symbols of the new order have occurred on a scale sufficient to weaken or destroy attachments and loyalties of the nationalists to pre-colonial socio-political units, either because they have been crushed and are beyond memory or because they are unattractive or manifestly unsuitable as "nations" in a modern world of nation-states. The European presence has done much towards the creation of new nations, the "national" sentiment of the nationalists being a reflection of this.

A few of the many factors which might be observed and evaluated in order to determine the probable success, as well as the territorial implications, of an African nationalist movement or nation-building endeavor are as follows:[35] (1) the degree of internal social mobility, economic interchange and interdependence, intermarriage and commonsality, and the intensity and level of social communication among the ethnic groups comprising a given territory; (2) the location of population clusters and "core areas," as well as of "sub-national" regions of more intense economic interchange or of cultural focus; (3) the powers and functions of "sub-national" political institutions (i.e., regional, tribal, etc), and the degree of *meaningful* participation in them by the Western-educated elements; (4) the rate at which "national" institutions and activities are capable of attracting and absorbing new social strata from all ethnic groups into the "national" life (e.g., the ethnic composition of the central administrative and technical services); (5) the centrality and nationalness of educational institutions, particularly the professional schools and universities; (6) the degree of pan-territorial circulation of nationalist newspapers and literature and the extent to which these play up "national" events and personalities; (7) the differentials in the material development, per capita income and wealth, the acquisition of modern skills and knowledge, and the concentration and capacity for accumulation of capital amongst the different sub-national areas and ethnic groups;[36] (8) the ethnic makeup of the Western-educated categories and particularly of the active membership of nationalist or proto-nationalist groups; (9) the development and extent of usage of a trans-tribal pan-territorial language, be it English, French, Portuguese, Swahili, or Hausa; (10) the compatibility of the "detribalized" basic personality types produced by the indigenous cultures; (11) the extent to which the territory concerned embraces total cultural groups, or, put another way, the degree to which artificial colonial boundaries have bifurcated ethnic groups whose division may be the source of later irredentism; and (12) the rapport between the Western-educated nationalist elements and the traditionalists, including the existence of nativistic tensions or economic grievances which the nationalists could manipulate or exploit in their mobilization of mass support.

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[35] For several of the concepts used here the author is indebted to the works of Professor Karl W. Deutsch, previously cited. See especially his *Nationalism and Social Communication,* pp. 15–45.

Results obtained from inquiries along these lines would go far to explain the present orientation of a nationalist movement, as well as possible future trends. And yet an emphatic note of caution should be sounded: objective forces of integration and disintegration are powerful determinants in the nation-building processs, but so also are subjective factors.[37] By all laws of geography and economics Northern Ireland should belong to Eire, and East Pakistan to the Republic of India; but they do not. By the same laws, the Gambia should belong to Senegal, French Guinea to Sierra Leone and Liberia, Mozambique to the Central African Federation, and so forth; and yet present trends suggest that such will not be the case. The principal forces currently operating to shape Africa's emergent nations are either tribalism or a nationalism following artificial imperial boundaries; and, with few exceptions, neither of these is directed towards the creation of political units which the geographer or economist would classify as ideal. In this respect, of course, Africa is not unique.

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[36] It could be argued, for example, that apart from historical and cultural factors, the difference in the per capita income of the three regions of Nigeria (£26 for the Western Region, £16 for the Northern Region, and £23 for the Eastern Region) is of no little significance in the recent and current drive for greater regional autonomy. See A. R. Prest and I. G. Stewart, *The National Income of Nigeria*, abridged ed. (Lagos: Government Printer, 1954), pp. 14–16.

[37] Given suitable conditions, including a politically favorable milieu and the proper techniques, there would seem to be no reason why subjective factors such as loyalties, attitudes, and attachments to national or "sub-national" symbols, could not to some extent be measured.

The foregoing raises the crucial question of whether it is possible for the peoples of Africa—in their own interest—to avoid the balkanization implicit in the full application of the national principle to their continent. So long as the rest of the world is organized according to that principle, and so long as the national idea universally embodies aspirations which cannot be satisfied by other forms of human organization, the answer would seem to be in the negative. The quest for racial equality and acceptance is as important an ingredient in the African revolt as is the desire to determine one's own destiny. Rightly or wrongly, self-government within the confines of the sovereign nation-state has become the supreme symbol of the equality of peoples. The only possible alternative would be broader Eur-African political groupings or self-governing plural societies in which emergent African leaders could play what they would feel to be an equal rôle. In the light of the persistence of national self-determination as a symbol, and particularly in view of the growing strength and contagion of African nationalism, the future of such multi-racial experiments will depend in a large measure upon the rapidity with which European governments and leaders provide for such a rôle.

IV. SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF RESEARCH INTO AFRICAN NATIONALISM

There is perhaps no other type of research venture capable of evoking stronger feeling than an inquiry into colonial nationalism. The word "nationalism" in a colonial milieu has tended to be treated as the equivalent of sedition, or even treason. And this for good reason: by definition colonial nationalists are seeking to bring about a radical alteration in the power structure; namely, to evict the imperial power and to enthrone themselves. From the moment it makes its presence known, therefore, a nationalist movement is, in effect, engaged in a civil war with the colonial administration, the constitutionality of its methods varying according to the liberality of the colonial regime and the moderation of the nationalist leaders.

As regards colonial officialdom, an American undertaking a study of African nationalism is handicapped by the fact that in a large measure the African nationalist awakening is the product of American influences. Since the turn of the century, American Negro religious sects have contributed no little to religious secessionism, particularly in South and West Africa. The Garveyism of the early 1920's had an influence among sophisticated Africans which has tended to be overlooked or minimized. Since 1919 a growing number of American Negro intellectuals have taken an increasingly militant stand on African colonialism. Anti-imperialist sentiment in the United States, especially during the Second World War, was the source of considerable inspiration and delight to budding African nationalists, as well as the cause of no little acrimony between wartime allies. The Atlantic Charter, the Four Freedoms, and public statements by Mr. Willkie and President Roosevelt have bulked large in postwar African nationalist literature. The most important American contribution, however, has been the impact of our culture upon African students who have studied in America. Many of the important pioneers in the African awakening were profoundly affected by their American experience. Of this group the late Dr. J. E. K. Aggrey and Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah from the Gold Coast, and Professor Eyo Ita and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe from Nigeria are the most prominent and best known. During the Second World War the number of African students in America was less than 25; since 1945 it has increased to over 500. With few exceptions these students have been and are strong nationalists, many of them having become leaders upon their return to Africa. In the eyes of colonial officialdom, therefore, an American inquiry into nationalism tends to raise certain doubts.

There has been a tendency in the past for American visitors making quick tours of Africa to rely mainly upon the white colonial administration for an appraisal of nationalist sentiment and activity. This is unfortunate in many respects. In the first place, it is most likely that any information bearing on nationalism is locked up in classified files. Secondly, most colonial administrators have tended to be anti-nationalists, even though many in British West Africa have adapted themselves to working with nationalists towards a mutually agreed goal of effective self-government. Their evaluation of nationalism is bound to be colored by their preconceptions and vested interests or by their honest fears regarding the welfare of the bush peasant, for whom they tend to have a preference and a strong paternal affection. Thirdly, circumstances have tended to place them too close to events or too far removed from the people. Their growing preoccupation with headquarters administration and development schemes, the social impediments—created frequently by the presence of white wives and families—to effective and continuous contact with the masses, and the almost total lack of rapport or confidence between nationalists and administrators, have given the latter many blind spots. Their past miscalculations of nationalist strength and trends tend to confirm this. In short, instead of being used as informants, a role they are not anxious to perform, they should be objects of study. Their fears, their adjustments, and their efforts to suppress, retard, manipulate, or encourage nationalism are all relevant in a complete study of the many interacting factors present in a nationalist situation.

Unlike the field anthropologist, who consciously seeks to work among the traditionalists, the student of political nationalism is concerned mainly with the attitudes, activities, and status of the nationalist-minded Western-educated *elite*. Here one is in a world very different from that of officialdom or the traditionalists. It is a world of great idealism, crusading zeal, and high resolve, as well as one of suspicion, hyper-sensitivity, and exaggeration. It has its careerists and opportunists, and its chronic nonconformists; but it also has its emergent statesmen, its enterprising industrialists, and its distinguished scholars. Only here can one get a partial glimpse into the depth of nationalist feeling, the sources of inspiration and ideas, and the key elements in nationalist motivation.

Yet there are distinct limitations to the interview technique, not the least important of which is the possession of a white skin. Moreover, a colonial nationalist movement must have its *arcana* as well as its propaganda.

In the quest for knowledge regarding African nationalism, the most fruitful as well as unprovocative avenues to explore are those already indicated in earlier sections. African nationalism is something more than the activities of a few disgruntled journalists and frustrated intellectuals to whom Lord Lugard referred in his *Dual Mandate*. It is the inevitable end product of the impact of Western imperialism and modernity upon African societies; it is also the inevitable assertion by the Africans of their desire to shape their own destiny. Imperial systems are disintegrating, new nation-states are emerging, and new forms of political organization transcending the national state are under experiment. These political aspects of African nationalism, however, are but the surface symptoms of a great ferment about which we know very little. The study and analysis of the many complex factors in this unfolding drama provide not only a stimulating challenge to the social sciences, but also a compelling invitation to greater interdisciplinary cooperation.

WORLD TRENDS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH*

C. B. MACPHERSON
University of Toronto

I. PURPOSE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE REPORT

The purpose of this report is to examine, on an international scale, the current trends in political science research.

The initial intention was to base the survey on the available information about researches being carried on by institutions, but it soon became apparent that such a survey could not give an adequate picture of current work or trends. In the first place, systematic information about research by institutions was, at the time of writing, available on a comparable basis only for a few countries and areas. In the second place, even if information on research by institutions were available for all countries, an analysis of it would give a very one-sided picture of the main trends in political science research. For it would leave out of account all the work being done by individual scholars, and even groups of scholars, in the ordinary course of their academic work. To single out the work being done by research institutes (whether they are attached to universities or established independently) and to call this "research," would be putting a narrrow interpretation on the word. It is, of course, tempting to do so. It is possible to canvass institutions and compile a comparative register of their researches; it is much more difficult, if not impossible, to compile a register that would list all the significant thinking being done in political science, including the theoretical work being done by individual academic political scientists in all the universities. Yet at least in countries where political science is a recognized academic discipline, and even in most of the countries where its subject-matter is still divided between university faculties of law, philosophy, history, etc., the work being done by individual scholars (with or without some research assistants) is greater than the volume of work being done by institutions or university units devoted specifically to research. The individual work may also be thought to be of more significance; but on this point opinions will differ.

The fact that opinions will differ on this is itself significant of the trend in the past few years. The research institute has in some countries become the leading hope of political science, as of the social sciences generally. In countries where political science has still to attain the status of an independent discipline, the research institute is often conceived as the most direct and practicable way of promoting the claims of the subject. In countries where political science is already an established academic discipline, the research institute may be a way of breaking through departmental divisions which are thought to have become too rigid, or of opening up new fields for which the existing academic organization does not readily find a place. The desire to establish research organizations for these purposes is itself a symptom of a deeper dissatisfaction.

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* A report prepared in April, 1953 for the International Political Science Association, as part of a larger inquiry instituted by the Social Sciences Department of UNESCO.

There is a very general uneasiness among political scientists, not least where the subject is best established and most extensively developed, as to the ability of political science to elucidate the political phenomena which constitute such urgent problems in our day. Where traditional methods of scholarship are thought to have been inadequate, the research institute has a ready-made claim to consideration. This is especially so because the dissatisfaction with established methods and approaches has taken the form of increasing insistence on strictly empirical research. It is in the very nature of the research institute that it should be engaged mainly in empirical research. As the description in the following section will show, the bulk of the research now being done by such institutions is the collection of data about the actual functioning of the political process (or of some part of it, such as the formation of public opinion, the electoral process, the political party as an instrument in forming and transmitting democratic pressure, the functioning of international organizations and international relations, etc.). Where the collection of data is undertaken with a view to testing hypotheses and ultimately to extending, modifying, or replacing the accepted theory, the potential value of such research is undoubted. And since it is a question of inquiring into the political behavior of masses of people, this kind of research is most appropriately done on a scale (and by techniques) beyond the resources of individual scholarship. The rise of the research institute is an obvious reflection of the trend to empirical inquiry into mass political behavior and as such is worth notice. But no examination merely of the research being done in such institutions would give a balanced view of what is being done in political science.

For this reason, an effort has been made to broaden this report by bringing into its scope whatever information was available about research in progress elsewhere than in research organizations. Information on this is both incomplete (being available only for a few countries) and not strictly comparable between countries. For some countries, we have partial records of individual research by established scholars. For some, we have lists of doctoral dissertations in political science. The researches of doctoral candidates are, of course, of uneven quality and in any quantitative survey should not generally be weighted as heavily as the work of established political scientists. But classified lists of doctoral theses may be taken to give some indication of the interests of the professors, and are therefore not to be discarded in a survey of trends, especially since relatively little information is available about the researches of individual professors in many countries. Except insofar as they are taking part in organized group research, professors often do not give any information about their own current, but yet unpublished, work, even though it be at an advanced stage. Work of quite first-rate importance thus escapes any listing until it is actually published.

Some consideration of recently published work therefore seemed to be a desirable supplement to the survey of research in progress. Here again we find large gaps in the available information. Lists of works in political science published during 1952, which have been drawn up by the International Political Science Association in preparation of the forthcoming first volume of the International Bibliography of Political Science, have been put at the disposal of the writer of this report, but these lists are so far available only for some countries. For other countries, reliance has had to be put on various sources of information, including general bibliographies and lists and reviews in national political science journals.

One other source which it was thought might provide an additional indication of the work being done by individual scholars proved not to yield the desired information. Since one of the first fruits of research is often the publication of articles in scholarly journals, it seemed possible that an analysis of all the journal articles in political science published in the last year or two might afford some indication of the kind of work that is currently being done. Information about this is particularly full: a comprehensive record for 1951 and 1952 is provided in the first two volumes of the *International Political Science Abstracts /Documentation Politique Internationale*, compiled by the International Political Science Association and the International Studies Conference. The two volumes contain abstracts of 2787 articles in political science, from a comprehensive list of periodicals in all parts of the world.

In the hope of throwing some light on the problem with which we are here concerned, several attempts were made to classify this material but in the end it proved impossible to distinguish with a sufficient degree of certainty between those articles which should be considered as instalments of research and those which were primarily designed to be informative (e.g., surveys of political developments in a foreign country) or which were primarily vehicles of the authors' views (not always evidently based on research) as to what should be done about something. The frequency of the latter two sorts of articles might, indeed, be taken as giving a partial measure of the demand in various countries for political enlightenment and guidance, or at least of the proffered supply of these commodities, but it is scarcely indicative of the amount of research. The attempt was therefore abandoned, not before certain broad impressions were gained, but without any statistically useful results.

One further limitation of this report—perhaps the most serious—remains to be pointed out. If the purpose of the report were only to analyze trends in the amounts of research being devoted to different parts of the whole field of political science, the deficiencies in the coverage and comparability of the information would not be too serious. But the report has a further purpose: to consider the progress, shortcomings, and difficulties of current research. There is, of course, no intention of setting up the reporter's judgment on the quality of any or all researches. But it is incumbent on the reporter to indicate the shortcomings which are revealed by the survey, and if this duty is to be performed it requires not merely a statement of lacunae, but an assessment of the stage of theoretical penetration, analytical or synthetical, which has been reached in various branches of the subject in various countries.

This is a formidable requirement. An attempt to meet it is made in the body of the report. But it is proper to say here that it involves a subjective judgment not only of the standards by which such assessment is to be made but also of the information. It is not always apparent from the information given about a research project what conception of it the projectors have, or what questions they are setting themselves. Yet this is what is really important. On this it has often been necessary to make tenuous and unverifiable inferences. That it has been necessary to do so constitutes the major limitation imposed on the report by the information available.

In order to elucidate trends a base is necessary. Fortunately this is provided in large measure by the studies made in 1948 or 1949 for several countries and published in 1950 in the UNESCO volume *Contemporary Political Science.* The description and analysis of current research which follows is wherever possible related to these studies. The order of description is the same, that is, by countries or groups of countries rather than by divisions of the subject across countries. This order is preferable on its own account, since any analysis of the trends, shortcomings, and possibilities must be related to the intellectual tradition, the national outlook, and even the view of the national interest, which vary from country to country.

II. DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF CURRENT TENDENCIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

1. *Political Science Research in the United States*

United States political science may appropriately be examined first, partly because it displays a greater quantity of research, and partly because there has recently been a remarkable amount of inquiry there into research, reflecting an unusual degree of concern about the position and prospects of political science in that country.

We may begin by summarizing the picture of political science research in the United States in 1948-1949 which emerges from the ten papers on American political science in *Contemporary Political Science* (Paris: UNESCO, 1950). In the study of American government in particular, and government in general, a steady shift of emphasis from formal institutions and structures to processes and patterns of behavior had left the latter the predominant approach. As part of this trend, the attention given to political parties and to public opinion had greatly increased. The study of public administration had also expanded, with great attention being given to practical application. The view that public administration was a part of a science of administration, and not rooted in politics, was prevalent, but was being abandoned by some leading scholars in favor of a view of administration as part of politics. In all the studies of government and administration there was increasing emphasis on quantitative research, increasing interest in psychological methods, and a vast amount of collection and clearance of data (statistical, observational, and experimental) by public and private agencies. Apart from the data collected for fairly immediate administrative purposes, there was an intensive effort to collect specialized data which would serve for the testing of hypotheses about particular relations within the process of government or administration. With this went a variety of attempts to define concepts and hypotheses, and construct theories, of political structure, pattern, and action. Underlying much of this activity was a growing concern with the management and manipulation of people, and a hope to contribute to policy formation. The study of international relations was greatly expanded, much of the work being devoted to attempts to understand foreign nations and to disclose the factors determining their policies. There was said to be a renewed interest in political philosophy, but the evidence did not suggest that this had yet shown itself in research or publication. Political theory was almost entirely empirical and intent on avoiding value judgment.

There was indeed considerable criticism of the prevalence of empiricism. Several writers urged that it was hampering the more important work that might be done, and that preoccupation with collecting data deflected attention from the need for, e.g., a consistent theory of democratic responsibility, or criteria of value in public policy and political institutions. In one field, lack of real progress was attributed mainly to the ambivalences and ambiguities in the minds of the political scientists who were devoting themselves to it.

It appeared to be widely assumed that, as one writer put it, political science had responsibilities "for improving and perfecting the operation of government" and that "the research needs of the country could no longer be left to the hazards of chance and individual interest" (*Contemporary Political Science*, p. 368). The prevalence of these assumptions was taken to explain the growth of research organizations whose purpose is to canalize and correlate research, and which, it was recognized, must thereby influence and guide the directions which research is to take.

Trends since 1948. The American Political Science Association Committee on Research, jointly with the United States Office of Education, has made a survey of research in political science in progress in American universities in the spring of 1950, the results of which were reported, with an admirable analysis, in June, 1952 (C. E. Hawley and L. A. Dexter: "Recent Political Science Research in American Universities", this REVIEW Vol. 46, pp. 470–85). In spite of unavoidable quantitative limitations, this provides a valuable statement of the position in 1950, and forms the main source of information in the field. The survey covers only the research in graduate departments of political science, and only in 75 of the 112 departments to which the questionnaire was sent, the other 37 not having replied. The authors of the report believe that it covers about 75% of the political science research in universities. It includes researches by doctoral candidates and by faculty members. In addition to this report (referred to hereafter as the Hawley-Dexter report), supplementary and more recent information, though not strictly comparable, has been gotten from a variety of reports of research projects (e.g., reports of the Social Science Research Council), from the annual lists of doctoral dissertations in political science published in this REVIEW, and from current bibliographies of published works.

From these sources of information combined, it is possible to draw a picture of the trends since 1948.

The relative number of research projects in the main fields of political science may be noted first. The three sources of information that have been used are not strictly comparable, but a rough picture emerges when parts of some of the categories originally employed in each of them are reclassified. In the following classification *Political Theory* covers works approaching or contributing to a general or systematic theory of politics, or devoted to a particular theoretical problem, and includes studies in methodology; *Political Ideas* covers the history of political ideas, and analysis of contemporary doctrines and ideologies; *United States Government* covers the legislative and representative process, public law and judicial and legal problems, and includes studies in state and local governments as well as the federal government; *Foreign Government* includes area studies as well as studies of one national government; *Public Administration* covers United States and foreign public administration; *International Relations* excludes area studies. The figures in the last column were reached by classifying the books by United States political scientists which were reviewed or noticed in the four most recent issues of this REVIEW (June, September, December, 1952; March, 1953), excluding text-books, manuals, surveys, and collections of documents and of readings.

UNITED STATES RESEARCH IN THE MAIN FIELDS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

	Hawley-Dexter Report (for Spring 1950)	Doctoral Dissertations in Progress Summer 1952	Research Works Published in 1952
Political Theory	44	29	11
Political Ideas	36	73	26
United States Government	270	265	37
Foreign Government	215	113	30
Comparative Government	34	9	4
Public Administration	306	127	20
International Relations	110	251	25
	1,015	867	153

These figures, necessarily resting on somewhat arbitrary classifications, can be taken only as broadly suggestive of the relative amounts of attention being given to the main divisions of the whole field. They afford some notion, too, of the total volume of political science research in the United States. The totals of columns 1 and 2 are, however, not comparable, since in the Hawley-Dexter report (column 1) some studies were counted more than once (when they appeared to be related to more than one of the seven subject divisions). The actual total of the studies classified in column 1 is 797. In column 2 (and column 3) each piece of research is counted only once.

The really significant developments in political science research cannot be shown by any statistical summary, but fortunately the material enables us to give some answer to the more important questions. What conception of their own task have the political scientists? What sort of results do they hope to achieve, and how are they going about it? What level of theoretical penetration has been reached, or is in view, in the different divisions of the whole subject? And has there been, in any of these respects, any significant change in the last few years?

In the study of government, particularly of United States government, the emphasis on empirical research has continued and even increased. So also has the emphasis on the process of government rather than the formal structure. "Process of government" must be understood here in its widest sense, including not only the ways in which governments make decisions and exercise their powers but also the ways in which governments get and keep their power. The current research is concerned more largely with the flow of power *to* government than with the flow of power *from* government; more with how governments are authorized than with how they govern. More precisely, the major emphasis of research on government is on the electoral and representative process, by which the people, as electors and as members of interest groups and parties, seek to have their wills represented in and to the bodies they authorize as their government. American political science has, of course, always paid very great attention to pressure groups, parties, and the formation of public opinion, so much so that these instruments have come to be regarded as the determinants of the legislative process. The emphasis on the electoral and representative process (of which parties, pressure groups, and public opinion formation are leading elements) is therefore far from being a new trend, but this whole field is now being subjected to more intensive research. This trend has quite clearly arisen out of an increasing concern, on the part of political scientists, about the adequacy of the democratic process in their own country, although this is seldom avowed.

Yet, paradoxically, American political science is so intent on empirical analysis that for the most part it eschews any inquiry into adequacy, since that would involve "value judgment". The prevailing view, one might almost say, paraphrasing the saying about justice, is that it is necessary not only that political science should be done but also that it should manifestly appear to be done, and here "science" is predominantly taken to mean purely empirical investigation and generalization.

The Hawley-Dexter report endorses the view expressed by Thomas I. Cook in *Contemporary Political Science* that concern for the techniques of power, opinion formation, etc . . . had turned attention away from the purposes of the political process, the needs of the ruled, and the potentialities for satisfying these needs. The available information about subsequent research on the whole confirms this view. The prevailing focus of attention is the mechanics rather than the purposes or potentialities of the political process. Even on the mechanics of it, the Hawley-Dexter report found no evidence of a search for a new theory of representation; the "pressure politics" theory was so generally accepted that there was no disposition to question the hypotheses. Indeed, that report found little evidence for any such trend, in political science research generally, as was reported by Charles E. Merriam in *Contemporary Political Science,* towards a "growing effort to interpret data, to use them as a check on assumptions and hypotheses, and in turn to develop new assumptions and hypotheses, examining implicit assumptions more carefully and making them more explicit."

In respect of the level of penetration of empirical research into the political process, there are signs of change since the Hawley-Dexter report. For instance, the elaborate research plan recently evolved by a Social Science Research Council inter-university group, for an extensive program of "Research in Political Behavior" reported in this REVIEW, Vol. 46, pp. 1003–45 (Dec., 1952), is very much concerned with defining and testing hypotheses. The stated aim is to discover uniformities in the empirically observed behavior of persons and groups in the political process, or sets of recurring patterns of behavior involving relationships of leadership and subordination, functional specialization, etc.

It refrains from inquiring how men ought to act. Keeping strictly on an empirical plane, it does emphasize that detailed and precise formulation of concepts and hypotheses must precede empirical research. It insists that the concepts and hypotheses to be formulated must be such as will permit "effective identification of behavioral uniformities" and "ease of replication and validation in successive researches." It does not insist on quantitative methods only but merely on empirical data. It hopes in this way to produce systematic theory, to build "a political science of increasing system, validity and generality of statement."

This ambitious long-term plan of research is typical of others in its emphasis on careful formulation of hypotheses and its desire to reach some systematic general theory. There is some reason to think that the intense preoccupation with "scientific" method may defeat the end ("a political science of increasing system, validity and generality of statement"); the formulation of problems and concepts is to be limited to those which will permit the discovery of uniformities and which will provide uniform specifications for extensive and repeated observations. Sometimes it appears that the cart has run away with the horse; research projects are chosen and are considered valuable because they can employ these careful empirical methods. This, of course, is not the only ground on which research projects are chosen; the underlying ground, though never acknowledged as more than a secondary reason, is the desire to reach generalizations which would help to improve the quality of American democracy. In any case, such research planning as this shows that the need for rethinking hypotheses and developing a new systematic theory of politics is emphatically recognized in leading research circles.

That is not to say that the bulk of the current research is at this level of questioning or of generality; it appears rather that the greater amount of research is still at the level characterized in the Hawley-Dexter report, while the planning and execution of research at the newer level is mainly confined to research institutes, such as the Hoover Institute with its R.A.D.I.R. (Revolution and the Development of International Relations) project (of which the first published studies have recently appeared: reviewed in this REVIEW, Vol. 46, pp. 867–73 (Sept., 1952)), and to other research groups sponsored by such bodies as the Social Science Research Council and the foundations which are concerned with the promotion of the social sciences. A notable instance of the latter is the Cornell Studies in Civil Liberties, sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation, analyzing governmental internal security programs purporting to be against disloyalty and subversive activity. Four substantial volumes of the series which appeared in 1951 and 1952 are reviewed in this REVIEW, Vol. 47, pp. 211–15 (March, 1953). The scope of those studies affords one indication that research into the exercise of governmental power and its impact on the citizen, while outweighed by the amount of research on the process of representation, is by no means neglected.

What has been said about the trend in the study of government indicates that work in the direction of systematic political theory is so far rather limited, but that there is increasing awareness of the need for it. The other branch of political theory, the study of the history of political ideas, including contemporary ideologies, has fared rather better, in volume at least. Much of it is designed to disclose the roots of present ideological conflicts, and has an obvious and implicitly recognized relevance to the defense of American values.

Comparative government, in any strict sense, has not developed as much as might have been expected; there is no clear evidence that it has developed much beyond the mainly descriptive level where the Hawley-Dexter report found it. The slowness of studies of government in general to reach a synthetic theoretical level, which we have already noticed, is characteristic of the present stage of comparative government in particular. The contemporary American thirst for information about foreign nations has resulted in a large number of separate studies of foreign governments, or of a particular aspect of them, as well as an extensive development of "area studies." (On the rise of area studies see *International Social Science Bulletin*, Vol. IV, No. 4, 1952.) Since the thirst for careful and abundant information needs to be satisfied before the thirst for theoretical analysis or synthesis can be extensively indulged, it is not surprising that much of this research is descriptive and historical.

The same may be said of the very large volume of research in international relations. There is little evidence to modify the finding of the Hawley-Dexter report that most of the research in international relations was really providing background material, descriptive and historical; that much of what analysis was being done was primarily legal analysis; and that social, psychological, and economic factors, as they apply to policy problems or to processes of international relations, made up a very minor theme. But, here, as in the study of government, the evidence suggests that, while the bulk of the work may not be conceived theoretically, yet the desirability of aiming at broad empirical generalization, based on massive and meticulously formulated research, is clearly recognized, at least in those centers where research is most intensively organized and supported: the R.A.D.I.R. project, already mentioned, is a leading example of this.

Finally, in the study of public administration, a similar but not quite parallel trend is observable. The bulk of the research now being done appears to concern particular administrative problems in certain states or cities, or in certain departments of a government, and to be designed to describe, to analyze, and to contribute to the solution of the particular problems. The work of the many American bureaus of municipal research and similar bodies, designed to produce immediately operative results for paying clients, will obviously be of that kind, and most of it should not be reckoned as political science research in the sense in which the term is generally used. But the greater part of the academic research in public administration, in which one would expect to find a theoretical approach and aim, does not evidently show a desire to work towards a general theory of public administration or contribute to synthetic studies. However, some influential individual scholars have moved away from the traditional theories, and are urging a reconsideration of the general theory of public administration. And, as well as individual scholars, organized research groups are moving in the same direction. For instance, one of the projects outlined by the Social Science Research Council group on Political Behavior, mentioned above, is an elaborate long-term research into "Party and Administration Responsibility: Council-Manager Government." This project is designed on a broad theoretical level and is intent on stating hypotheses more precisely and testing them more systematically and extensively than has usually been done. Thus the trend in public administration research is similar to that in other fields of government; the major part of the work is being carried on within the limits of accepted theory and with little questioning of assumptions, but an attempt to break through these limitations, or at least to subject the prevailing views to some searching new questions and extensive empirical testing, has taken definite shape.

2. *Political Science Research in Great Britain*

When one turns from American to British political science, two differences are immediately striking. One is that among British political scientists there is much less anxiety and perturbation about research aims and methods. The other is that there is less emphasis on purely empirical research and more inclination to examine political institutions and processes from the point of view of purpose—the purposes they serve, and the purpose they ought to serve.

For the first of these characteristics two reasons are apparent. British political scientists are on the whole less troubled about the representative and democratic quality of their own political institutions than are American political scientists about theirs. Hence there is less incentive for the British political scientists to question the established theories of their institutions, and hence less need to search for new techniques by which the accepted interpretations could be subjected to serious revision. Secondly, there is not the financial support for vast research projects in political science in Britain that there is in the United States. Funds go mainly to other kinds of social research where the need is thought to be greater. And since it is chiefly in the planning of large research schemes that the need to question traditional methods and aims of research arises, there has been little incentive or pressure from this quarter to be concerned about them.

The other noticeably different feature of British political science—the lack of insistence on purely empirical research—may be seen simply as a part of the British intellectual tradition, which has always tended to consider politics as a branch of moral philosophy. But why should this tradition have persisted so far into this "scientific age"? It is not that the spirit of empirical inquiry is absent—the spirit of the Webbs lives on, and there is a substantial amount of study of political institutions—but empirical research from which considerations of value and purpose are rigidly excluded is not at all typical. The prevailing spirit is indeed the same as that which guided and impelled the Webbs, whose research was informed by a sense of purpose embodied in a political philosophy. British political scientists are accustomed to refer their analysis of institutions fairly consciously to some overriding ethical political theory, whether it be utilitarian, idealist, or fabian. They are not afraid of value judgments, perhaps because they are fairly sure of their own values. This approach could be justified empirically, if such justification were thought necessary. Political life has been rather more informed by principles in Britain than in the United States; parties have defined and justified themselves by their adherence to one set or another of value principles as well as by their advocacy of different means to common ends. Hence, it might be said, a feeling for value principles is an asset to the political scientist who would analyze this political life. However this may be, the fact that the universities are fairly closely related to the political life of the country (training many of the politicians and civil servants, and enjoying easy relations with them), tends to reinforce on each side an appreciation of value judgments and a perceptible mistrust of purely empirical research. Even the term "political science" has not been fully accepted by its academic practitioners in Great Britain: they have designedly called their recently-formed political science association the Political Studies Association and their journal *Political Studies*.

Notwithstanding these general and still prevalent characteristics, political science has shared in the considerable growth of planned research in Great Britain in the social sciences generally in the last decade. The *Register of Research in the Social Sciences*, prepared by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, lists, for 1951-52, 1425 researches in all the social sciences, of which 230 are classified as political science or international relations. Of these, 137 are researches by doctoral candidates, and 93 are researches by other individuals or groups sponsored by organized research bodies (in or outside of universities). This is far from being a complete list of political science research in progress, since it does not include the work of individual scholars which is not done in connection with a specifically research unit. Much of the most significant academic research done by individual mature scholars is therefore not covered. The *Register*, however, when supplemented by a consideration of recently published work in political science, is sufficient to provide a picture of the relative weight of attention being given to the different fields of political science, and the relative strength of descriptive, analytical, and synthetic approaches.

The researches listed in the *Register*, when reclassified as nearly as possible on the same lines as were used above for the United States, show the following distribution: Political Theory, 5; Political Ideas, 22; British Government, 28; Foreign Governments, 25; Comparative Government, 4; Public Administration, 54; International Relations, 61; British Commonwealth and Empire Government, 28.

The only apparent significant development from the position in 1949 as outlined in the sections of *Contemporary Political Science* devoted to the British scene, is a shift of emphasis in the work being done on British government. W. A. Robson could say in 1949 (*Contemporary Political Science*, p. 294) that "the study of political or governmental institutions in the widest sense of the term is almost coterminous with public administration," and he was able to survey, under one or another subdivision of public administration, all the work being done on government. That he could do so was, of course, partly because an extremely broad definition of public administration was used, including the structure and functioning not only of administrative bodies but also of all legislative, executive, and judicial bodies, by virtue of the fact that they exercise control over administration. In this way, parliament, cabinet, and courts could all be brought into the purview of "public administration." But what is significant is that there was no problem of fitting into this framework any body of work on the electoral and representative process as distinct from the legislative and administrative process and institutions. There was, as Professor Robson and David Thomson noted (*Contemporary Political Science*, pp. 301, 538) little work on parties and the party system, the electoral process, or the formation of public opinion. In short, study of the flow of power to the government was relatively neglected, while the exercise of power by the government was subject to research in many of its aspects. Englishmen, it was observed (p. 538) have been accustomed to thinking in terms rather of the sovereignty of parliament than of the sovereignty of the people or the general will; which is perhaps another way of saying that English scholars have been comparatively satisfied with the institutions by which the will of the people is supposed to be brought to bear on the holders of power.

A rapid review of the work being done in the last few years indicates that increasing attention is now being given to parties, interest groups, public opinion, and the electoral process. Of the 28 current researches classified above as British Government, 21 are directly concerned with one or more of these phenomena. A substantial beginning has been made on the study of factors influencing voters, and of the nature and conduct of party organization; and the already lively interest in these matters seems likely to continue to increase. This research is conceived in the empirical way, being based on direct observations, and where possible using quantitative techniques, though the resources available have not so far been sufficient to permit an extensive use of interviews and statistical methods in electoral research. Not enough work has yet been done on elections, parties, public opinion, and interest groups to provide a basis for a new systematic theory of the representative process. So the possibility of a new systematic theory of British government, which would modify what some scholars consider to be the unduly rationalist assumptions of the prevalent theory, is still in the future.

The new interest in the electoral and representative process which has just been described has absorbed an increasing proportion of the energies being devoted to political science research, but it is probably true to say that the greatest proportion is still being devoted to the legislative, executive, and administrative process and institutions. The main lines of the established institutions —parliament, the alternate-party system, the cabinet, the civil service, and the judiciary—are not seriously questioned, but a great deal of thought is being given to the many problems of modifying various parts of this structure to enable it better to perform the tasks laid upon it by the extension of social services and of nationalized industry. This is the main focus of present work in public administration, and it is significant that substantial attention is being given to the many-sided problem of combining efficient administration with democratic responsiveness or control.

3. *Political Science Research in the British Commonwealth Countries*

Information on political science research in the Commonwealth countries is not inclusive enough to permit any full analysis, but a survey of some 80 researches now in progress there reveals some fairly clear lines of development. In each of these countries, the main concern of political science is with the structure and functioning of the political institutions of its own country, and with its foreign relations. And in most of the Commonwealth countries, political science as an independent academic discipline is a relatively recent development, so that almost the whole energies of the political scientists are absorbed by the work of description and historical analysis of their own countries' institutions.

In Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, most of the current research having any bearing on political life is either simply political history or is primarily descriptive of institutions or concerned with one particular national problem; it is some way distant yet from theoretical interpretation. In Pakistan the effort to define the structure and the problems of a newly-created state is naturally predominant. A few scholars in each of these countries, however, are working on the history of political ideas.

In Canada, where political science has had a longer development, some theoretical interpretation is now going on. A notable amount of attention is currently being given to the whole structure and process of political life in one region (western Canada) and particularly in one province (Alberta), with emphasis on the relation of the political system to economic life and social movements, and on the electoral and representative process, as well as (or rather more than) on the legislative and administrative system. The main project in this field is expected to produce a series of some ten volumes. Another project, in progress for some time, will result in a series of works, analytical and historical, on the government of the several Canadian provinces.

In India, where political science has been a recognized academic discipline for several decades, there is a longer tradition of theoretical thought than in any of the other Commonwealth countries. Indian scholars, during the period of struggle for national independence, were greatly concerned with the principles of democracy, especially in relation to the social and economic conditions of their country. The Indian contributor to *Contemporary Political Science* found, nevertheless, that Indian political science had done little to develop the modern theory of the state. He expressed the hope that now that India had won national freedom, it's political scientists, enjoying for the first time the conditions for constructive fundamental thinking, might develop a theoretical political science. This hope has not yet apparently been realized, but the achievement of Indian independence has had another effect: the greater part of Indian political science seems now to be devoted to foreign affairs and international relations.

4. *Western Europe*

In the countries of Western Europe the trends in political science research can only be understood in relation to the position of political science as an academic discipline. Generally speaking (but subject to an important qualification which is stated in the following paragraph) the extent of political science research varies in proportion to the degree of recognition of political science as a subject in its own right in the universities. And since in almost all of these countries this recognition is either entirely lacking, or has only just begun, the amount of political science research is very limited. This, of course, does not mean that the scholars of these countries take no interest in political institutions or ideas, but only that the field has been largely preempted by the philosophers, the legal scholars, and the historians, who generally bring to the study of political institutions and ideas the traditional outlook of their separate disciplines. While this situation prevails, the possibility of developing any systematic theory of politics or government, or of undertaking any extensive empirical research, appears to be remote.

But in several European countries the very impossibility of developing a systematic body of empirical political theory within the traditional academic structure has been a stimulus to the employment of newer methods and goals of research than are found in some countries where the path of political science has been smoother. In other words, while the traditional academic organization and the prevailing intellectual climate of most Western European countries have constituted a formidable obstacle to the development of a political science, the existence of such an obstacle has compelled the postwar generation of scholars to do some fundamental rethinking about the kind of political knowledge that is needed and the possible ways of attaining it. The underlying cause of all this is the heightened perception of the urgency of political problems, especially the problem of the control of political power. This is, naturally, particularly acute in those countries whose political (and academic) life was shattered by the war, or was undermined (even before the war) by the inability of existing democratic institutions to retain their vitality.

The result has been that in some of these countries political science has begun to develop outside the traditional, legal, historical, and philosophical categories, and to set up research on its own. This development is still on a relatively small scale, but it has attained some institutional recognition already. Where such a development is taking place, the tendency is for the scholars involved to take over as far as possible the most advanced methods, approach, and research aims from the political science of those countries where the subject has long had an independent existence and is most extensively developed, and particularly from American political science. Hence, in this still small but growing sector of political studies, the strict empirical approach predominates, and the research is concerned noticeably more with the electoral and representative process than with political structure and institutions. Precise research, quantitative where possible, is the main aim. Research objectives are generally limited to the elucidation of one particular part of the process of government, and are often based on field work in one particular section of the country or of the government. Such limitation is self-imposed because, in the empirical conception that prevails among the new political scientists, the construction of a broad systematic theory of politics must await the outcome of many specific limited researches. What is significant, however, is that the limited researches are increasingly coming to be thought of as contributions to the future construction of general theories of politics and administration. The overriding ultimate concern of most of the research in this advancing sector is to achieve some understanding of the sources and the possible ways of controlling political power.

It must be emphasized that what has been said in the preceding paragraphs about the new tendencies in political science research applies to only a fraction of all the work being done in politics. Law, history, and philosophy still predominate. But against this traditional background, the new developments, though small, are increasingly significant.

Information on the political science research in progress in all the countries of Western Europe is too scanty to permit a useful analysis of the work being done in each country separately. But the development is sufficiently similar as between many of them to permit a useful picture to be given by taking a few as typical.

Scandinavia. Of all the Western European countries, only Sweden has an established tradition of political science as an independent academic discipline, and this fact sets it somewhat apart, in respect of political science research, from the general position outlined above. Finland shares this distinction to some extent; but the position of political science in Norway and Denmark appears to be closer to that of the continental European countries.

In Sweden a substantial amount of work in political science research is being carried on in the universities. As was reported in *Contemporary Political Science* (p. 151) there is a close interplay between academic political science and active political life, in that it is usual for a large proportion of the academic chairs to be held by men who are also members of the Riksdag or otherwise prominent in political activity. This fact has probably promoted the status of political science in the universities. It may also be thought to have given political science research in the universities a bias in favor of those problems which are of particular interest to the legislature or to the parties. In view of this relationship, and in view of the fact that the continuity of Swedish political life has not been broken, it is not surprising to find that the greater part of the current work in political science is on the structure of Swedish government, Swedish social policy, and developments in foreign countries which are of direct interest to Swedish legislators. For instance, of the five books published in 1952 on foreign and comparative government, three are studies of the referendum in different countries (which studies were undertaken following a request by the Riksdag and are published as state documents); one is on social legislation in the Soviet Union; and one is on democratic socialism in the world today. Interest in political theory and ideology, in public administration, and in international relations continues. The newer trend towards the study of the representative process also has some currency in Sweden and has recently produced some studies of popular movements in relation to democratic government and at least one work on the electorate in a particular region. There does not, however, appear to be any very recent work on parties in the political process or on the formation of public opinion, nor any attempt at systematic empirical research into the electoral and representative process. Swedish political science in general has not yet sought to develop a systematic theory of the political process which would integrate the older constitutional and historical material with the newer material which might be gathered by long-term empirical research into political behavior. But the possibility of some such new ventures in political science is now being given considerable attention in Sweden; recently, in two successive numbers of the *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift* (1952, Nos. 3 and 4), there were five articles dealing respectively with "The Development of Society and the Scope of Political Science," "The Development of Society and the Scope of Jurisprudence," "A General Research Program for Political Science," "Goals and Methods in Political Science," and "The Concept of Social Classes." The widespread stirring of interest in goals and methods and concepts of political science appears to be a quite recent development in Sweden, and suggests that in spite of the continuity of Swedish political science there is now a disposition to take a new direction in political science research.

France. The trend of political science research in France shows some advance from the position of 1948–49 as it was outlined by the French contributors to

Contemporary Political Science. The more recent movement is mainly along the same lines as were already discerned there. The growth of political science is still subject to the restricting effects of traditional academic organization, but some of the limits imposed by this factor are now being overcome.

In respect of the obstacles to the development of political science, and hence of political science research, the position in France may be taken as typical of that in most of the continental European countries, while in the effort to surmount the obstacles France appears to be somewhat further ahead. The problem, until very recently, has been not a problem of *developing* political science, but one of *creating* a political science against the whole force of the academic and intellectual tradition, in which the study of political institutions has been dominated by the faculties of law, the study of political philosophy by the faculties of philosophy, and the study of political movements by the departments of history. To the extent that this situation has prevailed not only has there been no unified political science; what is more important, there has been no substantial body of scholars who think of themselves as political scientists. And, in these circumstances, certain areas of what is elsewhere considered to be political science are likely to be left unexplored, as not falling within the scope of law, philosophy, or history, notably the whole range of phenomena (parties, public opinion, the democratic control of administration, etc.) which are now regarded as central to the understanding of the political process. Hence the traditional university structure offers no encouragement either to research in these fields or to the development of an approach or method designed to produce a systematic theory of politics.

However, progress towards creating a political science has become increasingly evident in the last few years in France. The faculties of law are still dominant, but within them an increasing place is being given to work in political science. The first university chair in which political science shares the title (the Chair of Constitutional Law and Political Science, at Bordeaux) was created in 1951 and is held by one of the leading exponents of political science. The degree in law (*licence en Droit*) has just been reformed to permit specialization in one of three fields: private law, public law and political science, or economics. These developments, it will be noticed, have followed by some six or eight years the establishment (in 1945) of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, and the Instituts d'Études Politiques in several universities. Both the Fondation and the Instituts, as the use of the plural term "sciences politiques" indicates, are devoted to economic and social as well as political science, but in both organizations political science has been given room to grow and is achieving substantial recognition. The Fondation, for instance, has separate research centers for the study of internal politics, of international relations, and of public administration.

The most significant indication of progress towards the creation of a specifically political science is the establishment of the Association Française de Science Politique in 1949 and the *Revue Française de Science Politique* in 1951. These constitute, in effect, a declaration of independence on the part of political science as such, and are an impressive evidence of the existence of a body of scholars who think in terms of political science. They provide a means of encouraging and publishing research: the Association not only plans research but also provides some financial support for it.

Indirectly the Association and the *Revue* may do something even more important towards the creation of a political science, simply because their work is a demonstration that a political science already exists. The French intellectual tradition has long been noted for its desire for orderly, unified systems of thought, and bodies of theoretical principle. This has given law, philosophy, and history their academic tenacity; it also makes the exponents of political science desire above all to produce a systematic body of theoretical principles. The intellectual tradition is thus not only a conservative but also a radical force; once a new discipline can show that it exists, it can attract a surprising number of academic adherents, enthused by the possible adventure of building a new body of principles. It is perhaps for this reason that already some of the French philosophers want to see political philosophy attached to political science rather than continue as a department of philosophy, and some of the jurists wish for an enlargement of the sphere of political science. One may even suggest that, if the desire for intellectual system is strong enough to attract academic members of other disciplines into the camp of political science, the future development of political science will be more rapid than its modest beginnings in the last decade would suggest. For, after a certain point, such attraction is by its very nature apt to be accelerative and to move by jumps; when it is a question of a system, it must be all or nothing.

This possibility must remain, for the time being, mere speculation. But there is solid evidence that the present exponents of political science have a lively consciousness of what needs to be done, and that they are pressing on with researches designed to contribute to a theoretical understanding of the political process. This does not mean that they are all building systems. They are not; indeed, it is a matter of complaint by some philosophically-minded political scientists that no one is attempting a systematic theory. The French political scientists have, on the whole, an empirical conception of their task, a conception which requires a long period of concentrating on specific researches before the material is adequate for a theoretical system.

Apart from the substantial amount of research still being carried on in the faculties of philosophy (which has recently produced notable studies of such political thinkers as Hobbes and Rousseau) and in the faculties of law (which accounts for many studies of institutions) and in history (which provides numerous studies in international relations), the newer work which is conceived as political science is concentrated in a few fields: political parties, the electoral process, public administration (particularly in relation to the economic functions of the government), and foreign politics and international relations.

The Association Française de Science Politique is engaged in research in three main directions: (1) The economic and social functions of government. In this field, two particular things are being studied—social elections (elections to the Social Security organizations and to the Comités d'Entreprise) compared to political elections; and the structure and exercise of power within national enterprises. (2) The basis and determinants of foreign policy. (3) The functioning of political institutions, embracing a group of studies on the functioning of parliament. The Fondation Nationale is conducting researches on the foreign relations of the Soviet Union, on the functioning of democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany, and on the Saar (an area study), as well as some detailed studies in French public administration. The Institut d'Études Politiques of the University of Paris is conducting an extensive research program on the foundations of French foreign policy. This will take the form of a series of researches into the factors which bear on the decisions made by the politicians and diplomats, and will extend to investigations of the recruitment of those who make the decisions, of economic influences, and of the influences of public opinion, religion, and tradition. It is intended to apply not only the historical method of analysis, but also such quantitative methods as are applicable, and direct interview methods. It is evident that in both its approach and its method, this program of research is typical of the new conception of empirical political science, moving from a single problem back into the investigation of many factors—social, economic, political, and organizational—which are assumed to have a direct bearing on the particular political process in question.

The same Institut is also organizing other research on the political process: the influence of parties on the formation of public opinion, social groups and public opinion, and methods of analysis of parties and interest groups. Several researches into problems of foreign politics and international relations are being conducted by the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère.

All the research projects mentioned so far are group researches, planned by a research institute and carried out by a research group, often including advanced postgraduate students. To complete the picture, one must add the research being done by individual scholars; indeed, all the group research is in a sense only an adjunct of their work as individuals, and it is largely owing to their initiative that the group work has been developed. Thus the research for which French political science is now best known is that which has been developed by a few leading scholars, such as that on the relation of social classes and structure to the political process by M. Aron, on political parties by M. Duverger, and on the electoral process by M. Goguel.

Other Western European Countries. Information on political science research in progress in institutions in other European countries is, at the time of writing, too fragmentary to permit an adequate description or analysis. It is, however, sufficient to warrant the general assertion that in most Western European countries the position from which political science has to develop, if it is to develop at all, is similar to that outlined for France, and that progress towards a political science independent of law and philosophy is less noticeable elsewhere than in France.

Western Germany and Italy are special cases, in that their scholars were confronted, when scholarship was again possible after 1945, with the task of exploring the possibilities of various institutional forms which might be established for their restored democratic regimes, and of reconsidering the basic values of liberal democracy. Consequently, rather more attention than usual has been given on the one hand to political structure and on the other to ideology and political philosophy. The overriding problem of political life in these countries has been the total reconstruction of democratic government, and early in this process opinions as to how it ought to be done became divided more or less along party lines. Scholars as well as politicians were moved by the urgency of getting their views expressed. Hence much of the writing on political affairs has been as much polemical as scientific.

In Germany, however, there is now a notable development of institutes of political research, employing empirical and often quantitative methods, and mainly investigating aspects of the electoral and representative process. A partial list of the subjects of these researches, all dealing primarily with German phenomena, indicates the trend: the membership structure of German parties; the efficacy of political propaganda; electoral sociology (of specific regions); the influence of parties and social forces on the legislature, the government, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary; the Berlin elections of 1950; the techniques of public opinion formation in the Soviet zone; the composition and functioning of parliamentary groups. There is also some analysis of the scope and method of political science and some critique of postwar German literature in politics and related fields; a valuable work on this, surveying the philosophical and ideological trends of the last two or three years, has been prepared by the German scholar, A.R.L. Gurland, in his capacity as foreign consultant to the (U.S.) Library of Congress (*Political Science in Western Germany, Thoughts and Writings 1950–1952*, published by the Library of Congress, Washington, 1952).

5. *Latin America*

The available information about political science research in Latin America is not sufficient to establish any trends since the position outlined in the papers on Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay, in *Contemporary Political Science*. Of the researches in progress reported from research institutions, three deal with political doctrine or the history of political ideas, two are comparative studies of government and legislation, two are on municipal government and one on federalism, and two deal with political parties.

6. *Eastern Europe*

Although little information is available on current political science in the Soviet Union and the "new democracies" of Eastern Europe, a brief note on the main characteristics of political science there may be of value by way of contrast to the position in the West.

Because of the post-revolutionary nature of these states, and to the extent that their revolutions were made or consolidated by Marx-Lenin-Stalin theory, the lines of development of political science are strikingly different from those familiar elsewhere. The Marxist principle that theory should be a guide to action, and action the test of theory, is fundamental to the conception of social and political science in those countries. There is room, within the framework of Marxist political theory, for many different tentative interpretations of political phenomena and problems, but there is no room, in the countries of the Marxist revolution, for any basic conception of political science other than the one just stated. The result is that when new political phenomena give rise to new theoretical problems, they are discussed by the academic political scientists with a view to contributing to a decision which it is known will be made, and will be made politically. After a period of academic analysis and argument (which will be longer or shorter depending on the political urgency of the problem), a political lead is given, by the party, and a general theory is established as authoritative. Such were, for instance, the stages by which the present Soviet theory concerning the "people's democracies" was established.

The fundamental difference between this kind of political science and the Western kind follows from the Marxist concept of the role of theory, in conjunction with the fact that the state is able to implement the theory. In the countries of the Marxist revolution, the state (or party) can change any political institution swiftly, and will do so whenever the need is demonstrated and the problem has been more or less fully canvassed theoretically. Theoretical analysis is therefore understood to be a prelude to effective action. This gives it the vigor and consistency which flow from a sense of purpose, and which is possible where fundamental values are no longer in question, while it imposes limits which would be intolerable to those who believe that the individual must be left free to make fundamental value decisions.

III. PROGRESS, SHORTCOMINGS, AND DIFFICULTIES IN THE PRESENT STAGE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

It is apparent from the foregoing survey and analysis that political science is in a stage of transition and of some uncertainty in most of the countries where it is, or is becoming, a scholarly discipline in its own right. That its practitioners are, in general, aware of this—sometimes acutely aware of it—is, if not an evidence of progress, at least a *sine qua non* of progress. That much remains to be done will not be disputed by anyone familiar with the field. No attempt need be made here to list the particular lacunae in political science research in the different countries; many are apparent from the analysis just concluded. The more important problem is to discover what shortcomings there are in the main trends in most countries, and what difficulties are inherent in the kind of research revealed in those trends.

The dominant trend, in the political scientists' conception of their task, and in the sort of questions they set themselves, is clear enough. There is an increasing amount of more strictly empirical research, of which much, though not all, is being done with a sense of the need for a systematic general theory. Underlying this development is an uneasiness about the adequacy of existing political knowledge and existing political science methods.

The shortcomings of this trend must be judged by some criterion, and its difficulties (beyond the most superficial ones) must be discovered in confronting the inherent nature of the research with the criterion of the science. What criterion, then, are we to use? A decision can perhaps be reached by elimination.

1. One might say that political science research falls short of what might be expected of a political science, to the extent that is has not yet produced a systematic theory verified by practice. But to say this is to conceive political science too closely in the image of a natural science. Except perhaps for political science in the Marxist countries, where theory and practice are made interdependent, the test of practice is not available for the theories that political science research can produce.

2. Lessening the requirement, one might say that political science research falls short wherever it has not produced a systematic theory which, although not actually able to be tested by practice, does explain, to the general satisfaction of the political scientists, all the most important political phenomena under one or a few principles. But this is no adequate criterion. For such a set of principles may be generally accepted by the scholars of a country for a considerable time and then come to be rejected by them, or be considered unsatisfactory. Such appears to be the case with the "pressure group" interpretation, so well entrenched until now in American political science, and with various juristic theories of the state in Europe. Indeed, in political science (as in the natural sciences) rejection of established general theories, and pursuit of fresh specific researches, may be a sign of greater advancement and scientific penetration than the existence of a generally accepted theory.

In the natural sciences, when a prevailing general theory is rejected it is usually because it is seen not to be able to bring an adequate range of new (or newly discovered) phenomena under its general laws. In the social sciences this may also be the reason sometimes, but here another motive operates and is probably the more important: that is, that the functioning political system, as it is presented by the established theory, is felt by the scholars to be less defensible morally than it was. This appears less often as a conscious judgment than as an underlying worry, but it is perceptible at present among the political scientists of most countries, who are, in this respect, reflecting the attitude of a broader section of opinion. The change results less from any change in prevailing moral standards than from changes in the social structure and social relations which set up new moral demands on democracy.

In other words, the new matter which the accepted political theory cannot accommodate is not simply new factual phenomena, but new moral problems which have been brought into existence by changed social relations. When this is so, the requirement for valid political science research is both fresh empirical inquiry and fresh philosophical thinking. It is scarcely necessary to establish that we are in such a period now.

3. In this view, the criterion by which the progress and shortcomings of political science research ought to be assessed is not whether it has produced a systematic theory, or even whether it aims at producing a systematic positive theory by building up empirical studies. It is, rather, whether either systematic

theory or particular inquiries are being pursued with the requisite consciousness of the need to rethink a political philosophy adequate to the new moral problems posed by changes in society.

It is clear from the survey that political science in most countries is in or is approaching a stage of rejecting old principles and seeking new formulations which can be developed by empirical research. The requirements of empirical research are such as to put an emphasis on the mechanics of the phenomena, and on methods and techniques, and to subordinate, if not to extinguish, a conscious consideration of values. The great danger of the widespread efflorescence of empirical research is that it may take its distinction between positive and normative science to be more than a handy rule for preventing empirical research from being confused with value judgments in all its intermediate stages, and may make a fetish of positive political science. It is by no means clear that this danger has been avoided in current research.

The fundamental difficulty, therefore, of political science research in such a stage as the present is to keep a balance between either systematic or particular inquiries, on the one hand, and on the other, a political philosophy thought out in relation to a new set of social relations and problems. This is now becoming, and is likely for some time to be, the besetting difficulty of political science research. In the measure that the need for a new systematic positive theory of politics becomes the main preoccupation of political scientists, this difficulty will replace the hitherto prevailing difficulty which has attended empirical research, namely, the disposition of research to amass information for the sake of amassing information.

Still another difficulty is already evident and is likely to continue and even increase in strength: that research will be directed for thinly-veiled immediate pragmatic purposes. The amount of government-sponsored and government-directed research in political science already being done in some countries suggests that the most serious problem of political science research in liberal-democratic societies, now and in the years ahead, may be to avoid being used by governments for the manipulation of the political process at home or the furtherance of their purposes abroad.

PARTIES, PARTISANSHIP, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATURE

WILLIAM J. KEEFE

Pennsylvania College for Women

A significant result of the report "Toward A More Responsible Two-Party System"[1] has been the marked growth of interest in the American party system. It is nevertheless true that our knowledge about the way in which party systems function is far from complete. An area promising fruitful research and presenting many hypotheses susceptible of systematic inquiry is that of the role of party organizations in the legislative process.

I. THE ROLE OF PARTY IN POLICY FORMATION

It is the purpose of this article to examine the legislative role of political parties in the Pennsylvania General Assembly;[2] more precisely, to measure their influence in the formation of the state's public policies in one session of the legislature.[3] The most recent completed session at the time of this study was that of 1951—the longest session in state history.

In order to evaluate the impact of party upon legislation, the concept of a "party vote" has been used. This is merely an operating definition by which to measure differences in party attitudes on questions subjected to roll-call votes on the floor. The assumption was made that the interests of the parties can be established best by analyzing the voting behavior of their membership. Questions to which partisan significance is attached will find the parties aligned against each other.

To provide a definite standard for measurement, it was decided to call a party vote one in which at least 80 per cent of one party voted opposite 80 per cent or more of the other party. Thus, for example, a vote would be considered a party vote if 40 (or more) Democrats out of 50 voted "yea" on a question and, say, 80 (or more) out of 100 Republicans voted "nay." To establish the total number of instances in which the parties differed significantly on roll-call votes, a tabulation was also made of the number of votes in which majorities (50 per cent plus one) in both parties voted opposite each other.

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[1] Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association, "Toward A More Responsible Two-Party System," this REVIEW, Vol. 44 (Sept., 1950, Supp.).

[2] The Pennsylvania House of Representatives has 208 members; the Senate has 50. Republicans held large majorities in both houses in the 1951 session: 120 to 87 (one vacancy) in the House and 30 to 20 in the Senate.

[3] For a study which considers this in the Illinois legislature, see William J. Keefe, "Party Government and Lawmaking in the Illinois General Assembly," *Northwestern University Law Review*, Vol. 47, pp. 55–71 (March, 1952). This article also examines the early study of this subject by A. Lawrence Lowell, "The Influence of Party upon Legislation in England and America," American Historical Association, *Annual Report, 1901*, Vol. I, pp. 321–543. Two other recent studies which examine party politics in Congress are Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress* (Baltimore, 1951); and V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York, 1949).

These standards were applied to all the roll-call votes of the 1951 session of the Pennsylvania legislature. There were 1,285 roll-call votes taken in the Senate and 1,330 in the House of Representatives. Tables I and II show how the votes were distributed in the Senate and the House in terms of the agreement and disagreement registered between the parties. Singularly important in Table I, which contains Senate data, are the two percentages showing the number of party votes and the number of votes in which there was complete agreement between the parties. The first is surprising because it is so small: only 60 (4.7 per cent) of the 1,285 roll-call votes taken in the Senate found as much as 80 per cent of one party opposing 80 per cent of the other party. The second percentage is noteworthy because it is so large: 1,049 (81.6 per cent) of all the roll calls were resolved unanimously.

TABLE I. DISTRIBUTION OF 1951 SENATE SESSION ROLL-CALL VOTES ACCORDING TO PARTY VOTING BEHAVIOR

	Number	Percentage
Parties in Disagreement		
Party Votes*	60	4.7
Party Majorities on Opposite Sides†	21	1.6
Parties in Agreement		
Party Majorities on Same Side	155	12.1
Unanimous Agreement	1049	81.6
Total Roll-Call Votes	1285	100.0

* 80 per cent or more of one party voting opposite 80 per cent or more of other party.
† Majorities in each party opposite but less than 80 per cent cohesion.

TABLE II. DISTRIBUTION OF 1951 HOUSE SESSION ROLL-CALL VOTES ACCORDING TO PARTY VOTING BEHAVIOR

	Number	Percentage
Parties in Disagreement		
Party Votes*	142	10.7
Party Majorities on Opposite Sides†	33	2.5
Parties in Agreement		
Party Majorities on Same Side	228	17.1
Unanimous Agreement	927	69.7
Total Roll-Call Votes	1330	100.0

* 80 per cent or more of one party voting opposite 80 per cent or more of other party.
† Majorities in each party opposite but less than 80 per cent cohesion.

Also shown in Table I are two categories of votes which were neither party votes nor votes in which unanimous decisions resulted: those in which the party majorities either opposed each other or were on the same side. Thus, besides the 60 votes classified as party votes, there were an additional 21 votes in which party majorities opposed each other. Adding this figure to the first, it may be seen that there were only 81 roll-call votes (6.3 per cent) out of 1,285 in the Pennsylvania Senate in which Republican majorities opposed Democratic majorities. Obviously this is not a very significant amount of party conflict. Moreover, majorities in both parties were in agreement on 93.7 per cent of all the roll-call votes.

Table II contains the same type of data for the House of Representatives. There was more party voting in the House than in the Senate, and there were somewhat fewer unanimous roll calls, but the same general distribution is evident. Of 1,330 roll-call votes, 142 (10.7 per cent) were party votes.[4] On another 33 roll-call votes the majorities of both parties were in opposition. In all, meaningful party divisions occurred on 13.2 per cent of the roll-call votes in the 1951 House. Conversely, the parties were in substantial agreement on the remaining 86.8 per cent, with 69.7 per cent being unanimous and 17.1 per cent having majorities in both parties on the same side.

The general conclusion to be drawn from these data is that in terms of their total number, the policy decisions which confronted the Pennsylvania legislature were mainly nonpartisan. Moreover, the tremendous number of unanimous votes which occurred is good evidence that most questions coming before the legislature not only have no significance for the parties but also have none for other large "interests", e.g., rural-urban or big city-outstate. Much of the job which state legislators set out to do every two years has little connection with the party label under which they were elected. There are, in fact, scores of bills transformed into public law each session which go through the legislative process without controversy of any sort.

However, the existence of this large amount of nonpartisanship in state legislation should not obscure the fact that there are very real interests of both parties in legislative matters and that many of the most important measures of the session are influenced by specific party attitudes and policies. This will be seen in the consideration of the various types of issues which gave rise to the 60 Senate and 142 House party votes.

II. PARTY ISSUES

One of the important characteristics of party voting in this session of the General Assembly was the large number of party votes which occurred on a relatively small number of subjects. The comparative frequency with which party votes involved given subjects may be considered in Table III.[5] Here it is useful to point out that the primary areas of disagreement between the parties on public policy questions involved matters of taxation, local government, labor relations, workmen's and unemployment compensation, reapportionment, and the state administration. Nearly 70 per cent of the party votes of both houses related in one way or another to the above subjects.

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[4] The amount of party voting in the House, over that of the Senate, is not as great as it appears. Sixty of the 142 House party votes were on Democratic-sponsored resolutions to discharge committees from further consideration of bills. There was practically no debate on these and all were defeated in summary fashion by straight party votes.

TABLE III. THE SUBJECT MATTER OF PARTY ISSUES IN THE 1951 GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Subject Matter	Senate No.	Senate Percentage	House No.	House Percentage
Taxation	6	10.0	32	22.6
Local Government	15	25.0	20	14.0
Labor Relations	—	—	22	15.5
Workmen's and Unemployment Compensation	6	10.0	14	9.9
Questions of Procedure	9	15.0	4	2.8
Questions of Organization	1	1.7	10	7.0
State Government	2	3.3	8	5.7
Reapportionment	9	15.0	—	—
Aid to Business	1	1.7	4	2.8
Public Utilities	—	—	5	3.5
Public Assistance	—	—	4	2.8
Motions to Discharge Committees*	—	—	4	2.8
Loyalty Oath	—	—	3	2.1
Public Housing	1	1.7	2	1.4
Appointments	2	3.3	—	—
Miscellaneous	8	13.3	10	7.1
Total	60	100.0	142	100.0

* See footnote 5.

The subject most contentious for the parties in the 1951 session was that of a tax program. Note in Table III that 32 (22.6 per cent) of the 142 party votes in the House and six (10 per cent) of the the 60 in the Senate involved taxation. Thus, out of a total of 202 party votes in both houses, 38 (18.8 per cent) concerned the revenue policies of the state.

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[5] A problem of classification resulted when party votes might reasonably be placed in more than one category. For example, House Democrats—in the minority—sponsored a large number of resolutions to discharge bills from committee. In debate they contended that the vote to be taken in each instance was actually a vote on the bill itself, for it was only through this parliamentary procedure that it could be brought to the floor. Conversely, Republicans maintained that the vote on a motion to discharge a committee had no relation to the substantive merit of the bill, but rather was a move to circumvent proper committee action. All of these discharge motions were defeated in straight party votes. The question involved in classifying the subject matter of these votes lay in whether to call them party votes on a matter relating to the legislative process—the position of the committee system—or to consider them in terms of the substantive provisions of the bills. The rule used here was to classify them as discharge motions if at a later date they were reported to the floor (indicating approval by Republican committee majorities), but if never reported, to classify them according to the bills' provisions. It need hardly be observed that in all but a few cases the bills were never reported.

The second most controversial subject was legislation involving local governments: 15 (25.0 per cent) of the 60 Senate and 20 (14.0 per cent) of the 142 House party votes. Legislation pertaining to the field of labor relations brought 22 (15.5 per cent) party votes in the House. And bills to change the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and the Unemployment Compensation Law involved, together, 14 (9.9 per cent) party votes in the House and six (10.0 per cent) in the Senate. There were eight (5.7 per cent) party votes in the House relating to the Administration and two on this subject in the Senate. Disputed in the Senate was the plan for redistricting Pennsylvania's congressional districts, and nine (15.0 per cent) party votes occurred as a result of Republican-Democratic differences on the question.

In evaluating the influence of party upon public policy, more than ordinary attention should be given to the fact that a large number of the party votes in both houses related to either organizational-period decisions—ten in the House and one in the Senate—or questions of legislative procedure—nine in the Senate and four in the House. Most of these had little or no effect upon the public policy decisions taken by the legislature.

Consider, for example, the ten party votes on questions of organization which developed in the House. One was on the election of the Speaker (the one Senate party vote in this category was similarly on the election of the President *pro tem*); the other nine occurred on Democratic amendments to change the House Rules. All of the proposed changes were concerned with the committee system, their general purpose being to increase the Democratic proportion of the membership on standing committees, to make public committee minutes, to reduce the power of committee chairmen, and to liberalize the rule under which committees may be discharged from consideration of bills referred to them.[6] And all were defeated in straight party votes.

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[6] One of the proposed amendments took away the right of the chairmen of standing committees to vote except in the case of a tie vote. Under existing rules, the Speaker appoints both a chairman and a vice-chairman for each standing committee. Both have the right to vote, and they are in addition to the regular number of committee members. (Hence the majority party membership is greater than the party ratio in the House as a whole.) Another amendment provided that the committee ratio would have to be the same as the ratio in the House. Still another proposed change would have provided that any two committee members could request a roll-call vote in the committee, and that the minutes showing the vote would be "made available for public examination." To reduce the power of committee chairmen, an amendment provided that a majority of the members of a committee, two-thirds being present, could demand the immediate consideration of any bill or resolution which had been referred to the committee. Another proposed change advanced by the minority party provided that committee members could make public decisions taken in committee (although not what was said). The remaining important amendment would have reduced the number of votes required to discharge a committee from consideration of a bill from 105 to 85. (The Democratic membership was 87.)

The many party votes on questions of legislative procedure similarly had little direct effect on legislative products during the session. There were nine party votes in the Senate classified as relating mainly to procedural matters. All but two concerned motions,[7] intermittently sponsored by both parties, to either recess or adjourn. For example, soon after the convening of the session, Republicans backed a resolution to adjourn for one month, contending that that amount of time was necessary for the Governor to get his program ready for submission to the legislature. It passed over Democratic opposition. Presumably to embarrass the Administration, Senate Democrats attempted to adjourn the General Assembly in June, although no tax program was even close to being adopted. Other resolutions offered from time to time for the purpose of either recessing or adjourning aroused like party controversy. The four House party votes in this category also were on recess and adjournment motions. Particularly opposed by House Democrats was a motion to recess the General Assembly from early October until after the November elections. Republican strategy, they contended, was to wait until after the elections to pass the tax measures. In nearly all cases, the procedural questions giving rise to party voting were tied up with party strategy, and their direct influence upon public policy was slight.

It will be instructive here to look more closely at the specific legislative areas of interest to (and influenced by) the parties. The number of party votes precludes examination of each one individually, but the more important and those which are representative will be considered.

Of leading importance, both quantitatively and qualitatively, were the party votes occurring on tax legislation. It was estimated at the beginning of the session that the General Assembly would have to raise a minimum of $120,000,000 in new revenue in order to provide for such things as a soldiers' bonus, teacher salary increments, and a civilian defense program; the first of these alone amounted to $60,000,000.[8] The Governor's plan for raising this revenue centered in two tax measures, a one-half of one per cent personal income tax proposal and a bill to increase the corporate net income tax from four to five per cent. On these bills (chiefly on the flat income tax bill), and on other revenue proposals later offered in a "substitute package," occurred most of the 32 House party votes.

Tax measures which brought about party voting were caught up in many parliamentary maneuvers. Consider, for example, the six party votes in the House which related to Governor Fine's income tax bill. The Democrats first attempted to recommit it to committee for the purpose of holding a public hearing, voted against it on second reading, opposed it unanimously the first time it was up for final passage (and with some Republican assistance defeated it at this time), attempted to amend a reconsideration motion to provide for public hearings on the bill, voted against a motion for reconsideration, and after this motion passed, voted against it on final passage. It passed by a vote of 109–97, with only one Democrat voting for it.[9] Brought out repeatedly as the chief objection of the Democrats to the income tax bill was the fact that it lacked the graduated features of the federal income tax.[10]

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[7] These two both came on challenges by Senate Democrats to rulings from the chair. On a day late in the session when the Senate was working beyond midnight, Senate Democrats attempted to have a "committee of three" appointed for the purpose of calling Western Union to ascertain the correct time. The presiding officer ruled, and was sustained in a party vote, that the legislative day had not changed and that the Senate could therefore continue with that day's calendar. Democrats also appealed the right of the presiding officer to vote on the ruling which he had made. His right to vote was sustained in another party vote.

[8] *Pittsburgh Post Gazette*, January 1, 1951.

There was only one party vote in the House on the bill to increase the corporate net income tax. As provided in the original bill, the increase was from four to five per cent. The Democrats attempted to amend it to increase it to six per cent.

Another large group of party votes in the House, 17 altogether, occurred on a series of eight bills introduced late in the session as a "substitute package" of taxes, when it appeared the Senate might not pass the income tax bill. The exact questions involved in the party votes need not be recorded, although most of them came on Democratic attempts to amend the bills or to place them on the postponed calendar. This tax package involved the following: a bill to accelerate tax collection (to provide for collecting the first six months of corporate net income tax for 1953 in 1952);[11] a bill to apply a gross receipts tax to public transportation utilities; a bill to apply a gross premium tax to domestic and mutual insurance companies; a bill to tax the dividends received by Pennsylvania corporations having out-of-state subsidiaries; a bill to change the basis on which stock transfers are taxed; a bill to increase inheritance taxes, in most cases, from 10 to 20 per cent; a bill to impose a one per cent tax on real estate transfers; a bill to increase inheritance tax collections by sealing deposit boxes, upon death of boxholders, until their contents could be examined by the state Department of Revenue; and a bill similar to the preceding but relating to joint bank accounts. All of these passed over Democratic opposition. But even at the time of their passage, newspaper reports said that House Republicans hoped that the Senate would table them and pass instead the income tax bill.

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[9] Generally regarded as the strongest interest group in support of the income tax bill was the Pennsylvania State Education Society. According to the Democratic minority leader, Pennsylvania school teachers had been "deluded" by PSEA leadership into actively pressuring for it in the belief that a salary increase hinged on its passage.

[10] An interesting insight into House-Senate relations dealing with the passage of the bill was that, following it, House Republicans moved to recommit the corporate net income tax bill to committee. In making this motion, the Republican majority leader noted that "Any program not including a broad base tax will of necessity involve more than an additional one per cent tax on corporate income." Since Senate Republicans least wanted this, there would be some pressure for them to accept the income tax bill.

[11] Most of the Democratic objection to the "package" centered on this bill. They contended that it was much more than a bill to accelerate collection, some of its provisions having the effect of greatly increasing corporation taxes. The Democratic minority leader held the view that it would bring in more revenue than the income tax bill. Generally, estimates were that it would bring in $61,000,000 in corporate net income taxes that would ordinarily be collected in the 1953 biennium. Actually the bill amounted to deferring resolution of the tax issue until the 1953 session. (In that session a sales tax was put through on party-line votes with 100 per cent of the Democrats in both houses opposing it.)

Other party conflicts on tax matters in the House concerned issues of less importance. Several may be briefly noted: a bill to increase the maximum per capita tax rate for school districts; a bill extending the right of certain subdivisions to levy a wage tax; a bill to provide that new residents of a district and those attaining the age of 21 must notify their tax assessors. Democrats opposed these bills, all amendatory, as well. One of the more interesting party controversies on the question of taxation concerned an attempt by the Democratic minority leader to get a resolution adopted to provide that the Assembly would pass appropriations for one year's operation instead of two, with a view to having the Governor call a special session in 1952 for the purpose of considering the budget problem. It failed, of course.

At no stage during its stay in the Senate did the Governor's income tax bill give rise to party voting. The 20 Democrats, as expected, opposed it unanimously, but so did 10 of the 30 Republicans—and this split assured its defeat. There were, however, six floor votes in the Senate in which Republicans and Democrats differed on tax matters. Five of the six were on the "package" of tax measures which the House sent over, namely, the bills to tax public transportation utilities, life insurance companies, and real estate tranfers. As in the House, Democrats were consistent in their opposition to tax measures. The other tax party vote in the Senate came on Democratic opposition to a provision in the Civil Defense Act which they said did not place strong enough restrictions on the taxing power of authorities once an emergency had been declared.

Attention may now be given to the local government issues which brought about party voting. Ten of the 20 House party votes classified under "local government" related directly to the city of Philadelphia, as did 11 of the 15 Senate party votes. Specifically, seven of the ten party issues on Philadelphia in the House concerned legislation which transferred the power to appoint the members of Urban Redevelopment Authorities and Housing Authorities in cities of the first class (Philadelphia only) from city officials—principally the Mayor—to the Governor, and which increased the membership of these bodies from five to seven. Party voting on the two bills providing for these changes occurred for the most part on Democratic attempts to recommit the bills for the purpose of holding public hearings and to amend them, and of course on their final passage.[12] The primary argument used by the Democrats against the bills was that they violated home rule and insured Republican control—at the state level—of city functions. In party-line voting both bills passed the House but were lost when they failed to come out of committee in the Senate.

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[12] The Democratic amendments which lost were the following: one which restored the power of the Mayor to appoint the members of the Urban Redevelopment Authority and kept the membership at five; one which restored the existing system of appointing the members of the Housing Authority—two members being appointed by the Mayor, two by the City Controller (a Democrat), with the fifth member chosen by the other four; and one which vested the power of appointing Housing Authority members in the Mayor alone (a Republican at that time) and reduced the number of members from seven to five.

In the Senate, nine out of the ten "local government" party votes occurred on one bill, introduced by a Republican Senator from Philadelphia, to abolish Philadelphia county offices and integrate their functions and duties into the city government.[13] The bill was introduced shortly after the November election in which for the first time in sixty-eight years Democrats had won the city government (and also certain county offices). The specific feature of the consolidation bill which provoked the most controversy was that which affected the office of Sheriff, to which a Democrat had just been elected. The consolidation bill provided that the Sheriff would be appointed by the Philadelphia Board of (Common Pleas) Judges, and thus the newly-elected individual might lose his office. Democratic senators offered a number of amendments to the bill, all of which were defeated. They first attempted to give the City Council the power to provide for the office of Sheriff. When this was defeated, they offered successive amendments to give the power of appointment for this office to the Mayor, the Personnel Director, and the Commissioner of Records. Other similar amendments to the bill also lost. It eventually became acceptable to the Democrats when the sponsor had it amended to provide for a bipartisan commission to study the question and frame a supplement to the Home Rule Charter transferring and merging county offices. The same amendment deleted the provisions in the original bill which provided for immediate consolidation, and provided too that county officers elected in the last election would be permitted to serve out their terms.[14]

The other five party votes on local government legislation in the Senate concerned the following, all opposed by the Democrats: a bill to eliminate the eminent domain power of the city of Philadelphia to take land in adjoining counties for water supply purposes; a bill stipulating that one-half of the funds collected from water services by cities of the second class (Pittsburgh) would have to be used solely for maintenance and improvement of such water works; a bill to make it unlawful for cities of the first class (Philadelphia) to impose a wage tax on persons who are not residents of the city; and a bill to permit townships of the first class, by a vote of the township alone, to withdraw from a city within ten years after having been annexed.[15]

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[13] Constitutional amendments providing for this had been approved at the election.

[14] Senate Democrats had earlier threatened to block all appropriation bills if the Republicans passed the bill as originally introduced. Appropriation bills require a two-thirds vote (34) of all members elected for passage in the Senate. Since there were only 30 Republicans, Democratic support was essential. This fact, incidentally, probably accounts for the scarcity of party votes on appropriation measures. Bipartisan support will nearly always be needed to pass an appropriation bill and it may be surmised that many bills lacking this simply do not come up for a vote.

[15] A reading of the debate on the bill suggests that it would principally affect Scranton and its annexed 24th ward. The sponsor of the bill at no time advanced any reasons for its introduction. Speculation was that it was introduced at the request of former Democratic

Additional party votes on local government bills in the House may be noted. As in the Senate, House Democrats opposed the bill to provide for township re-establishment. Pittsburgh Democrats got party backing in their opposition to a bill which placed detectives in the Pittsburgh police force in the competitive class of the civil service, but the bill passed. A particularly controversial bill was one which provided that no public employees in Pennsylvania, state or local, could be prevented from participating in political activities after working hours. The *Philadelphia Inquirer* editorially called it "the most cynical political measure attempted in this state in years," saying it might as well have been titled: "An Act to Force the Philadelphia Municipal Court Back Into Politics."[16] The explanation for this is that several months earlier the President Judge of the Municipal Court had issued a directive forbidding political activity by court employees. The bill passed the House over Democratic opposition—and attempted amendments—but failed to get out of a Senate committee. House Democrats also voted against a bill which increased the number of judges of the Philadelphia Municipal Court.

The second most controversial subject for the parties in the House— in terms of the number of party votes—concerned the field of labor relations. Twenty-two party votes developed on legislation relating to this subject. Actually, however, there was comparatively little debate on them and all but one occurred on Democratic motions to discharge the Committee on Labor Relations from Democratic-sponsored labor bills.[17] All of the motions lost on straight party votes.

Similarly, 12 of the 14 party votes in the House on workmen's and unemployment compensation came about on Democratic motions to force committees to report bills. One of the two votes which dealt with bills themselves concerned a Democratic amendment to a Republican-sponsored bill which had the effect of liberalizing the benefit payments under unemployment compensation.[18] The other bill involved was one amending employer liability laws. In party-

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officeholders in the township who wanted to get back in power, or that the Republican party in Scranton wanted to see the township withdraw from the city since it had a preponderant Democratic registration. Altogether, there were three party votes on the bill in the Senate. It is interesting that the Governor vetoed it although its passage was due almost entirely to Republican votes in both houses.

[16] *Legislative Journal,* June 25, 1951, p. 3465.

[17] Representative of these bills are the following: bills to forbid employers from charging prospective employees fees for medical examinations, to amend the Labor Anti-Injunction Act, to require certain factories to employ a physician and a nurse, to eliminate the right of an employer to request an election, to prohibit discrimination in employment on account of age, to permit employees to leave work for a period up to two hours without loss of pay in order to vote, to prohibit the working of women for more than six consecutive days without at least one day of rest, and to provide that one member of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission shall be a representative of organized labor.

[18] The effect of the amendment was to place compensation on a day-base plan. More employees who work less than a full week would be eligible for benefits. The major Pennsylvania labor unions had endorsed the amendment.

line voting (with many Republicans not voting), Democrats succeeded in amending the bill to broaden the coverage of the occupational disease provisions of the law.[19] The 12 party votes on motions to discharge committees concerned a variety of subjects.[20] Senate Democrats also attempted to broaden the coverage of workmen's and unemployment compensation. In straight party votes they lost on amendments to bills to include civilian defense volunteers under the coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and also on similar House and Senate bills which provided for disability benefits for policemen and firemen contracting heart or respiratory diseases.

The 1950 census reduced Pennsylvania's delegation in Congress from 33 to 30 and made it necessary for the 1951 General Assembly to draw up a reapportionment plan (unless all 30 were to be elected at large). In order to get the most favorable plan, Senate Democrats took the position of not giving the necessary votes to pass House appropriation bills until party differences on the reapportionment bill could be worked out.[21] The result of this decision was that there were nine party votes in the Senate on House appropriation bills which the Democrats unanimously opposed. When the parties later agreed to the reapportionment bill, the appropriation bills passed without dissent. They had been controversial only because they formed a part of the Democrats' legislative strategy on reapportionment.

Six of the eight party votes in the House on the subject of "state government" were on Democratic motions to require committees to report certain measures.[22] The other two occurred on bills which provided for the appointment of legislators to certain administrative commissions. The Democrats attempted to amend the bills to provide that both parties would be represented in the appointments. On another matter of state administration, Senate Democrats lost when they tried to force the Committee on Agriculture to discharge a bill abolishing the Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission.

Some of the other party votes illustrative of the differing interests of the parties may be noted. All of the following were Republican sponsored (and opposed by the Democrats): a bill to create a State Apple Board to promote the consumption of Pennsylvania apples; a bill to provide that increased amounts of sulphur dioxide could be used in the preparation of certain canned foods; a bill to help protect the Pennsylvania trout hatchery business by requiring restaurants serving imported trout to label the country of origin on the menu (also a controversial bill in the 83rd Congress); a bill which strengthened the state's right to secure repayment from property left by deceased public assistance recipients; a bill having the effect of decreasing the authority of county boards of assistance and giving more power to the state Department of Public Assistance; a bill to provide that public housing projects could not be started unless approved by the "interested electorate"—voters living near the proposed site; and a bill which provided additional exceptions to compulsory school attendance.

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[19] It made any total disability or death which could be traced to silicosis compensible; prior to the amendment the disability or death had to be due *solely* to silicosis. A Republican opponent of the amendment contended that this would practically give health insurance to miners. Democrats pointed out that the courts had frequently not upheld claims for compensation because of the "solely" provision.

[20] Some of the objectives of these bills may be noted: to increase benefits, to increase the periods in which claims may be made, to further define "unemployment," to increase the compensation paid to illegally employed minors, and to change the law regarding allowance for dependents.

[21] As stated before, 34 votes are needed in the Senate to pass appropriation bills and there were only 30 Republicans.

[22] Among them were the following: a bill to increase the overtime pay of state employees; a resolution providing for the Joint State Government Commission to study the functioning of the administrative departments and make recommendations for reorganizing in order to achieve greater economies; a bill to create a new state agency, the Pennsylvania Consumer Commission; and bills to require that the Workmen's Compensation Board, the State Welfare Commission, and the State Board of Public Assistance each have a representative of organized labor. As in nearly all party votes, the Democrats lost on the resolutions.

Other party votes of interest occurred on issues such as these: a Democratic-sponsored amendment to increase the appropriation to the Western Psychiatric Institute, operated by the University of Pittsburgh; three amendments offered by House Democrats to the "loyalty oath" bill;[23] a Republican resolution to hold future inaugural ceremonies in the State Farm Show Building, instead of on the Capitol steps (the Democratic minority leader thought that there should continue to be "simplicity" in such ceremonies); and a Republican bill to prohibit individuals from advertising for matrimonial purposes, and outlawing the commercial conduct of matrimonial agencies. The introduction of this last bill followed a "lonely hearts" murder; a reading of the debate which took place fails to disclose why a bill like this should develop into a party issue.

The relative infrequency of party voting and the issues at stake in it have been shown. Although only a comparatively small number of the total number of votes followed party lines, it is nevertheless true that a high proportion of these were on significant questions of public policy. But it should also be pointed out that there were many other important measures, of equal concern to the public, which were settled on lines other than those of party.

Many major legislative proposals passed the 1951 legislature with the support of majorities of both parties. Among them were bills such as these: to increase substantially teachers' salaries; to outlaw the Communist party and other subversive groups; to increase truck weight limits; to authorize the sale of precolored oleomargarine; to provide for annual sessions of the legislature and absentee voting for war veterans through constitutional amendments; to create a "home rule" system of public health administration; and to extend the merit system in certain areas of state administration. And a number of measures such as the "loyalty oath" bill and the civil defense bill, which in their early stages were the object of considerable disagreement between the parties, eventually passed both houses with bipartisan support.

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[23] The main effects of these amendments would have been to place public school teachers on the same basis as teachers in state-supported colleges and universities with respect to their meeting the bill's requirements, and to change the oath provision to the same as the one taken by the legislators. On final passage, majorities in both houses supported the bill: 97 per cent of the House Republicans and 79 per cent of the Democrats, 100 per cent of the Senate Republicans and 63 per cent of the Democrats.

Also, many bills of far-reaching significance were lost in the session in actions unrelated to party policies or positions: for example, bills to change the formula under which the state reimburses school districts; to bring public utility employers and employees engaging in urban transportation under the provisions of the Compulsory Arbitration Act (called by opponents an "anti-strike" bill); to strengthen child-adoption laws (one of the most controversial issues in recent legislatures); to provide for local referendums on the question of Sunday evening entertainment (now prohibited); and to provide for the licensing and regulation of chiropractors. The point is made that many proposals of wide concern to the public, and having bearing on many groups within the commonwealth, are either adopted or defeated in votes in which the parties take no stand.

III. THE PARTY AS AN INTEREST GROUP

Consideration has been given in the preceding pages to the types of policy issues which were of concern to the parties. One of their most significant features is that a rather substantial number of them can be traced to the legislative party organizations' acting in the capacity of pressure groups, advancing and opposing legislation and other legislative matters primarily on the basis of their effect upon the party organizations. In this respect, they hardly differ from the National Association of Manufacturers, the CIO, or the American Legion. As in the case of pressure groups, they are desirous of getting legislation favorable to their group and of blocking measures which are counter to the interests of the party organization—both in and out of the legislature. Viewed from another standpoint, many of the decisions taken (on which party votes ensued) affected the Pennsylvania public in only the most indirect fashion, while their primary impact was upon the parties.

This can be illustrated by calling attention to some of the party vote issues in which the chief interest to be served was that of the party (the number of party votes is indicated in parentheses): the bills to transfer the power to appoint members of the Philadelphia Urban Redevelopment Authority and the Housing Authority from city officials (including the Democratic Controller) to the Governor (7); the bill expressly aimed at permitting Philadelphia Municipal Court employees to engage in political activities after working hours (2); the Philadelphia city-county consolidation bill, as originally introduced, in which Republicans and Democrats differed on what should happen with the Sheriff's office—to which a Democrat had just been elected—(9);[24] the bill relating to township re-establishment after annexation and aimed particularly at Scranton and its 24th ward (4); the appropriation bills caught up in Democratic strategy on reapportionment (9); Senate Democratic opposition on the Governor's appointments because of a long-standing feud with his Attorney General (2);[25] and Democratic attempts to insure that their party, as well as the majority, would be represented in appointments to certain administrative commissions (2). And a good case could be made for classifying the eleven organizational-period party votes as of predominant concern only to the party organizations;[26] similarly, the thirteen procedural questions—most of which involved adjournment or recess—were controversial mainly because of party strategy designed in some way to serve party interests. By conservative estimate, at least one-fourth of the party votes of the session may be traced to the "interest" politics of the party organizations.

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[24] The original Republican version provided for appointment of the Sheriff by the Board of Judges. The Common Pleas Judges later held a meeting and asked to be "taken out of politics." The point is not made here that city-county consolidation would not be in the "public interest," as opposed to the "party interest," but that the original provisions of the consolidation plan, coming after the city election won by the Democrats, were at variance with the best interests of Philadelphia Democrats. This fact appears clearly in the Senate debate. *Legislative Journal,* December 13, 1951, p. 6202.

CONCLUSION

There would seem to be five major understandings relative to the role of political parties in the Pennsylvania legislature which have been given an empirical validity in this study:

1. Nonpartisanship is much more in evidence than partisanship in the formation of the public policies of the state of Pennsylvania. Most of the decisions taken on the floor in the General Assembly are unanimous.[27] In the Senate unanimous roll-call votes amounted to 81.6 per cent of all those taken; in the House the percentage was 69.7.

2. In terms of the influence of party in policy formation, it was found that on only 4.7 per cent of the Senate roll-call votes and 10.7 per cent of the House votes were the parties substantially aligned against each other.[28] Moreover, a

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[25] Undoubtedly the biggest party issue in the first part of the session concerned the Attorney General, who had first received his appointment under the previous Administration. Governor Fine contended that the Attorney General could serve without Senate confirmation until the end of the session. Party voting occurred when Senate Democrats blocked other appointments because they were not allowed to vote on confirmation of the Attorney General. Eventually the stalemate was resolved when he resigned. According to newspaper accounts, Democratic bitterness was traced to 1938 when the same individual, Attorney General under the Democratic Earle Administration, brought about a grand jury investigation of the Administration.

[26] Of course, the public is affected too if on the outcome of these particular decisions rested better or worse, more responsible or less responsible state government; but to trace such effects to the proposed rules changes which were the subject of these party votes would be difficult indeed.

[27] A partial explanation for this high degree of unanimity is the constitutional provision that no bill can become law or no resolution be adopted without a roll-call vote on final passage. Thus, the great number of bills of minor character (many of them amendatory) which are introduced and passed each session receive at least one floor roll-call vote even though no opposition to them has developed at any stage in the legislative process.

[28] It is true, of course, that the role of party in the legislative process extends beyond that which can be shown by the analysis of membership voting behavior on the floor. Certain party operations do not readily lend themselves to statistical measurement; for example, the party contribution to organizing the legislature, formulating its rules of opera-

noticeable number of these votes concerned organizational and procedural matters or party strategy—rather than questions of state law—and their chief consequence was for the party organizations, not the public. Pennsylvania's laws are chiefly the result of bipartisan votes in the legislature.

3. There are, notwithstanding, important policy areas in which there are significant differences in the party positions. These are relatively few in number, however, and in the 1951 session were to be found mainly on the subjects of taxation, local government (particularly Philadelphia's), labor relations, workmen's and unemployment compensation, reapportionment, and the state administration. Relatively clear-cut party differences on legislation involving these areas appeared and, on the basis of one session's data, are indicative of the major principles and policies which separate the parties in state politics. Indeed, real differences are apparent, but it is impossible to know, at this point, how much they can be attributed to (a) party principles consistent over a period of time, or (b) in-party—out-party tactics which develop because one party is the majority, and responsible for state policy, and the other is the minority, and not responsible.

4. To the extent that the data of one session permit generalization, it may be said that the questions of public policy of most interest to the parties, and the ones on which they are most likely to divide, are economic in character: taxation, labor relations, workmen's and unemployment compensation, public assistance, and public housing.

5. Suggested in the study—and a concept the importance of which warrants additional investigation—is the belief that one of the strongest interest groups operating in and upon the legislature is the party organization itself. Many legislative decisions have the primary purpose of furthering party ends, and the public interest, while it need not be opposite to that of party, is only of incidental concern.

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tion, providing its leadership, assuming responsibility for the conduct of government, and, in the case of the minority party, clarifying policy, suggesting alternatives, and providing a check on the party in power.

It should also be pointed out that voting which took place in the committees of the legislature is not considered in this study. Aside from the task which would be involved in recording and analyzing committee voting, it would be impossible anyway in Pennsylvania, since committee records are not open to public examination. In any event, there is reason to believe that there is no important difference in the amount of party voting which takes place in committee as compared to that on the floor. The chief power residing with the majority party in committee is to refuse to report bills and resolutions which it opposes. However, any bill that is of real importance to the minority party can be made the subject of a discharge motion and a roll-call vote will have to be taken on it on the floor, thus indicating the attitudes of the parties on the bill. The Democrats offered numerous discharge motions in the 1951 session. The point of this is that party attitudes which would go undetected because of committee secrecy are brought to light on the floor through attempts—nearly always unsuccessful—to force committees to report bills.

FLORIDA'S NEW CAMPAIGN EXPENSE LAW AND THE 1952 DEMOCRATIC GUBERNATORIAL PRIMARIES*

ELSTON E. ROADY
Florida State University

Efforts by various states to regulate effectively the use of money in political campaigns have heretofore left ample loopholes for determined politicians. Florida has attempted to plug the loopholes with a revised election code which has become popularly known as "The Who Gave It—Who Got It Law."[1] Informed political observers in the Sunshine State are in agreement that in the 1952 Democratic gubernatorial primaries the new law gave an accurate accounting of monies.

Florida, like other states, has a number of economic interests which in the past have been associated with unreported contributions and expenditures in political campaigns, notably racing (both horse and dog), liquor, and corporations holding public utility franchises.[2] By early 1951, Floridians, having had more than a fair share of adverse publicity concerning tie-ins between gangsters and politicians, were eager to guard against such tie-ins in the future. The Florida voter felt that the existing law did not effectively regulate campaign financing, and demanded effective regulation.[3]

Another factor in Florida's desire for a new approach to the regulation of money in elections was the generally accepted belief that the old law simply was not honored. An eminently respectable candidate told a reporter following his defeat in the Democratic nominating primary of 1948: "Rather than lying about it [total expenditures], I just didn't file the final statement [required by the old law]. The only penalty was disqualification from holding the office, and I'd already lost the election."[4]

Aware of the heavy undisclosed contributions during the 1948 Democratic gubernatorial campaign, and of the extensive outlay of money in the United States Democratic senatorial primary race in 1950 (George Smathers vs. Claude Pepper), members of the 1951 Florida General Assembly convened at

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* The writer acknowledges the cooperation of Secretary of State R. A. Gray, Mr. W. P. Bevis, Mr. Milton Folds, and Mrs. W. E. Glisson of the Elections and Commissions Division of the Secretary of State's office, and the Statutory Revision Department of the Attorney General's office.

[1] Chapter 26819 (Senate Bill No. 8), Acts of 1951, *Laws of Florida.*

[2] Such associations were noted in the hearings before the Kefauver committee at Miami and Tampa.

[3] General public knowledge of these "tie-ins" came from the Kefauver hearings at Miami and Tampa and the reaction was one of high indignation. The Florida electorate had also been informed after the 1948 election of large financial contributions made to the successful candidate for governor. In this instance one of the three most widely publicized contributors was a Chicago and Florida race track owner and a long-time associate of the Capone gang.

[4] Quoted in Freedman, "Two '48 Campaigns Put Spotlight On Excessive Expenditures; 1951 Legislature May Draft Some Curb," St. Petersburg *Times* pamphlet (1951).

Tallahassee intent on making a thorough-going study and revision of the existing election code.[5] Representative Charles E. Shepperd of St. Augustine, a veteran member of the State House of Representatives and a member of its Elections Committee which considered the proposed new election campaign expense law, said that it was designed to "help clean up a political stench that rises to high heaven." He also said that the law had been drafted with the intent of "helping to keep elections from being bought by an open-handed, last minute expenditure of money, as has been done in the past."[6] In an opinion of September 25, 1951, the Florida Attorney General stated: "There may be those who consider that compliance with the provisions of Section 99.161 will be burdensome; nevertheless, it is recognized that the Legislature in enacting the law has sought to cure evils obvious to informed people."

The law as eventually passed in 1951 was a serious effort at preventing corrupt practices in Florida elections, with special emphasis on campaign finances.[7] The revised Florida election code is the first comprehensive attempt to adjust state regulation of campaign finances to the facts of contemporary political life. It recognizes the impossibility of putting limits on total expenditures for public office but demands adequate publicity of all expenditures and all contributions, including services in lieu of cash contributions.[8] And, while permitting unlimited expenditures, it limits individual contributions to $1,000.[9] It also imposes responsibility on each person involved in the financial process—donor, treasurer or deputy treasurer, and candidate.[10] The law requires a type of publicity which keeps before the electorate an up-to-date account of *all* monies involved in the political race so that *before* the citizen votes he knows the exact amount received by all candidates, the contributors and amount contributed by each, and the total expenditures and kinds of expenditures made by the candidate.[11] It also requires that all monies go through a treasurer's hands, be deposited in a designated bank depository, and be accounted for by the treasurer within twenty-four hours of initial receipt.[12]

The new law, in attempting to prevent contributions from sources which are suspect, prohibits "any contribution of any nature to any political party or to any candidate for nomination for, or election to, political office in the State of Florida," by:

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[5] The St. Petersburg *Times* had conducted a campaign of educating Florida citizens and especially the members of the Legislature on the need for a new approach to the control of money in elections. For the full story of the *Times'* methods see their publication "Who Gave It—Who Got It?." Special mention must be made of Morty Freedman, one of their political reporters. Mr. Freedman has been most generous in supplying information to the writer.

[6] *Florida Times-Union*, Dec. 21, 1951.

[7] The revised code, termed the Dayton-Andrews bill (Senator Dayton was Chairman of the Elections Committee, while Representative Andrews was a long-time student of the Florida election code), passed the House by a vote of 49–30 and the Senate by a 30–6 margin, after having been defeated on a voice vote.

[8] *Compilation of the Election Laws of the State of Florida* (Tallahassee: Secretary of State and Statutory Revision Department of Attorney General's office, 1951, pamphlet), Section 99.161(4)(a)(7).

[9] *Ibid.*, Section 99.161(2).

[10] *Ibid.*, Section 99.161(1)(a)(b)(c), (3), (4), (7).

[11] *Ibid.*, Section 99.161(8).

[12] *Ibid.*, Section 99.161(7).

> 1. Those persons holding a horse or dog racing permit or any persons with a vested economic interest in horse or dog racing.
> 2. Those persons holding a license for the sale of intoxicating beverages or any persons with a vested economic interest in same; and,
> 3. Persons operating a public utility subject to grant of franchise or regulation by the state or any persons with a vested economic interest in same; however, persons who are members of non-profit cooperative corporations operating public utilities are exempt from this prohibition.[13]

All candidates, save those running for municipal offices, are subject to the revised law.[14]

Efforts to regulate campaign finance are bound to be meaningless unless stringent penalities are attached and enforced.[15] The penalties provided for in the Florida revised election code include the possibility of conviction for commission of a misdemeanor or felony, citation for contempt, revocation of charter or permit, and the loss of commission to office.[16]

Although the three leading contenders for the Democratic nomination for governor in 1952 (tantamount to election in Florida) all expressed a desire to follow both the spirit and the letter of the new law and heartily endorsed its general objective,[17] a serious threat to the Florida effort arose in November, 1951, when the "Who Gave It—Who Got It?" section of the code (99.161) was challenged as being a denial of freedom of speech and of the press.

This challenge was initiated by a Tallahassee attorney, J. Kenneth Ballinger, who asked Attorney General Richard W. Ervin, in effect, if it were permissible for a private citizen to purchase newspaper space or radio time for his favorite candidate *without* that candidate's knowledge. The Attorney General advised that since such expenditures were within the meaning of the revised law "any such expenditures made must be paid in pursuance of the procedure set forth in the law," and that "neither a newspaper nor a broadcasting company may lawfully accept any money from a citizen for the purposes and under the circumstances" described in the question. Mr. Ervin added: "Nothing in this answer is to be construed as limiting the full right of any citizen freely to express himself concerning any candidate, short of the expenditure of funds or incurring of expenses for such purposes."[18]

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[13] *Ibid.*, Section 99.161(1)(a)(b)(c).

[14] *Ibid.*, Section 99.161(10).

[15] "The penalty provisions for its [the new election campaign expense law] violation, as set forth in Section 104.27, are so drastic in relation to a person's candidacy that, in the absence of court construction, extreme caution should be observed in arriving at the meaning and intent of its provisions." *Opinion of Florida Attorney General,* Sept. 25, 1951.

[16] Chapter 26819, Acts of 1951, *Laws of Florida,* Section 104.27.

[17] J. Wesley Fly (candidate McCarty's campaign treasurer) to R. A. Gray, Oct. 29, 1951; J. Brailey Odham (candidate) to R. A. Gray, Oct. 19, 1951; and Alto Adams (candidate) to R. A. Gray, Nov. 14, 1951.

[18] *Opinion of Florida Attorney General,* Nov. 30, 1951.

Shortly after this opinion was given, the editor of the Calhoun County *Record* of Blountstown brought suit in behalf of many Florida weekly newspapers contending that the law restrained him in his free right to publish a newspaper and was therefore a violation of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press. Circuit Judge Ira A. Hutchison of Panama City upheld his contention.[19]

In the meantime the owner of radio station WPLA at Plant City brought suit contesting the constitutionality of the law on the grounds that it violated both freedom of the press and freedom of speech. In this case Circuit Judge Henry Tillman of Tampa held that the law did not violate either guarantee.[20] An early decision by the Florida Supreme Court to resolve the issue was made impossible when Mr. Ballinger, busily engaged in campaigning for the Florida House of Representatives, asked for and was granted additional time in which to prepare his brief. As a result of this extension it was not until September 30, 1952 that the case was argued before the Supreme Court.

Mr. Ballinger contended that the constitutional rights of his clients were abridged by provisions of the election code which required all advertising and radio time purchases to be cleared through a candidate's campaign treasurer. He said that such a requirement is an "unconstitutional restraint" on the citizen who wants to buy advertising in behalf of a candidate or speak over the radio for his favorite nominee. He further argued that the law would not permit a newspaper owner to mail out extra copies of papers containing an editorial favoring a candidate, print or distribute handbills, hire a hall, rent sound equipment, or "take advantage of the mechanical aids of free speech" without prior authorization from the candidate or his representative. He concluded by insisting that this provision of the law amounted to previous license and censorship, both of which had been repeatedly held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.[21]

The attorneys for the State denied that the law prohibited any citizen from purchasing radio or newspaper advertising space, and contended that it merely required that they do so through the authorized agent of the candidate, the campaign treasurer. They pointed out that there was no "inherent" right of a citizen to buy radio time or newspaper space and that the right of a publisher or broadcaster to reject advertising or talking time had been sustained in the courts. The attorneys insisted that to strike down this section of the new code would defeat the intent of the legislators and make it impossible for the Florida citizen to learn "who gave it and who got it."[22] The Court held on March 17, 1953, by a vote of four to two, that the 1951 law requiring all campaign expenditures to clear through a candidate's treasurer and to be strictly accounted for was a constitutional exercise of the police power of the state.[23]

Even though the law had been challenged and the case was before the courts, the 1952 gubernatorial campaign, in compliance with the revised code, saw more publicity concerning campaign finances than ever before in the state. Each week the Secretary of State's office was flooded with the official reports containing detailed accounts of contributions and expenditures. Of the five Democratic candidates for governor, two together polled only 18,079 of a total of 738,479 votes. An analysis of the official reports of these two candidates would not be useful. Table I shows the total expenditures, vote received, and the cost per vote for the three leading Democratic contenders in Florida's first gubernatorial primary, May 6, 1952. For the first time we learned from official reports the high cost of running for governor in Florida. The results of this election indicate that there was little or no correlation between money spent and the number of votes received. Adams, who spent more than twice as much as Odham, received less than half as many votes, while McCarty, whose expenditures also totaled more than twice those of Odham, received one and one-half times as many votes.

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[19] *Finlay* v. *Ervin*, 1 Fla. Supp. 198.

[20] *Smith* v. *Ervin*, 1 Fla. Supp. 202.

[21] St. Petersburg *Times*, Oct. 1, 1952.

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] *Smith* v. *Ervin*, 64 So. 2d 166.

TABLE I. TOTAL EXPENDITURES, TOTAL VOTE, AND COST PER VOTE OF THE THREE LEADING DEMOCRATIC CONTENDERS IN FLORIDA'S FIRST GUBERNATORIAL PRIMARY, MAY 6, 1952*

Candidate	Expenditures	Total Vote	Cost Per Vote
Adams	$154,401	126,426	$1.22
McCarty†	156,239	361,427	.43
Odham†	72,753	232,565	.31

* Data in all tables were compiled from reports filed in the office of the Florida Secretary of State, Elections and Commissions Division. Expenditure figures are rounded off to the nearest dollar.

† These candidates subsequently opposed each other in the second or "run-off" primary of May 27, 1952.

McCarty, who had been the runnerup in the 1948 gubernatorial race, had strong financial backing in the $100 or more category from all major metropolitan areas of the state, as well as an excellent overall coverage of south, east, west, north, and central Florida. While Adams had backing from the same general areas, only about half as many persons contributed $100 or more to his campaign as did to McCarty's. Odham, on the other hand, received the bulk of his contributions of $100 or more from central and south Florida, with 229 of the 450 contributors in this category residing in Orange, Seminole, Dade, and Hillsborough counties. (See Tables II and III.)

McCarty and Adams received financial backing from the same county areas (primarily urbanized). McCarty, however, had 551 more individual contributors of $100 or more in these areas than Adams. Adams, on the other hand, received more generous contributions from his donors than did McCarty (see Table IV). In Dade, Duval, and Hillsborough counties, where McCarty had two to three times more individual contributors of $100 or more than Adams, he received almost three times the number of votes. Pinellas, one of Florida's

TABLE II. TOTAL NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF $100 OR MORE ARRANGED BY CITY IN FLORIDA'S FIRST DEMOCRATIC GUBERNATORIAL PRIMARY, MAY 6, 1952

City	Population	McCarty	Adams	Odham
Miami	249,276	198	76	47
Jacksonville	204,517	121	58	13
Tampa	124,681	92	27	42
Ft. Pierce*	13,502	90	24	2
Tallahassee	35,025	69	73	11
St. Petersburg	96,738	49	34	8
Orlando	52,367	40	21	70
Ft. Lauderdale	36,328	36	9	7
Panama City	25,814	29	27	10
W. Palm Beach	43,162	28	22	3
Pensacola	43,479	25	4	0
Lakeland	30,851	23	1	8
Ocala	11,741	18	1	14
Gainesville	26,861	18	8	6
Clearwater	15,581	17	1	0
Coral Gables	19,837	11	0	0
Sanford†	11,953	6	1	55
Miami Beach	46,282	0	10	15
Daytona Beach	30,187	0	1	13
Bradenton	13,604	2	0	10
All others	—	167	104	116
Total		1,056	505	450

* Home town of McCarty and Adams.
† Home town of Odham.

TABLE III. VOTE OBTAINED BY EACH OF THREE TOP DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES IN GUBERNATORIAL PRIMARIES IN FLORIDA IN TEN COUNTIES IN WHICH HE RECEIVED LARGEST NUMBER OF CONTRIBUTIONS OF $100 OR MORE

		No. of Contributions of $100 or more			Vote Received First and Second Primary				
					McCarty		Odham		Adams
County	Population	McCarty	Odham	Adams	First	Second	First	Second	First
Dade	495,084	209	62	86	68,921	73,941	42,951	63,407	20,389
Duval	304,029	121	13	58	34,883	39,175	28,103	38,497	7,552
Hillsborough	249,894	92	42	27	19,543	23,941	26,688	30,437	7,143
St. Lucie*	20,180	90		24	4,569	5,360			2,330
Leon	51,590	69	11	73	7,519	8,571	2,076	4,692	3,262
Pinellas	159,249	66		34	14,058	15,523			5,140
Orange	114,950	40	70	21	10,517	11,508	10,541	14,939	4,444
Broward	83,933	36		9	14,275	12,409			4,213
Bay	42,689	29	10	27	4,998	5,336	5,737	6,697	2,011
Palm Beach	114,688	28		22	16,570	16,480			5,695
Seminole†	26,883		55				4,252	4,310	
Marion	38,187		14				3,904	4,630	
Volusia	74,229		13				5,104	9,151	
Manatee	34,704		10				4,179	4,389	

* Home county of McCarty and Adams.
† Home county of Odham

two Republican counties, gave substantial financial aid to both Adams and McCarty but practically no aid to Odham, who was regarded as the most "liberal" of the candidates. The only county in which Adams received more individual contributions of $100 or more than McCarty was Leon, the site of Tallahassee, the state capital, where Adams had resided during his eleven years as a member of the Florida Supreme Court.

Odham's counties offer a considerable contrast to those of his two opponents. His counties were in central Florida, although he did receive some financial aid in the $100 or more category from two counties in west Florida (Leon and Bay) and one county on Florida's east coast (Volusia). In contrast to Adams' and McCarty's counties, Odham's represent rural or fringe-urban areas. Although an analysis of individual county and city contributions does not demonstrate any significant correlation between the money received and the vote received, it does suggest a positive correlation between the total *number of contributors* and total vote received—the greater the number of contributors, the larger the vote received.

TABLE IV. RANGE DISTRIBUTIONS OF NUMBER OF CONTRIBUTIONS FROM $100 TO $1000 TO THE CAMPAIGN FUNDS OF MCCARTY, ADAMS, AND ODHAM FIRST AND SECOND FLORIDA DEMOCRATIC GUBERNATORIAL PRIMARIES, 1952

Range	McCarty*	Adams†	Odham*
$100 to 299	956	362	414
300 to 499	31	63	30
500 to 699	39	52	1
700 to 899	3	9	1
900 to 1,000	6	19	4

* Both primaries.
† First primary only.

Relatively speaking, the number of large individual contributions to the Adams campaign offers striking contrast to the distribution in Odham's case, with McCarty assuming an intermediate position. Adams' major contributors came from the upper-middle to upper economic groups, with these two groups donating more heavily to his campaign than to that of any other candidate. McCarty's official reports show that his contributors range from middle to upper economic groups, with a significant number of professional people giving their support. Odham, however, received the bulk of his money from small

TABLE V. TOTAL NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF LESS THAN $100 FOR MCCARTY, ADAMS, AND ODHAM IN FLORIDA'S FIRST AND SECOND PRIMARIES, 1952

McCarty*	Odham*	Adams†
3,777	11,253	454

* Both primaries.
† First primary only.

contributions, the majority of which came from the middle economic group.[24]

The total contributions under $100 reflect the tremendous vitality of Odham's effort to attract financial support. His two rivals were completely outstripped in this category. Odham, employing techniques calculated to attract a large number of small donations, pitched his campaign on the theme "Dollars for Decency"—a plea for the restoration of integrity and honesty to the state government. This appeal produced an avalanche of one-dollar contributions and the bulk of his 11,253 donations under $100 were in one-dollar amounts. Odham also resorted to a comparatively new campaign technique, the radio-talkathon, and this also attracted many small contributions. The official reports show a sharp rise in number of contributions from each area immediately following his radio-talkathon.

TABLE VI. WEEKLY EXPENDITURES OF MCCARTY, ADAMS, AND ODHAM IN THE FIRST DEMOCRATIC GUBERNATORIAL PRIMARY, MAY 6, 1952 BEGINNING WITH THE REPORT DATED FEBRUARY 1, 1952

Adams	Odham	McCarty	Date Filed*
$3,732	$ 868	$1,653	2-1-52
1,705	406	2,843	2-8
3,504	446	4,153	2-15
301	547	4,077	2-22
4,361	1,032	4,969	2-29
1,997	759	4,349	3-7
1,896	3,272	3,959	3-14
8,402	1,223	4,019	3-21
11,715	4,037	7,515	3-28
11,846	5,573	13,377	4-4
12,206	9,940	16,680	4-11
15,866	8,078	17,854	4-18
16,263	10,549	17,770	4-25
42,009	19,047	32,780	5-5
—	—	14,941	5-9
6,230	—	—	5-20

* Expenditures are for the week preceding the date shown, except for the final reports.

Students of American politics have heretofore had to turn to tabulating newspaper and radio advertising and weighing and evaluating campaign literature in attempting to assess the amount of money spent at any given time in the course of a political campaign. Such efforts have demanded an extraordinary expenditure of energy and in many instances have been lacking in accuracy. In contrast, the official reports required by Florida's new election code give an accurate account of weekly expenditures. Adams, Odham, and McCarty followed an identical pattern of expenditures. All three increased their expendi-

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[24] The official reports require both name and address of each donor. The writer analyzed the lists of donors, using their professional, business, or occupational status as a prime base in determining economic group.

TABLE VII. WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS TO MCCARTY, ADAMS, AND ODHAM IN THE FIRST DEMOCRATIC GUBERNATORIAL PRIMARY, MAY 6, 1952

Adams	Odham	McCarty	Date Filed*
$5,325	$ 446	$3,320	2-1-52
1,500	1,099	4,050	2-8
2,245	417	8,190	2-15
3,547	537	5,712	2-22
2,645	1,067	6,956	2-29
1,747	1,760	5,160	3-7
3,075	3,446	4,658	3-14
14,553	1,416	4,859	3-21
11,691	4,723	9,174	3-28
8,748	5,647	10,240	4-4
10,331	10,898	15,527	4-11
15,244	8,133	16,100	4-18
18,026	11,790	22,014	4-25
39,319	31,841	42,999	5-5
—	—	212	5-9
—	20,529	—	5-10
3,738	—	—	5-20

* Contributions are for the week preceding the date shown, except for the final reports.

tures as election day drew nearer and all spent the greatest sums of money in the week immediately preceding the first primary.

Adams, who spent the largest amount in the final week of the campaign, devoted a major portion of his money in the closing days of the campaign to the conventional and traditional devices, i.e., printed literature via mail and handout, with some newspaper and radio advertising. Odham devoted the lion's share of his expenditures to the radio-talkathon. McCarty divided his heavy expenditures almost equally between radio advertising and the printing, mailing, and distributing of literature. The reports of expenditures suggest that since all three candidates followed the same general pattern and at about the same rate of increase, other factors were more important than the expenditure of money in their behalf. The evidence points to the unusual technique used by Odham and the effective statewide organization of McCarty as the other factors. As expenditures mounted during the last eight weeks of the campaign, so also did contributions. Since the new Florida election law restricts expenditures for all candidates to amounts on deposit,[25] it was to be expected that contributions and expenditures would be in almost exact ratio.

McCarty and Odham, the top Democrats in the first primary, met again in the second or "runoff" primary on May 27, 1952. They had sixteen days in which to collect money and twenty days in which to campaign actively. As in the first primary, the candidate spending the most per vote was unsuccessful; however, in both instances the candidate who spent the largest total sum of money came out ahead. Odham added 104,151 votes to his first primary total

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[25] *Compilation of the Election Laws of the State of Florida*, Section 99.161(6).

TABLE VIII. TOTAL EXPENDITURES, TOTAL VOTE, COST PER VOTE IN FLORIDA'S SECOND DEMOCRATIC GUBERNATORIAL PRIMARY, MAY 27, 1952

Candidate	Expenditures	Vote	Cost Per Vote
McCarty	$95,721	384,200	$.249
Odham	84,616	336,716	.251

while spending $11,863.66 more than in all the previous weeks combined. McCarty gained 22,773 votes and spent $60,507.99 less than in the previous weeks of his campaign. Perhaps this is an indication that there is merit in going all-out in a very short period of time just prior to an election. An analysis of the election returns to determine whether the Adams vote shifted heavily to Odham is inconclusive, but there is an indication that Odham received Adams' votes in Volusia, Polk, Pinellas, Palm Beach, Hillsborough, Dade, and Duval counties. However, since Odham made serious efforts to attract new votes in these areas, it is impossible to determine whether the increase resulted from his actions in the interim period, from the actions of Adams himself, or from decisions of individuals to support Odham, their preferred candidate having been eliminated in the first primary.

Political scientists have long attempted to ascertain precisely where the campaign dollar goes. The expenditure reports required under the new law give an accurate picture of the distribution of the Florida campaign dollar. The breakdown of the campaign dollar for the leading three Democratic candidates in the Florida gubernatorial primaries of 1952 are shown in large general groupings in Table IX.

TABLE IX. GENERAL BREAKDOWN OF EXPENDITURES OF MCCARTY, ADAMS, AND ODHAM IN FLORIDA'S FIRST AND SECOND GUBERNATORIAL PRIMARIES OF 1952

Item	Candidate	Total Expenditures	Per Cent of Total
Radio and TV	McCarty	$64,481	25.5
	Odham	91,172	57.8
	Adams*	29,499	19.1
Newspaper advertising	McCarty	47,117	18.7
	Odham	9,337	5.9
	Adams*	19,685	12.7
Printing	McCarty	45,688	18.1
	Odham	16,301	10.3
	Adams*	26,090	16.8
All other—salaries, travel, etc.	McCarty	94,673	37.7
	Odham	40,558	26.0
	Adams*	79,125	51.4

* First primary only.

Odham diverted seventy-four per cent of his funds to radio and TV, newspaper advertising, and printing, with the major portion going into his radio talkathons (57.8 per cent). McCarty used slightly over sixty-two per cent of his money for advertising, dividing his total almost evenly among radio-TV, newspapers, and printed materials. The reports show that Adams used the more traditional method of mailing vast quantities of printed campaign materials.[26] He also employed more persons on his headquarters' staffs and paid higher salaries than either McCarty or Odham. The evidence suggests that the older approach did not pay dividends and that greater use of radio by Adams might have made a difference in the outcome of the election.

TABLE X. TYPICAL ITEMS ON FLORIDA EXPENDITURE REPORTS: GRAND TOTALS FOR ODHAM BOTH 1952 DEMOCRATIC PRIMARIES

1. Salaries, including all secretarial and bookkeeping work and labor in all county organizations not donated	$ 12,016.00
2. Radio and TV advertising	91,172.65
3. Newspaper advertising	9,337.67
4. Printing of "Odham Record," signs, bumper strips, etc.	16,301.65
5. Office supplies	3,498.69
6. Postage, freight, express, etc.	4,363.12
7. Telephone and telegraph	7,790.55
8. Rental of county headquarters, halls, parks, and locations for public meetings, including utilities	2,288.33
9. Expense in travel	18,264.86
10. Miscellaneous expenses, including qualifying fee, sound equipment, rental of chairs, photo services, and other items not otherwise listed	2,408.41
Total	$157,370.08

The underlying premise of the new Florida election law is that if the people are informed as to the exact nature of the financing of a candidate's campaign they are capable of making a sound decision when casting their votes. This premise is based on two assumptions: (1) "too much" money reported by any candidate would contribute to his defeat, and (2) if the names of persons appearing on his contributions lists were obviously "wrong people" in the eyes of the general public, his candidacy would be adversely affected.

One of the best features of the present law is its self-policing effect. The candidates watched each other "like hawks," sending their workers to the Secretary of State's office regularly to copy lists of contributors and amounts for their opponents and then carefully checking these names with the public records to see whether or not they fell within the barred categories or gave over the $1,000 limit. The publicity which was necessary if the law was to be meaningful was provided by a conscientious corps of political reporters, including representatives of both Associated Press and United Press, who eagerly awaited the arrival of the official reports at the Secretary of State's office in order to send an account of the contents to their respective offices for publication.

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[26] The writer has attempted to adjust the losses the Adams people suffered in a fire during the campaign which almost completely destroyed their Tallahassee headquarters (state headquarters). One large item which went up in smoke consisted of uncounted numbers of both stamped cards and stamped envelopes. A considerable amount of campaign literature was also destroyed.

For the first time in the history of Florida politics, the electorate was given a comprehensive picture of money in a gubernatorial election. Never before in any state have such complete financial reports on a gubernatorial campaign been made available. Mr. W. P. Bevis, chief clerk in the Elections and Commissions Division of the Secretary of State's office since 1931, says that the revised code is "the best we've ever had," and the only one that "tells us the picture."[27] Mrs. Hortense K. Wells, long active in Democratic party organizational affairs (eight years the Democratic National Committeewoman from Florida), contends that the 1951 code "kept the election open and above board."[28]

The 1953 legislature strengthened the election code by clarifying confusing statements, eliminating conflicting provisions, and putting additional teeth in the punitive section.[29] In view of the action by the 1953 legislature, the favorable court decision in March, 1953, and the almost unanimous verdict that the revised election code effectively regulates money in Florida elections, it can be concluded that the Florida electorate will continue to be among the best informed on all aspects of campaign finances.

The revised code, especially that part which deals with campaign funds, may not have dried up *all* undercover financial activity. As Senator W. A. Shands of Gainesville has said, ". . . it is impossible to legislate honesty into anyone," but ". . . if we have the proper safeguards it is usually correct to assume that the dishonest man will go to the well once too often."[30] Representative Shepperd voiced the opinion: "It may not be a perfect law, for few laws are perfect. But it represents an honest attempt to help clean up politics. Any candidate who seeks to evade its provisions by subterfuge or by means of some legal loophole or technicality isn't fit to seek a public office in Florida."[31] The new Florida campaign expense law has proven its effectiveness at the state level; it might well be used as model for regulating money in national campaigns.

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[27] Interview, Oct. 20, 1953.

[28] Interview, Oct. 22, 1953.

[29] *Compilation of the Election Law of the State of Florida* (Tallahassee: Secretary of State and Statutory Revision Department of the Attorney General's office, August 1, 1953), Section 99.021, .061(4), .161(9), .172, .183, and Section 104.051, .27(8), .271, .371, .38, .381, .46.

[30] As quoted in *Who Gave It—Who Got It?*, St. Petersburg *Times*, pamphlet (1951).

[31] *Florida Times-Union*, Dec. 21, 1951.

THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEMS*

AUSTIN RANNEY
University of Illinois
AND
WILLMOORE KENDALL
Yale University

I

Distributing "raw" data among types or classes is a necessary and illuminating part of the process of research and discovery in any science, particularly in the early stages of the latter's development. But it produces fruitful results only if the types or classes make sense, which they will just to the extent that, *inter alia,* the variables we fix upon in defining them are the significant ones (for the purpose in view, of course), and that the classes (a) exhaust the phenomena under consideration, and (b) do not overlap.

One of the most elementary procedures used in dealing with the raw data of political conflict is that which, taking its departure from the notion of "party systems," seeks to assign each observed instance to one or another of three types: the "one-party system," the "two-party system," and the "multiple-party system." All party systems, it is assumed, belong as a matter of course to one of the three, so that one of the researcher's first tasks in studying the phenomena of party conflict in a given political situation is to find out with which one of the three types he is dealing. Until he has done this—so runs the tacit premise—he does not have his problem in manageable shape.

The concern of the present article is to raise and answer, with respect to this familiar table of party categories, such questions as the following: Does it, when used to deal with the phenomena of American politics,[1] produce results that are entirely satisfactory? Does it meet the tests mentioned in our opening paragraph? Is there, perchance, some fairly simple way to change it so as to permit affirmative replies to the two foregoing questions?

In the opinion of the present writers, this table of categories is open to two major criticisms. In the first place, while the variable underlying its types (how many parties in the system) seems clear enough, the dividing-line between two of them—"two-party systems" and "one-party systems"—is extremely difficult to draw, so that it is not clear, if we can imagine a one-party system that is turning into a two-party system (or vice versa), at what point it ceases to be the one and becomes the other. A glance at current usage of the term "one-

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* The authors wish to thank Professor Charles S. Hyneman for his many valuable criticisms and suggestions regarding the methodology of this article.

[1] We shall have occasion to mention certain non-American party systems, but shall do so only in terms of what is generally known about them, and thus does not require supporting evidence or documentation. The empirical data with which we shall deal are all American.

party system" will, moreover, show why this is the case. V. O. Key, for example, means by "one-party system" the kind of thing we find in Mississippi.[2] Professors Merriam, Gosnell, and McKean, on the other hand, mean by it the kind of thing we find in the U.S.S.R.[3] Evidently, however, it cannot be maintained that the Mississippi and Soviet party systems are essentially alike. Opposition candidates *can* (and sometimes do) oppose candidates of the dominant party in Mississippi. They *cannot* (and do not) in the Soviet Union. So the question arises whether any useful purpose can be served by continuing to call them both "one-party systems."

Even if we exclude the Soviet Union and the "peoples' democracies" from our purview, and confine our attention to "democratic" party systems,[4] this kind of difficulty does not disappear. One often encounters the statement, for example, that since Republican candidates almost always win in Maine and New Hampshire and Democratic candidates in Mississippi and Georgia, all four are "one-party" states. Surely, however, there are significant differences between the kind of party conflict we find in Maine and that which we find in Mississippi, and surely lumping them together in a single category encourages us to ignore these differences—and thus fail to understand the party system of either state. In Maine, to be sure, it is a rare thing for a Democratic candidate to be elected. But it is not a rare but rather a usual thing for him to win anywhere from 30 to 49 per cent of the vote—enough (in the opinion anyhow of those concerned) to justify the continuance of an organized, working Democratic organization. In Mississippi, by contrast, the lesser party often does not even put up candidates; and the candidates it does put up poll a mere 5 to 20 per cent of the vote. Consequently the Republican party in Mississippi appears to be a mere shadow party, whose major reason for keeping itself alive is to be there to dispense national patronage when the Republican party is in control of the national government.[5] And while "one party plus one shadow party equals one party" may be good arithmetic, "one regularly victorious party plus one regularly defeated party equals one party" is pretty clearly *not* good arithmetic.

In short, the present writers feel that the purposes of clarity would be better served if a fourth and a fifth category—one in between "one-party" and "two-party," and the other at one extreme of the spectrum—were added to take care of party systems like those of Maine and the U.S.S.R. We shall suggest such additional categories below.

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[2] V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups*, 3rd ed. (New York, 1952), pp. 314–22.

[3] Cf. Charles E. Merriam and Harold F. Gosnell, *The American Party System*, 3rd ed. (New York, 1940), p. 8; and Dayton D. McKean, *Party and Pressure Politics* (Boston, 1949), pp. 17–18. Merriam and Gosnell, to be sure, say later that such a totalitarian party system is not really a "party system," in the usual sense of that term, at all.

[4] *I.e.*, party systems operating within a total governmental structure that permits organized party opposition. This meaning of "democratic" party systems clearly is the one assumed by Key and other writers, and is one with which the present writers have no quarrel.

[5] Cf. V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York, 1949), Ch. 11.

At this point some readers may argue: "Of course the Mississippi party system is not the same kind as the Soviet party system; nor has anyone ever intended to suggest, by using the same term to apply to both, that it is the same kind of thing. The existing terminology is careless, but so what? It neither reflects nor creates confusion about the realities at stake. So why bother to add more categories, when the present ones do the job perfectly well?" Our answer is this: using the same term to apply to things that are different in *the* relevant aspect unavoidably tends—as our classroom experience has taught us —to identify these things in the minds of students, whether the users intend this or not. And, in any case, the possibility that it might have this result is reason enough for abandoning such usage in favor of more precise terminology.

The second deficiency of the current widely-accepted classification arises in connection with our general tendency to talk sometimes about *the* American party system—as if only one party system existed in the United States, namely, the "two-party" system. When, for example, the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association reports that "the two-party system is so strongly rooted in the political traditions of this country, and public preference for it is so well established that consideration of other possibilities seems entirely academic,"[6] it is clearly doing just this.

The above usage clearly invites the retort that in Mississippi and Georgia, for example, something other than "the two-party system" is to be found receiving rather more than "academic consideration." The authors of the report can, of course, reply that they were referring to the *national* party system only, and were leaving out of account for the moment the state party systems. But if so, we should hear sometimes (as we do not) of the American party *systems* —and expect the broadest generalizations about American parties to have that term, not "*the* American party system," as their referent. We cannot justify the use of the latter phrase, be it noted, by saying that the national party system is far more "important" than the state party systems, since the literature here in question often reminds us that state and local party organizations are far more powerful than the national organizations,[7] and that all national elected officials are elected from *state* constituencies (the President, of course, in a somewhat different fashion than senators and representatives). The correct statement would appear to be that our national "two-party system" is made up of electoral contests within the 48 state party systems, by no means all of which can accurately be called "two-party." And it follows from this statement—far more complex than the statements about the system that we normally hear—that the existing table of categories, because of its lack of precision, has encouraged us in careless habits of thought and description.

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[6] "Toward a More Responsible Two-party System," this REVIEW, Vol. 44 (Sept., 1950, Supplement), p. 18. Cf. Merriam and Gosnell: "One of the outstanding characteristics of the American party system is that it is a two party system . . ." *Op. cit.*, p. 2; or Bone: " . . . a . . . conspicuous feature . . . of the American party system is its biparty nature." Hugh Bone, *American Politics and the Party System* (New York, 1949), p. 356. Professor Schattschneider speaks somewhat more cautiously of *the* American two-party system: " . . . American politics is *dominated* and *distinguished* by the two-party system. . . . The two-party system is *the most conspicuous feature* of American political organization." E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York, 1942), pp. 66–67, emphasis added.

[7] Cf. Schattschneider, pp. 162–65; and Key, *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups*, Ch. 11.

The present article has two purposes: First, to propose a method for classifying party systems that avoids some at least of the difficulties the method now used gets us into; and second, by way of illustrating the method's possible usefulness, to place each of the 48 state party systems and the national party system in the category in which it belongs.

II

The present method of classifying a given party system involves deciding whether it is a two-party or multiple-party or one-party system, which in turn is a matter of fixing attention on the past behavior of the voters involved in it. The classifier asks in effect: Have most of these voters voted in the past for one party? If not, which of two things have they done—divided their votes between two parties, or distributed them among several parties? The tacit premise of this method is that the voters continue to behave, i.e., are now behaving, as they have in the past, and will continue to do so for some time at least in the future. The statement that a particular system is a two-party system, that is to say, is a statement both that voters have so behaved in the past that neither party could be said to have a cinch on winning, and that now and in the future either party, other things being equal, has a reasonably good chance to win further elections. In short, our estimate of the chances of any party, major or minor, in any given future election is—again, other things being equal—an extrapolation based on the statistics of its successes and failures in past elections.[8]

These criteria seem both meaningful and useful to the present writers; and we suggest that, on the basis of such data, there appear to be *five*—not three—possible types of party systems, of which four are democratic or non-totalitarian:

1. *The multiple-party type.* To this type belongs any system in which at most elections in the fairly recent past (a) three or more parties have shared the bulk of the votes and public offices, and (b) no single party has won a majority of either votes or offices (so that most governments have been coalition or "fusion" governments).

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[8] One of the clearest examples of the dependence of present expectations upon past election results in classifying party systems was given by Professor Lipson in a recent issue of this Review. He stated that the following conditions must be present if a party system is to be called "two-party": "(1) Not more than two parties at any given time have a genuine chance to gain power. (2) One of these is able to win the requisite majority and stay in office without help from a third party. (3) Over a number of decades two parties alternate in power." "The Two-party System in British Politics," this Review, Vol. 47, pp. 337–58, at p. 338 (June, 1953). Clearly, the expectations involved in Lipson's (1) depend upon the observations of past voting behavior which support his (2) and (3). See also the definitions, explicit and implicit, of "the" American two-party system in the works cited in footnotes 3, 4, and 7, above.

2. *The two-party type.* To this type belongs any system in which at most elections in the fairly recent past (a) two parties have shared the bulk of the votes and public offices between them, (b) the winning party has gained a majority of the votes and offices, and (c) the two dominant parties have alternated in winning majorities.

3. *The modified one-party type.* To this type belongs any system in which at most elections in the recent past (a) one party has won all or almost all the offices, but (b) the second party, though it has seldom won any offices, has normally received a substantial percentage of the votes and thus constitutes a significant center of organized party opposition.

4. *The one-party type.* To this type belongs any system in which at most elections in the recent past (a) one party has won all or nearly all of the offices, and (b) the second party has usually received only a small percentage of the popular votes.

5. *The totalitarian one-party type.* To this type belongs any system in which either (a) only one party has been permitted to participate in elections in the recent past, or (b) any parties other than the dominant single party that have participated are clearly "fronts" for the dominant party.

These criteria are, of course, stated in very general terms. They do not, by themselves, indicate *how many times* power must change hands between two parties in order that "alternation in power" can be said to have taken place, or *how long a period* constitutes the "fairly recent past," or *how large a percentage* of the popular votes may fairly be regarded as "substantial." Thus meaningful application of these necessarily general criteria to any given party situation would require the political scientist to study past election results, see if the various percentages of victories and shares of the popular votes fall into clusters, and, if so, select the dividing-lines between the clusters as the dividing-lines—in that specific situation *only*—between his categories.[9] That is what the present writers have attempted to do in their classification of 49 American party systems, the results of which appear below.

III

One familiar kind of data used in classifying the American national party system as a two-party system is the distribution of popular votes in presidential elections.[10] The graphs and tables in which these data are presented show that in the 22 presidential elections since the Civil War, the Republicans have won 13 times and the Democrats nine. They further show that in only three elections have third parties received over 10 per cent of the popular vote,[11] and that in only four elections have third-party candidates received any electoral votes.[12]

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[9] See, for example, the process by which the present writers arrived at the dividing-line between the "two-party" states and the other states in Table I, below. The specific dividing-line employed in that table would very likely be inappropriate for a classification of, say, the provincial party systems of Canada. The *process* for determining the dividing-line—as opposed to the specific location of the line itself—should be equally applicable to Canadian and American party systems.

[10] See, for example, the graph in Key, *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups,* p. 225.

[11] 1892—Weaver (Populist), 11 per cent; 1912—Roosevelt (Progressive), 27.5 per cent; and 1924—LaFollette (Progressive), 16.6 per cent.

A less familiar kind of data is the distribution of party strength in Congress. Here the figures reveal that in the 44 Congresses since the Civil War, the Republicans have controlled the Senate 29 times (to the Democrats' 15 times) and the House of Representatives 24 times (to the Democrats' 20 times).[13] On the basis of both kinds of data, then, the national party system is clearly of the two-party type.

IV

In classifying the 48 state party systems, the first step was to compile the results of all elections since 1914 in each of the states for three offices—President of the United States, United States senator, and governor.[14] Next, the percent-

TABLE I. THE TWO-PARTY STATES

State	Total of All Elections Rep. Wins	Dem. Wins	3-P Wins	Per Cent of Second-Party Wins
Arizona	12	32	0	27.2
California	22	11	1	35.3
Colorado	22	21	0	48.8
Connecticut	31	15	0	32.6
Delaware	22	11	0	33.3
Idaho	26	18	0	40.9
Illinois	21	14	0	40.0
Indiana	21	13	0	38.2
Maryland	11	23	0	32.3
Massachusetts	24	19	0	44.2
Michigan	30	13	0	30.2
Minnesota	28	7	8	34.8
Missouri	13	22	0	37.1
Montana	9	24	0	27.2
Nebraska	30	13	1	31.8
Nevada	11	25	0	30.5
New Jersey	24	13	0	35.1
New Mexico	14	29	0	32.5
New York	17	23	0	42.5
Ohio	23	22	0	48.8
Rhode Island	17	26	0	39.5
Utah	13	21	0	38.2
Washington	15	19	0	44.1
West Virginia	12	21	0	36.3
Wisconsin	31	7	6	29.3
Wyoming	15	20	0	42.8

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[12] 1892—Weaver (Populist), 22; 1912—Roosevelt (Progressive), 88; 1924—LaFollette (Progressive), 13; 1948—Thurmond (States' Rights), 39.

[13] Cf. the graphs in Louis Bean, *How to Predict Elections* (New York, 1948), pp. 15, 19.

[14] The raw data for Table I and the subsequent tables were drawn from the *World Almanac* (published by the New York *World-Telegram and Sun*), various issues from 1915

ages of victories in all elections for the second party[15] in each state were determined and placed along a scale from the lowest (0 per cent) to the highest (48.8 per cent). The authors then observed that the longest gap in the scale was that which occurred between 22.8 per cent and 27.2 per cent, and that the 48 percentages appeared to fall into two main groups or "clusters": those from 0 per cent to 22.8 per cent, and those from 27.2 per cent to 48.8 per cent. We therefore fixed 25 per cent as the dividing-line between the "one-party" and "two-party" categories, classifying as "two-party states" all those in which the second party had won more than 25 per cent of the elections studied. The states which met the relevant tests are shown in Table I.

TABLE II. THE MODIFIED ONE-PARTY STATES

State	Total of All Elections Rep. Wins	Dem. Wins	3-P Wins	Per Cent of Second-Party Wins	Per Cent of Elections with Second-Party Vote Over 30%	Per Cent of Elections with Second-Party Vote Over 40%
Iowa	34	10	0	22.7	88.6	70.4
Kansas	36	7	0	16.2	97.6	67.4
Kentucky	8	27	0	22.8	100.0	94.2
Maine	40	3	0	7.0	90.6	53.4
New Hampshire	37	6	0	14.0	100.0	86.0
North Carolina	1	33	0	3.0	79.4	30.0
North Dakota	36	8	0	18.1	75.0	59.0
Oklahoma	6	27	0	18.1	93.9	75.7
Oregon	26	7	1	23.5	88.1	55.8
Pennsylvania	28	7	0	20.0	91.4	65.7
South Dakota	34	9	0	21.0	97.6	72.0
Tennessee	4	40	0	9.0	72.6	34.0

The next question was: in how many of the 22 states in which the second party has won less than 25 per cent of all elections has the second party nevertheless usually won a "substantial percentage" of the votes? The data indicated that significant breaking-points occur at 30 per cent and at 40 per cent of the popular vote, which made it seem advisable to define "modified one-party

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to 1953. The period chosen for studying election results is from 1914 to 1952, and was selected for two reasons: It eliminates most of the effects of the 1912 split in the Republican party—an abnormal and temporary situation; and it provides a period of four decades, which, in the opinion of the authors, is a long enough period to indicate trends. The three offices were chosen partly because of the ready availability of statistics about them, and partly because in many states they are the only offices for which *all* the voters of the state vote.

[15] In those states in which third-party or independent candidates (both listed in the tables as "3-P") won at least one election (Alabama, California, Florida, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oregon, South Carolina, and Wisconsin), their victories were added to the second-parties' victories to show "total-opposition" percentages.

TABLE III. THE ONE-PARTY STATES

State	Total of All Elections Rep. Wins	Dem. Wins	3-P Wins	Per Cent of Second-Party Wins	Per Cent of Elections with Second-Party Vote Over 30%	Per Cent of Elections with Second-Party Vote Over 40%
Alabama	0	32	1	3.0	18.1	6.0
Arkansas	0	43	0	0.0	13.9	2.3
Florida	2	32	1	8.6	19.9	5.7
Georgia	0	44	0	0.0	4.4	2.2
Louisiana	0	32	1	3.0	6.9	4.6
Mississippi	0	32	1	3.0	6.0	3.0
South Carolina	0	32	1	3.0	6.0	6.0
Texas	2	41	0	4.6	16.2	6.9
Vermont	44	0	0	0.0	54.4	18.1
Virginia	2	34	0	5.5	41.6	11.1

states" as those in which the second party, while winning less than 25 per cent of all elections, has won over 30 per cent of the vote in over 70 per cent of all elections and has won over 40 per cent of the vote in over 30 per cent of all elections. By the same token, "one-party states" are defined as those in which the second party has won less than 25 per cent of all elections, and has also won over 30 per cent of the vote in less than 70 per cent of all elections and has won over 40 per cent of the vote in less than 30 per cent of all elections. The states falling in these two categories are shown in Tables II and III.

Finally, a political map of the American state party systems, based upon the foregoing data and interpretations, is shown in Figure 1.

V

One important question that arises from the foregoing analysis is whether the familiar one-party-two-party table of categories, however sharpened and refined, is a useful tool of analysis. Certainly it is a rough classifying device at best. There are, for example, many and important differences among the party systems of such states as Ohio, Rhode Island, West Virginia, New Mexico, and Washington—yet they are all lumped together in our classification as "two-party" states. If such disparate party systems can all be called "two-party," one may well ask, does locating a party system in such a loose category tell us anything important about the nature of party conflict in that system?

This question can be answered, the present writers believe, only by a detailed examination of each of the state party systems in each of our three categories, and a careful comparison of each system with the others in its particular category. V. O. Key's *Southern Politics in State and Nation* and Alexander Heard's *A Two-Party South?* are among the few attempts at such analysis and comparison; and both works suggest that, despite the many differences in party conflict among the various Southern states, there *are* important similarities among the


Two-Party
Modified One-Party Democratic
Modified One-Party Republican
One-Party Democratic
One-Party Republican

FIG. 1. The State Party Systems.

states we have classified as one-party states on the one hand and among those we have classified as modified one-party states on the other hand.[16] This, in turn, suggests to us that the same kind of careful analysis and comparison of the two-party states might reveal significant similarities among the party systems in those states.

In any case, the purpose of the present essay has been to suggest improvements in the present, widely-accepted method of organizing and categorizing data about party conflict. A clearer answer to the question, what *are* "one-party" and "two-party" systems, is not an answer to the further and more important question, what does it matter? It can, however, provide the starting-point for finding a satisfactory answer to the latter question.

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[16] Cf. Key, *Southern Politics in State and Nation,* Chs. 4, 10; and Heard, *A Two-Party South?* (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1952), p. 98.

AGE AS A FACTOR IN THE RECRUITMENT OF COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP*

ROBERT T. HOLT

One of the keys to an understanding of the Communist movement is a knowledge of the nature of its leadership. The idea of the professional conspiratorial elite is one of the unique Russian contributions to Communist dogma and practice. After the professional revolutionaries in Russia had successfully engineered the Bolshevik Revolution, they became models for the leaders of the new Communist parties that were established in the West. Scholars and statesmen alike have had cause to mention some of their unique qualities—their uncompromising discipline, their complete and intransigent dedication to their cause, their ruthlessness and capacity for self-sacrifice. In this paper an attempt will be made to develop and investigate hypotheses about some of the characteristics of those who have attained positions of high leadership in the Communist parties in Italy and France. Some information on the leaders of the party in the United States has been included for purposes of comparison. It is impossible in this study, of course, to attack the problem from the point of view of the motivations and personality structures that differentiate the Communist leaders from those lower in the hierarchy. Togliatti, Thorez, and their comrades are obviously not available for the sort of probing that would be necessary for this type of analysis. And in addition to the normal hazards involved in using detailed biographical and autobiographical sources for such an analysis, this material is too limited, too unrepresentative, and too propagandistic to be of much value.[1] However, it was felt that a useful analysis could be made and certain hypotheses tested by the use of purely "external" indices constructed from material available to Western researchers.

The Communist party, like other groups that seek supreme allegiance from their adherents, seems to make a special effort to recruit members from among young people. Some hypothetical reasons for this tactic come immediately to mind. The type of loyalty that it demands from its militants is perhaps best obtained from individuals who become associated with it while still young. The process of assimilation, particularly when it involves some negation of the dominant values of the society, can be completed most satisfactorily if it is begun before these values have become firmly entrenched or a whole host of other obligations and duties assumed.

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* The research for this paper was done under the direction of Gabriel A. Almond as part of a course in the graduate division of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and as one phase of the "Appeals of Communism" project conducted in the Center of International Studies, Princeton University. Some of the hypotheses investigated concerning the characteristics of party leadership were suggested by Theodore Draper, who acted as a project consultant.

[1] For an example of the autobiographical material that does exist, see Maurice Thorez, *Fils du Peuple* (Paris, 1949). An English translation of an earlier edition appears under the title, *Son of the People*, trans. Douglas Garman (New York, 1939). Also see Mario Montagnana, *Ricordi di un Operaio Torinese*, Vol. 1, *Sotto La Guida di Gramsci*, Vol. II, *Sotto La Guida di Togliatte* (Rome, 1949).

For two main reasons it seems logical to suppose that the leaders of the party would generally tend to become associated with it at earlier ages than the rank and file. First, the party tends to recruit its leadership internally, i.e., it is a "closed bureaucracy."[2] Thus, those who join the earliest have the best opportunity to move to the top. The second reason is that the demands the party places upon its leaders are severe, the allegiance required much greater than from the rank and file. It seems likely that this type of devotion is more easily commanded from people who join and become assimilated into the movement while still young.

These considerations led us to formulate two hypotheses about the role of age in the recruitment of the Communist party leadership. The first is that the leaders of the party joined the party or became involved in other radical movements at early ages. The second is that they quickly became functionaries in the party and thus while still young were a part of its militant cadre.

The study is based on a quantitative analysis of the Communist party leadership in Italy, France, and the United States. The samples for Italy and France are made up of all the regular members of the Central Committee of the Communist party.[3] Because of the fact that the National Committee (central committee) of the party in the United States has only twelve members, an additional thirty-six leaders have been included in the sample.[4]

The central committees have been chosen as representative of the leadership for several reasons. They are, formally, the highest governing bodies of the party. They comprise all the top leadership including, of course, the secretary-general, the secretariat, and the whole of the politburo (or its equivalent). The other members, although nominally elected at the party Congresses, are, in effect, chosen by the politburo and thus elevated to the select circle of central committee membership only after careful examination by the highest level leadership of the respective countries. In Italy and France the committee also contains most of the regional leaders of the party, and thus geographical distribution is assured.

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[2] "Closed bureaucracy," as the term is used in this study, refers to a bureaucracy in which the leadership is recruited from the ranks. By and large this type of bureaucracy is found in organizations existing largely for ideological purposes, for example, churches and some political parties. These organizations can be contrasted with business enterprises which at times recruit even top leaders from outside their own ranks.

[3] The Italian Central Committee used in this analysis has seventy-two members and was elected at the close of the Seventh Congress of the Italian Communist party held in Rome, April 3–8, 1951. *L'Unitá* (Rome), the official organ of the Italian party, carried the names of the new members of the Committee along with short biographical sketches on April 10, 1951. The *Parti Communiste Français* elected the Central Committee used in this sample at its Twelfth Congress, which met in Paris during the first week of April, 1950. The Committee consists of thirty-nine members whose names were reported in the party's organ, *L'Humanité* (Paris), on April 7, 1950. The major change in the composition of the French Central Committee since 1950 has been the removal of André Marty and Charles Tillon.

[4] The National Committee included in this sample was elected at the National Convention of the Communist Party of the United States held in late December, 1950. The names of the Committee members were obtained from *Political Affairs*, the theoretical magazine of the party, January, 1951. All but William Z. Foster and Elizabeth G. Flynn were among those tried under the Smith Act for conspiring to overthrow the government by force, found guilty, and given prison terms in 1949 (the so-called "trial of the eleven"). Elizabeth G. Flynn was tried in a later trial. The additional thirty-six included in the sample are among those who have been arrested in various parts of the country for violation of the Smith Act. Nine of this additional thirty-six are alternate members of the National Committee, and many have at one time or another served on it.

The Communist party has been known to attempt to enhance the prestige of its organization by putting into supposedly high positions important men who, although formally party leaders, do not have any significant policy or administrative function and cannot be considered as really part of the top leadership. Certainly, it could be argued that some of the members of the central committees, particularly in Italy, are little more than "window dressing." It is believed, however, that this problem is not serious; it would be worse if the sample had consisted of some other group of high echelon Communists of sufficient size—for instance, the Communist members of the French and Italian parliaments.

Excluded from the sample, of course, are those leaders of the underground, clandestine segments of the party who perhaps are not even known to the party leaders, let alone to Western observers.

The central committees have been chosen, in part, in order to get some kind of qualitative comparability among the men selected from the different countries. But this effort to get qualitative comparability has in itself introduced some bias. The Italian Central Committee included seventy-two members, whereas the French had only thirty-nine; the American sample included forty-eight leaders. Whenever reference is made to total figures, the weight of the Italian sample must be taken into consideration.

Another major difficulty was the lack of accurate information. Perhaps rather surprisingly, information on the Italians was the most accessible.[5] This is largely due to two factors. First, during the Fascist period in Italy the police kept elaborate dossiers on many of the men who are now on the Central Committee, and some of this information has found its way into print. Secondly, many of the members of the Central Committee are in the Parliament or have run for public office. Information on them is available in the regular biographical sketches of the members of the Chamber of Deputies and in election propaganda booklets put out by the party.

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[5] In addition to the issue of *L'Unità* cited above, the major sources of information on the Italian Communists were: (1) *Albo Biographicò dei Deputati e Senatori Communisti e Socialisti* (Rome, 1948); (2) *Il Parlamento Della Republica Italiana nella Prima Legislatura Constituzione Functionamento Biografie Dati Statistici*, Supplement to *Chi E* (Rome, n.d.); (3) *Chi E* (Rome, 1948); (4) a number of propaganda pamphlets put out by the Communists for the general election in 1948. An effort was made to double-check all information, particularly when the prime source was a Communist publication.

As would be expected, detailed information was available on most of the members of the American National Committee. However, little has been found on the early lives of the additional thirty-six that have been included in the sample.[6]

Information on the French leaders was more difficult to obtain.[7] An aura of myth and mystery surrounds some of the members of the French Central Committee, and as a result it is extremely difficult to separate fact from fantasy, particularly in the early lives and backgrounds of the leaders. And even when fantasy is identified and thrown out, it is sometimes impossible to uncover facts to fill the void. For example, André Marty was billed as the great hero of the Black Sea mutiny in the French fleet and thus as one of the enlightened few who early envisioned the Soviet Union as the leader of the working classes of the world. But there is some doubt as to whether Marty played the role ascribed to him. Some observers assert that he was not even there at the time. However, it seems impossible from this side of the Atlantic to check the Communist propaganda on this matter. In addition to these myths that may distort the material on the French leaders, it was found that for fourteen of the thirty-nine little information is available.

Some comments on the social background of the leaders are also in order here. The members of the central committees have been recruited from all segments of their societies. A study of their careers and of the occupational status of their parents shows, however, that a large plurality—about forty per cent—come from a working-class background. In the Italian and French samples, men with professional backgrounds are represented in greater proportions than might be expected. Almost one-quarter of the European leaders came from professional occupations. In Italy this includes such prominent figures as Terracini and Togliatti. In France Cachin and Casanova fit into this category. It is also significant that certain groups are under-represented. Only a few of these men were ever small businessmen, entrepreneurs, or independent peasants, or were sons of men engaged in these occupations. But while the occupational groups that formed the core of the classical bourgeois middle class are relatively absent, a significant minority come from the middle-class, white-collar groups —the clerks, accountants, draftsmen, etc.—that are the products of an industrial civilization.

An examination of the social background of these individuals raises some questions about an often-assumed characteristic of members of the Communist party. It is commonly believed that the party is composed of disgruntled, downwardly mobile individuals who are suffering from a loss or prospective loss of prestige and are venting the resulting hostility on society by revolutionary activity. If this were true, a comparison of the occupations of the Communist leaders with those of their fathers should tend to show an increase in those occupations which are lacking in social prestige. However, the percentage that could be considered on the basis of occupation as belonging to the lower classes remained constant between generations. On the other hand, there was a noticeable increase in those occupations generally considered to carry with them social prestige. (The latter statements may appear paradoxical; actually the increase mentioned can occur even with the constant percentage of lower-class membership because information on the occupations of fathers was less complete than on the leaders themselves.) Thus, whereas twenty-one per cent of the central committee members had a professional background, only nine per cent of their fathers would fit into this category. The amount of education the leadership had also does not seem to indicate downward mobility. Over one-third has had some university training. As would be expected, more Americans than Europeans have had the benefits of a university education, but twenty-two per cent of the Italians, for example, are college graduates and another six per cent have had some college education.[8] The data on mobility are fragmentary. But on the basis of a study of the variables of education and occupation, there is reason to investigate new hypotheses on the motivations that are related to joining the Communist party.

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[6] Major sources included: (1) United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, *The United States of America, Appellee,* v. *Eugene Dennis, et al., Defendants-Appellants, Joint Appendix* (New York, n.d.); (2) a number of hearings and reports of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1938–1951; (3) a series of press releases from the Department of Justice containing biographical information on the Communists arrested in the United States under the Smith Act.

[7] Major sources included: (1) *Dictionaire Biographique Français Contemporain* (Paris, 1950); (2) *Conseil de la République, Notice et Portraits* (Paris, 1947); (3) numerous issues of *L'Humanité* and other Communist publications in which biographical notes on individual Communists were found.

The first hypothesis had originally been formulated in terms of early membership in the party. However, since a large minority of the sample were born in the nineteenth century, it would have been impossible for them to have joined while they were still young an organization not formed until 1920 or 1921. The reformulation of the hypothesis to include participation in radical activity at an early age was based on an assumption that the social and psychological implications of association with syndicalist, anarchist, socialist, and communist groups in the first decades of the century were similar.

The first hypothesis stating that the leaders joined the party or participated in radical activity at an early age is supported rather conclusively by the figures in Table I. They indicate that fifty-one per cent were engaged in radical activity by the age of eighteen; seventy-three per cent by the age of twenty-two. It is equally important to note that only nine per cent became involved in radical activity after the age of twenty-two. A breakdown by country reveals that the

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[8] The intellectuals in the party leadership actually show signs of being upwardly mobile. A number of these came from working class backgrounds or from that amorphous border area between the working class and the bourgeosie which is occupied by what has been appropriately called the "lumpen bourgeosie." This point is mentioned because it is one way in which the Communist leadership seems to differ significantly from the Nazi leadership. Daniel Lerner concludes that the intellectuals in the Nazi movement were faced with a decline in status when they joined that party and implies that joining the party was one manner of coping with this prospective loss of prestige. See Daniel Lerner, *The Nazi Elite* (Stanford, 1951), p. 83.

TABLE I. AGE AT TIME OF FIRST RADICAL ACTIVITY

	Italy n = 72	France n = 39	Total n = 111
Before 16	37%	23%	32%
16–18	26	5	19
19–22	21	21	22
23–26	2	5	4
27–30	—	8	3
Over 30	1	2	2
No information	11	36	20

Italian leaders became involved in radical activity at earlier ages than the French—eighty-four per cent by the age of twenty-two years. The table shows that only forty-nine per cent of the French had participated in radical activity by this time, but this relatively low figure is related to the fact that there is no information available on thirty-six per cent of the French leaders. If those on whom there is no information available are dropped from the total and the percentage figure is re-calculated, we find that seventy-six per cent of the French leaders were involved in radical activity by the age of twenty-two.[9]

This hypothesis can also be supported by an examination of the ages at which those central committee members who were born in the twentieth century joined the party. This manner of testing the hypothesis, although based on a limited portion of the sample, has two advantages. First, it provides some data on age of actual adherence to the party and, secondly, it enables us to include the American leaders in the calculations. Two-thirds of the sample were born in the twentieth century. Sixty-two per cent of this group had joined the party by the age of twenty-one. If this figure is adjusted to include only those on whom there is information, it becomes seventy-five per cent. The Italian leaders are the youngest joiners; ninety-two per cent of those born after 1899 had joined the party by the age of twenty-one. The French figures are again distorted by the large number on whom information is not available, but of those born after 1899 on whom there is information, eighty-eight per cent had joined the party by the age of twenty-one. The data on the American Communists show a similar, though not as extreme a pattern as the European. Fifty-six per cent of those born in the twentieth century on whom there is information had entered the party by the age of twenty-one. The figures on the actual members of the National Committee show that of those born after 1899 all but Ben Davis, that is, nine out of ten, had joined the party by the age of twenty-two. A majority joined while still in their teens.

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[9] In a number of cases in the analysis where the "no information" category is particularly large, it was felt that a more accurate interpretation of the data could be given by using percentage figures computed on the basis of those on whom information was available. A manipulation of the figures in this manner assumes that the distribution of the variable among those on whom there is no information is the same as among those on whom information is available. In certain instances this seems to be a reasonable assumption to make, e.g., in regard to age at time of first radical activity. However, at other times it is believed that the very reason information is not available is related to the particular distribution of the variable.

There is an interesting trend among the Europeans who deviate from this predominant pattern of early participation in radical activity. There are twenty-two individuals who could be included in this group. A majority of these come from middle- or upper-class families. Since these are minority characteristics, it might be tentatively concluded that those Communist leaders who participate in radical activity later than is normal typically come from middle- or upper-class backgrounds. This would seem logical on the basis of what is known about the tendency of youth from working-class backgrounds to "mature" earlier than those from groups higher on the social ladder because of earlier separation from families and the necessity to "get along on their own" sooner. However, this is another manner in which the Communist leadership differs from the Nazi. It can be inferred from Lerner's study that Nazi leaders from middle- and upper-class backgrounds tended to join the party at younger ages than others.[10]

The above calculations indicate that the leaders joined the party or participated in radical activity at an early age, but one could legitimately raise the question whether the party leadership can be distinguished from the rank and file on the basis of this criterion. That question cannot be answered from the data thus far analyzed, but there is some evidence to suggest that the leadership of the party became members at significantly earlier ages than the rank and file. Table II is adapted from the forthcoming work by Almond and others entitled *The Appeals of Communism*. It indicates that among a group of former party members interviewed in several Western countries, sixty per cent of those who reached high echelon status in the party and only thirty-nine per cent of the rank and file participated in radical activity before they were nineteen years old. Just as important is the fact that although thirty-three per cent of the

TABLE II. AGE AT TIME OF FIRST RADICAL ACTIVITY FOR FORMER PARTY MEMBERS*

	Rank and File n=97	Low Echelon n=73	High Echelon n=51
Before 16	12%	23%	31%
16–18	27	32	29
19–22	28	21	24
23 and over	33	21	16
No information	—	4	—

* The group of former party members includes some 225 cases collected from Italy, France, Great Britain, and the United States.

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[10] *The Nazi Elite* (cited in note 8), pp. 10–12, 16–23.

rank and file ex-Communists participated in their first radical activity after the age of twenty-three, only sixteen per cent of the high echelon ex-Communists did so after this age. Almond's figures on high echelon ex-Communists are comparable to our figures on members of the central committees. His figures show that eighty per cent of the ex-Communists who reach high echelon status engaged in radical activity before the age of twenty-two. The comparable figure for our sample is eighty-nine per cent.

The second working hypothesis of the study is that the leaders of the party rose quickly out of the rank and file and while they were still young moved into positions in the party that occupied most of their waking hours. Table III gives the time lapse between joining the party and devoting full time or nearly full time to party work.[11] It indicates that the party leadership moved up in the party rapidly and that the leaders became functionaries at early ages. Fifty-six per cent were functionaries within two years of joining. If the unknowns are excluded, the figure is seventy-four per cent. Within three years eighty-five per cent had become functionaries—if the figure is computed on the basis of those on whom there is information. In interpreting these figures, it must be remembered that a number of the leaders joined the party at the ages of fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen. These make up a large majority of those who became functionaries only after five or six years of party membership. For these early joiners, it would be possible to be in the party for six years before becoming a functionary and yet be one at the age of twenty or twenty-one.

TABLE III. TIME BETWEEN JOINING COMMUNIST PARTY AND BECOMING PARTY FUNCTIONARY

	Italy n = 72	France n = 39	U.S. n = 12	Total n = 123
One year	57%	28%	8%	43%
Two years	11	13	25	13
Three years	4	8	33	8
Four years	3	5	—	3
Five years	4	5	8	5
Six years	4	3	—	3
No information	17	39	33	24

The Italians have the largest percentage in the one-year category. This can be explained in part by the fact that a high percentage of the present leaders of the Italian party joined in 1921, the year of its inception. Many were delegates to the Livorno conference in 1921, and although this was not considered *prima*

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[11] Because of the fact that it is being used as a index of recognition and acceptance of party goals, a loose concept of functionary has been employed, and the unique aspects of the party in the various countries demand that different criteria be established to determine functionary status in the several parties. For instance, in Italy during the period of fascism an exile ordered by the party qualified a man as a functionary. Participation in the Spanish Civil War as a Communist was also included in the definition of functionary.

facie evidence of being a functionary, many did receive official positions at that time.

The French figures show much the same pattern as the Italian. If those on whom there is no information are dropped out of the totals, over forty-five per cent of the French leaders fall into the one-year category. The American figures were computed only on the actual members of the National Committee. The explanation of the greater time lapse between joining the party and becoming a functionary in the case of the Americans is that only two of these men were among the founders of the party, and that most of the others joined the party at very young ages.

The assumption of functionary status can also be interpreted as indicative of relatively total commitment to the Communist party. By total commitment we mean the acceptance of and adherence to the stated and implicit goals of the party, the internalization of its value system, and complete devotion to the party in both thought and action. There was a significant number of instances in the lives of those leaders on whom information is relatively complete of the sudden and irrevocable dropping of a friend, wife, or lover at the momentary notice of the party. This was interpreted as indicative of total commitment, but since such data are accessible for only a few leaders, they are not presented quantitatively. The Communist party does not recognize a division of loyalties. It arrogates complete devotion to itself. Before a man is raised to functionary status, the party feels confident of his undying devotion, and the man himself recognizes at least to some degree the demands of leadership.

There is, however, one very good quantitative index which demonstrates commitment to the goals of the Communist party. It was assumed that one of the most reliable indicators of commitment is willingness to hold to one's beliefs and convictions in face of severe deprivation or threats of deprivation. Tables IV and V give some basis for determining this for the European leaders. Table IV reveals that almost eighty per cent of the members of the central committees in Italy and France have spent some time in prison or exile because of their political beliefs or actions based thereon.[12] The Communist party in Italy grew up in the face of totalitarian fascism, and the high percentage who were in prison or exile is, of course, a reflection of the strong coercive action

TABLE IV. NUMBER OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS WHO HAVE SERVED PRISON TERMS OR BEEN IN EXILE

	Italy n = 72	France n = 39	Total n = 111
Prison or exile	88%	64%	79%
No exile	10	3	7
No information	3	32	13

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[12] Because of the fact that arrest for Communist activity was one of the main criteria for selecting the American members, information on them was not included in Tables IV and V.

TABLE V. AGE AT TIME OF FIRST PRISON SENTENCE OR DEPORTATION

	Italy n = 49	France n = 25
Before 21	10%	—%
21–23	28	4
24–26	16	4
27–29	12	—
28–30	5	28
Over 30	28	64

taken by the state to suppress the party, particularly after 1925. Some of the Italian leaders served long prison terms; except for a short interim in 1937, Terracini was in prison from 1926 to 1943; Togliatti lived eighteen years in exile. These figures give some idea of the implications of Communist membership and of the intensity of conviction demanded of the leadership.

The figures on the French leaders have to be interpreted in a slightly different manner. A large majority of those who served prison terms or suffered exile were arrested in 1939 when the Communist party was declared an illegal, subversive organization and was dissolved. Many of the leaders were arrested at that time; some were imprisoned, others exiled, some (e.g., Thorez) sentenced to death. The almost sixty-five per cent who were imprisoned or exiled represents in quantitative terms what adherence to the Nazi-Soviet pact meant to the French Communist leaders.

The data in Table V give us little valuable information on the French leaders; they merely reveal that a majority of the arrests took place in 1939 when most of the leadership was over thirty years old. But for the Italians they do provide another index on age at time of total commitment to the goals of the party. The total of forty-nine includes only those who were imprisoned or confined for at least one year as a result of Communist activity. For many, this occurred only after the second or third arrest; for others, it came after return from voluntary exile which was originally undertaken to escape arrest. It is felt that this indicator of "total commitment" is a very reliable one because there is complete recognition of the severe consequences of Communist activity. It should also be pointed out that it is extremely conservative; the data in Table V show age of "total commitment," but certainly not *earliest* age of "total commitment." Thirty-nine per cent of the Italians who served prison sentences were sentenced before they were twenty-four years old; fifty-five per cent before they were twenty-seven.[13]

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[13] For empirical data on the Russian revolutionary leaders similar to that presented above, see Jerome Davis, "A Study of 163 Outstanding Communist Leaders," *American Sociological Society Papers*, Vol. 24, pp. 42–55 (1930) and George K. Schueller, *The Politburo* (Stanford, 1951). The Russian leaders of the revolution showed many of the characteristics here reported on Western leaders. For instance, Davis reports that over three-quarters of his sample had engaged in radical activity by the age of twenty-one. For information on the Nazi leaders see Lerner, *The Nazi Elite* (cited in note 8).

On the basis of the information available, it can be shown that the Italian leaders have an amazing record of early commitment to the goals of the Communist party. Some of the cases are almost unbelievable. Giancarlo Pajetta, at the present time a member of the Directorate (Politburo), comes from a middle-class but radical background—his father was a lawyer and both his parents were Communists. At the age of fourteen he joined the young Communists, and soon became a member of the provincial committee of the Communist youth in Turin. Two years later, in 1927, he was expelled from the *liceo* and denied access to any other school in Italy because of his membership in an anti-fascist organization. At the age of sixteen he became the youngest person ever tried before the Special Tribunals, the Star Chambers of Italian Fascism, and was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. After his release from prison, he immediately began to organize clandestine Communist groups in Turin. By 1931 the police were again hot on his trail and the Directorate of the Italian party ordered him to leave Italy. After working actively in the international Communist youth movement, he was recalled to Italy in 1933. Immediately he was arrested and sent to prison for twenty-one years. This case is exceptional, to be sure, but it does give some kind of indication of the type of men that make up the Communist leadership. Pajetta had served a prison term because of his political beliefs and activity by the time he was sixteen; by the time he was twenty-two he had been forced to leave his native land, had been a member of the executive committee of the Communist youth in Moscow, and had begun to serve a twenty-one year prison sentence for Communist activity.

What conclusions can be drawn and what further hypotheses developed from the data on age at various points in the process of assimilation into the Communist movement? First of all, the two hypotheses are supported by the data. The Communist leadership did participate in radical activity at early ages and also, when possible, joined the party while still young. Most typically, these men engaged in their first radical activity while in their teens or early twenties. They also moved into positions of functionary rank quickly and while still young were what might be called "full-time employees" of the party.

The data indicate that the Communist party is a type of "closed bureaucracy"—that it recruits its leadership internally. Thus it would be natural that those who joined at the earliest ages would have the best chances of moving into positions of leadership. However, it is interesting to speculate about the relationship of early commitment to the party goals to some of the other observed characteristics of the party elite. One of their frequently mentioned characteristics is their total involvement in the party which precludes any meaningful participation in other groups or activities. Most individuals have a plurality of partially competing loyalties—loyalties to family, to church, to state, or to other social groups—no one of which is constantly subordinated to another. The high Communist functionary apparently does not have these conflicting loyalties—at least to the same degree. It seems that his duties and obligations are ordered in a relatively rigid hierarchy. Loyalty to the party is not only at the top of this hierarchy, but also determines the order and importance of whatever secondary loyalties the individual may have.

Late adolescence is the period of life when the plurality of interests and goals that characterize most men are being developed and stabilized. If during this period an individual not only joins but becomes a functionary in the Communist party, which requires that he have few relationships outside of the party, it is unlikely that such interests will ever develop. For the remainder of his life, he may have little alternative to membership in the party. Dedication to the goals of the party may become such an integral part of his personality that another life may be almost inconceivable. The top leaders enjoy what might be called a "chastity of commitment" to the party. They moved into the party before being touched by many of the demands of society—before they had a family or settled career—and after they joined, they quickly surrendered their entire lives to the needs of the organization. It is certainly reasonable to suppose that the unique type of devotion demanded by the party of its leaders is most easily commanded from an individual who became committed to the party goals before becoming encrusted with a whole host of other loyalties and obligations.

In view of the above comments, it might be said that there are two aspects of total commitment to the Communist party: (1) the internalization of the value system of the party by the individual member; (2) the loss of alternatives, once having joined. The internalization of the value system of the party can occur in a variety of social contexts. The child of loyal Communist parents who becomes a "committed" member of the party in a sense has internalized the familial value system which is more or less isomorphic with the value system of the party. The adolescent coming into the party through this avenue is at peace with his family—is not rebellious toward family authority. He is, however, by virtue of his commitment, rebellious toward all of society which is opposed to the goals of the Communist party. The life of Pajetta, reported above, illustrates how an individual can conform to the value system of the primary group, but show extreme rebelliousness toward society. There are other Communist leaders who departed radically from family values and showed rebelliousness toward the primary group. These people found party members with whom to identify and to follow and affiliated with a group outside the family. On the basis of the data available, it can thus be said that some adolescents came into the party having internalized its goals through identification with the family's value system, whereas others came into the party through rebellion against the family's value system. Unfortunately, the data are too limited to provide anything except some context in which speculation can occur about variables which are important in contributing to the different patterns of rebellion-conformity which are observed. The awareness and understanding of the existence of these various patterns in adolescent culture in general provide a problem for the social scientist. In this country there are numerous examples of adolescents who simultaneously show slavish conformity and destructive rebelliousness.

As far as the loss of alternatives is concerned, it should be noted in passing that this loss is so complete and pervading that an individual can never get back to the place where he has a variety of important choices available for him to make. When he becomes a Communist, he closes many doors which can never again be opened—even if he were to leave the party. To be an ex-Communist is very different from never having been a Communist.

There is not enough information available to provide a basis for understanding the psychological motivating forces which promoted early commitment on the part of these individuals. Little is known, for instance, about their early lives. In spite of this, it might be worthwhile to bear in mind some general factors which may shed light on the question and also provide a context for further study. It has been pointed out that the decisions of commitment were made in late adolescence and early adulthood—a time when the strong impulses, conflicts, and rebelliousness that characterize early adolescence are being resolved. It is interesting to note that while commitment to the Communist party meant making peace with one authority (party authority), it made possible continued rebellion against and conflict with extra-party authority.[14] If data were available, a whole new research effort might be devoted to the investigation of the personal needs satisfied by this continued outlet for rebellion.

As mentioned above, the life of a party militant is not an easy one. Not only are the demands of the party severe, but persecution by the larger society may result from membership. This suggests that the motivating forces of the elite are strong—that the needs satisfied by active party membership are deep and pressing.

Although limited data make it inadvisable to carry this discussion much further, it is interesting to speculate on the need systems which might be in operation, the satisfaction of which would be easier and more complete through the Communist party than through the larger society. A person, for example, with a strong dominance-submission need system (i.e., with strong needs both to dominate over others and submit to others) might find more direct satisfaction through the Communist party where he submits to those above him in the organizational hierarchy and dominates those beneath him and where an issue is made of those relationships. A person who, for one reason or another, has a need to be aggressive and fight has more of a rationale for doing so as a member of a militant minority group. The Communist party is one place where these needs may be satisfied.

In summary, then, the process of commitment follows this course: (1) internalization of the party's set of values (either inside or outside of the primary group); (2) affiliation with party members; (3) the loss of alternatives (educational, vocational, social, etc.); (4) consequent reinforcement of the internalization (satisfaction of various needs).

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[14] The role of this type of motivation in the Nazi movement has been mentioned. See, for example, Erik H. Erikson, "Hitler's Imagery and German Youth," *Psychiatry*, Vol. 5, pp. 475–93, esp. pp. 475–80, 486 (Nov., 1942). Erikson characterizes Hitler as " . . . an adolescent who never gave in."

The previous few paragraphs have hypothesized about the possible personality characteristics of the Communist top leadership. This should not be interpreted to mean that any attempt is being made to "psychologize" the problems of the origins and development of the Communist movement. Even if it were experimentally demonstrated that a majority of the people in the Communist party had similar personality structures and need systems, we would not say that the Communist movement is "caused" by the existence of people with given personality patterns and need systems. The causes of great social movements are always too complex to be "explained" in terms of a single variable. The present knowledge in the social sciences suggests that it is most meaningful to conceptualize the problem of the origins of a movement such as communism in terms of the interaction of social forces and pressures and the need systems of different people in various groups in the society. Further speculation along these lines would not be fruitful because of lack of necessary empirical data.

URUGUAY INTRODUCES GOVERNMENT BY COMMITTEE*

MILTON I. VANGER
Harvard University

Of the ten countries in South America, nine now have presidents who are dictators or who at some time during their careers have exercised dictatorial power. The tenth, Uruguay, with its tradition of working democracy, has resisted this trend towards personalist government. Recently it took an important step in the diffusion of executive power when through orderly constitutional reform the national presidency was replaced by a nine-man executive committee. The nation's stability has been attested to by those most cautious of judges, the international investors, who, fearful of trouble in Europe after the outbreak of war in Korea, moved their capital holdings from Berne to Montevideo. The country's democracy has been even more welcomed by those who have found it an oasis of freedom from Perón's police state across the river. Uruguay has successfully met Latin America's ever basic problem, political stability under democratic procedure.

I

Casual visitors who call Uruguay the Switzerland or Denmark of South America probably have in mind its small size; its location between two large states, Brazil and Argentina; its population of merely two and a half million; its pastoral economy, political liberty, social legislation, and government economic activities; and especially its penchant for a Swiss-style pluripersonal executive. Yet at best this comparison is severely out of context.

The rolling natural pastures of the Uruguayan interior are the real basis of the nation's wealth. From the carefully bred livestock that graze them, come the wool, hides, and beef which make up ninety-seven per cent of the country's exports. But Urguayan ranchers have been content with fencing and breeding. Continuous grazing impoverishes the unimproved natural pastures, and unchecked animal diseases take their toll. Production costs continually rise while the livestock population remains constant.[1] And the system has social evils. Families take up valuable land, so ranchers insist on a bachelor life for their few permanent peons. At the crossroads and other no-man's lands, *pueblos de ratas*, or "rat towns," provide gathering places where men, women, and children live in filth and promiscuity.

In contrast, Montevideo, Uruguay's capital and only big city, has the easy-going atmosphere of a prewar European capital. The apparatus of repression, so apparent in nearby Buenos Aires, is absent. The home of almost one-third (approximately 900,000) of the entire national population, the city performs two prime functions: it handles the country's foreign trade and acts as national administrative center. Government employment takes care of an extraordinarily large though imprecisely known number of its people, perhaps 120,000, most of them old-line bureaucrats. In spite of a policy of protection, industrialization—except for food processing—has made limited headway.

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* A twenty-month stay in Uruguay on a fellowship from the Doherty Foundation, personal acquaintance with the leading figures in the reform, and close following of the Montevideo press constitute the background for this article.

[1] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *The Agricultural Development of Uruguay. Report of a Mission Sponsored by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations at the Request of the Government of Uruguay* (Washington, D. C. and Rome, 1951), pp. 2–3.

This typically Latin American combination of an underdeveloped monocultive interior and a large and, in a certain sense, parasitic capital hardly resembles Switzerland or Scandinavia. A much closer resemblance, at least to Scandinavia, appears in the area of public administration. Government bulks large in Uruguayan life. Since the country has a centralized and not a federal system, every-day matters like education and public health are under the national administration. Government functions expanded rapidly during the decade of the First World War, when Uruguay became the Western Hemisphere's pioneer in social legislation. The country had an eight-hour day and a social-security program nearly twenty years before the United States. Simultaneously, the government entered the economic field. Today, government corporations are active in or monopolize such important economic activities as transport, banking, insurance, electric power, and the importation of petroleum.[2] The Great Depression and World War II added to government power in Uruguay as everywhere else. The government now controls the allocation of foreign exchange, so crucial for its export-oriented economy; it subsidizes agriculture; and it participates in collective bargaining.

Democratic politics implies, of course, popular direction of government. Uruguayan politics are democratic. The country's respect for civil liberties is unsurpassed anywhere in the world, political campaigning is free and extensive, elections are honest, and their results are decisive. Yet one party, the Colorado, has been in power since 1865. The explanation of this riddle of democratic politics and indefinite one-party dominance is complex. The Colorado party has changed with the years, allowing new groups to take control. In this century a great and visionary politician, José Batlle y Ordóñez,[3] saved it from defeat and gave it the impress of advanced ideas. Those unwilling to follow the new direction broke off to found new Colorado parties; most of the party stayed with Batlle y Ordóñez to form the Colorado-Batllista party. Although the different Colorado parties have separate organizations, they recognize a common tradition and pool votes at election time by means of ingenious election laws which enable them to retain control of the national executive. These techniques are adequate for normal times, but historically the stress of political crisis determines a more heroic procedure; at such times Colorado dominance has been continued only by giving the traditional opposition Blanco (or Nationalist) party participation in government.[4]

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[2] Simon G. Hanson, *Utopia in Uruguay; Chapters in the Economic History of Uruguay* (New York, 1938), and George Pendle, *Uruguay: South America's First Welfare State* (London and New York, 1952) deal with government economic activities and social legislation.

[3] The best published biography is Roberto B. Guidici and Efraín González Conzi, *Battle y el Batllismo* (Montevideo, 1928).

II

President Andrés Martínez Trueba in his inaugural address on March 1, 1951, touched only briefly on the necessity for constitutional reform. Martínez Trueba was a Batllista, so that his listeners were aware of what he had in mind when he spoke—the *colegiado.* Forty years earlier Batlle y Ordóñez had brought back from Europe plans for a collegiate or pluripersonal executive as his solution for Latin America's ever-present problem of presidential omnipotence. Not until 1917, during the administration of his successor, was he able to get even a modified version of this plan approved by a hostile constituent assembly, and the effort split the Colorado party permanently. From 1919 to 1933 the country was governed by a president who controlled the ministries of war, interior, and foreign affairs, and a nine-man executive which controlled the other agencies. President Terra's coup in 1933 abolished the collegiate executive and restored full powers to the presidency, but the Batllista party survived Terra and won the election of 1946. Its leaders, doubly convinced of the dangers of presidential rule by the hounding they received during Terra's dictatorship, were pledged to institute the plural executive at the earliest opportunity.

While listeners were well aware of what Martínez Trueba meant, the reference to reform in his inaugural address drew little attention. Speculation was centered instead on his surprising victory in the recent November elections, for his candidacy represented the culmination of several years of uncertainty within the Batllista party. Shortly after taking office in 1946, President Tomás Berreta had died; Vice President Luis Batlle Berres, nephew of the late Batlle y Ordóñez, took over. As the new president gathered strength and popularity, he came to challenge his cousins, the three Batlle Pacheco brothers, for leadership of the party. In 1950 the issue came to a head with the nomination of two Batllista presidential candidates. The faction led by President Batlle Berres supported Martínez Trueba; the faction led by the Batlle Pacheco brothers supported the equally respected Cesár Mayo Gutiérrez. The Batlle Berres group considered itself the reforming and advanced sector; it labelled its opposition within the party as old guard. The wing gathered around the Batlle Pacheco brothers rejected any assertion that it was conservative; the brothers themselves were Batlle y Ordóñez's sons; they ran *El Día,* the newspaper he founded, and were in their own right experienced political strategists. Both tickets appealed to the areas of Batllista strength: Montevideo and the towns, and the farmers—though not the ranchers—of the interior. Batlle Berres had heavy support among the working people; *El Día* fared better with the commercial classes.

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[4] For the political history of Uruguay see Juan E. Pivel Devoto, *Historia de los Partidos Políticos en el Uruguay, 1811–1897,* 2 vols. (Montevideo, 1942–1943), and *Uruguay Independiente* (Barcelona, 1949); Alberto Zum Felde, *Evolución Histórica del Uruguay,* 3d ed. (Montevideo, 1945); and Eduardo Acevedo, *Anales Históricos del Uruguay,* 6 vols. (Montevideo, 1933–1936).

In addition to the Batllistas, a third Colorado candidate, Dr. Daniel Blanco Acevedo, was in the field. He united in his support the Independent Colorados, a coalition made up of the remnants of groups that had split with Batlle y Ordóñez and of the political forces growing out of the Terra coup of 1933. Dr. Blanco Acevedo is himself a close relative of the late Dr. Terra, and his supporters ranged from conservative ranchers to moderates of the business and professional classes of Montevideo.

The Colorados had, as usual, agreed to pool votes. The mechanics of vote pooling are relatively simple. The ballot for each party was simply a list headed by the candidate for president and followed by the candidates for the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. The voter would choose the list of his preference and deposit it unmarked in the urn. To determine the presidential candidate, the three Colorado lists would be counted separately, and whichever of the three received the greatest number of votes would have added to its total the votes of the other two. Vote pooling is not used in the legislative elections; here seats are determined by proportional representation among the lists of all parties in the election.[5]

Pitted against the three Colorado candidates was the seventy-seven year old *caudillo*, Dr. Luis Alberto de Herrera, perennial candidate and unquestioned leader of the Nationalist party. Herrera had the *caudillo's* wide-ranging appeal, not only to ranchers but to working people in Montevideo as well. He was handicapped in that the Independent Nationalists did not pool votes with him. This group, mostly Montevideo moderates, had broken with Herrera in 1933 when he supported Terra, and their dissatisfaction with him heightened when he began flirting with Perón. The small parties—Catholic, Socialist, and Communist—stood no chance of winning the election.

Martínez Trueba's victory capped an exciting campaign and came somewhat as a surprise. Batllistas did not usually vote against *El Día*. Martínez Trueba's list received 161,264 votes, that of Mayo Gutiérrez 150,951 votes, and Blanco Acevedo's 120,949 votes. These pooled came to 433,164 votes, enough to defeat Herrera's 254,835 votes, although the *caudillo* as usual was the single candidate with the most votes. The Batllista split was so nearly equal that ultimate control of the party by any one faction was in doubt, and it was this implication that intrigued politicians as they listened to Martínez Trueba's inaugural address.

Whatever others were thinking, the new president rapidly activated his own desire for immediate reform. This too surprised many, since such willingness to give up power is unusual in politicians. Since Martínez Trueba's own party lacked the votes to carry the colegiado through alone, he sounded out Herrera.

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[5] Julio T. Fabregat, *Los Partidos Políticos en la Legislación Uruguaya* (Montevideo, 1949), is a compilation of the pertinent laws.

The *caudillo* agreed, as did Batllista leaders. Closed-door negotiations then took place between an Herrerista committee and a Batllista committee (formed from both wings of the party) in May and June of 1951.

The different political groups negotiated for different reasons. For the Batlle Pachecos of *El Día*, this was a wonderful opportunity. They sincerely believed in the colegiado, as had their father before them. All their experience pointed to the danger of presidential government, and the personal power and possible second presidency of Luis Batlle Berres, who very likely would try to succeed Martínez Trueba, made immediate change greatly to their benefit. The Batlle Berres wing could not be enthusiastic. They had plans for this and the next presidency; there was time enough for change later on. But the colegiado was the core of the party program; they could not cross Martínez Trueba so soon after election, so they too sat in.

Herrera's motives were even more subtle. A one-time member of the old plural executive, he had turned against it in 1933; his party had been against the colegiado ever since. But political consistency on the theoretical level had never been his forte. His own future electoral chances were dubious and he badly needed the support of the Independent Nationalists. He too looked with disfavor upon another term for Batlle Berres. Within his own party there were pullings and haulings for the position of his political heir, and the right constitutional reform could ease this unpleasant problem. It could also give the Nationalist party its time-honored goal: co-participation.

The dispute between co-participation and one-party government is almost as old as Uruguay itself. On the lowest level, it involves simply the apportionment of government employment. On another level, it asserts the necessity of control and supervision of the majority party by the minority party through representation in the government. At different times Colorados have been able to reconcile this kind of minority participation with one-party government, but they insist that policy be made by the majority party. They hold that political parties represent views reflected in distinctive party programs and that only policy makers who are in the majority party and believe in its program can meet the mandate of the voters. The assumption underlying co-participation asserts, contrariwise, that government policy concerns the whole nation; therefore representatives of important minority positions should help formulate it. Since, in fact, co-participation is the political philosophy of the "outs" and one-party government that of the "ins," party rotation in office would reduce the struggle to academic dimensions.

The parties to the secret negotiations finally made public, on August 1, a twelve-page pact to be presented for approval, first to their respective party conventions, and then jointly to the national legislature.[6] The proposals really amounted to drastic amendments to the existing constitution, rather than general reform.[7] The principal innovation abolished the presidency and substituted the National Government Council (*Consejo Nacional de Gobierno*), whose nine members would be elected concurrently for four-year terms. Six seats on the council would go to the most-voted list of the most-voted party or party pool (*lema*)—the same system used for the presidential election—and three to the most-voted list of the *lema* which followed it. The presidency of the council, a purely honorary position, would rotate annually among members of the majority list. No single councilor could issue any orders. Ministers would be appointed by the majority vote of the councilors. An analogous system of plural executives would go into effect in the local governments. Local ballots, which had previously been separate from national ones, would now be combined. This meant that the voter had to vote the straight party ticket for all elective officials.

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[6] Directorio del Partido Nacional, *El Partido Nacional y la Reforma de la Constitución* (Montevideo, 1952), pp. 35–47. This publication contains the discussion of the pact by the Herrerista directorate. The only other important public disclosure of the pact-making process was in a speech by Andrés Martínez Trueba, *El Día* (Montevideo), November 4, 1953.

Very important, because of its political implications, was the proposed system of nomination of the directors of government corporations and similar government organizations. The councilors representing the majority party would name four members of a seven-member board of directors, and the councilors representing the minority party would name three; if the board had only five members, the parties would split three and two. Similar arrangements were proposed for the Supreme Court, the important general accounting tribunal, and the new and potentially powerful administrative tribunal. Budgetary procedure was revised so that the executive would present only one budget for its four-year period. No new government jobs could be created and government wages could not be increased during the twelve months preceding general elections. These last provisions, designed to cut electoral use of the public payroll, were incorporated at the suggestion of President Martínez Trueba.

The negotiators proposed that the new government take office March 1, 1952, to fill out the last three years of Martínez Trueba's term. In the future the council would be elected by popular vote; the first council, however, would be elected by the national legislature, with the majority party members nominating six councilors, and the minority party three. This transitory measure was more important than at first appears, since it meant carrying over the result of the presidential election without re-appeal to the voters. Similarly, of the methods available for constitutional reform, the negotiators chose the one most likely to allow their pact to go through unscathed by what might be unadvantageous revisions: a constitutional law approved by two-thirds majorities of both houses of the legislature, followed by ratification in a public referendum.

Public curiosity was now excited. Just what had the major parties gotten out of the pact? The Batllistas had the colegiado; though their ultimate goal was a plural executive with all nine seats going to the majority party, they compromised, as Batlle y Ordóñez had done in 1917, by giving three seats to the minority. The Herreristas got what they considered co-participation: three seats on the council and extension of the existing practice of giving them representation on government boards of directors. These well-paying jobs and keys to important patronage represented a sizable gain. Both groups profited from provisions limiting vote pools to factions of the "historic parties," thereby denying the benefit of pooling to coalitions of the smaller parties. The single ballot for national and local elections was important to the Batllistas, who were worried about ticket-splitting in Montevideo. There was a similar give and take on other party problems of an immediate nature. To protests that this was an immoral split of political loot, the negotiating parties replied that once approved by the party conventions the pact would be submitted to the legislature where reasonable changes could be made.

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[7] Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "Adoption of a Collegiate Executive in Uruguay," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 14, pp. 616–42 (Nov., 1952), considers that the modifications were sufficiently basic to constitute a new constitution. This article also compares the Swiss and Uruguayan constitutions.

It was at this stage that ex-President Luis Batlle Berres, who had remained silent throughout the negotiations, chose to complicate matters. Speaking at a party meeting in the river town of Paysandú, he first reaffirmed his faith in the colegiado and then expressed his dissatisfaction with the particular reform in progress. He called instead for the popular election of a constituent assembly. Such an assembly would serve a twofold purpose: it would test Herrera's loyalty in carrying out the pact—a loyalty which the speaker doubted —and it would stir up the public enthusiasm necessary for the colegiado's successful existence. The proposed political reforms were inadequate; social and economic reforms would have to be added.[8]

The speech created a furore. If he persisted in this attitude, Batlle Berres would break with Martínez Trueba, repudiate those of his supporters who had helped negotiate the pact, and lay himself open within the party to charges of duplicity. Such a position was politically unfeasible.

When the Batllista convention opened later in August, those who expected fireworks were disappointed. The pact's negotiators explained its provisions. The proposed colegiado was, they insisted, an improvement over the earlier one, since it would not have to divide power with a president. They denied that the new government would mean co-participation; one party would have the absolute majority and this majority would name all the ministers and make all decisions, thereby preserving one-party government. The presence of the minority on the council and on boards of directors would merely assure that no illegal acts took place. They reminded the convention that the late Batlle y Ordóñez himself had accepted the same arrangement in the old colegiado and had considered it one-party government. Only second-line leaders of the Batlle Berres wing spoke in opposition to the pact and even they came around to its support, although with reservations. César Batlle Pacheco, chief strategist of the *El Día* faction, in a strong speech defending the pact, dismissed the argument for a constituent assembly: "A general would be very imprudent if he moved his army through the most dangerous roads when he could conduct it through safer ones."[9] There were roars of approval and the pact was ratified.

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[8] *Acción* (Montevideo), August 16, 1951.

The Nationalist convention which met shortly afterwards was a smaller affair. Herrera's followers long since had adopted the line, "follow the *caudillo* in whatever he does." The *caudillo* now wanted the pact confirmed; the convention responded by unanimously approving it. Even those whose political futures were being darkened by the reform toed the line.

The project now went to the legislature, where promised modifications were forthcoming. Complicated revisions were introduced into the electoral law designed to give one of the majority's seats on the council to the Independent Colorados and one of the minority seats to the Independent Nationalists and so secure the support of these groups for the reform. Sensitive to complaints that the dignity of justice would be impaired by provisions concerning the judiciary, the contracting parties revised the methods for nomination of members of the Supreme Court and other tribunals, but the practical effects on party division of posts were slight. Another change gave the Senate a nominal right of rejection over nominees to the boards of directors of government corporations.

These alterations attracted votes, but the fundamentals of the reform remained. Revisions were decided upon in committee; debate on the floor was for the record. Within two months easy approval was secured.[10] Only one more step, approval by the voters, remained.

The parties now opposing the reform represented a very small part of the electorate; in the presidential elections of 1951 their combined vote was only one-seventh of the total vote. The colegiado itself was not a major issue. Within the opposition, the Civic Union (Catholic) and Socialist parties sympathized with certain types of plural executives, the Communists were indifferent to the question, and only old-guard Independent Colorados detested it. They had broken with Batlle y Ordóñez in 1913 over the issue; they now repudiated Dr. Blanco Acevedo, whose support the reform had won. Theirs was the traditional argument: the colegiado was slow, cumbersome, inefficient, costly, anarchic; furthermore, it gave one-third of the government to the opposition.

The anti-reform forces united behind the slogan, "Vote No Against This Abomination." Claiming that the voters who had elected a president for four years were being victimized by spoils-minded politicans, they asserted that the unspoken motives behind the pact were to resolve the Batlle family struggle and settle Herrera's internal feuds. How could Batllistas and Herreristas, at each other's throats for years, now embrace? The anti-reform forces sneered at what they called the new golden rule of Uruguayan politics: divide the jobs three and two.[11] The entrenched political organizations were, they maintained, trying to write their present predominance into the Constitution against the future. The opposition concluded its attack on the pact by calling on the good sense and common decency of the voters to reject what it considered a colossal affront.

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[9] *El Día*, August 23, 1951.

[10] República Oriental del Uruguay, *Ley Constitucional sancionada el 26 de octubre de 1951, que será sometida a plebiscito de ratificación el 16 de diciembre de 1951* (Montevideo, 1951), pp. 3–94.

[11] *El Diario* (Montevideo), December 15, 1951.

Unity among the parties favoring reform was at best only apparent. Luis Batlle Berres was in Europe leading Uruguay's delegation to the United Nations; his followers made no great effort to hide their distaste for what was transpiring. They attacked Herrera daily. Within the party they repeated their pre-convention strategy: on the basis of their majority in the presidential election, they demanded all five seats available on the coming National Government Council; yet once more they retreated. At nominating time they settled for two seats for their faction, two for *El Día*, and one for Martínez Trueba as a neutral. Dr. Blanco Acevedo had been promised the remaining majority seat, and his contribution to the campaign was a simple and direct, "Vote Yes so that Blanco Acevedo can go to the council." The campaign of the Batlle Berres group was far less direct; it was really designed to encourage abstention or worse. In fact, shortly before election day, they felt compelled to deny publicly that they were working against reform.[12] The *El Día* group worked hard; they called on the faithful to pay their debt to the late Batlle y Ordóñez, end presidential power, and help achieve the Batllista dream, the colegiado. Herrerista leaders were equally anxious to win. This was, for them, the best deal their party and their country had been offered in years. On the stump neither Batllista nor Herrerista speakers were anxious to defend the embarrassing pact; they preferred to call the opposition names.

It was apparent that the pro-reform campaign had not caught fire in Montevideo. The unions were afraid that the new government would weaken their friend Luis Batlle Berres and result in a less sympathetic policy toward organized labor. Students feared that the reform would introduce politics into the national university; formal disavowal by the negotiating parties of any such intent did not fully satisfy their doubts. A sharp drop in wool prices dampened economic activity and produced general discontent. Yet that seven-to-one vote majority of the parties favoring reform made even a close vote seem unlikely.

December 16, the day set for the referendum, was a pleasant summer Sunday. As expected, the vote was light and orderly. That night alarming results began to come over the radio. For those who listened at *El Día* it brought back memories of the colegiado's first defeat, thirty-five years before. Montevideo was voting against the reform. Several hours later bulletins from the interior showed that ratification would squeak through. Tension slacked off, *El Día's* siren announced victory—but in the back of many minds was a vision of dark and evil things narrowly averted.

Montevideo had voted "No" by 32,645 votes; the interior "Yes" by 60,157. Preliminary national totals were 196,025 votes "Yes," 168,513 "No." When challenged votes were added, a total of 429,760 had voted and the final favorable majority was 34,392.[13] Only half as many had voted as in the last presidential election.

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[12] *Acción*, December 15, 1951.

El Día put on the best possible face and interpreted the result as another victory of reason over obscurantism. Herreristas attributed victory to the Nationalist votes from the interior. The joy of Luis Batlle Berres' followers was opén: the electorate had heeded their warnings, and their leader's political fortunes were redeemed. The opponents of ratification were surprised and delighted by the closeness of the outcome. Some even made half-hearted suggestions that the Constitution be disregarded and new general elections held. But such talk died quickly and agreement to respect the vote was general.

It was not clear what the unusual vote implied. Hard times, union and student discontent, and other transient causes had something to do with the outcome. Many attributed all the credit or blame to the equivocal maneuverings of the Batlle Berres group. But the major reason why Montevideo voted "No" was the pact itself. The opposition made skillful use of its less savory features, and its sponsors were hesitant in its defense.

A significant fact coming out of the referendum was that the currents which agitate Montevideo do not carry to the interior. Montevideo is the country's political center where overall decisions are made; the interior's role is largely passive. In the capital the neighborhood political club moves the voters; in the interior it is the local *caudillo*. Interior politics still center on the traditional party symbols, while Montevideo's are more complex. The capital's voters demonstrated independence and a willingness to decide on particular issues. This great loosening of party discipline can develop into a large floating vote and seriously prejudice the supremacy of the traditional parties which the constitutional reform attempts to perpetuate.

III

On March 1, 1952, government by committee was installed. The new government faced a difficult if not crucial situation. Martínez Trueba's year in the presidency had been devoted to seeing the reform through. He had been inactive on other fronts. The post-Korea bonanza wool prices, which capped the Batlle Berres era, had disappeared. The treasury was left with deficits from these free-spending years while current revenues plummeted.

There was some uncertainty whether the national council could successfully confront its problems. Public vote had given it only shaky approval. Its composition, a by-product of the pact, presented possible difficulties. Could the cohesive majority necessary for its functioning be fashioned from one neutral Batllista (Martínez Trueba), two Batllistas from *El Día*, two Batllistas from the Batlle Berres wing, and Blanco Acevedo, an Independent Colorado? Luis Batlle Berres' return from Europe in April heightened the possibility of dissension, especially when he began a campaign of criticism against Martínez

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[13] *Acción*, December 17, 1951; Directorio del Partido Nacional (cited in note 6), p. 14.

Trueba. This development was not surprising, since the Batlle Berres group now had only two-ninths of an executive which they believed belonged to them totally.

Forebodings of serious dissension have not yet materialized; on the whole the council has acted firmly and smoothly. It met its biggest test when it took extraordinary measures and ended a general Montevideo transport strike in September, 1952, acting with more firmness than Martínez Trueba had shown under like circumstances during his term of office. Later, in the face of considerable vocal opposition, it ratified a defense treaty with the United States, and the legislature after some delay concurred.

The council's principal preoccupation throughout its first two years has been meeting the continuing economic difficulties brought on by the wool crisis. It saw through the legislature a budget as austere as political conditions would permit, one of whose provisions limited the filling of vacancies in government employment. It has severely regulated foreign trade by cutting imports and has resisted a more favorable dollar exchange rate for wool exports, with the result that the 1953 commercial balance was favorable after two years of deficit.[14] In addition to retrenchment, the council has attempted a positive economic policy. It has approved and the legislature is considering large-scale electrification expansion and long-range economic development plans in cooperation with the World Bank. A six-year public works program frankly designed to provide needed employment has also been submitted.

The council's economic policy has been both realistic and foresighted, but in the absence of a higher world wool price its immediate results have not been to bring back good times. Hard times lose votes and the election approaches. The council has already felt obliged to approve a rise in old-age pensions and has refused to raise the retail milk price in Montevideo. Similar steps will undoubtedly be taken before 1954 ends.

One definite result of the new government has been to increase the strength of party organization. Since neither the Batllista nor the Herrerista councilors have any large personal followings, they need party support and approval for their acts; this gives the party caucus increased importance. Coincidentally, executive influence over the legislature has been weakened. Political pressure on legislators comes from the party caucus rather than from the councilors. This weakening of the political power of the executive and strengthening of the political party was precisely the intended result of the reform, but it is not an inherent characteristic of the collegiate institution. To win elections the parties will have to put up strong popular candidates who, when elected, may be far less amenable to party discipline than are the members of the present council.

From the very start all of this council's deliberations have been influenced by the coming 1954 elections, when party strength under the new system will be measured for the first time. It was almost inevitable that the old co-participation controversy would become a central issue. Colorado majority cohesion has conserved one-party government in large part. The favorable vote on the defense treaty with the United States was six to three along party lines. In the trying days of the transport strike, and at other times, unanimity and minority assent were sought. This is minority participation in policy making—real co-participation. The increasing political pressures which the election brings make any serious Batllista-Herrerista cooperation difficult. Although the councilors of the Batlle Berres faction have generally voted with their *El Día* brethren, outside the council the Batlle Berres group is already campaigning against a presumed *El Día*-Herrerista control of the government.

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[14] Speech by Eduardo Acevedo Alvarez, Minister of Finance, *El Día*, November 7, 1953.

IV

Subordinate political considerations play a large role in Uruguay. Such concerns are not unique to that country, of course, but some of them are of a special sort. In the United States the development of social security and the merit system have cut much of the vote-delivering power of political organizations. Uruguay has an older social security system and a relatively larger bureaucracy, but these have enhanced the vote-delivering power of political organizations. If an eligible applicant for an old-age pension waits for normal processing, years elapse; presentation of a politician's calling card speeds the pension through. Similarly, political influence is the safest and surest means of advancement in government service. In other countries the social-service state is markedly impersonal, here it is markedly personal. The price Uruguay has to pay for this condition is high: the large and lazy bureaucracy taxes resources, and overstaffing with political appointees has wrecked the earnings and service capacities of once successful government corporations. The price is high in another way: the situation imposes on political leaders a base and discouraging tutelage, and on the voters a reciprocal skepticism—as was so apparent in the process of constitutional reform.

The unusual nature of the recent change is in contrast with the quietness of current politics. Although the country has moved with the times, it is no longer Latin America's social and economic innovator. Actually the Batllista party program has not been revised in almost thirty years; party leadership is divided between the sons and the nephew of the founder. Herrera, seventy-eight years old, has dominated his party for three decades. Even in the smaller parties the pattern is repeated. Uruguayan politics today is dominated by old men and the sons who have inherited their fathers' authority and political views.

The colegiado itself is not exotic to Uruguayans. The idea has been before them for forty years. They have experienced fifteen years of mixed pluripersonal and presidential government. And certainly in the present reform lofty aims have been confused with practical political considerations.

Can government by committee survive? The usual objections are that it is slow, cumbersome, and ineffectual. Not necessarily: a collegiate executive can be firm, as the present government has shown in its decisive handling of the transport strike, while a president can be vacillating. It is true that under the pressure of economic crisis, President Terra overthrew the existing colegiado in 1933 in Uruguay's only twentieth-century deviation from constitutional government. Yet the important cause then was not the council's policy in the face of difficulty, but control of the different branches of government by antagonistic political groups. The current reform fills the needs of the existing political situation. Political shifts in the future are much more likely to produce difficulties for the plural executive than is its own possible ineptness.

A threat to the colegiado could quite likely endanger Uruguay's most compelling success—political stability under democratic procedure. It bears repeating that the country's respect for civil liberties is unsurpassed anywhere in the world, that Uruguayan political campaigning is free and extensive, that elections are honest, and that election results are decisive. Even the devious maneuverings of politicians are the offshoots of democratic politics, since they spring from the necessity of securing ultimate public approval. Among the complex bases of Uruguay's political stability, one seems cardinal: there is not so great a difference between the political parties that they cannot abide by the results of an election. This fact must be properly appreciated. It does not mean identity of interests or merely personal politics. These last years have been heavily political so that personal differences have come to the forefront. In addition, however, certain general ideological tendencies can be discerned. Batllistas are sympathetic to government intervention, Herreristas tend to defend ranchers' interests; Batllistas favor freethinking, Herreristas do not; Batllistas, and indeed all Colorados, are pro-American, Herreristas are pro-Argentine; Batllistas emphasize comprehensive party organization, Herreristas have a much looser organizational framework. These are discernible tendencies; they are not always formalized in campaign platforms. Americans sometimes seem to expect politics in other countries to be highly rigid both ideologically and socially, forgetting the essential ambiguousness of the American party system. Uruguayan political parties resemble their American counterparts in that they try to make the broadest possible appeal without neglecting the interests of their long-time supporters.

Latent threats to Uruguay's stability can always be suggested. Some say that a demagogue could gather strength with the unions and emulate Perón. But Montevideo's limited industry provides too small a proletariat to support such a movement, even if the unions so desired. It is true that rural workers are exploited, but so far they are content with the old parties. If Montevideo's floating independent vote should solidify into new political molds, it would pose a problem for the existing electoral system. But such a new force would more likely be a stabilizing and democratic element whose demands could be met through constitutional reform. Serious realignments within the traditional parties would pose the greatest threat, but there is much precedent for compromise and solution. There is every chance that the country's orderly development will continue.

For the short run all eyes are on this November's election. Within the Batllista party, jockeying for this crucial vote has long been underway. The Batlle Berres faction wants separate lists for its candidates and those of *El Día*, in a win-or-lose struggle for all the council seats available. It refuses to take responsibility for the acts of the present government and is attempting to rally the Independent Colorados to its side by calling for an eventual all-Colorado colegiado. *El Día* is quite satisfied with the present collegiate arrangement and demands that the Batlle Berres group either support or leave the government. It calls on all Batllistas to unite around the true principles of the party in opposition to the personalist leadership of Luis Batlle Berres.[15] It therefore resists separate lists in favor of a joint list including both factions and neutrals. Either separate lists, a joint list, or some form of proportional representation can be reconciled with the electoral system. On the basis of the past, some compromise whereby both factions are represented on the council would be the most likely outcome. Among the Herreristas, agitation is even greater, if possible. The struggle over succession which the *caudillo* hoped had been submerged by the reform has broken loose. There will be two Herrerista lists, one with and one without the blessing of Herrera.

The campaign promises to be intense and bitter, with a Batllista victory its generally expected outcome. Because of the struggle for votes within the parties, it appears likely that Herrera, Cesâr Batlle Pacheco, and Luis Batlle Berres will head electoral lists and have places in the next government. If so, this will present the colegiado with its greatest challenge and its greatest opportunity. It will be challenged to produce a working government with the country's three most powerful political leaders daily facing each other across the table. It will be an opportunity for the best and most experienced leadership the country can offer to transcend squabbles and to continue political stability under democratic procedure; and, through revitalizing the country's bureaucracy, increasing basic production, extending social justice to the rural poor, and extending production and social justice in the capital as well, to progress toward a richer life for all Uruguayans.

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[15] *El Día*, February 2, 1954.

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ARTICLE

NOTES ON LITERATURE AVAILABLE FOR THE STUDY OF COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

I. COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATION—AN EMERGENT FIELD

American interest in public administration abroad began with a concern for improving American administration. This resulted in comparisons between American and foreign practice, usually in favor of the latter, and in recommendations for the importation of this or that institution from abroad. Dorman B. Eaton's *Civil Service in Great Britain: A History of Abuses and Reforms and Their Bearing upon American Politics* (New York, Harper, 1880) is a classic of this literature. Abounding in value judgments, it mixes exhortation and prescription with descriptive material. Administrative institutions were viewed as discrete objects which could be imported upon demand, little attention being paid to the environmental factors which conditioned the development of an institution in its original home or to the limitations upon and possible effects of its introduction into a new environment.

At a later stage, students of comparative administration devoted themselves largely to describing the various systems—generally European, or at least Western—and to noting similarities and differences in respect to institutions and behavior.

The responsibilities and aspirations of occupation government in Germany, Japan, and elsewhere, the follow-through on economic and military foreign aid, and the development of technical assistance programs—especially in public administration—have all brought to the fore the problem of which ideas or institutions derived from American administrative experience may appropriately be transferred to other countries. Thus William C. Colman, in his "Civil Service Reform in Greece," *Public Personnel Review*, Vol. 10, pp. 86–93 (April, 1949), discusses some of the difficulties in this connection encountered by American advisers in Greece. The interdependence of administrative institutions and behavior with their cultural, economic, and political context has become apparent and has necessitated a revision of old working assumptions.

The contemporary outlook on comparative administration is also influenced by the injection of the new insights of the behavioral sciences into administrative theory. The question is raised whether "principles" of administration developed in the American context have any general validity or whether they merely describe administrative institutions and practices in one country. At the same time the separation of the study of administration from that of political processes has been challenged, decision making in the executive branch of our government has been subjected to intensive scrutiny, and many traditional conclusions of administrative theory have been questioned. All this has led to the notion that comparative analysis can be used to check the ideas and hypotheses derived from study of American public administration, furnish new insights into the nature of administrative behavior, and assist in overcoming the ethnocentrism of much of the existing literature in this field.

Three recent studies give some idea of how much progress has been made and what needs to be done next. A subcommittee of the Committee on Public Administration of the American Political Science Association, under the chairmanship of Professor Walter Sharp of Yale University, gave some attention to this problem. The subcommittee's unpublished report to the Association in September, 1953 included a preliminary checklist of research areas and priorities, an outline of a suggested method of study of comparative administration, a discussion of a possible conceptual framework, and proposals for a pilot research project to initiate more intensive study in this field.

Another document showing current interests in comparative administration research is the report of a Conference on Comparative Administration convened by Public Administration Clearing House, Princeton, N.J., Sept. 12–14, 1952 (published as *Report of a Conference on Comparative Administration*). Annex VI of this report, a 10-page memorandum entitled "Samples of Foreign Publications on Comparative Administration," illustrates some of the main categories of material available for comparative study. Annex IX is a reprint of a "Report on Non-Government Research on Comparative Administration," by the Department of State, External Research Staff. This includes, in addition to an analysis of current research in the field, a list of research projects underway on administrative subjects in countries receiving Point Four aid.

A parallel line of inquiry is reflected in the article "Research in Comparative Politics," this REVIEW, Vol. 43, pp. 641–75 (Sept., 1953), which reports the findings of the Social Science Research Council Interuniversity Research Seminar on Comparative Politics held at Northwestern University in the summer of 1952. This report discusses some of the conceptual problems of conducting comparative studies of the whole range of political problems, including those of administration.

II. COMPARATIVE MATERIALS

In this review of the literature on comparative and foreign materials, the major bibliographical sources are listed, together with a number of individual works selected, for the most part, because they use a comparative approach or are not included in existing bibliographies. The sources cited relate mainly to administration at the national or central government level. Limitations of space dictate omission of references to the substantial body of comparative literature on local government and municipal administration. The listing of materials in English is more complete than that of materials in other languages, but samples of the foreign language material have been cited to give some idea of its extent and character.

Bibliographies. There are a few bibliographies on the literature available for the study of comparative administration. *A Short International Bibliography of Public Administration* (UN, Sales No. 1953. II. H.1) brings together titles on public administration from 24 countries in 8 languages and suggests the subject matter of public administration through selective listing of representative current materials. A mimeographed 50-page list by Professor Lynton K. Caldwell entitled *Comparative Public Administration: An Outline of Topics and Readings* (Albany, New York, Graduate Program in Public Administration, 1953) lists literature, largely in English, on a variety of public service systems outside the United States. (This bibliography is now out of print.)

The U.S. Technical Cooperation Administration issued, in July, 1953, a mimeographed *Selected Bibliography for Public Administration Representatives* which, while it lists mainly American works on public administration, includes a section on "Comparative Administration and Public Administration in Individual Countries" and a valuable listing of materials under the heading "Technical Assistance in Public Administration." The latter may be supplemented by *Standards and Techniques of Public Administration with Special Reference to Technical Assistance for Underdeveloped Countries* (UN, TAA, Special Committee on Public Administration Problems, N.Y., 1951. Sales No. 1951. II. B.7). This is intended as a tool for practitioners in underdeveloped countries, but it includes some conceptual analysis based upon the thinking of an international team.

Bibliographical notes appear in many journals of political science and public administration, as in the section on Book Notes and Bibliography, "Foreign and Comparative Government," in this REVIEW. The *Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives* [*RISA*] (Brussels, International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 1928-date) is a quarterly journal of international scope that has included bibliographical listings and comment. Its coverage is best on Western Europe and the United Kingdom, although other parts of the world are not completely neglected. Major categories include administrative law and organization, public service and fiscal administration, and program fields such as police administration, public health, social security, labor, and transport and communications. In the first years of publication materials were classified by country under each major subject heading. Later the subarrangement by country was abandoned, and since 1950 the comprehensive current bibliographies have been dropped from the *RISA*, although reviews and annotations of selected titles have been retained.

The International Institute commenced in 1953, on behalf of the United Nations and the U.S. Foreign Operations Administration, the publication of a bimonthly bulletin called *Progress in Public Administration*, dealing especially with administration in the economically less-developed countries. It gives current bibliographical information. Useful also are *International Political Science Abstracts*, issued quarterly by the International Political Science Association with support from UNESCO (N.Y., Columbia University Press).

The *Statesman's Year-Book* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1934-date) contains not only information about the government of every country in the world, but also a selected bibliography for each country section. These bibliographies generally include major public documents and reference works, and often cite other bibliographies concerning the country.

Some international bibliographies dealing with special subject fields are useful for comparative studies. An example is the *Selected List of Books, Pamphlets and Periodicals in English on Community Organization and Development* (UN, Doc. No. ST/SOA/Ser.0/5, March 1953). This bibliography includes descriptions of development and planning projects in non-Western as well as Western countries. The *Revue de l'Institut International de Statistique* (The Hague, 1933-, quarterly) includes a "Bibliographie statistique internationale" in each issue. Materials in the housing and planning field may be located through the *News Sheet* of the International Federation of Housing and Town Planning (The Hague). A list of works on federalism is given in E. Monpied and E. Zaleski, *Bibliographie fédéraliste* (Paris, l'Union, 1950). Information about other such specialized bibliographies may be obtained from Constance M. Winchell, *Guide to Reference Books* (Chicago, American Library Association, 1951).

American publications dealing with specialized fields frequently list works on foreign countries. For example, the U. S. Civil Service Commission Library issues a monthly annotated bibliography entitled *Personnel Literature* which includes a section on "Foreign Civil Service." Similar listings may be found in the journals and periodicals in many specialized fields.

Bibliographies listing works on administration in specific regions or countries are mentioned below in the sections dealing with the various geographic areas.

General Studies. The use of an analytical comparative method for public administration studies is still limited. There are some books of readings and collections of essays which treat administrative institutions in several countries. Often the introduction, and some comments in the body of the text, draw attention to similarities and differences among the administrative arrangements of the countries concerned, but the mere collection in one volume of descriptive essays about different systems cannot be considered a comparative method, although it provides a foundation for comparisons. A book such as *Administration: The Art and Science of Organization and Management,* ed. Albert Lepawsky (New York, Knopf, 1949), drawing as it does on a wide variety of sources, provides good material for comparative study.

Some of the books on politics and government have made use of a comparative method, and have included sections dealing with administrative problems. Examples are Herman Finer, *The Theory and Practice of Modern Government with Special Reference to Great Britain, France, Germany and the U.S.A.* (N.Y., Holt, 1949) and C. J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston, Ginn, rev. ed., 1950).

An essay that illustrates some of the possible fruits of comparative study is S. E. Finer, "Patronage and the Public Service; Jeffersonian Bureaucracy and the British Tradition," *Public Administration* [London], Vol. 30, pp. 329–60 (Winter, 1950). This article, stimulated by a reading of Leonard D. White's *The Federalists* and *The Jeffersonians,* makes some provocative comparisons of the evolution of the patronage system in nineteenth-century Britain and in the United States.

Aspects of Administration. In the literature on the various aspects of administration, such as public personnel, finance and budgeting, and program planning and coordination, there are works which deal with the subject in different countries and at different times. Thus considerable descriptive material about foreign public personnel administration is available. A classic example of this approach is the book by Leonard D. White and others, *Civil Service Abroad: Great Britain, Canada, France, Germany* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1935) and the earlier collection of public documents from 15 countries, edited by White, *The Civil Service in the Modern State* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1930). *Reader in Bureaucracy,* ed. Robert K. Merton (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1952), contains a collection of materials on different aspects of the civil service drawn from a variety of countries.

Historical accounts of civil service systems also provide background for comparative analysis, as for example Ernest Barker, *The Development of Public Services in Western Europe, 1660–1930* (London, Oxford, 1944); M. Cary, "The Civil Service in Ancient Civilizations," in *The Development of the Civil Service* (London, King, 1922); and J. H. Hofmeyer, "Civil Service in Ancient Times," *Public Administration* [London], Vol. 5, pp. 76–93 (Jan., 1927). In some general histories the civil service is given considerable attention, as for example in the Cambridge Ancient History (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1923, 12 vols.).

Several contemporary civil service systems are discussed in *Report on the UN Seminar on Public Personnel Management* (UN, Doc. ST/TAA/Conf. 1/1, 31 Jan. 1952). This 236-page document contains statements by practicing administrators about the civil service in Pakistan, the Philippines, Israel, Denmark, Norway, and France in addition to general discussion by participants on various problems raised in papers by American experts. Much of the material prepared for this seminar, somewhat revised, appears in the July, 1951 issue of *Personnel Administration* (Washington, D.C., Society for Personnel Administration). Among essays comparing aspects of public service administration in two countries may be mentioned Leon D. Epstein, "Political Sterilization of Civil Servants: The United States and Great Britain," *Public Administration Review,* Vol. 10, pp. 281–90 (Autumn, 1950).

In the organization and management field, a series published by the International Institute of Administrative Sciences for the United Nations includes a survey of problems encountered by different governments in attempting to improve organization and management prepared by Thomas D. Kingdom, *Improvement of Organization and Management in Public Administration* (Brussels, 1951); and a study of the organizational setting of O & M offices by Arnold Miles, *Central O & M Offices; What They Do and Where They Are* (*Brussels,* 1951).

A study of the development of planning in European and American governments, sponsored by the Public Administration Clearing House, is Sir Henry N. Bunbury, *Governmental Planning Machinery: A Comparative Study* (Chicago, Public Administration Service, 1938). On regional plans, a comparative study carried out by the International Geographic Union, Commission for the Study of Regional Planning, has been published as *L'aménagement de l'espace; planification régionale et géographic (en Italie, Belgique, Grande-Bretagne, Venezuela)* (Paris, Colin, 1952).

Public finance and budget and fiscal administration are the subjects of recent comparative studies. For example, *Budgetary Structure and Classification of Government Accounts* (UN, Doc. no. 1951, XVI.3, 1951), prepared by the U.N. Department of Economic Affairs, sets forth general ideas on "good practice" and adds an appendix in which the budget systems of four countries—Italy, Sweden, the U.S., and the U.S.S.R.—are described. A similar method is followed in *Government Accounting and Budget Execution* (UN, Doc. no. ST/ECA/16, 1952). There is also a useful report of an international conference, with materials on some ten countries, in the U.N. Fiscal Commission, *Report on the Technical Assistance Conference on Comparative Fiscal Administration* (UN, N.Y., Doc. no. E/CN.8/67, 5 Dec. 1952).

A comparative study by an international non-governmental organization is Institut International de Finances Publiques, *Le budget dans le cadre de l'économie nationale; L'évolution de la structure et de la technique budgétaire dans les différents pays* (Paris, Sirey, 1950). Other private studies are: Emanuele Morselli, "On the Historiography of Thought on Public Finance," *Public Finance*, Vol. 6, pp. 53–80 (1951); and F. Neumark, "National Types of Public Finance," *Openbare Financien* [Public Finance], Vol. 2, pp. 18–38 (1947). A study prepared for the New York State Tax Commission is J. Wilner Sundelson, *Budgetary Methods in National and State Governments* (Albany, 1938).

Substantive Fields. Though studies in substantive fields are generally concerned largely with technical problems, some deal with common aspects of administration. For social welfare administration, for example, the United Nations has conducted an extensive inquiry resulting in the publication of *Methods of Social Welfare Administration* (UN, Doc. no. 1950. IV.10, 1950). This document gives the replies from 30 countries to a questionnaire. The replies are followed by a brief summary. Subsequent studies dealing with special aspects of this subject are found in a series on *Social Services: Planning, Organization and Administration for Social Welfare.* These include *In-Service Training in Social Welfare* (UN, Doc. E/CN.5/261, 1952) and *Methods of Administering Assistance to the Needy* (UN, Doc. CE/CN.5/273, 1952).

In the educational field an older study by the International Bureau of Education is entitled *L'organisation de l'instruction publique dans 53 pays* (Geneva, 1931). A recent comparative study on the administration of economic development, an IIAS document, by Donald C. Stone and others, is entitled *National Organization for the Conduct of Economic Development Programs* (Brussels, IIAS, 1954). The material is arranged topically and the experience of different countries is used in the presentation.

The administration of foreign affairs and relations with international organizations has been of interest to UNESCO which, with the help of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences and the guidance of Walter R. Sharp, prepared a document entitled *National Administration and International*

Organization: A Comparative Study of Fourteen Countries (Brussels, IIAS, 1951). A similar study on the administrative problems of "newly independent countries" in the international field is now being conducted by UNESCO.

III. STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATION IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

If comparative studies in public administration are to advance, much information about different administrative systems will be needed. The accumulation of such information is not in itself comparative research, but it provides the foundation for comparison. It may well be that before much significant comparative work can be done, many gaps in our knowledge of administrative systems will have to be filled. To discover what is already known and what the gaps are it is necessary to survey the available literature. The remainder of this article, therefore, seeks to provide keys to this literature. Where the literature is adequately covered in available bibliographies, these only are cited, and no effort is made to cover individual works. This applies to Europe, Latin America, and the English-speaking countries of the Commonwealth of Nations. For other areas (Asia, Africa, the Pacific and the Caribbean), a more complete listing is given. Available bibliographies are mentioned, however, and the listing of individual works is necessarily selective.

United Kingdom. The literature on public administration in the United Kingdom is perhaps the most highly developed outside the United States, and is certainly the most accessible to American students. The journal of the Institute of Public Administration, *Public Administration* (London, 1923–) is widely available in the United States. Its regular book notes provide a convenient index to British publications in this field. The English materials are particularly strong on certain topics—the civil service, local government, administration of nationalized industries, various substantive fields, administrative law, and the machinery of government in a parliamentary system; the English have not, however, developed certain types of literature that are popular here, notably the general textbook on public administration.

A general bibliography, entitled *Public Administration* (London, H.M.S.O., 1950), has been prepared by the Organization and Methods Division of the Treasury. Another list is M. Plan, "Public Administration: A Guide to British Publications" (*British Book News*, Feb., 1951, No. 126, pp. 83–90). A guide to research on public administration in progress in the United Kingdom is provided in the Institute of Public Administration's *Survey of Research in Progress in the Universities into Public Administration and Allied Fields* (London, I.P.A., 1951–). The major works on public administration in the United Kingdom are listed in the UN's *Short International Bibliography* (cited above) under the various topical headings. Caldwell's bibliography, *Comparative Public Administration* (cited above) gives an extensive list of works on the British Civil Service. A first-rate journal in the organization and methods field is the monthly *O&M Bulletin* published in London by H. M. Treasury, O&M Division.

Dominions, English-speaking. In the dominions, the Canadians have produced the most extensive literature on public administration. The Institute of

Public Administration of Canada (Philip T. Clark, Secretary, 256 Roxborough St., Toronto 5, Ontario) issues a *Newsletter* and has published the proceedings of its annual conferences since 1949. These volumes provide an introduction to the major personalities interested in public administration in Canada and afford glimpses of different aspects of Canadian administration. The Institute has also mimeographed a *Bibliography of Public Administration for Canadian Students*, prepared by Rodney Grey. This is a selective list but it includes the main works on Canadian administration. Useful also is Caldwell's bibliography (pp. 22–24). Another source is the *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* (Toronto, Canadian Political Science Assn., 1935–).

The Australian regional groups of the Institute of Public Administration publish a journal, *Public Administration* (Sydney, 1938–), which should be consulted first by anyone studying Australian administration. Unfortunately this journal fails to give much bibliographical data and its book notes usually deal with foreign, especially British, rather than Australian materials. The Australian Public Service Commission also publishes a journal called *Public Service.*

The *New Zealand Journal of Public Administration* (Wellington, New Zealand Institute of Public Administration, 1938–), is the best source of bibliographic information for the study of this dominion's administration. The New Zealand Public Service Commission has also published since 1948 a monthly magazine, *Staff Training*, which has recently been combined with the *New Zealand O & M Review* to form a new publication, called *Public Service.*

For the Union of South Africa, the *Public Servant,* organ of the Public Servants' Association, Pretoria, is a convenient guide to the relatively sparse literature on public administration in the Union.

Western Europe: General. No general bibliography for Western Europe is available, although lists for individual countries have been published. The *Revue International des Sciences Administratives* provides general documentation for the area. It is particularly strong for France, Germany, and Belgium, with fewer listings for other countries of the continent. The study of administrative law has been pursued with notable success and there is a large body of literature in this field. Works on public finance are particularly strong in Italy. The study of administrative practices, on a rather technical scientific management level, has resulted in a substantial body of literature. There is also a great deal of writing on constitutional systems and general governmental problems.

Two European journals of special value as guides to current literature are the *Bulletin d'Information Bibliographique et Documentaire Recherches* (Strasbourg, France, Council of Europe, Documentation Centre,) and the *Cahiers de Bruges*, published by the College of Europe at Bruges, Belgium.

Many of the works on comparative government give convenient bibliographic notes. One of the latest, *European Political Systems,* ed. Taylor Cole (New York, Knopf, 1953), includes unusually full bibliographies, often annotated, for the countries covered.

France. A comprehensive view of French literature in public administration may be obtained through the files of *La Revue Administrative* (Paris, Sirey), a bimonthly independent journal which contains full bibliographical notes and substantive articles. This journal carries a regular column on foreign administration which sometimes has materials useful for comparative study. The major works on French administration are listed in the UN *Short International Bibliography* (cited above).

The French literature on the civil service is listed in H. Puget, *Bibliographie de la fonction publique et du personnel civil des administrations publiques* (Paris, Domat-Montchrestien, 1948). More recent studies are listed by Caldwell.

Germany. Since the Hitlerian and World War II interregnum, interest in public administration has revived. Among the journals that have reappeared since the war and which may be looked to for guidance in the German literature are: *Offentliche Verwaltung* (Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1948–); *Der Städtetag* (Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1948–); and *Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt* (Berlin-Charlottenburg, Heymanns). Several German societies and institutes are now concerned with administrative problems. An example is the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Personalwesen, with headquarters in Frankfurt, organized in 1949. It has issued several monographs on various aspects of personnel administration in Germany, is publishing a series of studies of the public service in different countries, including France, Great Britain, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, and the United States, and puts out a monthly newsletter called *DGP Informationen.* Caldwell and the UN list should also be consulted for German titles.

Scandinavia and Benelux. The Scandinavian Association for Public Administration's journal, *Nordisk Administrativt Tidsskrift* (Copenhagen), gives bibliographic information about current Scandinavian publications, emphasizing administrative law materials.

The Belgian and Dutch literature, also strongest on administrative law, is largely covered by the *Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives.* A selective bibliography is included in Paul de Visscher, "The Study of Governmental Institutions in Belgium," *International Social Science Bulletin,* Vol. 2, pp. 40–46 (Spring, 1950). A recent mimeographed list of civil service materials by Edmond-Pierre Seeldrayers, editor of the *Revue Internationale* and a professor at the University of Brussels, is entitled "Bibliographie sur la fonction publique en Belgique" (Brussels, n.d.). A Belgian journal is the *Revue de l'Adminstration et du Droit Administratif de la Belgique* (Brussels, Dioncre).

Spain. An ambitious undertaking, begun in 1950, is the *Revista de Administración Pública,* published by the Institute de Estudios Politicos in Madrid. In addition to articles about Spanish administration, heavily weighted with legal materials, this journal includes bibliographic information about Spanish and Portuguese publications, as well as some references to Latin American materials.

U.S.S.R. The study of administrative institutions and behavior in the Soviet Union and countries under Communist party control presents peculiar difficulties. No effort is made to cover this field here. Professor John Hazard at Columbia University, who offers a course on Soviet administration in the program of the Russian Institute, has compiled bibliographic data on both Russian and English language materials which he has included in syllabi and in published writings. "L'enseignement du Droit Administratif en U.R.S.S.," *Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives,* Vol. 17, pp. 80–86 (1951), gives information about Soviet works on administrative law. The major text used in Russia appears to be I. I. Jewtichiew and W. A. Wlasow, *Administrative Law of the U.S.S.R.* [trans. title] (Moscow, 1946). A general discussion of the subject is contained in Merle Fainsod, "Recent Developments in Soviet Public Administration," *Journal of Politics,* Vol. 11, pp. 679–714 (Nov., 1949). Attention is called also to Fainsod's recent book, *How Russia is Ruled* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1953), reviewed in this issue of this REVIEW (pp. 541–44). Part III, especially ch. 12, is important for Soviet administration.

Latin America. Three selected bibliographies on public administration in Latin America were mimeographed in 1953. One of them, UN Library, *Selected References in Public Administration in Latin America* (1952, 7 pp.) covers materials—particularly on administrative law—in Spanish, Portuguese, and English arranged by country. The other two lists were prepared by the Pan-American Union and by the Division of O & M of Puerto Rico, and were published by the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, Dept. of State, Washington D.C. Both have the title *Selected References on Public Administration in Latin America* and were issued in 1953. The administrative law materials are omitted from the Puerto Rican list, which is arranged topically. The PAU list gives Spanish works first, then Portuguese, both parts being subdivided by subject.

In Brazil the Departamento Administrativo do Servico Publico (DASP) publishes a monthly journal called *Revista do Servico Publico.* DASP is a prolific publisher of reports and monographs dealing with various aspects of Brazilian administration and the *Revista* usually includes, besides substantive articles, some bibliographical information, especially about Brazilian publications. Another Brazilian journal is the *Revista de Administração,* published by the Institute of Administration of the University of São Paulo.

It is expected that the new Brazilian Institute of Administration of the Gétulio Vargas Foundation will shortly produce important contributions to the Latin American literature. A comprehensive program of publications intended as teaching aids and covering all major aspects of administration has been announced.

The Islamic World. No bibliography of public administration materials for any Islamic country yet exists. The Committee on Near Eastern Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies, however, has recently compiled a *Selected and Annotated Bibliography of Books and Periodicals in Western Languages dealing with the Near and Middle East. . .* (Washington, D.C., Middle East Institute, 1952). This includes references to some studies that provide background information on government and law.

The analysis of administrative institutions in classical and medieval times in the Middle East should illuminate by contrast contemporary administrative institutions. It is an ironic reversal of roles that when the Ottoman Empire was at its height a European diplomatist, Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, after an extended tour of duty in the Sublime Porte, wrote a series of letters advocating that the merit system and training for public service, as practiced by the Turks, be substituted for the ineffective patronage systems which prevailed in Western Europe in his day. De Busbecq's *Turkish Letters* have appeared in many texts, the latest being the Oxford edition, 1927, with a translation by Edward S. Forster.

Some glimpses of Ottoman administration may be gleaned from Sari Mehmed Pasha, *Ottoman Statecraft: the Book of Counsel for Veziers and Governors* (English and Turkish texts, with an introduction by W. L. Wright, Jr., Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1935). A general view of the Ottoman system is presented in Albert H. Lybyer, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1913). More detailed information about the training system for Ottoman administrators is contained in Barnette Miller, *The Palace School of Muhammad the Conqueror* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1941).

Details about the administration of other Islamic countries are less available. Information about Persian administration under the Safavids in the 18th century, however, may be found in the *Tadhkirat al-Muluk*, trans. V. Minorsky (London, Luzac and Co., 1943), a manual for administrators of the day.

On the contemporary scene, the School of Political Science in Ankara has published a series of monographs in Turkish dealing with various political problems. It also issues a review entitled *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi.* More recently the Public Administration Institute has been set up in Ankara with assistance from the United Nations. This Institute is establishing a research section which plans to prepare and publish studies of public administration in Turkey. The *Report of the Working Group on the Institute for Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East* (UN, N.Y. Doc. no. ST/TAA/M.2, 10 June 1953) is of interest not only because of the specific plans proposed but also because of its analysis of Turkish training needs.

A Department of Public Administration has been established at the American University of Beirut, with aid from the U.S. Point Four program. It is expected that this Department will also sponsor the publication of studies of administration in the Middle East.

The literature in Western languages on administration in Arab countries is extremely sparse. Majid Khadduri published a pamphlet in Baghdad in 1944 entitled *Government in Iraq.* This material is now included in his book, *Independent Iraq* (London, Oxford University Press, 1951). A substantial work on Lebanese constitutional organization is Pierre Rondot, *Les Institutions Politiques du Liban* (Paris, Meisonneuve 1947, published by the Institut d'étude de l'orient contemporain). For Egypt, an administrative law study is G. Watrin, *Le Conseil d'État Égyptien* (Paris, Conseil d'État, Études et Documents, 1948).

Two recent articles that shed some light on the problems of teaching public administration in the Middle East are Paul Beckett and Frederick Bent, "Letters from Beirut," *Public Administration Review,* Vol. 13, pp. 1–11 (Winter, 1953), and R. Montagne, "The Teaching of Democracy in Islamic Countries," *Journal of African Administration,* Vol. 4, pp. 58–62 (April, 1952).

A discussion of administrative problems in the context of economic development is included, generally, in the reports of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Two Islamic countries are included in this series: *The Economy of Turkey* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1951) and *The Economic Development of Iraq* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1952). In this connection see also James W. Martin and Frank C. E. Cush, *Administration of the Turkish Ministry of Finance* (Ankara, Ministry of Finance, 1951). Material on financial administration in some other Islamic countries may be found in U. N. Fiscal Division, *Public Finance Information Papers, Egypt* (UN, Sales No. 1951. XVI. 7), *Iran* (UN, Sales No. 1951. XVI. 4), and *Iraq* (UN, Sales No. 1951. XVI. 6).

Israel. A quarterly journal in Hebrew dealing with public administration is *Haminhal,* published by the Israel Institute of Public Administration in Tel Aviv and edited by The Hon. Edwin Samuel. Much of this journal deals with principles of administration based on foreign experience, but a few articles deal with administrative problems in Israel.

An annual *Government Yearbook* in English (Jerusalem, Government Printers) gives information about the activities of all official agencies, as well as material relevant for administrative analysis, such as statistics on government employees. A general evaluation of the work of the government, including appraisals of organization and methods, is contained in the *Annual Report* of the Comptroller General (in Hebrew). Parts of Vol. 3 (Jerusalem, Tevet, 5713, December, 1952), dealing particularly with questions of control, audit, local government, corporations, and the O & M Unit in the Comptroller's office, have been translated into English. The first two volumes have not been made available for public sale. The annual reports of the Civil Service Commission, in Hebrew, give information on problems of personnel.

A general description of the Israeli government, in Hebrew, with much attention to constitutional problems, is Yehoshua Freudenheim, *Hashilton Bimedinat Israel* [*Government in the State of Israel*] (Jerusalem, Rubin Mass, 1953). The first discussion of administrative law in Israel is a lecture by Z. Silbiger in a volume of papers published by the Training Division of the Civil Service Commission, *Sidrei Shilton Umishpat Be-Israel* [*Government and Law in Israel*] (Jerusalem, 1953). The first Hebrew textbook in public administration, by Benjamin Akzin, Dean of the Law School and Chairman of the Department of Government of the Hebrew University, is called *Ikkarei Haminhal Hatziburi* [*Principles of Public Administration*] (Tel Aviv, Dirr, 1952). This work outlines the traditional principles of administration, and gives a few examples from Israeli experience. Another general work is Edwin Samuel's *The Theory of Administration* (Jerusalem, Rubin Mass, 1947).

A few short articles have appeared dealing with specific phases of administration. Edwin Samuel is the author of "The Administrative Problems of a New State—Israel, 1948–51," *Public Administration Review,* Vol. 11, pp. 229–32

(Autumn, 1951) and "Israel's Administrative Problems," *Zionist Quarterly,* Vol. 1 (Winter, 1952). Another article, by Sidney Mailick, is "Organization for Personnel Management in Israel," *Public Personnel Review,* Vol. 13, pp. 28–35 (Jan., 1952). A description of the work of the Institute of Public Administration in Israel by M. Hacohen appears in the report of the UN Seminar on Personnel Administration, pp. 187–90, and is expanded in "The Institute of Public Administration in Israel," *Personnel Administration,* July, 1951, pp. 31–37. A recent advisory report, under F.O.A. auspices, is John Corcoran, *A Program for Strengthening Public Administration in Israel* (Chicago, Public Administration Service, 1953). A *Report on Training of the Civil Service of Israel* (UN, Sales No. 1953.II.H.&.) was prepared by O. E. Ault of the Canadian Civil Service Commission, who visited Israel as an adviser on civil service problems under the auspices of the UN Technical Assistance Administration.

India. The study of Indian administration in ancient and medieval times should bring into sharp relief some of the variations in public administration that may be attributed to cultural differences. An ancient Indian work, about the third century, B.C., is Kautilya's *Arthasastra,* trans. R. Shamasastry (Mysore, Raghuveer, 4th ed., 1951). This volume of advice to kings covers a wide range of topics, such as appointment of officials, establishment of espionage, taxation, arbitration of boundary disputes, city planning, methods of diplomacy and war, treatment of conquered territories, and feudatory relationships. A modern Indian commentary is Pramathanath Banerjea, *Public Administration in Ancient India* (London, Macmillan, 1916).

I. H. Qureshi, *The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi* (Lahore, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1942) describes administration in a pre-Mogul dynasty (about the 15th century). A detailed study of Mogul policy (16th–18th centuries) is given by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, *Mughal Administration,* 3d ed. (Calcutta, M.C. Sarkar and Sons, Ltd., 1935 [London, 1942]).

A comprehensive view of the British administrative system in India, with special attention to the development and effect of the Indian Civil Service, is Sir Percival Griffiths, *The British Impact on India* (London, McDonald, 1952). This work also includes an historical retrospect of Hindu and Mogul administration, with bibliographic notes. A great deal of useful background information is found in various books on Indian history, perhaps the most complete being the *Cambridge History of India* (New York, Macmillan, 6 vols., 1922, especially Vol. 6, Chs. 11–22). An account of the operations of the East India Company is contained in Holden Furber, *John Company at Work* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1948). A. N. Keith's *Constitutional History of India* (London, Methuen, 1936) describes Indian governmental institutions under British rule.

An Indian view of administration in the British period is M. Ruthnaswamy's *Some Influences That Made the British Administrative System in India* (London, Luzac, 1939). A highly regarded account dealing with the British period, by an influential Indian political scientist, is Angadipuram Appadorai, *Dyarchy in Practice* (London, Longmans Green, 1937).

There are several "standard" books on the civil service, notably Sir Edward

Arthur Blunt, *The Indian Civil Service* (London, Faber and Faber, 1937) and L. S. S. O'Malley, *The Indian Civil Service, 1601–1930* (London, J. Murray, 1931). To balance these British interpretations, one might consult H. W. Kunzru, *The Public Services in India* (Allahabad, Servants of India Society, 1917).

For contemporary India there are several texts which survey the whole field of public law and government and include some information about administration. One of the best of these is R. C. Jain, *Indian Administration* (Delhi, Chand, 1951). This work contains less constitutional narrative than most of these books and includes chapters on such topics as "Village Government and its Organization," "District Administration," "Local Self-Government," "Public Finance—Central and States," and "Administrative, Defense and Foreign Services." Other books in this category include M. R. Palande, *Introduction to Indian Administration* (Bombay, Oxford University Press, 5th ed., 1951); G. N. Joshi, *The Constitution of India* (London, Macmillan, 1950) and *Indian Administration* (London, Macmillan, 1937); and Akshyal Ghose's older work, *Public Administration in India* (Calcutta, University of Calcutta Press, 1930).

More specific discussion of administrative problems is provided in Government of India, Planning Commission, "Administration and Public Cooperation," Part II of *The First Five Year Plan* (Delhi, Government of India, 1952). This public document is of major importance as a reflection of serious governmental thinking about administrative problems. Among the preparatory documents for the Planning Commission is a report by A. D. Gorwala, I.C.S., ret., entitled *Report on Public Administration* (Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1951), which makes various recommendations concerning ways to strengthen Indian administration. A more comprehensive study by Gorwala entitled *Public Administration in India* has been prepared for publication by the Indian Council of World Affairs. Gorwala is also the author of an insightful pamphlet for the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics entitled *The Role of the Administrator; Past, Present and Future* (Poona, 1952). An American interpretation of the Indian administrative scene is Paul Appleby's *Public Administration in India; Report of a Survey* (Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1953).

Several administrative inquiry commissions at the provincial level have turned in reports of interest to the student of comparative administration. One of these was by the Bengal Administration Enquiry Committee in 1944, known as the Rowlands Report. This report is now almost impossible to obtain, but a summary of it was published in *O & M Bulletin* (London, Treasury, Vol. 3, June, Aug., and Oct., 1948). Other provincial reports include Madras, *Outline of Administration* (Madras, Government of Madras, 1949), and the report of the Bombay Administrative Committee Inquiry.

The work of the Indian Planning Commission has stimulated Indian interest in problems of economic development administration. Among the documents of the Planning Commission is a report by K. T. Shah, *National Planning, Principles and Administration* (Bombay, Vora, 1948), which contains a section (pp. 119–52) on "Administrative Organization of the Plan" and, as Appendix I, a "Schematic Chart of the Administrative Machinery."

Administrative problems have also been considered within the framework of other development plans. An example is the Indian proposals for the Colombo Plan conference, India, Ministry of Finance, *Six Year Development Plan of the Union of India, 1951–57, as Submitted to the Commonwealth Consultative Committee at the London Conference* (Delhi, Government Printing Department, 1950), which contains, as Chapter IV, an essay on "Administrative Machinery for Planning." An Indian commentary on the general problems of development planning is N. V. Sovani, *Planning of Post-war Economic Development in India* (Poona, Gokhale Institute, 1951). Gorwala has also published a *Report on the Efficient Conduct of State Enterprises* for the Planning Commission (Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1951). An American commentary is contained in three lectures by Merril R. Goodall, *Administration and Planning for Economic Development* (Delhi, Ranjit, 1952).

Other studies of development problems which give some attention to administration are C. N. Vakil and P. R. Brahmananda, *Planning for a Shortage Economy: The Indian Experiment* (Bombay, Vora, 1952), and B. Singh, *Federal Finance and Underdeveloped Economy* (Bombay, Hind Kitabs, 1952). The Community Projects Administration of the Government of India publishes a journal, *Kurekshetra*, containing information and exhortation for Development Officers, which indirectly reveals the Administration's plans and its view of its function.

Representative of the literature on administrative problems in river valley development is S. C. Bose, *The Damodar Valley Project* (Calcutta, Phoenix Press, 1948). Sudhir Sen, Secretary of the Damodar Valley Corporation, has written several articles about the work of the D.V.C., in which comparisons with the T.V.A. are frequent. Recently he has launched a series of articles on the subject, "We Need More River Valley Authorities in India" the first of which, on the topic "TVA Shows the Way," appeared in the 1953 annual number of the *Indian Journal of Power and River Valley Development* (Calcutta, 6, Waterloo Street).

Some information on finance administration may be obtained from UN, Fiscal Division, Public Finance Survey, *India* (UN, Sales No. 1952, XVI, 1).

Sukumar Basu in "The Public Service Commission in India," *Public Administration* [London], Vol. 31, pp. 81–84 (Spring, 1953), describes one of the important programs to deal with civil service problems. The Union Public Service Commission, all of the Part "A" State Commissions, and some of the Part "B" State Commissions publish annual reports. Information on a training program for new recruits to the Administrative Service is given in M. J. Desai, *Indian Administrative Service Training School* (Delhi, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1948); and information about instruction and research in public administration in the universities is contained in S. V. Kogekar and A. Appadorai, *The Teaching of Political Science in India* (New Delhi, Indian Council on World Affairs, 1953).

Among current Indian periodicals particular mention should be made of the *Indian Journal of Political Science*, published by the Indian Political Science Association. The May-June, 1953 issue contains an essay by Professor Kogekar on administrative problems in India, and the July–September number contains several articles on this subject, including A. K. Ghosal's "Some Administrative Problems under Planning," and M. Venkatarangaiya's "The Pattern of Public Administration in the Five-Year Plan." *The India Quarterly,* published by the Indian Council on World Affairs, runs occasional articles on administration and has a book review section. Among other periodicals, special mention should be made of *The Eastern Economist,* published in New Delhi and edited by Eric da Costa, which often comments on administrative developments. Its "Special Independence Number," published in August, 1953, contains a section on "Public Administration since Independence" (pp. 263–68). On economic administration see also the monthly *Reserve Bank Chronicle* (Bombay).

Pakistan, Ceylon, and Burma. Relatively little is available on public administration in Pakistan, Ceylon, and Burma. Richard Symond, *The Making of Pakistan* (London, Faber and Faber, 1950), contains some information about administration. S. Osman Ali presented some "Notes on the Civil Service of Pakistan," to the UN Public Personnel Seminar (St/TAA/conf. 1/1, pp. 191–96). Two public documents that provide some useful background information are *O & M in Pakistan* (Karachi, Cabinet Secretariat, 1952, 18 pp.) and *Administrative Directory of the Government of Pakistan* (Karachi, 1951), a compendium of information about the various departments of government and their work.

In Ceylon a regional group of the Institute of Public Administration has been formed and has published an annual *Journal of Public Administration* since 1950. *Public Administration in Ceylon,* by Sir Charles Collins (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1951), is a history of constitutional arrangements in Ceylon during the period of British rule, but also provides an introduction for anyone making a study of administration in Ceylon. One of the International Bank reports deals with Ceylon and should be consulted for information about problems of economic development administration: *The Economic Development of Ceylon* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1953). A Ceylonese public document is the *Report of the Commission on the Organization, Staffing and Operative Methods of Government Departments* (Colombo, Government Press, 1948).

For Burma, a useful, although scarce, document is the *Interim Report* of the Administration Reorganization Committee (Rangoon, 1949). The Committee has submitted a final report, not yet published. F. S. V. Donnison has contributed a volume to the Royal Institute series entitled *Public Administration in Burma* (London, 1953), which lays a foundation for subsequent study of Burmese administration. Keen analyses of colonial administration and policy in Burma under British rule are provided in the books of J. S. Furnivall. His *Colonial Policy and Practice* (Cambridge, Eng., Cambridge University Press, 1948) is probably the best place to begin.

Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia; An Annotated Bibliography of Selected Reference Sources (Washington, D.C., Library of Congress, 1952), compiled by Cecil Hobbs, provides a convenient index to the literature on Southeast Asia, including available material on government and general political background. Little has been produced, however, dealing specifically with public administration.

The Royal Institute series on public administration provide a useful beginning point for certain countries, although these works give more attention to general governmental organization and public law than to public administration as the term is used in the United States. They include W. D. Reeve, *Public Administration in Siam* (London, R.I.I.A., 1951); S. Jones, *Public Administration in Malaya* (London, R.I.I.A., 1953); and Sir Charles Collins, *Public Administration in Hong Kong* (London, R.I.I.A., 1953). J. S. Furnivall's *Colonial Policy and Practice* (cited above) covers—in addition to Burma—the Dutch East Indies; and his *Netherlands India: a Study of Plural Economy* (Cambridge, Eng., Cambridge University Press, 1939), provides more detailed information on Indonesia under Dutch administration. Also of interest for the student of Dutch Indonesian administration are the works of Hubertus J. van Mook, former Lt. Governor of the Dutch East Indies and currently Director of the Public Administration Division of the UN's Technical Assistance Administration. Especially valuable are his *Indonesia and the World* (Amsterdam, Bezige Bij, 1949) and *Mistakes of Democracy in Southeast Asia* (New York, W. W. Norton, 1950).

Some observations on administrative problems in Thailand are contained in a mimeographed report by two technical assistance experts: Lyman S. Moore and Edmond F. Ricketts, *A Program for Strengthening Public Administration in the Kingdom of Thailand* (Washington, M.S.A., 1952). A comprehensive study of colonial administration in Malaya and Indonesia is provided by Rupert Emerson in *Malaysia, a Study in Direct and Indirect Rule* (N.Y., Macmillan, 1937). Additional information about Malayan government is contained in an article by Charles Gamba, "Government in Malaya," *Public Administration* [Australia], Vol. 12, pp. 27–41 (March, 1953). The administration of Singapore is reviewed in K. J. O'Dell, "Municipal Administration in Singapore," *Public Administration* [England], Vol. 24, pp. 22–30 (Spring, 1946). A survey of the city's government with recommendations for improvement is given in the report by L. C. Hill entitled *Report on the Reform of Local Government in Singapore* (Singapore, Government Publications Bureau, 1952).

For the Philippines, a guide to the available literature on public administration is available in the form of a 53-page mimeographed document prepared by Araceli Andaya for the Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, entitled *An Annotated Bibliography on Philippine Public Administration* (Manila, 1953). Since copies of this document may be obtained by writing to the Institute, it is unnecessary to list Philippine materials in this space.

Two ECAFE studies on the region are *Statistical Organization and Activities in Countries of Asia and the Far East* (ECAFE, Doc. E/CN.11/322, 1951) and *Structure of Industrial Organization in the Public Sector* (ECAFE, doc. E/CN. 11/I&T/51,1951).

China. Chinese language materials provide a vast storehouse of information about administration. E. A. Kracke, Jr., *Civil Service in Early Sung China, 960–1067* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953) is an example of what can be accomplished by analysis of these materials. S. Y. Teng and Knight Biggerstaff, *An Annotated Bibliography of Selected Chinese Reference Works* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, rev. ed., 1950), describes many Chinese classical materials that might be used for this kind of research.

Some modern Chinese authors have already attempted to describe the administrative systems of classical times. These works are in Chinese, but the titles are given here in translation: Chen Ku-yuan, *A History of Chinese Administrative Systems* (Shanghai, Commercial Press); Ting Yuan-Pu, *A History of Chinese Administrative Systems* (Shanghai, Commercial Press); Kao Yi-Han, *A Brief History of the Chinese Cabinet System* (Shanghai, Commercial Press); Kao Yi-Han, *A Brief History of the Chinese Impeachment System* (Shanghai, Commercial Press); and Teng Ting-Jen, *A Study of the Chinese Examination System* (Shanghai, Ming-tze Press).

A few ancient Chinese writers have been recognized through English translations. Notable among these is the 11th century statesman whose works are translated by H. R. Williamson in *Wang An-Shih, A Chinese Statesman and Educationalist of the Sung Dynasty* (London, Probsthain, 1935). Wang An-Shih was an advocate of administrative regularization, civil service reform, and improved fiscal procedures. His administrative theories are reported to have influenced Henry Wallace when he was Secretary of Agriculture. A biography of Wang An-Shih's rival, Su Tung-Po, is contained in Lin Yu-Tang, *The Gay Genius* (New York, John Day Co., 1947). *The Complete Works of Han Fei-Tzu; A Classic of Chinese Legalism* (3rd century B.C.), translated from the Chinese by W. K. Liao (London, Probsthain, 1939), and the later (3rd century, A.D.) *Jen wu chih* of Liu Shao, translated by J. K. Shryock as *The Study of Human Abilities* (New Haven, American Oriental Society, 1937), contain advice to rulers on administration and the conduct of public affairs.

During the period of Nationalist Government rule in China a substantial volume of literature on modern public administration began to appear. Some of the main works in Chinese (again listed by English translation of their titles) are Chang Chin-Chien, *Theories and Practices of Public Administration* (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1935); Pai Peng-fei, *A Study of Administrative Law* (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1937); and a compilation of materials by the Ta-Tung Press, Shanghai, entitled *A History of the Development of the Chinese Administrative System* (1943).

In the field of personnel administration there is another book by Chang Chin-Chien, *Public Personnel Administration* (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1939), and a more recent book by Wang Shih-Hsien, *Personnel Administration* (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1943). A comparative study by Hsueh Po-Kang is *Chinese and American Public Personnel Administration* (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1937). In the field of financial administration, a pioneer work is Tan Pin, *A Study of the State Treasury System* (Shanghai, Min-Tze Press, 1929), followed by Wu Kwan-Yin, *Chinese Budget System* (Chien-Hwa Press, 1932), Hu Shan-Hen, *Financial Administration* (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1935), and, most recently, Ma Ta-Yin, *Chinese Financial Administration* (Cheng-Chung Press, 1947). On provincial administration there is Shih Yang-Cheng; *Chinese Provincial Administrative System* (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1947).

A Chinese Association of Personnel Administration published a monthly journal in Shanghai before the war, and a revived society in this field now issues a quarterly in Taipei. The Department of the Interior in Nanking formerly issued a *Journal of Administrative Efficiency,* and the Executive Yuan published a *Journal of Public Administration* in Nanking.

Apart from the works dealing specifically with public administration, there is a large storehouse of Chinese materials from the study of which a great deal of information about Chinese administration could be obtained. Many of these works are listed in John K. Fairbank and Liu Kwang-Ching, *Modern China: A Bibliographical Guide to Chinese Works, 1898–1937* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1950). A few examples, cited here by code number from the Fairbank bibliography, illustrate the kinds of Chinese language material available. The *National Government Year Book* (No. 1.4.5, Chungking, 1944) gives detailed information about the structure of executive agencies. One third of the book describes city and provincial governments. Ch'en Chih-mai, *The Chinese Government* (Doc. 3.1.1, Chungking, 1944), by a professor who had worked in the Executive Yuan, describes the organization and functioning of the Kuomintang and of each of the five Yuan. A forerunner of modern exchange of persons programs is described in the *Diary of a Diplomatic Mission to Nine Countries,* by Tsai Hung-tz'u (Doc. 4.2.8, Peking, 1907). In this volume the author, President of the Board of Ceremonies, records his trip "to investigate the governments of various countries." He concludes that there are some good points in Western administration, and carefully lists the agencies visited, including the "Yamen of the Board of Revenue" in Washington, D.C. Huang Hsu-wan, *A General Survey of the Maritime Customs Service* (Doc. 6.12.1, Peking, 1917) is a comprehensive description of the history and work of the Customs Service and its internal organization. It is worthy of study as an early example of the injection of Western administrative ideas into Chinese administration. Chang Chi-hsin, *Outline of Chinese Educational Administration* (Doc. 7.6.7, Shanghai, 1934) is an extended history, comparing Chinese and Western theories and practices and reviewing changes in central and local educational administration since the late Manchu period. *Descriptions of Financial Administration,* published by the Ministry of Finance, Peking (Doc.6.11.2), is a series of volumes, each one covering one province and giving detailed information about the operation of the fiscal system in the late Manchu period, including many details about corruption and irregularities.

Turning to the very recent period, since the evacuation of the Nationalist Government to Taiwan, one finds that already several works on public administration have been published in Taipei in the Chinese language. These include Chang Chin-Chien, *Public Administration* (Cheng-Chung Press, 1952); Tso Lu-Sheng, *Public Administration* (First Press, 1953); and Lin Chi-Tung, *A Study of Chinese Administrative Law* (Cheng-Chung Press, 1952).

It is striking that despite this extensive output of Chinese materials relatively little has been written in Western languages on Chinese administration. Chien Tuan-Cheng's *The Government and Politics of China* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950) provides the best general introduction to Chinese governmental institutions and problems during the period of Nationalist rule, with introductory chapters on the history of traditional Chinese administration.

Although not dealing with administration as such, the monthly mimeographed journal of the U. S. Mutual Security Agency mission to China, *Chinese-American Economic Cooperation* (Taipei, 1952-) contains, *inter alia,* some interesting sidelights on Chinese administration.

Japan. Basic bibliographic information is supplied by Robert E. Ward, *A Guide to Japanese Reference and Research Materials in the Field of Political Science* (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, Center for Japanese Studies, 1950). Sections XV and XXII deal with "Administrative Law" and "Public Servants," respectively. His "A Survey of Political Science Literature on Japan," this REVIEW, Vol. 46, pp. 201–13 (March, 1952) contains a brief section on public administration.

A convenient guide in English to the literature on public administration in Japan is provided by Kiyoaki Tsuji, "The Science of Public Administration," in *The Japan Science Review,* "Law and Politics," No. 1, pp. 79–83 (1950). Among the recent studies in Japanese mentioned in this article are Shigeo Yoshitomi, *Principles of Administrative Organization* (1939), *Reform of Administrative Organization* (1941), and *The Practical Character of Politics* (1948); Masatoshi Nagahama, *Problems in the Public Election of Local Governors* (1947); Royama, Nagahama, Yanase, Sugai, and Tsuji, *Studies of the Civil Service System in Several States* (1948); and Kiyoaki Tsuji, *The Bureaucracy in the Japanese Government* (1952).

In 1952, a Public Service Training Council was established to help training centers in government agencies, both national and local, improve their work. The Council has organized conferences at which papers on various aspects of administration were delivered. It publishes a monthly *Newsletter* and has announced plans for publication of a quarterly journal.

A Japanese Society for Public Administration, the Nihon Gyosei Gakkai, was formed in 1950 under the leadership of Professor Masamichi Royama, but has not yet commenced publication of a journal. The journal of the Political Science Association in Tokyo University, *Kokka Gakkai Zasshi* [Journal of the Society for the Science of the State], established in 1948, is probably the best general source for information on current public administration.

In the personnel field the National Personnel Authority has issued annual reports in English. Other English language materials are Shirven and Speicher, "Reform of Japanese Administration," *Personnel Administration,* July, 1951; Hugh H. MacDonald and Milton J. Esman, "The Japanese Civil Service," *Public Personnel Review,* Vol. 7, pp. 213–24 (Oct., 1946); Foster B. Roser, "Establishing a Modern Merit System in Japan," *Public Personnel Review,* Vol. 11, pp. 199–206 (Oct., 1950); and Earle A. Cleveland, "Civil Service in Okinawa," *Pub-*

lic Personnel Review, Vol. 11, pp. 69–77 (April, 1950). An older review of the Japanese civil service is S. T. Takeuchi, "The Japanese Civil Service," in *The Civil Service in the Modern State* (cited above), pp. 513–55.

In the field of administrative organization, the Japanese "Hoover Commission" *Report on Reform of the Administrative System* [in Japanese](Tokyo,1951) proposed changes to accompany the transition from occupation status to full independence. An English-language survey of the reorganization carried out in accord with this report's recommendations, together with bibliographical information, is given by Ardath W. Burks in "A Note on the Emerging Administrative Structure of the Post-treaty Japanese National Government," *Occasional Papers,* Center for Japanese Studies, no. 3, pp. 47–58 (Ann Arbor, Mich., University of Mich. Press, 1952).

For earlier comment see also Milton J. Esman, "Japanese Administration—A Comparative View," *Public Administration Review,* Vol. 7, pp. 100–12 (1947); and Richard G. Brown, *Recent Developments in Japanese Civil Service* (Evanston, Ill., The Author, 1950).

Korea. Information about literature dealing with Korean administration is not now available. However, the Institute of East Asiatic Studies at the University of California is preparing *A Guide to Korean Studies* which may be expected to include a comprehensive listing of existing materials relating to Korean government and administration.

Africa. The most convenient key to available literature on Africa is *Introduction to Africa: A Selective Guide to Background Reading,* prepared by the Library of Congress (Washington, D.C., University Press, 1952). Anyone planning to study administrative problems in the continent ought also to make use of *Continuing Sources for Research on Africa* (Washington, D.C., Library of Congress, 1952), a list of societies and institutes, and official agencies with the titles of their journals, reports, etc. For East Africa some useful sources can be found listed in Roland Young and J. Gus Liebenow, Jr., "Survey of Background Material for the Study of the Government of East Africa," this REVIEW, Vol. 48, pp. 187–203 (March, 1954).

In the periodical field the *Journal of African Administration* (London, Colonial Office, 1949–) is an invaluable source of information and bibliographic references for British Africa. Margery F. Perham, *Colonial Government: Annotated Reading List on British Colonial Government, with Some General and Comparative Material on Foreign Empires* (London, Oxford University Press, 1950) is a good supplement to the Library of Congress bibliography. The quarterly *Colonial Review* (University of London, Colonial Dept.) contains abstracts and summaries of the best current literature on colonial problems.

For French Africa a general guide is the *Encyclopedie coloniale et maritime* (Paris, Guieysse), which issues monthly supplements on all aspects of colonial life. For Belgian Africa the leading journal is *Zaire, revue congolaise* (Brussels, Editions Universitaires), which gives extensive bibliographical information.

The literature on colonial administration is extensive. Caldwell lists the main works on pp. 42–44. *Principles and Methods of Colonial Administration,* ed.

C. M. MacInnes (London, Colston Papers, Butterworths Scientific Publications, 1950), provides a convenient introduction to the policies of the different colonial powers. Another general study is J. de Almada, *Colonial Administration by European Powers* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1947).

For background information the student should make use of Lord Hailey's *An African Survey* (London, Oxford University Press, 1938) and, for more specific material on British Africa, his *Native Administration in the British African Territories* (London, H.M.S.O., 1950). A series of portraits of African administrative institutions may be found in the anthropological case studies in *African Political Systems,* eds. Meyer Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (London, Oxford, 1940).

There are several studies of civil service problems in Africa, especially relating to the development of native personnel. The *Report of the Commission on the Civil Service of the Gold Coast, 1950–51* (Accra, Government Printing Dept., 1951) is a comprehensive survey, with recommendations to strengthen personnel administration and the Africanization program. W. J. Haimes, *Report on Whitley Councils* (Nairobi, Government Printer, 1950), gives attention to another aspect of public service administration, taking into account the problems of an interracial society. Another study is L. C. Hill, *Report on the Civil Service in Kenya* (Nairobi, the Secretariat, 1945). A survey of educational problems and administration—an important factor in the development of native personnel—is *African Education: A Study of Educational Policy and Practice in British Tropical Africa* (Oxford, Nuffield Foundation and the Colonial Office, 1953).

The French and Belgian materials on Africa give more attention to general organizational and legal problems. Two studies are M. Merlo, *L'Organisation Administrative de l'Algerie* (Algiers, Ferraris, 1951); and Georges Surdon, *La France en Afrique du Nord* (Algiers, 1946). The latter is a comprehensive treatment of Islamic theories on the organization of government, and a description of the structure and functioning of government in North Africa under French rule. A scholarly survey of the legal and administrative organization of the French regime in North Africa is Herbert Liebesny, *The Government of French North Africa* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943). A Belgian work is R. Delvaux, *L'Organisation Administrative du Congo Belge* (Antwerp, Edition Zaire, 1945).

Little work has been done on Ethiopian administration, but a recent technical assistance advisory report is G. M. Morris, *Report on the Organization and Administration of the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Imperial Ethiopian Government* (Washington, D.C., F.A.O., 1953).

Pacific Islands. A bibliography that includes some references of value for the study of Pacific Islands administration is *Non-Self-Governing Areas with Special Emphasis on Mandates and Trusteeships,* comp. Helen F. Conover (Washington, Library of Congress, 1947). A notable contribution to this field is made by *South Pacific,* the bimonthly journal of the Australian School of Pacific Administration.

A monograph covering government and reconstruction in New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, and the British Solomon Islands is Cyril S. Belshaw, *Island Administration in the South West Pacific* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950). J. W. Davidson gives some general observations on Pacific Islands administration in "The Changing Political Role of Pacific Islands Peoples," *Journal of Public Administration* [N.Z.], Vol. 14, pp. 46–57 (Sept., 1951) and "The Administrative Consequences of Modern Colonial Policies," *Ibid.*, Vol. 15, pp. 32–36 (Sept., 1952). Another study is the *Report of the Commission to Inquire into and Report upon the Organization of District and Village Government in Western Samoa* (Wellington, 1951).

Problems of administration in the American Pacific territories are discussed in the management surveys conducted by the Department of the Interior preparatory to assumption of civilian control. The studies of the Trust Territory, in two volumes, and of American Samoa, in one volume, were published in 1951. On the same subject, see also Emil J. Sady, "Department of the Interior and Pacific Island Administration," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 10, pp. 13–19 (Winter, 1950). For general background see Rupert Emerson and others, *America's Pacific Dependencies* (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1949).

Valuable information on administrative conditions in the Trust Territories will be found in the reports of the Visiting Missions of the UN Trusteeship Council, as well as in the reports of the Administering Powers. The reports on non-self-governing territories under Article 73 (e) of the UN Charter do not contain "political" information in most cases; hence they are of limited use for administrative study, though they do contain important background information on economic, social, and educational matters.

The Caribbean. Information about administration in the non-Spanish speaking Caribbean is quite scarce. *The Caribbean Commission: Monthly Information Bulletin* (Kent House, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad) gives occasional bits of information on administrative subjects, and some bibliographical notes.

Mission to Haiti: the Report of the UN Mission of Technical Assistance to the Republic of Haiti (UN, doc. 1949. 11B.2, 1949) provides, in the setting of an overall survey, some information about administrative problems, especially in the field of public finance.

Data about problems of economic development administration in two countries of the area may be found in the I.B.R.D.'s *Report on Surinam* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1952) and *The Economic Development of Jamaica* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1952).

FRED W. RIGGS.

Public Administration Clearing House.

BOOK REVIEWS

Natural Right and History. By Leo Strauss. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1953. Pp. x, 327. $5.00.)

Is there any foundation in reality for the distinction between right and wrong in ethics and politics? Professor Strauss believes that there is and in presenting his case makes a significant contribution towards an understanding of the intellectual crisis in which we find ourselves. Based upon a series of lectures which Professor Strauss delivered at the University of Chicago in 1949 under the auspices of the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation, this book presents a formidable challenge to a positivistically oriented social science.

Modern social science not only admits its inability to help us in discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate, just and unjust objectives but denies that any rational method exists by which such judgments can objectively be made. As a consequence, Professor Strauss points out, "we can be or become wise in all matters of secondary importance, but we have to be resigned to utter ignorance in the most important respect: we cannot have any knowledge regarding the ultimate principles of our choices, i.e. regarding their soundness or unsoundness; our ultimate principles have no other support than our arbitrary and blind preferences. We are then in the position of beings who are sane and sober when engaged in trivial business and who gamble like madmen when confronted with serious issues—retail sanity and wholesale madness." Such a conception of social science, Professor Strauss declares, not only leads to nihilism but, in fact, "is identical with nihilism." Modern social scientists not only deny that "men can know what is good" but insist that that denial is required by the demands of tolerance and the cultivation of individuality.

The modern rejection of natural right, i.e. the rejection of the belief that there is a foundation in reality for the distinction between right and wrong in ethics and politics, takes place in the name of history or in the name of the distinction between so-called facts and values. The first two lectures examine each of these critically, with the second being devoted to a brilliant analysis of the meaning and limitations of the methodology of Max Weber. Underlying Weber's methodology, Professor Strauss points out, is the view that "reality is an infinite and meaningless sequence, or a choas, of unique and infinitely divisible events, which in themselves are meaningless"—all meaning originating in the activity of the knowing subject. Not only is this a view of reality with which few people today would be satisfied, says Strauss, but it is also a view to which Weber himself was unable to adhere consistently. For he "could not deny that there is an articulation of reality that precedes all scientific articulation." The subsequent lectures discuss the origin of the idea of natural right, the classical doctrine of natural right, the modern idea of natural right especially as conceived by Hobbes and Locke, and the crisis of modern natural right in Rousseau and Burke.

The rejection of natural right in the name of history is historicism, and it is with the rise of historicism and its limitations that the bulk of this book is concerned. Briefly stated, historicism is the doctrine that all thought is historically conditioned and hence relative. There is not, because there cannot be, any knowledge of an eternal, transhistorical order such as is presupposed by the theory of natural right. But historicism is open to the objection that it professes to be a truth of just such an eternal and transhistorical nature. It states that all truths are radically dependent upon the societies in which they emerge and so are relative to those societies; but this most fundamental truth is asserted as valid everywhere and always. Historicism attempts to meet this objection by the assumption of an absolute moment in history. At one moment in history it is given to men to realize the complete dependence of all their thinking upon history. In that moment men perceive that all their ideas of natural right were a delusion.

Professor Strauss suggests that the answer to historicism is to show how it came about. Historicism, he says, is the outcome of the crisis of the specifically modern interpretation of natural right. If this can be shown, then historicism's claim to have arrived at the absolute moment in history will collapse.

The origin of the idea of natural right has its roots, Professor Strauss argues, in the classical philosophers' discovery of the distinction between nature and convention. The discovery of this distinction gives birth to philosophy, or the quest for "the first things." "In brief, then, it can be said," Professor Strauss declares, "that the discovery of nature is identical with the actualization of a human possibility which, at least according to its own interpretation, is trans-historical, trans-social, trans-moral and trans-religious." The philosophic quest for the first things is embodied in metaphysics as the science of being and it is now seen that political institutions have their ultimate explanation in metaphysical presuppositions. Hence the classical philosophers, and notably Aristotle, taught that there is an objective order of human wants determined ultimately by the structure of human nature. The end of man is the perfection of his nature. But since man is by nature a social being he cannot reach his perfection except in society, or more precisely, in civil society. Civil society is thus natural, because demanded by human nature, and can be said to be prior to the individual inasmuch as nature intends not mere human existence but human perfection. Moreover, in order to reach his highest stature, man must live in the best kind of society; hence the preoccupation of classical natural right philosophy with discovering the theoretically ideal order of society based on nature and transcending the flux of history.

The break with this tradition of natural right, Professor Strauss argues, was first made by Hobbes, whose intention was to put natural right on a scientific basis. Civil society, as Hobbes conceives it, is not natural; it is merely an artificial construction designed to preserve the individual's original right to his own existence. Whereas in Aristotle's philosophy society is prior to the individual, in Hobbes' philosophy the individual is in every sense prior to society. Professor Strauss goes on to show how John Locke accepted Hobbes' shift in emphasis from natural duties to natural rights and carried it even further.

But it is in Rousseau's theory that "the modern natural right teaching reaches its critical stage. By thinking through that teaching, Rousseau was brought face to face with the necessity of abandoning it completely. If the state of nature is subhuman, it is absurd to go back to the state of nature in order to find in it the norm for man. Hobbes had denied that man has a natural end. He had believed that he could find a natural or nonarbitrary basis of right in man's beginnings. Rousseau showed that man's beginnings lack all human traits. On the basis of Hobbes' premise, therefore, it became necessary to abandon altogether the attempt to find the basis for right in nature, in human nature. And Rousseau seemed to have shown an alternative. For he had shown that what is characteristically human is not the gift of nature, but is the outcome of what man did, or was forced to do, in order to overcome, or to change nature; man's humanity is the product of the historical process. For a moment—the moment lasted longer than a century—it seemed possible to seek the standard of human action in the historical process." Professor Strauss's thesis then, is briefly this: by abandoning metaphysics and a teleological view of human nature, the modern interpretation of natural right brought upon itself a crisis which issued in historicism. Historicism's claim to have arrived at the absolute moment in history therefore falls, because the genesis of historicism can be traced to an intellectual crisis which adequately explains it.

Professor Strauss brings to his task an admirable scholarship and a brilliant, incisive mind. His style reflects the lucidity of his thinking and as a consequence his book deserves a wide audience, not only among political theorists, for whom it is indispensable, but among political scientists generally.

Any reservations I have about the book would refer to the author's initial presuppositions rather than to the details of his analysis. Professor Strauss approaches the problem of natural right from the perspective of classical paganism; he interprets the modern revolt against the tradition of natural right, not primarily as a revolt against the Christian tradition, but as a revolt against the classical tradition. And it is not to the Christian tradition but rather to the classical tradition that he would have us return. The natural law doctrines of the Middle Ages appear to him to be a distortion of the classical tradition caused by the introduction of beliefs imported from revelation. One may contrast with this view the study of natural law by A. P. D'Entrèves and Erich Voegelin's *New Science of Politics*, to mention but two recent works that would challenge that interpretation. It seems to me that Professor Strauss dismisses with insufficient evidence and argument the contention so ably defended by Etienne Gilson that Christian philosophy is not only possible but that St. Thomas Aquinas went a long way towards achieving the harmony between reason and revelation that Professor Strauss would deny is possible. To interpret the crisis of our times primarily as a revolt against the classical tradition is to interpret that crisis as being primarily the result of an intellectual mistake. And it is suggested, by implication at least, that intellectual conversion to Aristotle would effect the cure. That intellectual mistakes may well have been made and need correction, and that we can learn much from Aristotle can be conceded; but intellectual mistakes themselves have a cause and to some of us it would seem that St. Paul had a more profound understanding of man's predicament and need than did Aristotle. Which is not to deny the wisdom of the Greeks but only to say that it is insufficient.

JOHN H. HALLOWELL.

Duke University.

How Russia is Ruled. BY MERLE FAINSOD. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1953. Pp. xi, 575. $7.50.)

The Dynamics of Soviet Society. BY W. W. ROSTOW IN COLLABORATION WITH ALFRED LEVIN. (New York: W. W. Norton and Co. 1953. Pp. xvi, 282. $3.95.)

Law and Social Change in the U.S.S.R. BY JOHN N. HAZARD. (Toronto: The Carswell Co. 1953. PUBLISHED under the Auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs. Pp. xxiv, 310. $4.50.)

There is need not only for specialized studies of particular aspects of Soviet practice but also for syntheses based on reliable research. This is why one must greet with satisfaction the book of Professor Fainsod, who has achieved a great work of synthesis. His book appeared at almost the same time as Mr. Rostow's, which also purports to provide the reader with a global picture, but which does so in a much less satisfactory manner. Mr. Rostow forewarns in the preface that he is not a specialist in the Soviet field. It is not easy, however, to write about the Soviet regime without an intimate knowledge of Russian history and of the Russian language. The image of the Soviet society which emerges from Professor Fainsod's book is warranted by his skillful use of the Soviet publications and enlivened by the comments extracted by the author from his interviews with Soviet escapees. Mr. Rostow used only publications in English; however, he includes by way of compensation a very useful bibliography of American and English books on the Soviet Union.

Both books use basically the same method: an historical survey of the factors which compose the present Soviet reality and an analysis of the contemporary Soviet regime. Professor Fainsod's historical survey is remarkable for its penetrating insight and well-balanced comment. He rejects any deterministic interpretation of Russian history and refuses to see a fatalistic trend towards autocracy in Russia. There were, indeed, developments in the Russia of the past which could eventually have produced a representative government, and there were many Russians in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries who did their best to transplant the Western democratic ideas to their native soil. The most one may say is that autocratic government has so far been victorious. Yet the rejection of the deterministic interpretation does not warrant high hopes for a sudden succession of the Soviet regime by a true democracy. As Professor Fainsod observes: "Autocracy generates its own authoritarian antibodies and endows them with its own peculiar contour." When the end of the present totalitarianism in Russia does come, one may hope at the most for a slow and progressive transition to forms of government which are familiar to the West.

Professor Fainsod wisely refrains from prophesying about the future and cautions against unwarranted expectations of a sudden collapse of the present Soviet structure. He enumerates the factors of cohesion, including the political interest of the Soviet rulers in using the totalitarian machinery forged in Stalin's lifetime; the vested interests of the higher bureaucracy; the indoctrination of minds coupled with isolation from outside sources of information; and the patriotic feelings which are stimulated by the regime. He discusses also the opposing factors of tension, such as the insecurity of even the bureaucratic elite; the low standards of living of average citizens; the dissatisfaction among the unskilled and semi-skilled workers and collective farmers, who are reduced to bare subsistence; and discontent among the Soviet non-Russian nationalities faced with the present policy of Russianization. He does not believe in the possibility of successful mass uprisings because "Soviet totalitarianism breeds a sense of aloofness, of isolation, and of suspiciousness in the individual. It is not a milieu congenial to the large-scale conspiracies." The conclusion seems to be that the regime may be threatened in peacetime only by an open struggle among the top leaders or by a revolt of its own bureaucracy (including Army officers), possibilities which are not necessarily probabilities.

There is no analogy between the dissatisfaction in Tsarist Russia and the repressed discontent in the Soviet Union. Professor Fainsod observes that "Literature [in the nineteenth century] was the laboratory of society," while Soviet novels, dramas, or poems must follow strictly the party line and must not stir doubt in the minds of readers.

Professor Fainsod is correct in stressing the importance of the peasant problem in the Soviet Union. The party was successful in replacing one intelligentsia by another and in regimenting industrial workers, but in its long struggle with the peasants it has suffered one setback after another. Although the party is armed with all the weapons of state coercion, it had to acknowledge in 1953 a new defeat at the hands of the collective farmers whose only defense, passive resistance, resulted in a serious shortage of agricultural products.

Professor Fainsod describes the elitist and hierarchical structure of Soviet society, in which the peasant, the unskilled and semi-skilled worker, and the lower stratum of the intelligentsia have to pay the costs of industrialization and of material benefits for the upper bureaucracy. This strictly hierarchical society is founded on an institutionalized inequality and is a perversion of the Utopian dreams of pre-Marxist and Marxist socialists of the nineteenth century. Professor Fainsod explodes a myth which still survives in some minds that Stalin alone was responsible for the present situation. He says: "The elitism which was so deeply ingrained in Lenin . . ., the tradition of highly centralized leadership, the tightening regimen of the party discipline, the absolutism of the party line, the intolerance of disagreement and compromise, the manipulatory attitude towards mass organization, the subordination of means to ends, and the drive for total power—all these patterns of behaviour which crystallized in the early years were destined to exercise a continuing influence on the code by which the party lived and the course of action which it pursued." A short sentence tells the whole story of the effects of the many purges: "The laws of survival in the totalitarian party favor the tough and the adaptive; the tenderhearted and the independent-minded tend to fall by the way and disappear."

This volume will be a lasting contribution, even if one or another chapter becomes progressively obsolete because of changes in the structure of the Soviet Union. The basic anatomy and physiology of the regime as presented in the book is there to stay, although the day may come when events will vindicate the following statement by a Soviet writer purged long ago: "There is no such thing as the last revolution; the number of revolutions is infinite."

While Mr. Rostow's picture of the Soviet regime frequently coincides with Professor Fainsod's, some of his opinions are controversial. For example, it is difficult to agree with the author when he says that Stalin maintained only a verbal loyalty to the ideal of world revolution. His appeal to the foreign Communist parties at the Congress in October, 1952 was certainly more than an expression of verbal loyalty, for he promised publicly the support of the party and consequently of the Soviet state. The sovietization of Eastern Europe and the support given to Communist China and Northern Korea prove that he was willing to grant more than mere verbal assistance whenever he could do it without endangering the U.S.S.R. itself. At other points the author's interpretation of Russian history shows a lack of familiarity with the subject, as, for instance, in the references to the *Zemskii Sobor*, the Imperial Senate, and the alleged absence of aggressiveness in Russian history.

Again, one can hardly agree that the Soviet offensive policy began only in 1945. Should one qualify as defensive such Soviet moves as the annexations of the Baltic States and of half of Poland, the war against Finland, or the imperialist plans of further expansion laid before the Nazi leaders by Molotov in November, 1940? And while the author is right in saying that there is no evidence that the discontent of the non-Russian nationalities is identified with aspirations for national independence, neither is there any evidence to the contrary; the absence of free elections precludes the possibility of extracting any such evidence.

Mr. Rostow is unduly optimistic in his hope that the Soviet trade unions may emerge as a working-class movement directed against the regime; the Soviet trade unions are nothing but an arm of the party which controls them from top to bottom. One may also doubt whether historians will really look back, as the author believes, to the *Pravda* editorial of April 7, 1953, with its criticism of the then defunct Ministry of State Security, and on the publication in the Soviet press of President Eisenhower's speech of April 16th, as first symptoms of the liberalization of the regime. Yagoda and Beria were not only criticized but shot, but this did not bring about any change in the oppressive policy of the regime. However, Mr. Rostow's speculations concerning the future, even if not shared, have the merit of stimulating the reader's own guessing.

Professor Hazard's book provides another useful guide to the understanding of the regime. The author has used Soviet legislation as an effective tool for the reconstruction of the regime in action. Soviet law makes one understand the nature of the Soviet system, because a totalitarian state is compelled by its very nature to regulate every detail of social life, and because Soviet leaders act on the strength of Lenin's view that "law is politics" and mould legislation according to the current needs and goals of the Communist party.

This short history and survey of Soviet law reviews each branch of Soviet legislation in its development since the Revolution and in its present stage. It contains a wealth of information and a skillful analysis, documented by frequent references to Soviet judicial cases which help one understand the impact of the legislation upon the life of Soviet citizens. The limpid style makes it easy even for a person who has had no legal training to follow the author's interesting analysis. The legal materials adduced by Professor Hazard support the image of the regime found in Professor Fainsod's book. A lawyer accustomed to Western standards will be struck by certain features of Soviet law: its stern nature, the denial of civil rights, the collective responsibility of the family of a soldier who has deserted abroad, the punishment by analogy for acts which are not forbidden expressly by the Soviet codes, strict labor discipline enforced by law, and the flexible interpretation of international law to suit the political expediency of the Soviet Union.

W. W. KULSKI.

Syracuse University.

Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century. BY ROBERT ENDICOTT OSGOOD. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1953. Pp. xii, 491. $6.50.)

This book addresses itself to the debate on the extent to which foreign policy should be guided by considerations of national self-interest and of ideals. Buttressed by careful historical study covering the period from 1898 to 1942, and characterized by thoughtful reflection throughout, Dr. Osgood's volume is a sober, constructive guide to statesmanship and public enlightenment. Eschewing the extremities of the overzealous Realists on the one hand and of the selfless Utopians on the other, the author does not hesitate to affirm that idealism and self-interest are compatible, within rational limits, or that idealism is a driving force which can impel men toward constructive goals and new ways of tackling old problems. He also believes that it is the only impulse which can sustain the popular sacrifice necessary for survival—a fundamental in the scale of values embodied in national interest.

A good deal of the ground material used by the author has been dealt with before by diplomatic and political historians. Nowhere has its total meaning been more thoughtfully appraised in terms of the conflicting emotions, changing policies, and bewildered reactions of Americans in their search for a foreign policy responsive on the one hand to their native idealism yet viable on the other hand in a world of tensions, struggles, and wars.

Within the pages of this book are re-enacted the succession of Great Debates which have stirred, and torn, the American body politic since 1898—expansionism versus anti-imperialism; internationalism versus nationalism; neutrality versus intervention in war; adherence to the League versus noninvolvement; disarmament, outlawry of war, isolation versus participation in global struggles. The author generally follows Walter Lippmann's thesis that Americans often found themselves in untenable positions during this period of fluctuating stands because they tended to regard struggle and conflict between nations as unnatural and wrong and rejected constructive use in time of peace of their own elements of strength for political ends. Because the American people held an unrealistic view of the true nature of world politics and of "the conditions under which they might reconcile their ideals with their national self interest, their foreign relations from the turn of the century to the 1930's were marked by impulsiveness, instability, and ineffectiveness." And because their ideal expectations could not be fulfilled, and because they persisted in making and adhering to commitments they would not back up with force when challenged, bewilderment and disillusionment swept the nation. Only when the public became aware, through the crucial events of 1940–1941 and the unfolding of Axis war ambitions, that a close relationship existed between their own security and survival and that of others does the author feel that they at length began to appreciate that realism and enlightened self-interest could be reconciled with ideals.

While accepting the validity of the Christian-liberal-humanitarian ideals, and while acknowledging their implications for personal living, the author concedes that in practical international politics the dictates of security and of survival are not always strictly compatible with supra-national ideals. This being so, the task of the statesman—and of the public also, it might be added—is to reconcile ideals and national self-interest, insofar as possible, on a case by case basis through selection of means and ends according to a consistent scale of values. Only by identifying the points of coincidence of the two can narrow egoism be modified. And only as political, economic, and military realities are soberly weighed in terms of national interests and of security can ideal values be maximized in the actualities of international struggle. For the extent to which the nation can approximate its ideals and its national goals depends upon an accurate appraisal of the forces at work within the world, the elements of power involved, and a wise choice of instruments and patterns of policy. Sheer impulse or selflessness cannot gain it these ends. For the first time in its modern history, the United States has actually been confronted since 1940 with a realization that its own survival and the values and interests which are vital to it are at stake in world politics and that the preservation of security is in itself a cardinal value.

Despite the transformation which has occurred in the American outlook, the author fears that old predilections to act by impulse may arise yet again to occasion new pitfalls as the United States becomes still more involved in the complexities of international politics. This has been evidenced already since 1945 in the blind faith Americans reposed for some time in the United Nations, in their continued disposition to think that solutions can be found to all international problems, in their search for scapegoats when events turn out to their disliking or when conferences become stalemated over presently insoluble issues, and in the appearance of urgings to try to escape it all.

The heart of the author's reasoning is found in his belief that "ideal goals are not obtained in the real world of conflicting national purposes by moral fervor alone but only by a pragmatic calculation of the means to an end, by a rational anticipation of the actual consequences of a given action." Self-interest without ideals is unrealistic and can become self-defeating. Power for survival and for the attainment of national objectives must be measured by ideal standards and a consistent scale of values. Whether one subscribes fully to the author's premises and conclusions or not, the views which he has set down on the respective roles of ideals and of national self-interest, and their interconnection, merit reflective thought by all concerned with the security and well-being of the nation.

NORMAN J. PADELFORD.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Moscow and the Chinese Communists. BY ROBERT C. NORTH. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1954. Pp. 306. $5.00.)

This book covers the whole period from 1920 to 1953 and treats relations with Moscow within the framework of developments within China and the Chinese Communist party. It is especially interesting for the period up to 1937, for which it uses many sources that are new or not readily accessible. There is a very good discussion of the rather obscure developments which led to Mao Tsetung's rise to leadership and complete confirmation of the falsity of official Communist history which tries to defend Stalin's policy during this period.

The period from 1937 to 1949, which saw the growth of Communist control from a small, remote, and backward area round Yenan to the whole of mainland China, receives much less adequate and much shorter treatment (only 60 pages). Great reliance is placed on the Army Intelligence report published in the McCarran Hearings, but this is not an altogether satisfactory source. When it was produced, U. S. Intelligence had not been able to fill out the gap in information from Communist areas between 1940 and the summer of 1944 caused by refusal to short-circuit the Kuomintang news blockade. For instance, when the U. S. Army Observers' Section reached Yenan, the reviewer learned that his attempt to make contact with British or U. S. Intelligence from West Hopei in 1943 had failed because the U. S. authorities had used a radio station with operators from Tai Li's organization, the very organization responsible for preventing any contacts with the Communist areas.

To the non-American reader it seems that the interpretation of this period has been inhibited by reluctance to make too open a challenge to current popular beliefs in America. In the concluding chapter it is cogently argued that "The West . . . and especially the United States, needs to strengthen public confidence in its own democratic *revolutionary* heritage . . . and demonstrate to the world that we are a bold, imaginative, and constructively revolutionary people" (p. 285). But previous chapters do not apply this standard to American policy. It is said: "Even in retrospect, it is difficult to formulate an American course which, if followed, would necessarily have stopped or even seriously frustrated the Communists" (p. 202). But as early as 1941 P. A. M. Linebarger had written that "the base of Communism is peasant revolt. If the conditions of peasant revolt are eliminated, Communism will not be much more of a threat to China than it is to the advanced countries of Europe" (*The China of Chiang Kai-shek,* p. 174). A very obvious course for America was indicated by the evidence that the Communists were gaining because they met opposition from the Kuomintang but never competition—that they were winning support, not through the specifically Communist elements in their policies, but through their readiness to give the peasants what they wanted, which made people ready to accept or overlook the specifically Communist elements. The situation is seriously misrepresented by the statement that "many Americans—largely ignorant of what went on among the Chinese Communists—were doubtful whether the Nationalist need for increased efficiency and effectiveness in the war effort justified the undemocratic measures which Kuomintang leaders were taking" (p. 203), because many of the Kuomintang measures were directly incompatible with efficiency or an effective war effort and made sense only as directed to preserving the traditional Confucian social structure. For instance, it is recognized that the failure of Kuomintang units in North China to hold their own against the Japanese was due to faulty strategy (p. 189). But this faulty strategy was related to the fear of the Kuomintang authorities of allowing the type of organization essential for effective guerilla warfare. By following correct but, by Kuomintang standards, highly irregular methods, Wang Yu-min in East Shantung was able to resist both Japanese and Communists until 1945.

If, instead of backing a party with Leninist organization and a leader with Confucian ideals, American policy had followed the course which Mr. North recommends in his final chapter, China might have been offered some acceptable alternative to Communism and it is possible that important sections of the Communist movement might have been won over to something like Titoism.

Acceptance of the current American view of Communism as motivated by nothing but a drive for power leads to an analysis which almost certainly exaggerates the consistency and cunning of Communist policy. While the drive for power may be especially prominent in Communist motivation there is evidence that Communists, like other people, often act from mixed motives. For instance, opinion in Yenan towards the end of 1945 saw a fight with the Kuomintang not so much in terms of a long-range plan to establish undisputed Communist power (cf. p. 228) as in terms of self-preservation. From 1927 to 1937 the Kuomintang had usually killed any Communists it could catch and there was some real justification for a fear that only Communist armed strength prevented a resumption of this policy. Mr. North may be right in arguing that the Marshall Mission was bound to fail because the Communists were determined to seize power. But he rather slurs over the evidence indicating that it was also bound to fail because American policy never provided the Communists with any guarantee of security except through victory in a civil war. It is, for example, rather disingenuous to say that "Chinese Communist papers and radio accused the United States of intervening on the side of Nationalist forces . . . but Washington insisted that the American purpose was to secure the full surrender of Japanese forces throughout China. . . ." (p. 224) without admitting that the final surrender of Japanese forces was secured only by the Communist capture of T'aiyuan in 1949 and that, even near the main American bases, Japanese troops continued for months to hold sections of the Kuomintang front.

This criticism has concentrated on what seems the weakest section of the book and should be qualified by saying that even for this period it provides a lot of interesting information. Chapter XIV provides a good summary of developments under the Peking Government. If space permitted, the reviewer would like to challenge the phrase "totalitarian efficiency" and argue that the regime has been efficient in spite of, and not because of its totalitarianism. But this is a large and controversial question.

LINDSAY OF BIRKER.

The Australian National University.

American Foreign Assistance. BY WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN AND REDVERS OPIE. (Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1953. Pp. xii, 615. $6.00.)

Raising the World's Standard of Living: The Coordination and Effectiveness of Point Four, United Nations Technical Assistance, and Related Programs. BY ROBERT T. MACK, JR. (New York: The Citadel Press. 1953. Pp. xviii, 285. $4.00.)

In these days, when the new slogan "trade, not aid" is being gingerly bandied back and forth across the Atlantic, the appearance of a thorough and judicious analysis of American foreign aid programs since Pearl Harbor is particularly timely. As such, *American Foreign Assistance,* the product of several years of painstaking research by two distinguished economists under the auspices of The Brookings Institution, should be warmly welcomed alike by government officials and by students of recent American foreign policy.

The Brown-Opie study is a solidly documented volume which traces in detail the evolution of American foreign aid through five overlapping phases: (1) wartime lend-lease and reciprocal aid to our allies; (2) early postwar relief and rehabilitation assistance—both through UNRRA and by subsequent unilateral loans and grants; (3) economic aid for European, and in a limited and somewhat sporadic fashion Far Eastern, recovery—largely through the Marshall Plan; (4) the Point Four program for underdeveloped areas; and (5) the emergence of the Mutual Security program since NATO and Korea. During these twelve fateful years, according to the authors' calculations, "the United States made available approximately $94 billion for programs of assistance to foreign countries in pursuit of the political, military, and economic objectives of its foreign policy" (p. 8). Subtracting loans, the net total of direct grants exceeds $80 billion, roughly half of which represents aid given since the end of World War II. It is with the motivation, administration, impact, and limitations of *postwar* aid activities that the study is primarily concerned. The final section of the book presents a general appraisal of aid policies and operations, including a number of concrete recommendations for the guidance of future US foreign economic policy.

While maintaining a generally sympathetic point of view toward foreign aid goals throughout their study, the authors do not hesitate to intersperse critical evaluations. They note, for example, that except for Point Four all US aid programs were intended as emergency measures, and even Point Four has not been regarded by many members of Congress as a long-range instrument of policy. The observation is made that Washington's wartime estimates of postwar recovery needs proved to be grossly inadequate; also, that the notion that reconstruction could be achieved by loans, without resorting to outright grants, only gradually came to be regarded as unrealistic. With reference to the Marshall Plan, the test of need was mainly dollar deficits which, in the authors' opinion, turned out to be an unsatisfactory criterion since it failed to provide sufficient amounts of assistance to achieve complete recovery, or to supply "proper incentives" to the Europeans to put their own economic house in order. To some readers, among them the present reviewer, this latter judgment, made with the advantage of hindsight, may seem unjustifiably severe. Indeed, the authors themselves in a later passage question "the propriety of . . . efforts by the United States to persuade, press, or coerce its allies to accept objectives that are presumably in the interest of all" (p. 568); and they look upon the Benton amendment to the Economic Recovery Act (designed to promote "free enterprise" in Europe) as an unwise attempt to influence the internal policies of the aid-receiving countries.

Most economists, on the other hand, would agree fully with Brown and Opie's condemnation of the tying of economic aid to the disposal of American agricultural surpluses, not to mention the provision that at least half of the American goods supplied to overseas nations must be transported in American ships. Both of these conditions, it is convincingly shown, had the effect of reducing the capacity of such nations to earn and save dollars and thereby ran counter to the avowed purposes of the Marshall Plan.

The authors of *American Foreign Assistance* are equally critical of the recent tendency to subordinate economic aid to security considerations. The earmarking of counterpart funds for military purposes by the Mutual Security Act of 1951 is singled out for castigation as "undue interference" in the domestic affairs of other countries. In milder vein, the Battle Act (restricting Western trade with Communist-dominated areas) is characterized "as an uneasy compromise between the American and the European views of the effect of such trade on the security of the free world" (p. 233), although the authors admit that the Act was applied by the Administration with marked restraint.

In their overall appraisal of American aid policy, Messrs. Brown and Opie properly emphasize the impressive results it has achieved in overcoming the economic and military weaknesses of the free world community—despite the necessarily improvised and often poorly coordinated administration of much of the policy. Looking ahead, however, they fear that the need for further *non*-military assistance may be underestimated. Point Four, in their judgment, should be continued on a long-term basis and along with it effective arrangements for the provision of capital for economic development will somehow have to be devised. But at best they see little hope that private lending will be sufficient and they are convinced that any substantial renewal of international investment will require intergovernmental action—presumably through the United Nations. The United States, they believe, must lead the way toward a world-wide liberalization of commercial policy and toward general currency convertibility. This is a large order and there are at present few signs that it is likely to be viewed sympathetically in congressional circles.

Raising the World's Standard of Living, by Robert T. Mack, Jr., is of a decidedly lower order of scholarship. Originally submitted as a doctoral dissertation at the University of Chicago, Mr. Mack's study consists largely of a descriptive account of the machinery through which various types of economic and technical assistance have been provided by international agencies (chiefly the United Nations system) and by the United States government. Since most of the research for the study was completed by the middle of 1950, such attention as the author gives to the "expanded" UN program and to US Point Four operations is fragmentary, frequently out-of-date, and not always accurate. The volume contains a mass of documentary information on the legislative history of the UN and US programs and undoubtedly will be useful for background reference purposes. A case study on the handling of foreign aid in Iran, although apparently based entirely on materials available in this country, is perhaps the most valuable feature of the study.

In general, however, it does not really do what its subtitle would lead one to expect, namely, provide a critical appraisal of the "coordination and effectiveness" of current multilateral and bilateral aid programs. Coordination is the recurring theme of each successive chapter—indeed, the term itself is employed almost *ad nauseam*—but one is never quite sure whether the author fully understands its connotation as an overall administrative problem. There is much cursory comment about coordination (though little or nothing on "effectiveness"), yet the reader does not get much insight into the informal dynamics or human aspects of the process.

Unfortunately, Mr. Mack's survey is marred by a verbose and rather pedestrian style, as well as by numerous factual errors. To cite only two: the Hot Springs Conference of 1943 did not, as the author implies, draw up the Constitution of FAO (p. 32); nor is it accurate to claim that the UN Technical Assistance Board "coordinates not only its own members, but also other international, intergovernmental, and regional organizations operating in this field" (p. 113). In noting the role of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, no reference is made to its "productivity" program—probably the most significant of its endeavors from the point of view of Mr. Mack's study, while the economic aid activities of the US Economic Cooperation Administration in Southeast Asia and the Pacific appear to have been completely overlooked.

In this reviewer's opinion, the author would have been well advised to mature his judgments, many of which seem to lack substantive foundation, by further inquiry and reflection following his Ph.D. thesis operations. In its present form, the printed volume impresses the reader with having been hurriedly put together in order to expedite publication. This may be an unfair characterization, but the grandiose title of the study, at any rate, is scarcely warranted. It is regrettable that what might have been an outstanding contribution should treat so important a subject in such a disappointing manner.

WALTER R. SHARP.

Yale University.

Administration in Foreign Affairs. By ARTHUR W. MACMAHON. (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press. 1953. Pp. v, 275. $3.50.)

How much do intelligent laymen, including political scientists not specializing in international relations, need to know about the technical problem of administrative organization for the conduct of foreign affairs? In this instructive treatise, which began as a series of lectures for the Southern Regional Training Program in Public Administration, Professor Macmahon holds that perhaps their first need is to realize that here as elsewhere a little knowledge may be a dangerous thing. "For in foreign affairs especially," he observes, "things never go quite right and there is a constant temptation to seek a scapegoat. If the scapegoat is [alleged to be] the structure, we may bedevil ourselves to the end of time by cherishing the illusion that there is somehow a simple, decisive, frictionless way of arranging the organization. . . . The sickening frequency and now apparently automatic newspaperman's use of the word streamlining are signs enough of the muddy middle ground that must be crossed in achieving a mature sympathy for organization as one of the great resources of a people."

From the standpoint of administration—questions of substantive policy fall outside the scope of the book—the conduct of foreign relations poses a dual problem: how to achieve what Macmahon calls a "concert of judgment" in decision-making in Washington and how to match it by a concert in action on the part of all governmental agencies having responsibilities abroad. Neither of these is easily accomplished. For one thing the United States has yet to become accustomed to participation in foreign affairs on so vast a scale, to providing so much of the necessary initiative and leadership, and (though this confronts all nations more or less alike) to using the methods and working through the machinery of council or parliamentary diplomacy; for another there is the tremendous size of its own establishment. In 1951, for example, there were 167,315 civilians working outside our continental limits. Some 45 per cent were employed in U. S. territories and possessions, yet 91,234 were in foreign countries.

Most of these, to be sure, were aliens performing largely manual services, but 32,475 were American citizens. Among them 20,768 were employed by the Armed Services, 8,390 by the Department of State, and 1,537 by the Mutual Security Agency, which has since been reorganized as the Foreign Operations Administration. A dozen other departments and agencies had smaller though in some cases fairly sizeable numbers.

With regard to improving the concert of judgment at home, Macmahon shows that emphasis on refining administrative adjustments has already produced substantial dividends and concludes that this, rather than the search for some grand new scheme of organization, represents the true line of advance. Let the huge Department of Defense keep plugging away at real unification and thus reduce, for instance, the danger that U.S. officers in N.A.T.O. may find it more difficult to check and clear projects within the Defense establishment than with the Department of State or the Foreign Operations Administration. Let the staff of the Bureau of the Budget go on serving as the "prime institutional catalytic of decision." Let Americans be reconciled to the unlikelihood that the Cabinet will ever become an effective instrument of coordination but note meanwhile that the National Security Council, "in essence a Cabinet Committee," gives promise of being "decisively fruitful." Finally, let no one assume that the President could easily lighten his own enormous burden in this field by the simple expedient of formalizing the position of a high assistant for foreign affairs with which Truman and Harriman experimented. The sounder way, in Macmahon's view, is to "seek the magic of free minds by equipping for creative thinking men rooted in responsibility, especially the Secretary of State himself."

Intelligence studies, cultural exchange, information and economic programs are here to stay, and the proper way for them to be organized is probably "within the framework of a single though suitably decentralized department of foreign affairs." All of them are vital phases of the conduct of foreign affairs and all are manageable within the State Department provided there be no rigid insistence on scalar streamlining. Intelligence is basic but the process involved is "far more patient than mysterious." Though economic operations are often held to pose problems insoluble except by the establishment of an independent agency, the early record of State's Technical Cooperation Administration was so good that it could well have become "the nucleus of an economic operating branch in a composite department."

In view of the near erasure that has been made of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs in recent years, the need for interdepartmental coordination will continue at a premium. Since the War there have never been less than thirty major interdepartmental committees dealing with foreign policy and this general arrangement may be expected to continue. Incidentally, some evidence of the reality of interdepartmental cooperation can be found in the fact that "in a sample of two post-war years only about one-fourth of the United States representatives at nearly four hundred international meetings were from the State Department."

With regard to the integration of the efforts of U. S. agencies and officials abroad, William H. Draper's success as Special Representative in Europe for the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense and the Mutual Security Administrator indicates that it may from time to time and place to place be possible to employ a device of this kind for regional coordination. Yet there can be no doubt that the main responsibility for the unification of our activities abroad must continue to be organized on a country-by-country basis and be vested in the chief diplomatic officer accredited to its government. Lastly, with regard to personnel, Macmahon quotes with approval the view of the advisory committee appointed by Secretary Acheson in 1949: the United States should have "a single personnel system applicable to all people under direct administrative control of the Secretary of State."

JOHN A. VIEG.

Pomona College.

The Advice and Consent of the Senate: A Study of the Confirmation of Appointments by the United States Senate. BY JOSEPH P. HARRIS. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1953. Pp. xii, 457. $5.00.)

The constitutional decisions of the courts usually find their way quickly into the accounts and analyses prepared by those whose business it is to discern the meaning of judicial thought in both its current and historical aspects. Less systematic and less voluminous commentary is the rule with respect to practice in the interpretation of those parts of the Constitution whose content rests on decisions by the political organs of government. One of the resulting gaps in the literature is plugged by Professor Harris' book. He directs his attention to the brief clause empowering the President to nominate, "and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate," appoint "ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments" are not otherwise provided for. So generously has the Senate, on which Professor Harris focuses his treatment, interpreted its authority under this succinct mandate that about 400 pages are required for a rather compressed analysis of practice under the clause.

In the organization of the mass of data on the subject Professor Harris chose to devote about one-half his space to an historical account of actions of the Senate in giving or withholding its advice and consent and the other half to topical analyses. A selective report on practice before this century emphasizes those incidents and cases most significant in the formation and development of senatorial custom. As the story approaches the present day, the account becomes more comprehensive and several spectacular cases are the subjects of notable chapters, such as those on the Brandeis and Olds cases.

The topical chapters both rest on the historical data presented in the first half of the book and report additional relevant materials. Individual chapters are devoted to a codification of Senate precedent and practice in relation to nominations to different categories of offices: cabinet officers and heads of independent agencies, diplomatic officers, judges, and administrative and military officers. One chapter copes with the identification of the exact usages comprised within the rule of senatorial courtesy and another deals with Senate procedure in its "advice and consent."

Long reflection on its record does not necessarily generate an admiration for the Senate. Professor Harris concludes that "on the whole, the requirement of senatorial confirmation has not elevated the standards of appointment to federal offices." Senatorial confirmation has not provided the salutary safeguard "against unfit appointments that Hamilton expected, but has rather confirmed the judgments of Madison and John Adams, who expressed doubts concerning the wisdom of the provision." Professor Harris takes the view that appointments by the President with senatorial confirmation should be so few that both the President and the Senate could know what they are about. He contends, however, not for a substitution of presidential patronage for senatorial patronage but for an extension of the career service.

While Professor Harris is concerned about the proper place of the Senate in the appointing process, he devotes his efforts principally to analysis of practice. The book bears throughout the marks of careful workmanship and will doubtless remain for some time the standard treatment of a question of very considerable significance in the American constitutional system.

V. O. KEY, JR.

Harvard University.

Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality. BY KARL W. DEUTSCH. (Cambridge: The Technology Press, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Pp. x, 292. $5.00.)

Professor Deutsch has several objects in view: giving aid and comfort to a converging assault by specialists in many disciplines upon the scientific understanding of nationalism; stimulating the growth of a body of research knowledge composed of operationally pertinent data; and adding something to the subject on his own account. The first part of the monograph explores a wide range of contributions to the topic of nationalism by historians, political scientists, economists, sociologists, social geographers, social psychologists, linguists, ethnologists, and others. The spirit of the treatment is tolerant and constructive, aiming at translation and fusion rather than separatism. As a means of demonstrating the fruitfulness of his research Professor Deutsch presents four case studies of the languages used in Finland, Bohemia, India and Scotland, which he utilizes to provide an index of assimilation to the ultimate nationality.

The theoretical discussion lays particular emphasis upon some of the conceptions developed in certain branches of communication theory. Engineers concerned with studying telephone and other networks of communication have examined the efficiency with which patterns fed into the nets are reproduced at terminal points. Although the term "information" has crept into the vocabulary of the engineers, the word does not have the connotation of a "meaning." It is restricted to the patterns of sound waves, dots and dashes, and electromagnetic phenomena familiar to physicists. Whatever interferes with the duplication at the output point of the physical pattern fed into the network at the input point is "noise." The term "memory" is borrowed to refer to the storing of past inputs so they may be available at some later point in time than usual. It has been brilliantly shown that communication traffic conforms to fundamental laws of physics, notably entropy (the tendency of order to give way to disorder). Mathematicians working with neurologists have proposed to apply the same mode of analysis to the operation of the brain and the nervous system.

Unfortunately the connection between theories of this kind and nationalism is not demonstrated in Professor Deutsch's study. The potential significance of the diffusion of language patterns is no novelty in the history of the subject. If the author's interest in the study of assimilation was stimulated by communication theory, this was largely a personal accident, since the pertinent hypotheses are readily derivable from standard theories of the phenomena. It is significant that the term "information" as employed by the engineers does not figure in the analysis when Professor Deutsch comes to grips with his topic. He wisely reverts to a more differentiated vocabulary, and undertakes to provide operational specifications for "will," "consciousness," and the like. Similarly the term "memory" is measured by no new indexes. It is postulated rather than demonstrated that "memory" (plus many other meaningful predispositions) is linked with language.

Perhaps the most serious limitation on Professor Deutsch's work comes from disproportionate reliance upon categories that he does not apply, with a resulting deflection of attention from the most promising core of theories of human behavior, namely, those on valuation. If we postulate that human beings act to maximize their net value realizations, the task of theory is to formulate guides to inquiry in which such a phenomenon as nationalism is shown to rise and fall according to a fluctuating pattern of expectation. The perspectives, in turn, need to be related to the attention structures that arise in stated circumstances. The most fruitful formulation of nationalism will connect it with the theory of choice, and especially with the category of choices that concerns politics most directly, namely, the sanctioned choice (decision). In terms of dynamic equilibrium theory, we need a model capable of empirical verification in which nationalism is a changing magnitude in reference to rival "ism" magnitudes (such as localism, regionalism, transnationalism, universalism), and varies as a function of specified systems of change in expectations relating to values incorporated within the self-systems of human beings under specified environmental circumstances (acting upon specified systems of predisposition). Similar specifications are needed for situations involving other values, such as respect and enlightenment (social class; and access to news and interpretative comment).

The point of these remarks is not that Professor Deutsch does not allude at some point to what is at stake, but rather that the lack of emphasis upon the value process leads to a scattered and disproportionate theory. This may help to explain the feebleness of the projections into the future made in the final chapters, and the dogmatism that occasionally intrudes, such as the view on page 51 that a worldwide body politic is impossible.

The affirmative contributions of the book should not be cast in the shadow. Perhaps Professor Deutsch's eclecticism and infectious enthusiasm for research will draw into the circle of productive scholars specialists who would otherwise devote themselves to less important topics. The numerous indications of the kinds of operational indexes pertinent to the study of social and political processes may encourage needed research work. (An excellent example is the enumeration at the beginning of Chapter 5 of some of the indexes suggested by communication studies.) The four cases summarized in Chapter 6 are presented with care and imagination, and are eligible take-off points for many promising inquiries.

HAROLD D. LASSWELL.

Yale University.

Church, State, and Freedom. BY LEO PFEFFER. (Boston: Beacon Press. 1953. Pp. xvi, 675. $10.00.)

The explosive issue of church-state relations—which many in the United States had apparently and somewhat naively thought was dead or at least soundly slumbering—has come more and more to the forefront in the politics, law, and thought of the past two decades. The many legal cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses, controversies turning on the relation of education to religion, such works as the monumental three-volume study of Anson Phelps Stokes, and the several polemics of Paul Blanshard and his critics have served to remind us that the relationship of spirituals to temporals is indeed a perennial and often ubiquitous problem in political and legal theory and in practical politics.

As a scholarly discussion of the whole problem, mainly in the context of American conditions, Leo Pfeffer's study will take high rank. Written by a lawyer and emphasizing the legal issues involved, it is also characterized by a serious interest in problems of political theory and sociology.

The volume is divided into three parts. In the first, the author considers the evolution of what he conceives to be the uniquely American principle of church-state relations and religious freedom. There is a good summary of theory and practice from ancient times to the Reformation; an analysis of the problem and its "solution" in countries other than the United States; and an excellent account of the slow development of the "American principle" from colonial times to the adoption of the First Amendment.

Part Two considers the "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment as it has been interpreted in American thought, law, and political practice. With great erudition, the author examines the issues of state aid to religion, church intervention in state affairs, state intervention in church affairs, the public school and religious education, the "released time" experiment, religious practices in the public schools, state aid to religious education, and "indirect" and federal assistance to education. Pfeffer endeavors to state every point of view as persuasively as possible, usually in the words of the respective advocates themselves. At the same time, he frankly avows his own position, which is that the prohibition of laws "respecting an establishment of religion" was intended to bar, and ought to bar, not only preferential aid to one religion but also state assistance to religion in general. This was the position taken by those most closely associated with the passage of the First Amendment, he maintains, and is also the interpretation which will in the long run permit both state and church to perform their respective functions best.

The text for Part Three is the "religious freedom" clause of the First Amendment, as differentiated from the "establishment of religion" prohibition. Here the author considers the relation of religious freedom to national defense, including the problem of conscientious objection to war; the bearing of the "freedom" guarantee on the protection of public morals; the legal definition of blasphemy and sacrilege; religious freedom and regulation of property; and liberty in relation to marriage and the family, welfare of children, protection against financial insecurity, and the raising of revenue.

At the conclusion of the study Pfeffer offers several "theses" which he believes find "reasonable support" in his researches. Briefly, they include the following: church and state in history have ever tended to compete for the control of human destiny, and while at times church has dominated state, more frequently state has controlled church and used the ecclesiastical organization for its purposes. Before the American experiment "separation of church and state" and "religious freedom" were virtually unknown. While the two notions are sometimes in conflict, on the whole "separation" guarantees freedom and freedom requires "separation." The idea of separation and freedom "was conceived to be as absolute as possible within the limitation of communal society" and the framers of the First Amendment imposed a "moral obligation" on future generations to preserve the experiment. Historical impairments of the principle (which are due to man's imperfections) should not be used to "whittle away" at the "absoluteness" of the First Amendment and, as a matter of fact, to the extent that historical deviations (for example, religious education in the schools) have developed, the evils against which the "fathers" warned have materialized. Basically, however, the American people have been "faithful" to the principle and under its aegis "religion has achieved in the United States a high estate unequalled anywhere else in the world."

On the whole, Pfeffer makes out a good case for most of these propositions. One wonders, though, under what theory the "fathers" could impose on their descendants a "moral obligation" to carry out the ideas of the First Amendment. One might wish, also, that Pfeffer had emphasized more strongly the great difficulties of separating "spiritual" from "temporal" concerns. Then, too, his reading of history seems at some points to be overly simplified.

By and large, however, students of political theory and law, as well as the general reader, will find this a well-written and skilfully organized volume which illuminates what is becoming once more an increasingly acute issue in American politics and thought.

MULFORD Q. SIBLEY.

University of Minnesota.

Politics, Economics, and Welfare. BY ROBERT A. DAHL AND CHARLES E. LINDBLOM. (New York: Harper & Bros. 1953. Pp. 526. $5.00.)

This is an important book, in part because it represents a far-flung, pioneering venture in the joint use of the tools of political science and economics, and in part because it applies the tools of these two disciplines to the concept of economic planning, which is defined as "an attempt at rational calculation and control in the use of scarce resources."

The keystone of the book is the cogently-argued thesis that the great issues of socialism versus captialism, planning versus nonplanning, and welfare state versus laissez faire simply do not exist. The possibilities for rational social action depend not upon our choice among mythical grand alternatives but largely upon choice among particular social techniques. In fact, the central core of both classic liberalism and classic socialism is the belief "in the possibility of achieving progress in extending freedom and equality through man's capacity for rational calculation and control."

The authors attempt a systematic analysis of rational calculation and control. They discuss aids to calculation, mechanisms for setting goals, and basic control techniques and processes. They devote the bulk of the book to four central socio-political processes required for economizing: price system (control of and by leaders); hierarchy (control by leaders); polyarchy (control of leaders); and bargaining (control among leaders). "Any complete society intelligently bent on using its resources efficiently must, unavoidably, make some use of all forms of them . . . ."

Among the most useful aspects of the book is a detailed comparison of the advantages of the price system and hierarchy. The values of a price system are many. It makes rational calculation easier by providing a common denominator of values and by "delegating" decisions to a large number of persons. It also facilitates various forms of control. It is "a mechanism by which leaders can through payment of wages, rents, interest, and other money rewards, induce workers and other holders of resources to submit to hierarchical control within the enterprise . . . [and] through which leaders control consumers so that they do not attempt to consume more production than is available." At the same time, businessmen can be controlled by consumer and occupational choice, by competition (particularly through substitution), by bargaining, and by the hierarchical controls of government. These controls operate to an important extent even under conditions of monopoly and group efforts to set prices and divide markets. In fact, the customary pricing routines of business are "sometimes an intelligent approach to marginalism in the face of uncertainty." There is even a role for the price system in socialist societies and in nationalized industries.

The greatest limitation of the price system is that it is "a highly specialized process and adaptable to a much narrower range of problems than is the case for the other processes." In the case of such sharable services as education and national defense, "high cost to individuals makes choice through the price system wholly inefficient." Price system rewards cannot be used for some ends, such as attracting men into the armed services. When private system rewards can be used effectively, they may have too explosive an effect upon the distribution of national income. Or else the existing distribution of income will require collective allocation or subsidization. Third party damages from market transactions may be both widespread and serious. Also, people often wish to escape market choice because it takes too much time or leads to a breakdown of standards they would like to see enforced. "Price system choice and allocation may operate at an extremely low level of rationality." In all real world price systems, control over entrepreneurs is always imperfect. The effectiveness of a price system for choice and allocation is sharply reduced by either inflation or depression.

Bureaucratic organization, on the other hand, is "often the indispensable means by which a small number of individuals can coordinate the actions of a large number." Its use is essential when the desired amount of coordination cannot be achieved through face-to-face contact, a free confederacy, reciprocal or spontaneous controls, or the price system. It is needed to handle complex operations and to obtain the maximum advantage from the division of labor. It also comes into being because of "the desire for status and control as ends" and "a cultural bias in favor of deliberate, conscious efforts at an apparently rational adaptation of means to ends."

But bureaucracy has three major weaknesses. First, bureaucracies are often wasteful of resources. Yet "in a wide variety of situations the internal economies of business bureaucracies are more than offset by the external costs they create, and the internal wastes of government bureaucracies are more than offset by the external social gains." Second, hierarchy is likely to produce serious inequalities in human dignity and political power. Third, it is likely to escape both internal and external controls. In addition, it suffers from such minor weaknesses as red tape, passing the buck, rigidity, impersonality, and overcentralization.

These weaknesses of bureaucracy cannot be overcome merely by replacing business hierarchies with government hierarchies (or vice versa), or by new rules (which usually mean more red tape). The more important prerequisites for the successful use of hierarchy are social acceptance of it, more political controls, some degree of decentralization to small groups, and above all supplementation through the price system. Both hierarchy and the price system, in turn, must be supplemented by polyarchic and bargaining processes.

The authors' treatment of these subjects will raise many questions. To this reviewer a central question is whether rational social action should not be viewed as an aspect of the general social process of group organization and conflict. Another is whether it is not essential to study the divergent objectives of different groups and the sources and uses of whatever power they are able to wield. If the answer to both these questions is affirmative, then much of the book's systematic framework diminishes in importance and many of the valuable analyses and insights in the book can become truly fruitful only when seen in a new and broader perspective.

Yet the many questions which the book suggests can be of tremendous value to the future development of the social sciences and—as this reviewer has already discovered by putting the book to use in a graduate seminar—to the promotion of creative thinking among advanced students. With a sense of historical perspective the authors write in their preface that "one way to measure the progress of a science of political economy is by the degree to which a book of this kind becomes obsolete." Without suggesting undue optimism concerning the pace of progress, this reviewer suggests that political scientists and economists tap this rich vein of ore as quickly and thoroughly as possible.

BERTRAM M. GROSS.

Jerusalem, Israel.

Flood Control Politics: The Connecticut River Valley Problem, 1927–1950. BY WILLIAM EDWARD LEUCHTENBERG. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1953. Pp. vi, 339. $5.00.)

This case study of floods, flood control, and politics in the Connecticut River Valley over a twenty-three year period closes with a three-fold answer to the question: "Why in a region which prides itself on its attention to public issues, in a region where river valley development has been a controversial question for more than two decades, is the record so poor? Why has so little been done? Why has so much that has been done been done so badly?" The author concludes:

> Much of the explanation lies in the practice of assigning responsibility for water resources to a number of federal agencies, each isolated from the rest, often working at cross purposes, with no fixed responsibility for developing a coordinated program. . . .
>
> A second reason for the poor record of the Connecticut Valley during this period stems from the inadequacy of individual state action and the limitations of the compact device. . . .
>
> A final reason for the failure to develop the Connecticut River Valley stems from the inclination of economic interests and political parties to turn every water resources problem into an ideological dispute, to view every question, no matter how technical, as a moral issue.

In arriving at this assessment, the author has documented his statements meticulously. A total of 745 notes and a 33-page bibliography support the twelve chapters tracing the history of the Valley. The book constitutes a detailed examination of what has gone on during the past quarter-century, and will be a definite source of interest to all students of water resources development and its politics, whether they agree with the conclusions or not. Throughout the book, the documentation seems to support the theses that the investor-financed public utilities frequently exercised a controlling influence on the actions of state governments; that the Army Engineers were both inept and expedient in their handling of problems entrusted to them; that the interstate compact device is not satisfactory for handling the problems of development of an interstate stream; and that full federal control of water resource development is the only sound answer.

Early in the book it is stated that when Franklin Roosevelt took office in 1933 there was no national water policy. The author could well have pointed out that today there is equally no explicit national water policy.

Many of the weaknesses of the 1936 Flood Control Act are set forth, with the statement that President Roosevelt's advisers were well aware of them and that the President must bear much of the responsibility for the 1936 Act. Another writer has recently indicated that the Administration does not appear to have been alerted to the important policy implications of that Act until late in April of 1936, less than two months before the bill was passed and signed.

While the author does not pretend to competence in the field of engineering, he appears to assume that control of floods in the Connecticut Valley necessitates the construction of reservoirs. At one point, a definite question is raised as to engineering:

> Yet the Army Engineers must bear the burden either of having advocated a plan of flood control that would needlessly have flooded one of the loveliest valleys in New England, when a perfectly feasible alternative proposal existed, or having agreed to a final, "compromise" plan which failed to provide adequate flood protection for the lower valley. The War Department first asserted that it was impossible to go up the feeder brooks and build dams that would give adequate protection and then agreed to a proposal that did just that. Moreover, if a high flood control dam was required on the West River, then hydro-electric power could have been developed, and the final compromise sacrificed power as well.

No question is raised or discussed in the book as to whether all the flood protection that is economically sound for the Valley might not be provided by the construction of levees, flood walls, and other local protective works at the seven major urban damage centers in Massachusetts and Connecticut. Perhaps an exploration of this question would show that, notwithstanding the great dramatic impact of a serious flood or hurricane, the economics of flood damage reduction (not flood control) would not warrant the kind of program that the high dam (and public power) advocates support. It is possible that such consideration has affected state participation in the federal proposals.

It is particularly timely that this extensive and detailed study should become available while a proposal for adoption of the interstate compact device as an approach to solution of the Missouri River problems is actively under consideration, and when a Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government has assigned one of its task forces to examine the whole federal activity concerned with water resources and power.

There probably will be many who will not agree with the author's conclusion when he says: "In the last analysis, the President was correct when he wrote Cross in 1937 that water resources were not properly the subject of interstate compacts but of federal legislation."

Nevertheless, the book should bring to mind a warning in the task force report on natural resources made for the first Hoover Commission: "If the consolidations recommended by the Committee . . . are not carried into action, and if present competition among federal resources agencies continues, it will in all probability be necessary to establish regional authorities."

And, there is another prediction that was made in December, 1952 by a subcommittee of the Committee on Public Works of the United States House of Representatives: "If conflicts among the agencies cannot be resolved with the existing distribution of functional responsibilities, the subcommittee believes it probably will invite the consideration of a new approach for the resolution of the many conflicts."

In any event, the experience of the quarter-century described by the author should provide lessons that must be heeded if water resource development is to be successfully prosecuted and, particularly, if the states and local governments are to bear a larger share of the work.

CHARLES D. CURRAN.

Washington, D. C.

Public Policy: A Yearbook of the Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University, 1953. EDITED BY C. J. FRIEDRICH AND J. K. GALBRAITH. (Cambridge: Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard. 1953. Pp. xi, 292. $4.75.)

This is the fourth volume in a series which was begun in 1940, and is now being resumed after interruption by the war. The first volume stated that its purpose was to make available studies growing out of the Littauer seminar program, and this is still the major idea, though the 1953 volume invites "critical studies of limited areas of policy" from any members of the profession for future issues.

The reviewer has the problem that always arises in dealing with a symposium, complicated here by the absence of any unifying theme. To be sure, the first four essays are on subsidy problems, the next four are on problems of the bureaucracy, and the final four are grouped as studies in comparative government and civil rights. But the essays in each group are related only in a very episodic fashion, so that one is reduced to talking about the individual contributions or about the general questions raised by such a publication. This review will try to do a little of both.

The group of essays on bureaucracy is headed by Arthur Maass' brilliant discussion of the weakness of the Budget Bureau as a policy staff for the President. The Bureau's dilemma results from the fact that operating agencies look to it for indications as to whether their proposals are "in accord with the program of the President," whereas in many cases no definite policy line has been laid down. Recognizing the impossibility of going to the President on each day-to-day problem that arises, the Bureau tends, Maass says, to "muddle through," to try to mediate differences so that there will be no policy conflict which has to go to the President. Lacking in both authority and professional knowledge as to substantive policy questions, the Bureau tends to interest itself in the institutional manifestations of problems, leaving basic program conflicts unresolved. Maass goes on to indicate why the Bureau, characterized by the parochialism and caution of a career bureaucracy, cannot possibly function as a top policy staff, and concludes with some suggestions as to how such a staff might be organized.

The outstanding essay in the third section is Robert G. McCloskey's brief but incisive analysis of three governmental areas, all appropriately exploited by the McCarran Act, where current constitutional doctrines permit exercise of "arbitrary power"—control of the mails, of public employees, and of aliens. McCloskey discusses the reasons given for judicial self-limitation in these areas, and concludes that arbitrary power is so much the exception in the American governmental system that a re-thinking of the judicial policy is justified.

These two essays, plus several others on which space is lacking for comment, far outweigh a few meaningless pieces in the volume, but do they justify the claim of the work to the status of a yearbook in the field of public policy? Obviously it would not be feasible to attempt to make the issues discussed representative of the policy issues faced by the United States during the year in question. But on whatever ground the policy issues covered are selected, the purpose of the volume, considering its auspices, should certainly be to advance the systematic study of public policy. It is difficult to believe that such a purpose has been served here. Before long it would seem appropriate for the editors to vary their pattern by including some analysis of the lessons learned by the Harvard seminars and the most fruitful methods discovered for tackling public policy problems. The kind of hard thinking which Harold Stein and his Committee on Public Administration Cases put into the development of the case concept might be equally effective here.

C. Herman Pritchett.

University of Chicago.

The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics, 1918–1945. By John W. Wheeler-Bennett. (London: Macmillan & Co.; and New York: St. Martin's Press. 1953. Pp. xvi, 829. $12.00.)

A monumental work in which the author of *Hindenburg: The Wooden Titan, Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace,* and *Munich: Prologue to Tragedy* has finally come to grips with the central fact in German politics, the German Army—state within the state. Here the student of history and politics finds an encyclopedic coverage of events in the German arena based on painstaking research as well as personal contacts and observations by the author. The copious footnotes and appended biographical data contain an exhaustive "who's who" in German politics and as such represent an invaluable commentary on the events and the literature of the times. With his noted literary skill, the author has woven into the story of the Army a history of the Weimar Republic, a description of the rise and fall of National Socialism, an excellent account of the German resistance movement, and a discussion of major phases of World War II. He has been able to utilize many important documents hitherto available only in widely separated archives, collections of personal papers, memoirs, periodical literature of several countries, and the records of the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials. It is regrettable that he was not in a position to make use of the von Seeckt and Stresemann papers, which are now available to the public in the United States.

The study commences with an examination of the position held by the Army at the end of World War I and finds that already in 1918 an "umbilical cord" existed "which bound the infant Weimar Republic to its progenitor and protector, the German Army." Soon the Army, under von Seeckt's leadership, assumed a role of supreme arbiter in the state. The magic formula which so consistently enabled the generals to wield political power with impunity was the simple pronouncement: "The Government does not have the confidence of the Army." The generals believed that the same formula could be employed with equal facility once their creation, Hitler, had outlived his usefulness. They discovered, to their everlasting regret, that in Hitler they had met their Nemesis. Once power had slipped from their grasp, some generals and a larger number of officers of lesser rank attempted to turn back the clock by joining in conspiracies against the totalitarian regime. Their attempts, valiant but quixotic and disorganized, terminated in the bloodbaths of July and August, 1944.

As a work on the German Army, and as a study of armed forces in politics, the book is indispensable reading. It is, in addition, a real literary achievement. This reviewer has but one major criticism: throughout the book, the "Army" is equated with "the Generals." This may be methodologically sound in view of the extraordinary discipline which prevailed in the old German Army. However, it seems to be debatable whether it is sound to equate certain officers of the old guard with the Army of post-1938 days. It is especially debatable whether from 1939 on the Army command was as preoccupied with the contemplation of attempts on Hitler's life as the author's preoccupation with the resistance element seems to imply. Could it be that Wheeler-Bennett succumbed to a literary temptation to emphasize the exceptional doings of exceptional men over the relatively drab routine of an Army at war?

HENRY L. BRETTON.

University of Michigan.

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography. By John A. Garraty. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1953. Pp. xxiv, 433. $6.00.)

This is a successful biography. The author had access to the Lodge papers and set out to recreate Lodge's point of view, realizing that the Senator was a controversial figure and that as an author he should avoid "the twin perils of the whitewash and the tar barrel." The gentleman from Massachusetts, known as "the scholar in politics," was elected six times to the Senate and so might qualify under Tom Reed's definition of a statesman as "a successful politician who is dead"; but this revealing record fails to prove the rating. Henry Cabot Lodge was a diligent and expert partisan, a highly trained and intelligent worker with the raw material of politics, and an effective operator of legislative techniques.

A third of this book is devoted to "one of the great rivalries of American history." The Lodge-Wilson conflict over the Versailles Treaty and League of Nations Covenant is intimately, accurately, and comprehensively told in these pages, largely in Lodge's words. There was a mutual antipathy between Wilson and Lodge, not so much personal on Lodge's side as political, for in Mr. Garraty's words—which I can confirm from Lodge himself—he regarded Democrats in power as "incompetent to transact the nation's business in a responsible way" (p. 127). In his Republican conscience Lodge knew the Democrats were going to fight the war and win the peace in the wrong way, and they largely met his expectations. He was too serious and "patriotic" not to agree or even commend when they acted right (according to his ideas). He cooled on the league of peace idea, which could easily be overdone, and he found that Wilson overdid it. Tactically, as Republican leader, Lodge's partisan task was to impose Republican coloration on a treaty and League of Nations negotiated by a Democrat. As a broker of votes in the Senate's factions he assembled the specifications, and in the end was able to point to votes which indicated that Wilson's stubbornness prevented his having a treaty made safe for the United States by the persistent efforts of Republicans. It was a very competent major operation of the parliamentary order which disregarded the merits of the patient. Lodge's maneuvering to a successful issue is narrated with very few omissions, though the biographer, like his subject, pays very minor attention to the substance of the reservations which would or would not yield the majorities Lodge required. It is ironical, though a tribute to the inherent integrity of America, that Lodge's success in defeating an irrepressible idea marked a progressive decline in his party prestige.

Lodge was a politician the like of whom is in short supply. A well-bred, educated intellectual of independent means, he deliberately embarked on a career of public service in which there was never "a private interest which in the remotest way conflicted with or affected my performance of my public duties" (p. 282). He was in politics for 45 of his 74 years, 37 in Congress, of which 31 were in the Senate. He learned party loyalty and "practical" politics under the lash of opposition and defeat provoked by men of his own ilk, Charles W. Eliot among them. He was married to a remarkable woman, and his contemporaries divided his career into two parts marked by her death in 1915; he grew in stature with her and was less sure of himself without her.

Mr. Garraty, in using the Lodge papers, had the benefit of the memories and criticism of the Senator's grandsons. The Senator's namesake contributed some footnotes on the League fight, including one (pp. 379–82) to vindicate his grandfather's views. Senator Lodge, who sought no higher office, had his name on no legislation, but he helped mold much of the enactments of a generation in which he was a leader of his party. For all the doings of the scholar, the politician, or the man, Mr. Garraty has diligently dug out of the Lodge papers a first-hand account, seasoning the record with observations with which the normal reader will invariably agree. Seldom has the political scientist had so complete a revelation of a public man's devotion to his country as controlled by the demands of a party which he helped to formulate.—Denys P. Myers, *Washington, D. C.*

Federal Examiners and the Conflict of Law and Administration. By Lloyd D. Musolf. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1953. Pp. xii, 203. $3.00.)

The increasing use of the hearing officer in federal regulatory activities, and the controversy about administrative justice culminating in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, provide the context of this study of federal examiners. Nearly a score of federal agencies have hearing officers who come within the term "examiner" as used in the Act. Perhaps the most controversial of these have been the NLRB trial examiners, although examiners play a significant role in the procedures of the FTC, CAB, FCC, FPC, SEC, ICC, and Department of the Interior, as well as several other agencies.

What makes the study of the examiner's office of more than ordinary interest to the student of law and administration is that it relates directly and dramatically to the whole controversy over the nature and scope of administrative justice. The familiar complaint that administrative justice tends to unite in one agency the functions of judge, jury, and prosecutor—and the fact that the complaint sometimes has considerable substance—has tended to focus attention on the few hundred federal examiners who find themselves at the center of this whirlwind. It is precisely in the role of the examiner and his relationship to the other officers in the agency that the practical application of the "separation of functions" drive tends to center. Is the function of the examiner properly analogous to that of a trial judge, in that he is a professionally disinterested man chosen for his judge-like qualities who is to make an initial decision on the law and the facts? This the author calls the "court tradition." Or is his role properly that of furnishing one element in a continuous and institutional process through which the agency as a whole arrives at an administrative determination required to carry out established policy? This the author calls the "agency tradition." If it is the first, he must be given a considerable degree of independence from influence by agency heads, he must be virtually isolated from other staff members in preparing his recommendations, and he must be precluded from having any part in the framing of final agency decisions. If it is the second, consultation with other staff members is proper and desirable, and participation in the final decision-making is useful.

A review of experience in the various agencies shows a wide variety of actual practice with respect to the central questions regarding the examiner's role, particularly those having to do with his isolation and his independence. The impact of the Administrative Procedure Act on this rather unstandardized situation is summarized as follows: (1) it tends to enhance the examiner's powers in the direction of giving his report the finality of a trial judge's decision; (2) it exalts the examiner's decision through requiring that it be in writing, be accompanied by reasons, be served on the parties for comment, and be made a part of the formal record of the case. One result has been that the Supreme Court and other federal courts have increasingly been willing to reverse agency findings on the basis of examiners' reports, and in effect to uphold the examiner against the agency as though he were a trial court and the agency an intermediate appellate court. The author rightly regards this as an undesirable tendency which endangers the responsibilities of the regulatory agency.

Today, the conception of the examiner's function is "in turmoil." This has perhaps arisen out of a justifiable drive to strengthen the examiner to assure adequate performance. But in doing this, "adherents of the court tradition have either inadequately perceived or deliberately ignored the consequences for the system of agency responsibility for regulation" (p. 137). The danger is that recent judicial decisions (notably the *Universal Camera Case* in 1951) will place excessive emphasis on the examiners as trial courts and will encourage them to "go it on their own" in disregard of the importance of agency policy-making. This, in the opinion of the author, is not required by a moderate interpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act, within the framework of which it will be possible to secure a proper balance in the examiner's office. Such a development awaits an understanding of all the factors involved and "the exercise of restraint by all concerned."—VINCENT M. BARNETT, JR., *Williams College.*

The Legislative Process in Congress. BY GEORGE B. GALLOWAY. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1953. Pp. xii, 689. $6.00.)

This book is "a successor to, rather than a revision of," the writer's earlier work—*Congress at the Crossroads*, published in 1946, which consisted of 374 pages in contrast to the present 689 pages. Extensive new material is added taking into account the operation of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Twenty-five chapters take the place of the original eleven, and there has been a thorough rearrangement of the subject matter. Some new chapters greatly expand a number of subjects dealt with briefly in the earlier work, such as the committee system and its operation, the organization and procedure of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and the party organization within Congress. Other new chapters on control of expenditures and foreign relations, Congress and public opinion, the role of the individual congressman, Congress and the courts, and pressure politics take up matters not previously given much if any consideration. Part Four contains three chapters entitled: "The Operation of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946"; "Proposed Reforms in Congressional Investigations"; and "New Steps in Congressional Reform." Without doubt, the author's long and close relationship with Congress has placed him in a unique position to produce what is the most comprehensive, up-to-date, and useful single volume on the national lawmaking body. The book is indispensable for all students of American government and of the American legislative process.—O. DOUGLAS WEEKS, *The University of Texas.*

Civil Rights in Immigration. BY MILTON R. KONVITZ. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1953. Pp. xii, 216. $3.50.)

The Cornell Studies in Civil Liberty were initiated in 1946 with the publication of Konvitz's *The Alien and the Asiatic in American Law.* The most recent addition to this series is by the same author and, in part at least, on the same subject. Instead of revising his earlier book following the passage of the McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act in 1952, he decided to write a new one on the subject of discrimination in American legislation relating to the alien. This he does in three chapters dealing with admission and exclusion, deportation, and naturalization.

In these three chapters the author briefly reviews the historical development of the American policy of discrimination against the alien on account of race, color, creed, opinion, and national origin, with particular reference to the post-World War II period. The result is a critical evaluation of present policy as embodied in recent congressional legislation. The national origins formula is "most offensive" from the standpoint of both civil liberties and human rights. Aliens are sent back to their native country like "parcel post." A ten-year ineligibility for naturalization for former members of the Communist party "is too far-reaching a sword." From these and other criticisms there can be little dissent.

On the constructive side the author makes a number of recommendations, some of which go further than those of the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization (1953). He suggests, for example, application of the Administrative Procedure Act to entry and exclusion, as well as deportation, cases; expulsion of aliens only where entry was fraudulent or illegal; and elimination of all but constitutional distinctions between native-born and naturalized citizens.

For the political scientist this little volume is a useful addition to the literature of civil rights in the United States. It may not be as objective or neutral as some persons would like, but perhaps, as the author points out in his preface, it may be more desirable to aim at strengthening the reader's power of conviction and his sense of social responsibility.—L. V. HOWARD, *Tulane University.*

American Constitutional Custom: A Forgotten Factor in the Founding. BY BURLEIGH CUSHING RODICK. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1953. Pp. xx, 244. $4.75.)

It is the purpose of this study to show that "there is scarcely a single important feature of our American political system that does not bear the imprint of an earlier European tradition" (p. 1). While this debt to tradition is generally accepted as a fact, it is accepted uncritically and without sufficient appreciation of its extent. Professor Rodick, therefore, makes no small contribution in his extensive documentation of what is, if not entirely "a forgotten factor," one too seldom given its proper weight. It is not until the Jeffersonian revolution of 1800 and the subsequent western expansion that definitely indigenous political habits and customs have any appreciable development (p. 101). Prior to this beginning in the early nineteenth century of a definitely American constitutional tradition, there is practically no feature of our constitutional system without its English precedent. The electoral college was one of the very few exceptions, and to Professor Rodick it is significant that this exceptional feature was one of the first to fall into disuse (pp. 86–87).

Some of the analogies which the author draws between English history and our own would seem, however, to be somewhat accidental. It is one thing to point out that our political theory, at least directly, is almost wholly English in origin. It is something else to draw a parallel between the Uxbridge Conference in 1644 and the Staten Island Conference in 1776 or to brand the defection of Charles Lee as the American counterpart of the plot of Edmund Waller (p. 49). The similarity of these events would seem to be entirely the result of historical accident and while the drawing of such parallels or similarities may add to the interest of the study, it contributes very little to the support of the central thesis.

In the concluding chapter Professor Rodick raises the question of why tradition was the cardinal element in our founding, why the Fathers were motivated as they were. His conclusion is that adherence to habit, custom, and tradition is one aspect of the general problem of emotional drives, and that this adherence is inseparable from such drives as acquisitiveness, gregariousness, fear, ego, religion, the procreative impulse, desire for the good life, etc. It is further concluded that changes in habit, custom, and tradition are occasioned, at least in part, by the operation of such political forces as "the stake in society principle, the iron law of oligarchy, the abuse of political power and the swing of the political pendulum" (pp. 126–28). With reference to this discussion the reviewer is in agreement with the statement of Henry Adams, quoted at the beginning of the chapter: "politics cannot stop to study psychology." It would seem sufficient that it appreciate what Professor Rodick makes so abundantly clear—that the forces of continuity and change are in constant conflict, and that while we are capable to a degree of breaking the bonds of our experience, we should do so with great caution. What is always to be sought is such a balance of these two forces as will serve the general welfare (p. 132). The problem remains of how, at any one time and place, this balance is to be effected. Here again tradition is possibly our best guide, and to the understanding of that tradition the present study is a significant contribution. It discharges quite adequately the duty which it assigns the student of political traditions: it traces "the elements of continuity in those customs that appear to be new, and the elements of change beneath the appearance of their continuity" (p. 132).—Frank Grace, *University of Michigan.*

The Decline of Agrarian Democracy. By Grant McConnell. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1953. Pp. 226. $3.75.)

Agrarian democracy, in the author's view, existed in America in the 19th century, when the farmers were in the majority or nearly so. It found political expression in mass movements like the Populist party whose programs were broadly conceived in the general interest and had as their goal the limitation or fragmentation of power. The decline of agrarian democracy is equated with the growth of a power structure within agriculture itself, beginning with the county agent and the extension services of the land grant colleges and reaching its apex in the American Farm Bureau Federation. This, then, is a critical history and analysis of the Farm Bureau movement.

What is most impressive about the story, which is told with economy of detail but thorough documentation, is the sure political instinct of the Farm Bureau leadership which has understood the sources of its own strength and known how to protect them. Mr. McConnell sees the A.F.B.F. as a federation of federations of local farm elites, which despite the diversity of their regional and commodity interests have been unified by the national organization on a class basis (they are "superior farmers," in the Farm Bureau's words). Their power is consolidated through control of the publicly-subsidized county agents and extension services. Protection of this "decentralized" machinery for serving and controlling the farmers thus has been the central concern of the Farm Bureau; new farm programs must be administered through it or be destroyed. The account of the battles waged to this end sheds much light on the current farm controversies which rack the Congress and the Administration.

The book really has no conclusion. The author laments the passing of "agrarian democracy," which he knows is final. He sees cause for alarm in "the fact that the conditions of power exclude so large a part of the farm population from the benefits of the political process," and in this he is surely right. But this is by no means exclusively a farm problem. None of the great power groups in our pluralistic society represent more than a fraction of the people for whom they purport to speak. The problem of how to get adequate representation for the unorganized promises to worry us for a long time.—Ralph K. Huitt, *University of Wisconsin.*

Texas Presidential Politics in 1952. By O. Douglas Weeks. (Austin: Institute of Public Affairs, The University of Texas.

1953. Pp. x, 116. Paper, $1.25; cloth, $2.00.)

O. Douglas Weeks was chief Texas correspondent for the A.P.S.A.'s Cooperative Research Project on Convention Delegations in 1952. Bravely addressing himself to the staggering task of reporting on the nominating process for both parties in the state's 254 counties, he set up a clipping service on the 16 principal newspapers of the state and enlisted the cooperation of political scientists throughout the state as observers of various conventions. Countless interviews provided the rest of the data.

The book begins with a summary of Texas politics in the preceding eight years and an explanation of the convention system through which the delegates to the presidential conventions are chosen. There follows the account of the struggle from precinct to county to state conventions. The system in both parties creaked under the strain of a great rush of new voters, but the confusion was greater on the Republican side. Until 1952 the party had been a small, exclusive club; now several hundred thousand voters wanted to make it a part of the electoral process. The book's most entertaining reading deals with the unblushing fraud with which Taft-oriented leaders threw out the Eisenhower majorities from the county and state conventions.

Other chapters cover Texas in the national conventions, the campaign in the state, and an analysis of the election results. The author concludes with some penetrating skepticism about the likelihood of the election foreshadowing a real two-party system with Republican candidates for county treasurer and sheriff. When the Eisenhower Administration appointed bolting Texas Democrats to cabinet and subcabinet posts (Hobby and Anderson), it did not encourage the growth of the party in Texas. Many parts of the Texas election law are serious obstacles to the party. Finally, so long as Texas conservatives retain a firm grip on the state Democratic party, it is not necessary for them to organize a second conservative party.—DONALD S. STRONG, *University of Alabama.*

Renewing Our Cities. BY MILES L. COLEAN. (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund. 1953. Pp. x, 181. $2.50.)

Miles Colean draws on his long experience with municipal planning and housing to take a broad view of the problem of forestalling and eliminating urban blight. His book is packed with revealing insights and practical suggestions for action in an area where only the valiant presume to see light.

The basic assumption is that a city resembles an organism in having a "natural" course of development which, if not interrupted, will result in constant renewal of its physical and economic structure. When blight occurs, some obstacle to this renewal has, perforce, intervened. The problem of renewal is, then, simply the identification and elimination of the obstacle to new investment. He summarizes typical obstacles, including lack of sanitary and occupancy laws, air pollution, noise, low quality of municipal services, high level of taxes, traffic congestion, strangulation of cities through archaic municipal boundaries, multiplicity of independent political jurisdictions, dispersed ownership, false values, fallacious zoning, resistance to changes in established social relations, shortage of adequate housing, racial prejudice, improper building codes, low yield on new property as compared with other types of investment, poor potentialities for reuse, and high cost of renewal operations. Such substantial causes, surely, are quite sufficient to discourage new investment where the conditions suggested occur. It may be questioned, however, whether these may not be more or less omnipresent outgrowths of the pace of technology beyond social enlightenment at the present point in the history of American society. To think of them as unnatural obstacles to an otherwise smoothly running economic mechanism reflects a theory which has long since lost most of its adherents.

Colean concludes with a nine-point program designed to insure the removal of the roadblocks noted. Despite its uncertain theoretical basis, those interested in improving urban living could hardly fail to profit by a reading of this little book.—ROBERT T. DALAND, *University of Alabama.*

Congressional Quarterly: Almanac, 83rd Congress, 1st Session—1953. Vol. IX. (Washington: Congressional Quarterly News Features. 1954. Pp. 663. $17.50.)

For the first time the *CQ Almanac* is made available for separate purchase to those who do not subscribe to the *CQ* weekly service. It contains a concise summary of the year on Capitol Hill, including all legislative steps, individual voting records, lobby registrations, election percentages, costs of electing the Congress, reorganization orders, box score on the

President's program, and many other matters, making it altogether a complete reference manual for the first year of the 83rd Congress.

The Forging of American Socialism: Origins of the Modern Movement. By HOWARD H. QUINT. (Columbia, S. C.: University of South Carolina Press. 1953. Pp. ix, 409. $6.00.)

This is a detailed account of conflicting and cooperating groups and ideologies which, in 1901, were forged into the American Socialist party. The reader becomes acquainted with persons who have been, if in memory at all, merely names. Issues of doctrine and program between the many "radical" groups which attempted to get a foothold in United States politics, in the organized labor movement, or among "people of good will" are clearly pointed. The author refuses to be tempted into lateral trails from which interest in socialism emerged. Setting the story of social questioning in the environment in which it was nourished might have made the socialist movements seem less isolated from the main stream of American history than they appear to be. The volume well repays reading by anyone interested in increasing his comprehension of the rich variegation of our national past.

Farm Policies of the United States, 1790–1950: A Study of Their Origins and Development. By MURRAY R. BENEDICT. (New York: Twentieth Century Fund. 1953. Pp. xv, 548. $5.00.)

A detailed and interpretive analysis of the evolution of the varied policies of government affecting agriculture and of farmer participation in politics. Although earlier policies as to land, money, tariffs, and internal improvements are adequately summarized, over half of the volume deals with the last 25 years and a closing chapter points up the issues for the future.

Resource Conservation: Economics and Policies. By S. V. CIRIACY-WANTRUP. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1952. Pp. xi, 395. $6.50.)

An analysis of the problem of conservation; of forces affecting depletion or conservation, such as tenancy, tax and credit systems; of the objectives and criteria of conservation policy; and of the techniques for implementing policy.

American Life: Dream and Reality. By W. LLOYD WARNER. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1953. Pp. xv, 268. $3.75.)

As a summary for the general reader of twenty years of research on community studies, by the author of the Yankee City series, this book is disappointing. Some aspects of the American scene (*Reality*) are analyzed from a social-status or class-structure point of view, but "our hopes for a realizable future" (p. vii, *Dream*) are ignored. The promise is enticing, but the product is weak.

The Political Liberalism of the New York Nation: *1865–1932.* By ALAN PENDLETON GRIMES. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 1953. Pp. ix, 133.)

A review of the contribution to American political thought of the New York *Nation* over a period of nearly seventy years. The writer believes that because of a sufficient continuity of editorial policy, this periodical reflects at least one rather definite evolving segment of liberal political thought in the United States.

Olson's New Deal for California. By ROBERT E. BURKE. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1953. Pp. xi, 279. $4.00.)

The story of the only Democratic state administration in California during the twentieth century, that of Culbert L. Olson from 1938 to 1942, which, while unable to put through its principal reform policies, helped to give the Democratic party a new importance in California politics.

Impatient Crusader: Florence Kelley's Life Story. By JOSEPHINE GOLDMARK. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1953. Pp. xii, 217. $3.50.)

An account of the career of an indefatigable social reformer, Florence Kelley (1871–1932), who worked as Chief Inspector of Factories for Illinois, in Hull House and the Henry Street Settlement, and as General Secretary of the National Consumer's League, and had a part in founding the U. S. Children's Bureau, the National Woman Suffrage Association, and the National Child Labor Committee. She also rendered valuable assistance to Louis D. Brandeis.

Propaganda Handbook. By D. LINCOLN HARTER AND JOHN SULLIVAN. (Philadelphia: Twentieth Century Publishing Co. 1953. Pp. 440. $5.00.)

A manual of the art of propaganda which devotes considerable space to the techniques and media of the propagandist and embodies in part a case study approach.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE
University of Maryland

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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

Governmental Liability: A Comparative Study. By H. Street. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 1953. Pp. iv, 223. $5.00.)

In the field of political responsibility, the maxim "The King can do no wrong" has long been paralleled (and nullified) by the fact that all the king's acts of government are performed by his ministers, who can be held to account for their actions. In the legal sphere, however, the same maxim, in the form of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, has not yielded so easily; while individual responsibility of agents of the government in this field is notoriously inadequate, even democratic governments have clung tenaciously to immunity from suit and have only slowly, and still by no means completely, assumed legal liability in a fashion comparable to that imposed upon private citizens.

Professor Street has given us a comparative study, somewhat historical but primarily analytical, of the law of government liability in Great Britain, the British Commonwealth, the United States, and France. Separate chapters deal with "Tort," "Contract," "Expropriation, Quasi-Contract and Trusts," "Remedies against the State," "Substantive Limitations on Liability of the State," and "Procedural Limitations on Liability of the State." The present situation in each of the countries discussed is far from satisfactory. Although he has kind things to say about French *droit administratif*, the author is unable to accept its frequent panegyrics at face value. "French legal administration," he declares, "is hamstrung by a blind unreasoning adherence to a 200-year old doctrine of political conduct, the separation of powers" (p. 76). Among the bad results of this doctrine are an "excessive respect for the political branch" and "too much uncertainty about the principles of liability" (p. 77).

The realm of torts has for long been the area in which government liability in Britain and the United States has been most lacking. Each country has recently moved to improve this situation—Great Britain by the Crown Proceedings Act (1947) and the United States by the Federal Tort Claims Act (1946). Professor Street shows, however, that both acts leave a great deal to be desired. They are shot through with ambiguities and exceptions. How true this is of the United States statute has been illustrated by a Supreme Court decision announced since Professor Street's monograph came from the press. This 4–3 decision, in *Dalehite* v. *United States*, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), dismissed claims growing out of the devastating explosion of two ships being loaded with explosive chemicals at Texas City, Texas, in 1947. Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, was moved to remark: "Surely a statute so long debated was meant to embrace more than traffic accidents. If not, the ancient and discredited doctrine that 'The King can do no wrong' has not been uprooted; it has merely been amended to read, 'The King can do only little wrongs" (p. 60).

In addition to painstaking analysis of existing law, the author provides suggestions for reform. This book is a valuable contribution to the study of comparative law and should be of great use to all who would help continue the process of subjecting governments to the rule of law.—J. Roland Pennock, *Swarthmore College.*

The Administrative Reforms of Frederick William I of Prussia. By Reinhold August

Dorwart. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1953. Pp. xvii, 250. $4.00.)

This work is an historical study by an historian. The reviewer lacks both the language skill and the historical knowledge to comment critically upon it as a study in eighteenth-century Prussian history. Judged impressionistically, however, it meets the tests of thorough, careful scholarship. The narrative is presented in a competent, no-nonsense style; the footnotes are impeccable and informative; and charts, appendix, and a critical bibliography increase the usefulness of the work. The title, moreover, is over-modest: the administrative reforms of Frederick William I (highlighted by the creation of the General Directory in 1723) are skillfully presented in the perspective of previous and subsequent events in Prussian administrative development. Students of administration will welcome the work to the small and slowly growing list of competent administrative histories.

To this reviewer, a peculiar feature of the work is the absence of any direct use of—or even reference to—either recent literature of a general nature in the field of public administration or the various conceptualizations of "bureaucracy" by the sociologists. While use of contemporary "professional" administrative terminology in the narrative might be criticized on the grounds that it would distort the facts, giving a "sharpness" that was in fact not present, it is puzzling why there was no explicit use of the Weberian conceptualization of bureaucracy: here was a case study that (apparently) fitted precisely the pattern described. It is puzzling also why there is no reference to Ernest Barker's *The Development of Public Services in Western Europe, 1660–1930*—though there are frequent and competent references to and comparisons with administrative developments in other Western European countries.

To say the least of it, however, the author had the right to choose his own idiom and frame of reference, and had no obligation to scratch the reviewer's particular intellectual itches more sharply than he does. As it stands, though his book is not addressed to students of administration, he has still succeeded in putting them in his debt.—Dwight Waldo, *University of California (Berkeley).*

Courts, Lawyers and Trials under the Last Three Tsars. By Samuel Kucherov. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1953. Pp. xii, 339. $6.00.)

The reform of the judiciary (1864) and that of the army (1874) were the two immediately successful ones of the so-called "great reforms" of Alexander II. Curiously, the emancipation of the serfs (1861), which provided the foundation for all subsequent reforms, made at first no appreciable change in the economic and social (as distinct from legal) status of the peasantry.

The administration of justice, however, was revolutionized by the Statutes of 1864. Samuel Kucherov, a former member of the Russian bar, has written a solid, informative, well-documented, and at times highly moving account of the evolution of the Russian judicial system from the pre-reform days to the advent of the Soviet government. A jurist of erudition and vision, the author illuminates his narrative by drawing enlightening parallels between the Russian and the Western European and American judicial institutions and practices. He emphasizes the virtues of the law courts created by the Statutes of 1864, and he makes clear the inevitable conflict resulting from the incompatibility of an independent judiciary with the traditional omnipotence of an absolutist bureaucratic government. It is this conflict that gave the Russian courts their social significance as the only agencies where, in periods of reaction, freedom of speech was tolerated and protest against political and social inequities could be heard. Hence the enhanced prestige and responsibility of the Russian bar, the organization, complexion, and functions of which Mr. Kucherov discusses in detail.

The lay reader will find particularly interesting Mr. Kucherov's extensive summaries of the more important political trials held under the empire. While the perorations of the defense counsels, which are quoted at length, may appear at times a trifle rhetorical and over-emotional, the latitude allowed by the court to the defense was truly admirable, and inescapably invites invidious comparisons with the dreary routine of Soviet political trials.

Mr. Kucherov has successfully performed an exacting and important task. Judicious literary editing, however, would have greatly added to the readability of his excellent volume.—Michael T. Florinsky, *Columbia University.*

European Political Systems. Edited by Taylor

COLE. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1953. Pp. xxxiii, 699. $6.00.)

A new comparative government text by an extremely able group of scholars. It is organized in the traditional country-by-country manner and includes sections on Russia, the satellites, Germany, Italy, Britain, and France. Adequate materials on constitutions and political institutions are included, but the authors have worked on the assumption that these can be made meaningful only by prior investigation of the economic, cultural, and historical determinants within the society. Much more attention than is customary is given to matters of ideology and political theory and the analyses of the systems of government are made deeper and richer in consequence.

Etat des périodiques officiels français. Liste des revues, journaux et bulletins statistiques des assemblées parlementaires et des administrations centrales à la date du 1er janvier 1952. (Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale. 1953. Pp. 39.)

For the first time there is available in a single place a full list of the official periodical publications of the French government, 171 in number. The list begins with the *Journal officiel,* the parliamentary assemblies, the Présidence du Conseil, and follows with the Ministries in alphabetical order. For each title is given so far as possible the date of the first issue, frequency, the editing and distributing agencies, the cost when available on subscription, and a brief note as to the content. The list was reprinted from the *Bibliographie de la France,* Sept. 11–25, 1953. There is promise of further lists for the annual and other serial publications of the central government, all the periodicals and serials of the local authorities, of the French Union overseas, and of "établissements publics."—J.B.C.

Villes et Campagnes: Civilisation urbaine et Civilisation rurale en France. ASSEMBLED BY GEORGES FRIEDMANN. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1953. Pp. xxiv, 480. 1200 fr.)

A series of round-table discussions on urban and rural civilization in France by French sociologists and other scholars interested in sociology held during "Sociological Week" (organized by the *Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique*) in Paris in March, 1951.

Canadian Government Publications Consolidated Annual Catalogue 1953. BY OFFICE OF SUPERVISOR OF GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS. (Ottawa: Queen's Printer. 1954. Pp. xvi, 578. $1.00.)

The first annual catalog is actually only a cumulation for the English language documents of the *Monthly Catalogue* from January to September, 1953, with the addition of all other Canadian official publications in English, in print as of September, 1953. The Supervisor of Government Publications also issues a *Daily Checklist,* which appears every day except Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays. On pages 37–41 is a very useful list of the royal commission reports so far as these are available in print. For the French language official publications a separate annual catalog is being prepared.—J.B.C.

Interdepartment Committee on Social and Economic Research. *Guides to Official Sources, No. 3: Local Government Statistics.* (London: H. M. Stationery Office. 1953. Pp. v, 34. 1s. 6d.)

The *Guide* emphasizes the general and financial statistics of local government in the United Kingdom, and gives a well-balanced picture of the material available, unpublished as well as published. There is an historical sketch. Currently, the main reliance is on the statistics collected and published by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. There is also a summary of the statistics collected by other departments as well as a statement of the nongovernmental returns prepared by the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants, Society of County Treasurers, Rural District Councils' Association, etc. The first of the *Guides to Official Sources* dealt with labour statistics, and the second with census reports of Great Britain, 1801–1931.—J.B.C.

Le Parti Liberal dans le Système Constitutionnel Britannique. BY ALBERT MABILEAU. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1953. Pp. vii, 349. 1100 fr.)

The study of the Liberal party in the twentieth century is representative of the growing interest among French scholars in the analysis of party politics; it is issued by the *Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.* Attention is devoted to the activities of the parliamentary party, to the decline of the party's electoral support, to the relation of the party to Labour, and—most important—to the recent ideological dilemma of the Liberals.

The Passing of Parliament. By G. W. Keeton. (New York: Ernest Benn, Ltd. John de Graff, Inc., Distributor. 1952. Pp. vii. 208. $4.50.)

The theme of this book is that the basic principles of parliamentary sovereignty and rule of law have been undercut by "continual and relentless encroachments of the executive" which resulted from the expansion of the suffrage, the trend to collectivism, and the planned society—and that this rise of the executive threatens personal freedom and security and brings England to "the threshold of tyranny." It thus follows the line of Lord Hewart's argument but adds later court cases and legislation and much reference to a possibility that England could move down "The Road to Moscow" (the title of Ch. 2).

The Machinery of Justice in England. By R. M. Jackson. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1953. Pp. ix, 372. $8.50.)

This volume seeks to explain both for lawyer and layman the principles and organization of the English legal system. The second edition has been wholly rewritten to take account of important developments since the first issue in 1940.

The Government of the Swiss Republic. By Ramesh Chandra Ghosh. (Calcutta: The World Press, Ltd. 1953. Pp. ix, 192. 10s. 6d. net.)

A well-rounded discussion of the structure and operation of Swiss political institutions by a lecturer at the University of Calcutta. Unfortunately, his almost uncritical admiration for everything Swiss, coupled with his obvious dislike of the American presidential system (which he denounces as "suffering from bitter party rivalry, sudden change in home and foreign policy, too much concentration of power in the hands of a single individual, noisy conventions, corrupt patronage, undemocratic rings, bosses and caucuses"), leads at times to exaggeration of the merits of the Swiss system.

Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East. By Helen Miller Davis. (Durham: Duke University Press. 1953. Pp. xxii, 541. $7.50.)

A useful reference book on the legal basis of political institutions and relations of the states from Egypt eastward through Afghanistan.

Deutschland Heute. Mit einem Geleitwort von Bundeskanzler Dr. Konrad Adenauer. Herausgegeben vom Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung. (Wiesbaden: Wiesbadener Graphische Betriebe. 1953. Pp. 416. DM 12.50.)

The official report on the Federal German Republic of today and developments since May, 1945 embraces the political, economic, social, and cultural aspects, as well as the international aspects such as are treated in the chapter on the European Coal and Steel Community (pp. 305–313).—J.B.C.

Amtliches Behördenverzeichnis. Stand Juni 1953. Herausgegeben vom Statistischen Amt des Saarlandes. (Saarbrücken: Einzelschriften zur Statistik des Saarlandes, No. 8. 1953. Pp. 54. 200 fr.)

Although the Saar has had its own government for more than five years, the above is the first official directory showing the organization of the administration with the ministries and their subordinate agencies, local government bodies, "Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts," non-Saar offices located in the Saar, and church bodies. Street addresses and telephone numbers are given, but not the names of officials. A folded chart shows the organization of the ministries. There is an index by name of agency and catchword.—J.B.C.

Central European Democracy and Its Background: Economic and Political Group Organization. By Rudolf Schlesinger. (New York: Grove Press. 1953. Pp. xiv, 402. $5.00.)

A study of political developments in Germany and Austria from 1862 to 1938 (and to a lesser extent in Czechoslovakia after 1918) with emphasis on interconnections between political and economic group organizations. The "lesson" the author seems to derive from his study is that "the sectional mass movement, unless it gives birth to something which outgrows its limitations, is incapable of creating the setting in which its inherent potentialities can develop."

The Rebirth of Austria. By Richard Hiscocks. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1953. Pp. ix, 263. $3.50.)

A general account of political, economic, social, and cultural developments in Austria from 1945 to early 1953, with only slight attention to political institutions.

Federal Government Gazette, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Vol. 1, No. 1, 4th September, 1953. (Salisbury: Government Printer.)

The first issue of the Federation gazette publishes the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Constitution) Order in Council, August 1, 1953, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Commencement) Order in Council, and the Royal Instructions. The Constitution provides that the Federation consisting of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland "shall be known as the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland" until and unless the Federal legislature otherwise enacts. —J.B.C.

Current Soviet Policies: The Documentary Record of the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress and the Reorganization after Stalin's Death. EDITED BY LEO GRULIOW. (New York: Frederick R. Praeger. 1953. Pp. xiv, 269. $6.00.)

An English translation of Stalin's "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR," of the proceedings of the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress, and of related documents as well as of selected materials on early post-Stalin developments (up to April 7, 1953). The volume includes an explanatory introduction by the editor and a glossary of some Soviet terms.

The Peoples of the Soviet Far East. BY WALTER KOLARZ. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1954. Pp. xii, 194. $4.50.)

Based of necessity almost entirely on Russian sources, this is, nevertheless, an excellent brief report of the ways in which the Soviet government has spread its control over Asian Russia, and has destroyed or bent to its purposes the various ethnic groups that, almost without exception, have been unable to withstand the political power and economic pressure of the new "colonizers."

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

WILLIAM H. ROBERTS

Catholic University of America

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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

Beyond Containment. BY WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1953. Pp. vi, 406. $5.00.)

A substantial portion of this book deals with conditions inside Russia from the Revolution to the present. Chamberlin's account covering the 1920's and early 1930's is a repetition of what he has reported at greater length in a less biased way in books published many years ago. According to the current account, conditions are so dreary that one is led to believe that life was much better under the Czars, and the reader is not prepared for Chamberlin's incidental admissions of Russia's contemporary technological and industrial power and rising living standards. Chamberlin's purpose is to suggest that discontent among the masses and among the non-Russian nationalities inside the U.S.S.R. may be so great as to invite a policy of liberation. However, having taken his readers up the hill he promptly marches them down again, for he concedes on page 296 that for practical purposes containment is probably the only feasible course in Europe, and he declares flatly that under present conditions it would be "insane rashness" to precipitate an armed clash. However, Chamberlin offers sound advice should a clash ultimately come: to fight an intelligent political war along with a military one and to avoid the "Unconditional Surrender fiasco" of the late war.

Most of Chamberlin's book is a rehash of history, of history told more objectively in scores of other books. There is a sketch of American-Russian relations from the eighteenth century to 1945, in which we are informed that the Monroe Doctrine at the time of its promulgation was aimed not primarily at the restored Bourbons of France and Spain but at Russia, and that Thomas Jefferson, who never set foot in Russia, was "the first American Ambassador" to St. Petersburg. On pages 51 and 52 the suggestion is made that if Roosevelt had not encouraged Britain and France to get into the Second World War and that if the Western powers had simply ignored Hitler, Hitler would have invaded Russia, both Germany and Russia would be weaker today, and not only America but also Britain and France would stand secure and strong in a safe world. We are led to believe that Russia is dominant in Eastern Europe and the Balkans merely because of Yalta rather than because her position, along with American primacy in Greece, Italy, Western Europe, and Japan, represents the actual power situation in the world today, reflecting geography, armed might, and the collapse in 1918 and 1945 of traditional "balancers." There is a perfunctory account of the Marshall Plan and NATO, and a grudging admission that these measures have been effective, although Chamberlin leaves the impression that the best promise of European strength lies in the free enterprise systems of Switzerland, Belgium, and West Germany. According to Chamberlin, Russia secured "complete political domination of China" mainly because of the ineptitude (or worse) of American foreign policy. Chamberlin fails to tell us that the middle way was indigenously weak in China and that not a single leading American, not even General Wedemeyer, proposed sending American armed forces to try to save Chiang Kai-shek during the critical years from 1946 to 1949. More important than hindsight and retroactive judgments on China policy would be constructive suggestions of social policies and military measures designed to save Indochina from the Communists, but Chamberlin, who saves his ammunition for the "ifs" of history after they are safely past, conveniently ignores this.—WILLIAM G. CARLETON, *University of Florida.*

Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, 1940–45. BY WILLARD H. ELSBREE. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1953. Issued under the Auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Pp. v., 182. $3.25.)

In this study, the author analyzes the role the Japanese occupation played in the development of nationalist movements in Southeast Asia during World War II. He first gives an outline analysis of Japanese plans for the political framework of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and traces at some length the factors which conditioned subsequent revisions of the "blueprint." The author's general thesis is that Japan underestimated the importance and strength of nationalism and failed to make full use of this force in prosecuting her administration of the occupied areas. The nature and extent of political participation in Indonesia are then analyzed, at national and local levels, as factors in enhancing national unity and centralization, in the context of the changing fortunes of the military situation. It is the author's conclusion that Japanese appreciation of the nature, strength, and importance of the nationalist movements advanced progressively as the military situation took a more critical turn for Japan. Separate treatment is given to the question of minorities (Chinese, Indians, and Karens) in the program of Japanese occupation insofar as they affected the central problem of nationalist movements in Southeast Asia.

This is a well-balanced and adequately documented work in an important pioneer field. When a series of intensive case studies covering each of the regions of the entire area covered in this study is available, we shall be in a better position to appraise more comprehensively the role Japanese occupation played in rendering the nationalist movements so revolutionary and explosive throughout the area following Japanese surrender.

A word or two, not so much in criticism as by way of suggestion, may be in order. The shattering of the old myth of the impregnability of the white man's rule, so dramatically symbolized in the fall of Singapore and the collapse of the Netherlands Indies in the initial stages of the war, was responsible, perhaps more than any other single factor, for reducing the political prestige of the old colonial powers beyond repair and for rendering the postwar return of British, French, and Dutch masters to their former positions in Southeast Asia impossible, even following the "unconditional surrender" of Japan. The reviewer feels that the author perhaps should have given more attention, in his introductory chapter, to such factors operating primarily on the international scene, against the background of which nationalist movements took on specific patterns and concrete significance.

Also, perhaps a little more systematic analysis of the sociopolitical factors already operating throughout the area at the time of the outbreak of the war should have been attempted.—TATSUJI TAKEUCHI, *Columbia University.*

Les Publications Officielles des Institutions Européennes. BIBLIOGRAPHIE ÉTABLIE PAR MICHEL ROUSSIER . . . AVEC LA COLLABORATION DE MARYVONNE STEPHAN. (Paris: Dotation Carnegie pour la Paix Internationale. 1954. Pp. 73.)

Monsieur Roussier's bibliography is devoted to the official publications of the European bodies striving after the Second World War to build a United Europe, and includes in chronological order of establishment Benelux, Comité de Coopération Economique, Organisation Européenne de Coopération Economique, Groupe d'Études pour une Union douanière européenne and Conseil de coopération douanière, Organisation du Traité de Bruxelles, Conseil de l'Europe, Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier, and the Assemblée ad hoc chargée d'élaborer un project de traité instituant une communauté politique européenne. Under each body is given a brief note as to the establishment. Roussier has attempted to be as inclusive as possible for the publications of these bodies, whether printed or mimeographed, periodical or not, administrative, technical, or popular. No systematic provision has been made by any of these bodies for the deposit of all their documents in a library, national or parliamentary, in each of the participating countries.—J.B.C.

The Multi-state System of Ancient China. BY RICHARD LOUIS WALKER. (Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press. 1954. Pp. xii, 135. $3.50.)

Basing his conclusions on extensive research in Chinese as well as European language materials, the author has completed a study of the state system in China during the Ch'un Ch'iu Period (722–481 B.C.), which he hopes will be useful for students of modern international relations as well as sinologists. Some may doubt whether such terms as "sovereignty" or "totalitarian" can be used to describe accurately Chinese feudal institutions of nearly three thousand years ago. None will contest that Walker has consciously underlined the well-known statement by Benedetto Croce: "All true history is contemporary history."

Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842–1854. BY JOHN KING FAIRBANK. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1953. Vols. I and II. Pp. xiii, 489; 88. $7.50.)

A detailed study of the beginnings of the commercial and political penetration of China by the West, of far more than specialized interest because of the author's understanding and description of the interplay of Oriental and Western ideas, and of the Western clash with Chinese social and cultural standards—especially in the treaty ports. The research on this work has stretched over a long period of time, and Professor Fairbank has made much use of Chinese materials available to him in Peking as long ago as 1932; the small second volume is devoted solely to sources, bibliography, and a glossary of Chinese names and terms.

Canada and the Far East: 1940–1953. BY H. F. ANGUS. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. 1954. Pp. x, 129. $3.50.)

This is an analysis primarily of Canadian policy toward the countries and problems of southern and eastern Asia, though it is framed in the broader context of general foreign policy. It deals with public opinion as well as government policy and draws upon both government documents and periodicals. The work is organized on a functional rather than a country-by-country basis and serves as a continuation of A.R.M. Lower's *Canada and the Far East, 1940.*

Contemporary World Politics. BY NORMAN HILL. (New York: Harper and Bros. 1954. Pp. xvi, 714. $6.00.)

This well-written new volume does not develop a theory of international politics and it avoids the lengthy historical and country chapters that add bulk to so many texts. The author leads off with a description of the state system and the nature and conduct of international relations, disposes of the historical and area background in 70 pages, and then in a lengthy section entitled "Motivations and Forces" takes up a series of key topics: national interest, national power, geography, imperialism, nationalism, ideology, technology, population, etc. The final section considers the place of war in international dealings and the various attempts or proposals to limit or to eliminate it.

A Concise History of the Law of Nations. By Arthur Nussbaum. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1954. Pp. xiii, 376. $5.00.)

A revised edition of a book first published in 1947. In comparison with the first edition more space is given to developments in the Middle Ages and in Russia, and a new appendix is added in which the author takes sharp exception to J. B. Scott's writings on the superiority of the Spanish scholastics over Hugo Grotius.

Survey of International Affairs: 1938. Vol. III. By R. G. D. Laffan et al. Edited by Veronica M. Toynbee. (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1953. Pp. xiv, 622. $9.50.)

Still catching up on the prewar years, this volume of the Royal Institute's 1938 *Survey* deals with northeast Europe, the Soviet Union, the Balkans, the aftermath of Munich, and the rearmament efforts of Germany, Britain, and France.

The World the Dollar Built. By Gunther Stein. (New York: Monthly Review Press. 1953. Pp. 288. $4.00.)

The author's argument runs as follows: world stability and prosperity depend upon how and how well the U. S. manages its economic affairs, but this country has not found a way to sustain high production and full employment except by spending for rearmament (or even war); if the world is to avoid being led to economic crisis and a likely military solution to the crisis, the U. S. must be persuaded to tamper with its free-enterprise system by various methods, including "priming" by international spending and development.

American Economic Policy toward the Philippines. By Shirley Jenkins. With an Introduction by Claude A. Buss. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1954. Pp. viii, 181. $4.00.)

The background and present state of the Philippine economy, surveyed especially and rather critically in terms of its U. S. orientation and the favored position granted U. S. business in the islands; the author is somewhat more pessimistic of the Republic's economic future than is Professor Buss, who contributes a politico-economic introduction.

Japan and America: From Earliest Times to the Present. By Lawrence H. Battistini. (New York: The John Day Co. 1954. Pp. x, 198. $3.00.)

A highly condensed and factual summary of the relations between Japan and the U. S. since Perry's visits in 1853 and 1854; the author has been in Tokyo since 1946, first with SCAP and now as lecturer at Sophia University.

The Decline of Neutrality, 1914–1941: With Special Reference to the United States and the Northern Neutrals. By Nils Ørvik. (Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag. 1953. Pp. 294.)

A slightly condensed Wisconsin doctoral dissertation by a Norwegian student, who examines the concept of neutrality and studies its evolution through World War I and the interwar period with specific reference to a large and a small power, the U. S. and Norway. In both cases neutrality failed; the U. S. was too big to abstain from world influence, and Norway was economically and militarily unable to support such a policy.

America Faces World Communism. By Anthony Trawick Bouscaren. (New York: Vantage Press. 1954. Pp. viii, 196. $5.00.)

World War III began in Greece in 1944, U. S. policies have never really faced up to this fact because of the influence of Communists and their sympathizers upon official and public opinion, and the only hope for victory is for the U. S. to build up the entire non-Soviet world "with a view not of appeasement or containment-coexistence, but of an offensive leading to the ultimate cutting of the Soviet cancer from the world body politic."

Nationalism and Communism in East Asia. By W. Macmahon Ball. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press; New York: Cambridge University Press. 1953. Pp. viii, 210. $4.50.)

An Australian political scientist, long involved with Far Eastern affairs, offers his own succinct explanation of the nationalist movements in ten Asian countries and of the effect of communism on those movements.

The Dutch Colonial System in the East Indies. By J. J. van Klaveren. (The Hague: J. J. van Klaveren. 1953. Pp. 230. $4.00.)

An extremely detailed and chronological study, based on Dutch sources.

The Struggle for Kashmir. By Michael Brecher. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1953. Published under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations. Pp. xii, 211. $5.00.)

An exhaustive review of the documentation, especially UN, on this subject, plus eight months of investigation in Kashmir, Pakistan, and India, have produced a handy guide to developments within and the protracted negotiations over this contested region. The book concludes in early 1953 with no indication of Sheikh Abdullah's forthcoming displacement.

The Refugee in the Post-War World. By Jacques Vernant. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1953. Pp. xvi, 827. $6.00.)

A detailed survey of a far-reaching, tragic, and often ignored problem, carried on in collaboration with various international agencies and supported by a Rockefeller Foundation grant, but bearing no marks of "official" editing. Part I treats the origin of the problem, briefly considers the work of the numerous international agencies in this field, and attempts to place the refugees in categories. The remainder of the book analyzes the position or reception of the refugeee in some 40 nations.

Austria's International Position, 1938–1953: The Re-establishment of an Independent Austria. By Cary Travers Grayson, Jr. (Genève: Librairie E. Droz. 1953. Pp. xvi, 316. 15 fr.)

After a brief review of Austria's position from 1918 to 1938 and an examination of her fate under German rule, the author concentrates on a comprehensive study of her international status from 1945 to 1953. Twenty-nine documents pertinent to the topic and a bibliography are appended to the volume.

The Price of Freedom: Greece in World Affairs, 1939–1953. By Dimitrios G. Kousoulas. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 1953. Pp. xi, 210. $4.00.)

Details of the Italian attempts on the Balkans in the early stages of World War II, the Nazi occupation, internal postwar politics, and the international power struggle over Greece, as analyzed by a young Greek now studying at Syracuse.

Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy: Volume III. 1933–1941. Edited by Jane Degras. (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1953. Pp. xxii, 500. $8.50.)

The areas of growing Soviet concern show up clearly in this collection of official and public documents, speeches, and press releases, but much of the important material on this crucial period must still remain unpublished in whatever archives the Soviet foreign office maintains.

The Incompatible Allies: A Memoir-History of German-Soviet Relations, 1918–1941. By Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer. (New York: Macmillan Co. 1953. Pp. xiii, 350. $5.00.)

Mr. Hilger was on the staff of the German Embassy in Moscow from 1918 to 1941. During those eventful twenty-three years he took part in practically all the deals between Germany and Soviet Russia and became more or less acquainted with a great many important figures in the shifting Soviet political scene. With the aid of his co-author, Professor Meyer, he provides a lively narrative of his experiences and offers a number of interesting insights into the devil's kitchen of the Nazi-Soviet chefs.

Soviet Economic Policy in Postwar Germany: A Collection of Papers by Former Soviet Officials. Edited by Robert Slusser. (New York: Research Program on the U.S.S.R. 1953. Pp. xx, 184.)

Seven former Soviet officials describe the behavior of Soviet occupation armies and authorities in Germany. Various chapters deal with the dismantling of German factories, confiscation of livestock, requisitioning of grain, Soviet agricultural policies, exploitation of German uranium mines, etc.

Diplomacy in a Whirlpool: Hungary between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. By Stephen D. Kertesz. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. 1953. Pp. xvi, 273. $4.75.)

A well-documented study of Hungarian foreign policy since 1918, with special emphasis on the period beginning with 1938, written by a former Hungarian diplomat. Based both on published materials and on the author's personal experiences.

The Struggle for Poland. By H. Peter Stern. (Washington: Public Affairs Press. 1953. Pp. 79. $2.00.)

A brief account of the struggle between East and West for the control of Poland, based mainly on memoirs of various participants in the struggle—Polish, American and British—and on collections of official documents.

Ukraine under the Soviets. By Clarence A. Manning. (New York: Bookman Associates. 1953. Pp. 223. $3.50.)

Using primarily materials prepared by a group of displaced Ukrainian professors, the author describes in a series of twenty-five short chapters the developments in the Ukraine under Soviet rule, including not only political and economic developments but also such matters as literature, culture, and religion. He concludes with an ardent appeal for a free Ukraine.

Ukrainian Communism and Soviet Russian Policy toward the Ukraine: An Annotated Bibliography, 1917–1953. By Jurij Lawrynenko. (New York: Research Program on the U.S.S.R. 1953. Pp. xxviii, 454.)

An exhaustive compilation of works (mostly in the Russian and Ukrainian languages) dealing directly or indirectly with the above topics. The author is a Ukrainian émigré scholar.

Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism. By Olaf Caroe. (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.; New York: St. Martin's Press. 1953. Pp. x, 300. $5.00.)

A study of past and current developments in five Soviet Republics in Central Asia inhabited mostly by Moslems of Turkish stock. The author's avowed purpose it to "weigh old influence with new and estimate the part which these peoples are destined to play in the struggle between the Communist World and the West." On the whole, he doubts that Soviet rulers will be able to assimilate completely the nations of Central Asia.

The Allies and the Russian Revolution: From the Fall of the Monarchy to the Peace of Brest-Litovsk. By Robert D. Warth. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1954. Pp. vi, 294. $4.50.)

Delving with painstaking care into a mass of materials ranging from official documents and memoirs to newspaper reports, the author offers a detailed but never dull account of the chequered relations between Russia on one side and the Allies, as well as the Germans, on the other from March, 1917 to March, 1918. His study seems to bear out his major conclusion: "Allied policy and diplomacy in the period concerned was based on an almost total lack of understanding of the forces and events of the Russian Revolution. The Allies—like the Central Powers—were primarily concerned with the efficient conduct of the war, but the idealistic reasons for which they were supposedly fighting were nowhere more glaringly contradicted in practice than by their Russian policy—in regard to both democratic and Bolshevik Russia."

The Great Powers and Eastern Europe. By John A. Lukacs. (New York: American Book Co. 1953. Pp. xii, 878. $7.50.)

A study of international politics of Central-Eastern Europe from 1934 to 1945, with a brief survey covering the period 1917–1933. Includes a helpful bibliography.

Institutes of International Affairs. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1954. Pp. vi, 131. $1.25.)

Concise sketches of the purposes and activities of institutes existing in all countries.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

H. ARTHUR STEINER*

University of California (Los Angeles)

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POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH, AND METHODOLOGY

The White Umbrella: Indian Political Thought from Manu to Gandhi. By D. Mackenzie Brown. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1953. Pp. xv, 205. $3.75.)

This book contains excerpts from the most representative Indian writings on politics from ancient to modern times. Professor Brown contributes an historical-cultural background, a concise analysis of the nature of Indian thought, an introduction to each group of selections, and a set of useful notes. Much of the old writings consists of instructions to practicing politicians, especially kings. Much of the modern writing, inspired by the struggle for freedom, is political propaganda, albeit of high caliber.

One of the services this book can render is to disabuse our contemporary Kiplings of the idea that East cannot meet West. The fundamental nature and the range of Indian and Western political thought are remarkably similar in many respects throughout the ages. There are idealists and Machiavellians among the Indians. There is, for instance, little of the much vaunted Asian spirituality, peacefulness, or forgiveness in the admonition of the *Santiparvan:* "One should bear one's foe on one's shoulders as long as time is unfavorable. When, however, the opportunity has come, one should break him into fragments like an earthen jar on stone."

Professor Brown wisely warns that there may be a discrepancy between Indian political thought and contemporary political practice. He might also have warned that these brief excerpts cannot give a complete picture of their writers' thoughts. This is particularly true of the moderns whose inner conflicts between ancient Indian and modern Western influences are not reflected in the book. An advantage of the brevity of this volume is that teachers of theory may be induced to make it required reading. For it is high time for us to realize that the West has no monopoly on political thought and that the politics of the East are not any more mysterious than those of the West.—Werner Levi, *University of Minnesota.*

French Corporative Theory, 1789–1948: A Chapter in the History of Ideas. By Matthew H. Elbow. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1953. Pp. 222. $3.75.)

Ever since the autonomous organization of national production, as proposed by the Italian syndicalist and former I. W. W., Rossoni, was perverted into Mussolini's system of state-controlled, joint labor-management corporations, the term corporatism has fallen into disrepute—a disgrace which Pétain's similar experiment did nothing to alleviate. Some recent writers have been trying to cleanse the term of its fascist taint and to demonstrate the long and honorable tradition of corporatist thought. In his *German Theories of the Corporate State* (New York, 1947), Ralph H. Bowen did so with distinction, tracing the anti-revolutionary romanticist tenets of what may be called "the third camp," equidistant from both *laissez-faire* and Marxist *étatisme*, back to St. Thomas and forward to the well-known encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII. Now a disciple of Professor Bowen has attempted to accomplish the same task for Pétain's predecessors who, after the French defeat of 1871, turned to the circle of German corporatists around Bishop Ketteler for inspiration (as, in his field, Ernest Renan turned to ideas of German education). Like all writers in his subject, Dr. Elbow is troubled by the haziness of corporatist theory, a haziness typical of similarly well-intentioned blueprints of a classless social order, as for instance Guild Socialism. The attempt to bring some sort of unity into the diffuse prehistory of French "Social Catholicism" (prior to 1918) takes up three-fifths of the book, with the too little known La Tour du Pin as the central figure. Unfortunately, a few intruders complicate an already complex story. One of them is Georges Sorel, whose shortlived connection with royalist traditionalism was at best tenuous. The author of *Reflections on Violence*, who believed in a dynamic capitalism as he believed in a vigorous proletariat, should have been kept off the corporatist roster on which the author rightly places Georges Valois, Sorel's apostatic follower. To the motley crowd of French corporatists (among them birds of such different feather as the ex-leftists Déat and Doriot, royalists like Maurras, fascists like Colonel de la Rocque, and ex-liberals like Paul-Boncour), Marshal Pétain's *état français* of 1940 looked like the fulfillment of their dream, only to disappoint them as bitterly as Il Duce disappointed his Rossonis. The question that remains to be asked, but which the author, with scholarly caution, refuses to answer, is whether the consistent failure of the corporatists is not due more to some basic fallacy in the very doctrine of corporatism than to the refusal of the bureaucrats to keep their hands off the economy. Its propagators, to be sure, are for the most part not trying to hoodwink labor but are honest seekers after a way out of the class struggle. But they also reflect, particularly in the Third and Fourth Republics, a mentality characteristic of a static if not stagnant economic situation; they are social quietists in a crisis which, today more than ever, demands bold measures if France is to be saved, for her own sake as well as for the sake of Greater Europe.—James H. Meisel, *University of Michigan.*

Heresy, Yes; Conspiracy, No. By Sidney Hook. (New York: The John Day Co. 1953. Pp. 283. $3.75.)

Many thoughtful people are convinced that the domestic Communists in our midst constitute a threat to our national security. But many of these same people are concerned about how the growing number of loyalty programs, legislative investigations, sedition trials, and private purges aimed at this threat are to be reconciled with the freedom of speech and belief which is supposed to be guaranteed by our Constitution and which is essential to the functioning of our democratic system.

It is to this problem of reconciliation that Sidney Hook's latest book is addressed. The best statement in the book is this one: "From time to time certain phrases catch the public fancy. . . . Repetition gives them a patina of familiarity so that their use soothes the understanding instead of challenging it. Gradually these phrases begin to be employed in all sorts of contexts until they function not as summaries of thought, but as substitutes. . . . " Unfortunately, the balance of the book is a prime example of what this statement describes. It is built upon a repetition of terms and phrases long used in this area as substitutes for thought.

Freedom of belief and expression should be preserved for "heresy," says Hook, but not for "conspiracy." This distinction certainly has a "patina of familiarity," but what does it mean? The heresy which is to be protected, we are told, consists of "unpopular ideas or opinions" and includes "Communist ideas." But what is a conspiracy? "A conspiracy . . . is a secret or underground movement which seeks to attain its ends not by normal political or educational processes, but by playing outside the rules of the game. . . .The signs of a conspiracy are secrecy, anonymity, the use of false names and labels, and the calculated lie."

This definition may seem a somewhat imprecise tool to apply, but it works fine. It just happens that Hook's definition of a conspiracy is also his description of the Communist party, so that he comes inevitably to the conclusion that, while a man may entertain and express Communist ideas, he may not join the Communist party[1] without becoming a conspirator.

But doesn't this conclusion rest upon an assumption of "guilt by association?" Hook views this phrase as one of the substitutes for thought which he so abhors, but recognizes that it describes a process of reasoning which our courts have occasionally condemned. This, however, merely provides the occasion for another distinction and the only touch of novelty in the book. Asserting, erroneously, that the judicial condemnation applies only to imputing "criminal guilt," Hook introduces a doctrine of "moral guilt" by association which justifies noncriminal sanctions, both governmental and private.

The last half of Hook's book is devoted to explaining why the Communist party member is unfit to teach, but his argument is built upon unsupported assumptions.[2] *All* party members who are teachers have abandoned their intellectual independence and committed themselves to preaching party doctrine in the classroom. What is the evidence of this universal commitment? There are "official instructions" to that effect—an article in *The Communist* in 1937 and a resolution adopted at a party convention in 1936. How does Hook know that all members are aware of these instructions? They were "addressed to the general membership" in publications which "all members are expected to read." And even if all present members are aware of instructions published sixteen years ago, how does Hook know that all will obey? The party expects all members to obey and "weeds its ranks carefully."

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[1] For an exposition of Communist ideas by one who was not a Communist party member, see Sidney Hook, "Why I Am a Communist," *The Modern Monthly*, April, 1934, p. 143.

This book is offered by the publisher as "a tough-minded philosophy to guide American liberals."—VERN COUNTRYMAN, *Yale University.*

Communication and Persuasion: Psychological Studies of Opinion Change. BY CARL I. HOVLAND, IRVING L. JANIS AND HAROLD H. KELLEY. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1953. Pp. xii, 315. $4.50.)

The Yale psychologists who did the communications experiments reported in this book state in the preface their hope that "as the program develops political scientists and economists interested in the formation and modification of values will also participate." This hope will probably be shared by political scientists who read this book carefully.

The use of the controlled experiment in social science is an exciting advance and its value is well demonstrated in these studies. Unfortunately, the early chapters deal with questions which, however important to learning theory in psychology, will seem trivial to political scientists. The candidate for public office would probably like to know whether his influence is increased or decreased by changes in the order of his arguments but the relevance of the problem to political science seems slight. The experiments reported in the later chapters, however, are significant for political science both in method and in findings. Several of the experiments bring to mind political situations which might be studied under equally rigorous conditions. Examples of findings relevant to political science are those on relationships between opinion change (and resistance to it) and group membership. People's motivation to retain membership in a group is shown to increase their resistance to communications contrary to the standards of the group. Such findings should interest students of electoral behavior, especially those interested in the role of political parties and other organizations as reference groups for the recipient of political propaganda.

Along with the findings on group membership there are data which will intrigue the political scientists who have delved into personality theory in psychology. For example, the high degree of "persuasibility" found among people considering themselves "socially inadequate" will bring to mind the writings of Fromm and Reisman dealing with the personality determinants of political behavior. Other personality characteristics shown to be positively related to "persuasibility" are low self-esteem, inhibition of aggression, and depressive tendencies.

These and other findings will probably bring some "we knew this all along" replies, but the methodologically discriminating reader will feel considerable security in the knowledge gained through such meticulous research procedures. The solid information it provides about one aspect of political behavior is its major argument for the research procedure used. Whether or not the findings are "significant" for political theory can only be judged by studying them. If we accept the position that political behavior can be studied scientifically, we now have two clear directions in which to proceed. This book describes research of a highly *intensive* nature and probes the processes of persuasion, learning, and opinion change. Refined cross-section attitude surveys are of the extensive nature designed to describe major characteristics of large populations. Each has a polished methodology which political scientists would do well to master.—GEORGE M. BELKNAP, *Michigan State College.*

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[2] Both Hook and I are repeating ourselves here. He has made the argument before. Hook, "What Shall We Do About Communist Teachers?," *Saturday Evening Post,* September 10, 1949, p. 33; Hook, "Should Communists Be Permitted to Teach?" *New York Times Magazine,* February 27, 1949, p. 7; Hook, "Communists in the Colleges," *New Leader,* May 6, 1950, p. 16. And I have criticized it before. Countryman, *Un-American Activities in the State of Washington* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1951), pp. 381–86.

World List of Social Science Periodicals. (Paris: UNESCO. 1954. Pp. 161.)

A Register of Legal Documentation in the World. (Paris: UNESCO. 1954. Pp. 362.)

The *World List* includes periodicals which publish original studies and articles by specialists. It does not include legal periodicals or those dealing with certain subjects closely connected with social science, such as history, philosophy, and social geography. The title of each periodical is listed in the original language and in the case of less familiar languages in English also. For each periodical there is a brief descriptive note in French and English. The *Register* contains only a listing, either in the original language or in French, but includes all the types of publications (statutes, court decisions, reviews, etc.) used in legal study.

Political Science in India. BY S. V. KOGEKAR AND A. APPADORAI. (Delhi, India: Premier Publishing Co. 1953. Pp. iii, 110. Rs. 5/.)

This volume contains much evaluation and an extraordinary amount of information, including bibliographical listings of Indian publications, descriptions of courses of study—with prescribed readings—in selected Indian universities, and an outline of topics on which student and faculty research is being done.

Reason in History: A General Introduction to the Philosophy of History. BY GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL. TRANS. AND EDITED BY R. S. HARTMAN. (New York: The Liberal Arts Press. 1953. Pp. 95. $.75.)

This small volume is designed to introduce the beginning student to the Hegelian view of history. After an introduction by Professor Hartman, which states admirably the background of Hegelian thought, brief selections from *The Philosophy of History* are given. The classics published by the Liberal Arts Press make a fine list for those who may be teaching intellectual history at the undergraduate level.

David Hume's Political Essays. EDITED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION, BY CHARLES W. HENDEL. (New York: The Liberal Arts Press. 1953. Pp. lxiv, 166. $.75.)

A selection of eighteen political essays from Hume's *Essays Moral, Political, and Literary,* together with a lengthy introduction and a selected bibliography.

The Pursuit of Happiness. BY HOWARD MUMFORD JONES. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1953. Pp. xi, 168. $3.50.)

In five lectures in the William W. Cook Foundation series, the author traces "the glittering generality" of "pursuit of happiness" through early American documents and individual statements; takes a turn at what the courts have said about happiness; finds in classical philosophy and in Puritanism, respectively, the "spectator theory of happiness for the aristocrat" and "the prosperity theory for the Christian merchant"; analyzes the concepts of happiness in Cooper, Emerson, and William James; and finally finds that in the twentieth century happiness is in the area not of law but of psychology, and is sought not in the way of the country gentleman or the merchant prince but in personal adjustment to the environment.

Essay in Politics. BY SCOTT BUCHANAN. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1953. Pp. xiii, 236. $3.75.)

The essay is concerned with the intricate complex of corporations of various sorts which make up much of the life of the nation and which constitute in fact many unrecognized governments sharing in sovereignty and power over the people, but which are lacking in coordination and in responsibility. The need, it is contended, is to recognize them as bodies politic and to give them federal republican forms of government and thus revitalize the significance of the consent of the governed.

The Present as History: Essays and Reviews on Capitalism and Socialism. BY PAUL M. SWEEZY. (New York: Monthly Review Press. 1953. Pp. viii, 376. $5.00.)

Some essays and a number of book reviews published over the past 15 years by an economist of Marxian views who is attempting to illustrate here how many present developments are in the stream of history.

Man and Modern Society: Conflict and Choice in the Industrial Era. BY KARL DE SCHWEINITZ, JR. AND KENNETH W. THOMPSON. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1953. Pp. xii, 849. $5.25.)

A valuable collection of readings designed for general education courses. The emphasis is political and economic. The theme is that the great issues among men today result from the impact of new forces on the old ideological and institutional framework. The effort here is to display both the framework and the contemporary problems.

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NEWS AND NOTES

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

NEXT ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION

The Fiftieth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association will be held September 9–11, 1954, at the Sherman Hotel in Chicago. The Chairman of the Program Committee is Professor Stephen K. Bailey, Wesleyan University; the Chairman of the Committee on Local Arrangements is Professor C. Herman Pritchett, University of Chicago.

Pomona College was co-host with the Citizenship Clearing House to a Southern California Conference on Preparing College Men and Women for Greater Participation in Practical Politics, held at the Mission Inn, Riverside, California, February 19–20, 1954. The members of the conference included some sixty college administrators, professors of government, political leaders, and newspaper editors selected by an advisory committee consisting of Professors Totton J. Anderson, of the University of Southern California, David Farrelly and Ivan L. Hinderaker, of the University of California at Los Angeles, Robert L. Morlan, of the University of Redlands, Don Muchmore, of Long Beach State College, and John A. Vieg, of Pomona College, who served as chairman. A Southern California affiliate of the Citizenship Clearing House is now in process of being organized.

The Citizenship Clearing House Unit for Eastern Pennsylvania held a student conference on "Student Participation in Party Politics" on March 19 and 20, 1954. Principal speakers at the conference were: Professor Stephen K. Bailey, of Wesleyan University and Mayor of Middletown, Connecticut; George Leader, Democratic candidate for Governor of Pennsylvania; and Lloyd Wood, Republican candidate for Governor of Pennsylvania. A portion of the conference was devoted to section meetings in which there were panel discussions participated in by students, faculty members, and political party leaders.

A special conference on the Middle East was held at Grinnell College, March 4–8, 1954, under the sponsorship of the Grinnell Institute of International Affairs. Leading participants included the following: S. E. Gerard Priestley, British author and historian; Taraknath Das, professor of political science at Columbia University; Abdul Hamid Ghaleb, alternate Egyptian delegate to the United Nations; M. S. Sundaram, First Secretary, Education Department, Embassy of India; Syed Amjad Ali, Ambassador from Pakistan; John Durnford Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State; and Abba Eban, Ambassador from Israel.

Specialists in several fields recently examined the relationship between Antioch College's courses in economics, political science, and law, and the school's study-plus-work program. Among the several hundred employers and alumni who attended a centennial conference on the Yellow Springs campus at Antioch to evaluate "Work Experience in Higher Education," February 11, 12, and 13, were: Charles Gant, program analyst, National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C.; J. Alan Ofner, industrial relations division, Argonne National Laboratories, AEC, Chicago; Truman Safford, attorney, Curtis, Morris and Safford, New York; Frederick Beckman, supervisor, Department of Mental Welfare, Columbus, Ohio; John O. Harper, attorney, Cory, Durfee, Martin and Brown, Springfield, Ohio. Chairman of the panel was Heinz Eulau, associate professor of government at Antioch. Separate discussions were held in thirteen other fields of major concentration. Students and faculty members participated in all, as panelists or in the audience. Antioch was the first liberal arts college in the country to adopt a study-plus-work program.

Under the plan, students regularly alternate classroom courses with jobs secured for them in thirty-three states.

The Third Institute on World Affairs and International Cooperation will be held at the Pennsylvania State University during the main summer session, 1954. The Institute will have as its theme "The American Impact Abroad—Its Effects on International Cooperation and Understanding." Professors Elton C. Atwater and R. Wallace Brewster, of the political science department, are serving on the all-university committee supervising the Institute.

The Third Western Training Laboratory in Group Development will be held at Idyllwild, California, between August 15 and 27, 1954. The Laboratory is intended to provide understanding and skills for individuals who want to improve their effectiveness in working with groups. Participants with a variety of occupational backgrounds are expected to attend. The training staff will be made up of faculty members from various universities as well as of active group leaders in business, government, industry, public health, education, social welfare, and the like. For information, write Department of Conferences and Special Activities, University Extension, University of California, Los Angeles 24, California.

The Sixtieth National Conference on Government of the National Muncipal League will be held in Kansas City, Missouri, November 7–10, 1954.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Political scientists and others contemplating research in Japan will be interested in a new residential center, International House, which will soon be opened in Tokyo. Construction was started this spring, and the building is expected to be open to its first residents early in 1955. International House has been made possible by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation and from funds raised locally in Japan. The managing director is Shigeharu Matsumoto, Tokyo lawyer and writer. Dr. Gordon Bowles, formerly Executive Secretary of the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, and now teaching anthropology at the University of Tokyo, is co-director.

The facilities of International House will be primarily for scholars who have completed their training. It is being constructed near Tokyo Central Railroad Station—in the heart of Tokyo. The building will contain lecture and dining halls and residence quarters for a maximum of fifty guests. Conference study rooms will also be available. The library will emphasize current periodicals from many foreign nations and will include special collections of books on contemporary Western and Asian problems. It is not expected that the House will engage directly in research and translation projects, but it will assist persons and organizations employed in these activities, and special attention will be paid to visiting and resident foreign scholars engaged in Asian studies. Inquiries concerning facilities which will be provided to visiting foreign scholars may be obtained by writing to the International House of Japan, Inc., Bank of Tokyo, Marunouchi Branch 2, 1-chome, Marunouchi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo.

Harold Stassen, Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, delivered an address on February 22 at the University of the Philippines during the dedication ceremonies for the newly constructed Rizal Hall. The Institute of Public Administration of the University of the Philippines, now located in Rizal Hall, was established under a contract between the University of Michigan and the University of the Philippines, through the assistance of FOA and the Philippine Government. Ferrel Heady, on leave from the University of Michigan, is the present director and chief advisor of the Philippine Institute.

On March 1, 1954, through private funds made available by Chancellor Rufus B. vonKleinsmid, there was established in the School of Public Administration, University of Southern California, an International Public Administration Center in order to provide special service for the foreign professors and students who are taking advanced graduate training. In effect, this is an extension of the work which the School has been doing under government contract, first for a group of Turkish professors, 1951–1953, and then for a group of Brazilian professors, 1952–1954. The present participants and associates in the International Public Administration Center are: Arif Payaslioglu, Ankara, Turkey; Reyan Toluner, Istanbul, Turkey; Paulo Neves de

Carvalho, Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais, Brazil; Chukuemeka Okeke, Nigeria; Evangelos J. Rizos, Greece; Nouri Al-Kadhim, Iraq; and Raphael Velasco, Mexico; Vinod Pathak, India; Miss Eila Ketola, Finland; Madanjit S. Malik, India; Celodonio E. Felix, San Juan, Puerto Rico; Wedding Fricke, Germany; and Fernando Segurra, Costa Rica.

The Rutgers Lincoln Prize of $1,000, to be offered annually for the best manuscript on Lincoln or in the Lincoln field, is announced by Rutgers University Press. The winning manuscript will be published jointly by the Abraham Lincoln Association and Rutgers Press, and the award will be divided equally between an outright grant and an advance against royalties. The purpose of the Lincoln Prize is not merely to stimulate continuing work in this field, but particularly to find books worthy of the centennial significance of the years from 1954–1965. Manuscripts must be submitted to Rutgers Press before October 1 of the year in which they are to be considered. Authors or agents are invited to write to Rutgers University Press for further details before submitting any manuscript.

The Association of Research Libraries has approved a program for making promptly and inexpensively available all doctoral dissertations currently accepted by colleges and universities in this country. Forty-three institutions are now publishing all or part of their dissertations under this plan. As expressed by the ARL, the general objectives of the dissertation publishing plan are as follows:

1. All doctoral dissertations should be published immediately upon acceptance to facilitate more effectual communication of new research material than is now possible through the existing costly, inefficient, and incomplete system of interlibrary lending of typescripts of dissertations.
2. A permanent central repository for doctoral dissertations, from which copies could be inexpensively procured at any time, should be maintained to simplify the distribution of this new research material.
3. Uniform listing, indexing, and abstracting of these dissertations, in one central bibliographical source, should follow as soon as possible upon their acceptance.

To achieve these objectives, the ARL endorsed publication of dissertations in microfilm and formulated the basic plan which makes use of the services provided by University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Various levels of participation are possible, and each participating university makes its own decision as to whether the university or the student pays the fee. Any institution granting doctorate degrees may participate in the plan or secure more detailed information by writing directly to University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

The Washington Semester at the American University was honored recently by the Freedom Foundation by the award of the George Washington Medal for outstanding contribution to American citizenship.

A third unit of the Washington Semester has been announced for the fall of 1954. This expansion of the program will permit the addition of approximately twenty colleges and universities. Institutions sending students for the first time in the spring of 1954 were: Augustana College, Florida Southern College, Monmouth College, Pomona College, University of Redlands, Rollins College, Syracuse University, Valparaiso University, and Wabash College.

The American University is offering a six-weeks Public Affairs Laboratory in Washington, D.C. from June 21 to July 30. The program includes background lectures by the faculty of the University, seminars with public officials, field trips, and individual projects. Six hours of graduate credit will be given to students participating in the Laboratory.

The department of political science at Duke University will offer a special course in Japanese civilization during the 1954 summer session in commemoration of the hundredth anniversary of the opening of Japan by Commodore Perry. Through a recent grant by the Japan Society, a number of scholarships will be offered to graduate students who have had no opportunity to make a special study of Japanese affairs. Professor Ralph J. D. Braibanti, of the political science faculty, will conduct the course.

A new undergraduate program in world studies will be offered by the University of Rochester beginning with the fall semester. This program will place emphasis upon the political, economic, social, and cultural forces that have molded the civilizations of Eastern

Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and Africa, and that are forging new societies in these areas today. This program will be directed by Vera Micheles Dean, of the Foreign Policy Association. Mrs. Dean has been appointed visiting professor of government at the University of Rochester.

Recent guest lecturers before the political science graduate seminar at Duke University include the Hon. George McGhee, former Ambassador to Turkey and Assistant Secretary of State, and Dr. Lujo Toncic, member of the House of Representatives of the Austrian Parliament.

Guest speakers on the annual federal lecture program of the School of Public Administration at the Florida State University during the spring semester were Francis P. Brassor, Executive Secretary of the new Hoover Commission, Eugene M. Zuckert, member of the Atomic Energy Commission, and a number of other prominent federal officials.

Fifteen members of the department of political science at the University of Pennsylvania appeared in a television series over Philadelphia Station WFIL from February 5 to May 14, 1954. The program is entitled "The University of the Air," and the topic of the political science series was "This World of Politics." Lincoln Harter, assistant professor of political science, was moderator of the series on political science.

Six professors of political science have been appointed to the research staff of the Missouri Little Hoover Commission. The three full-time members are: Carl A. McCandless, of Washington University, who is the director; and Henry Schmandt, of St. Louis University, and John W. Schwada, of the University of Missouri, who are serving as assistants. The heads of the departments of political science of the three universities named above have been designated as part-time consultants. They are: Thomas H. Eliot, Washington University; Paul Steinbicker, St. Louis University; and Martin L. Faust, University of Missouri. The three full-time members are on leave from their respective universities for a year beginning February 1, 1954.

Lawrence L. Durisch and Robert E. Lowry, both of the TVA, received the Louis E. Brownlow Citation and Award at the annual meeting of the American Society for Public Administration in March, 1954. The award was for the best article published in the *Public Administration Review* during 1953. The title of the winning article was "The Scope and Content of Administrative Decision."

A new chapter of Pi Sigma Alpha, political science honorary, was established at the State University of Iowa this spring. Thirty members were initiated, including five undergraduates, seventeen graduates, and eight faculty members.

Marver H. Bernstein, of Princeton University, gave a course on regulatory commissions during the spring session at Columbia University.

Arnold Brecht, since 1933 professor of political science at the New School for Social Research, became professor emeritus on March 15, 1954. His students honored him on this occasion by publishing six of his papers on relativism and related problems as a book under the title *The Political Philosophy of Arnold Brecht*, with an introduction and a bibliography of his writings. Professor Brecht has accepted an invitation from the University of Heidelberg, Germany, to deliver a course of lectures on the comparative history of political institutions and a seminar on problems of twentieth-century political theory from May through July as a guest professor. In the fall, he will return to the United States to lecture at the New School and to write.

Professors James M. Burns, of Williams College, and John P. Roche, of Haverford College, were members of the faculty of the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies, Salzburg, Austria, for the January, 1954 session. Professor Burns lectured on American political parties and offered a seminar on the American experiment in government, while Professor Roche devoted his lectures to American political thought and his seminar to American constitutional law.

Lynton K. Caldwell, of Syracuse University, served as a consultant in public administration to the Institute of Public Administration at the University of the Philippines for a two-month period beginning February 5, 1954.

Carl Q. Christol, of the department of political science at the University of Southern California, has been appointed a member of the Committee on International Law in the

Courts of the United States, Section on International and Comparative Law, American Bar Association.

During the winter quarter, Gordon R. Clapp gave six Walgreen Foundation lectures on the TVA at the University of Chicago, and George S. Pettee presented another Walgreen series on "Soldiers and Civilians."

Dorothy I. Cline, assistant professor of government at the University of New Mexico, has announced her candidacy for the city commission of Albuquerque.

James S. Coleman, instructor in political science at the University of California (Los Angeles), delivered a series of addresses in seven cities in western Canada during January. The lectures covered various topics relating to political developments in Africa and were given under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

Robert A. Dahl, of Yale, offered a course on the policy-making process during the spring session at Columbia University.

David Fellman, professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, was a participant in the social science seminar at Iowa State College on March 11, speaking on the subject of civil liberties. He is scheduled to deliver five lectures on the same subject at the Utah State Agricultural College in June.

Russell H. Fifield, associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan, was awarded the 1953 George Louis Beer Prize of the American Historical Association for his recent book, *Woodrow Wilson and the Far East: The Diplomacy of the Shantung Question.*

Charles Gilbert is working in the office of Senator Hubert Humphrey in Washington while teaching a seminar on politics and legislation at Swarthmore College.

W. Leon Godshall, professor and head of the department of international relations at Lehigh University, absent on leave, 1952–54, completed a tour of duty as visiting professor of international relations at the University of the Philippines on March 15. On his return voyage to Lehigh for the summer session, he will visit Singapore, Suez, Cairo, and various points of interest in Europe.

John H. Hallowell, of Duke University, recently gave four lectures at the University of Arkansas. These were part of a lecture series on moral philosophy which the University of Arkansas is sponsoring with the aid of the Rockefeller Foundation.

J. Eugene Harley, of the University of Southern California, delivered the principal address at the Pacific Southwest Regional Conference of the American Association of International Relations Clubs, held at Redlands University, February 19–20, 1954. His subject was "Recent Important Developments in International Law and Organization."

Majid Khadduri, Professor of Middle East Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, has been awarded the Rafidain Medal by the Government of Iraq. This medal is for scholarly and literary accomplishment and was awarded to Professor Khadduri for his recent book, *Independent Iraq.*

Louis E. Lambert, of the department of government at Indiana University, is serving again this summer as director of a three-week workshop in state and local government. The purpose of the workshop is to encourage the teaching of state and local government in Indiana high schools. The method used for the presentation of material is a roundtable with panelists selected from among leaders of Indiana local government and politics.

Arthur W. Macmahon, Eaton Professor of Public Administration at Columbia University, is spending a sabbatical leave in Europe; he is lecturing this spring at the College of Europe in Bruges. Professor Macmahon was chairman of the Columbia University Bicentennial Conference on Federalism which was held at Arden House between January 11 and 14, 1954.

Roy Macridis, associate professor of political science at Northwestern University, read a paper on "Political Science and Comparative Politics" at the International Political Science Association meeting in Florence, Italy, April 4–11, 1954.

B. Mirkine-Guetzévitch, Dean of the Faculty of Law and Political Science of the French University of New York, offered two courses in the department of government at Harvard University during the spring semester. He participated in a conference held as a part of the Bicentennial Celebration at Columbia University in January.

Robert G. Neumann, associate professor of political science at the University of California (Los Angeles), was one of eighty Americans selected to visit Germany as a guest of the German Federal Government. Professor Neumann spent part of February and March observing political developments in West Germany.

Professors Russell M. Ross and Vernon Van Dyke, of the political science department at the State University of Iowa, are participating in an evaluation of the general education courses, a project undertaken on the basis of a grant from the Ford Foundation. Professor Van Dyke is also directing a survey of the role of the State University of Iowa in world affairs, a project undertaken at the suggestion of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

John F. Sly, professor of politics at Princeton University, was in Liberia, West Africa, in January, 1954 as a consultant to the Department of State to examine and report on the management and fiscal policies of the free port of Monrovia.

R. G. Whitesel, of the political science department of the State University of Iowa, was on half-time status during the spring semester while working on a Ford Foundation project in educational television, "Freedom in a Democracy."

Arthur M. Wilson, professor of government and biography at Dartmouth College, has been awarded the 1952–1953 Modern Language Association-Oxford University Press Award for a manuscript entitled "Diderot: The Testing Years, 1713–1759." The award consists of a prize of $1,000 in addition to royalties.

POLITICAL SCIENTISTS AS AREA SPECIALISTS

It has been common to assume that American scholarship in the social sciences and humanities has been oriented to Western cultures. Valid though this assumption may be, the results of a recent report prepared by the American Council of Learned Societies suggest a much wider specialization in Asian, African, and Eastern European studies than many of us had realized. Of particular interest is the fact that political science seems to reflect a greater scholarly concern for these areas than many of the other social sciences or the humanities. The report, *Preliminary Analysis, American Personnel in Asian, African and Eastern European Studies* (Washington, D.C., November, 1953) (mimeo. 16 pp., 17 tables, 5 maps), was prepared by J. F. Wellemeyer, Jr. and Max H. North. It resulted from the National Registration of the Humanities and Social Sciences (in which the American Political Science Association participated when it circularized its membership in 1952) and is based on the registration of some 25,500 members of twenty-three professional societies. The project was financed by the Office of Naval Research, but the report summarized here was made at the request of the Board of Overseas Training and Research of the Ford Foundation which needed the information to review its programs in Asian and African area studies.

The report classifies as an area expert anyone who has done research, published papers or books, or taught courses relating to the area. Incidental travel and military intelligence research were not included in this consideration, unless such experience was combined with language competence or other professional training. The report aims to give a statistical description of scholars competent in Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe, but does not seek to evaluate the supply of experts or to appraise their qualifications.

Two screenings of the rough data indicated that 3,218 persons reported themselves as area specialists. This constituted about one-eighth of the registrants in the National Registration. From the data submitted by these 3,218 persons, the analysis in this report is made. The areas of specialty and the special characteristics of expertness in each area are shown below.

Near and Middle East. This includes North and East Africa, Turkey, Asia Minor, Israel, Syria, and Transjordan. Of the 544 persons who recorded their principal specialty in this area, the largest group (82) were specialists in biblical literature. Political science and economics ranked next, each claiming 54 specialists. History, geography, archeology, sociology, anthropology, and literature each had between 40 and 50 specialists in this area. Oriental studies and linguistics had 37 and 22, respectively. Art, statistics, philosophy, musicology, aesthetics, and education had fewer than 10 specialists. Religion and classical studies account for much of the interest in this field. A slightly higher proportion of native-born American citizens and a slightly smaller proportion of women are found in this group.

Far East. This region includes China, Japan, Korea, Formosa, and the Ryukyu Islands. Of the 883 persons who reported their principal specialty in this area, 357 persons were specialists in Japan, 222 in China (general). Political science ranked first in number of specialists (146) with economics, history, and oriental studies second, third, and fourth, respectively. Sociology, geography, and literature have between 56 and 82 each. The Far East group contained a higher proportion of native-born Americans than the average, a higher proportion of government employees, and a lower proportion of persons with doctor's degrees.

Eastern Europe. European Soviet Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the Baltic countries, and the Balkans are included in this area. Of the 1,175 persons with a primary specialty in this area, 214 had a specialty for Greece alone, leaving 1,085 persons who might be considered specialists on Russia and her European satellites. Political scientists were second in number of specialists (213), being outranked by history (217), and followed by economics (205). Classical Greek literature, sociology, anthropology, and geography were represented by 72, 43, and 55 persons, respectively. This group had the lowest proportion of native-born Americans of all the regions, reflecting, according to the report, considerable immigration of specialists to the United States.

South Asia. India, Pakistan, Nepal, and Ceylon was the area of specialty of 200 persons. The most numerous were economists, with 33 specialists. Political science and history ranked next with 29 and 27 specialists, respectively. History was represented by only 14 persons, which seems low for this field, considering the extensive interest of historians in the remainder of the Far East. Fewer South Asian specialists have master's and doctor's degrees than is the case for most other regions.

Southeast Asia. In this region, consisting of Malaya, Burma, Indo-China, Thailand, the Philippines, the East Indies, and Melanesia, 191 specialists were registered. The most numerous group was in economics (47), but political science ranked second (26), followed by anthropology and sociology. Other disciplines were represented by fewer than 20 persons each. The highest proportion of native-born Americans was found here, but there were fewer women and fewer persons with doctorates than in most other fields.

Northern Asia. Only 27 specialists registered for the area, which includes Siberia, Manchuria, Mongolia, and the Kazakh, Uzbek, Turkmen, Tadzhik, and Kirghiz Soviet Republics. There were 10 economists, 4 anthropologists, 6 geographers, and only 2 political scientists. Other disciplines were represented either by one or no specialist.

Central, Western, and Southern Africa. This area south of the Sahara Desert was listed as the first specialty of 85 persons, the most numerous group being the anthropologists with 23 persons. Political science ranked next with 12 persons. Sociology, geography, history, and economics came next with 11, 10, 9, and 7 specialists, respectively. Other disciplines were represented by fewer than five persons each.

Selected Pacific Islands. Of the 39 specialists on Micronesia and Polynesia, 19 were anthropologists. The next most numerous group is not clearly given. Table II of the report lists political science as ranking second, with 8 specialists. The text of the report (p. 12) lists 8 economists, although Table II shows no entry at all for economists. This, however, is an oversight, for subsequent correspondence between this reviewer and the principal author of the report confirms the impression that the entry should be for political scientists. Geography, sociology, history, and linguistics are represented by 4, 3, 2, and 2 specialists, respectively.

The report tabulates other data such as citizenship, age, education, type and location of employer, total professional income, employment status, and sex of the area specialists registering.

A few minor errors and organizational deficiencies slightly mar the report, but this is understandable since, as the title indicates, this is a preliminary version. It has been submitted to several specialists in the areas under survey and is being revised on the basis of suggestions received. It is planned that the revised form will be published probably this year.

The report suggests several observations of pertinence to political science. These observations cannot be regarded as definitive since they are based only on the data used in the report. Hence some comment on the possible limitations of the data as described by the report's authors seems pertinent here.

Undoubtedly there are more area specialists in the United States than those who completed the questionnaires used in this study. Schedules (as the report calls them) were mailed to some 55,000 persons, of whom only 25,500 responded. There are probably many among those who did not respond who would qualify as area specialists. If, as the report states (p. 2), the proportion of area specialists is the same among non-respondents as among respondents, there would be 3,424 more qualified persons. Very likely the same proportion would not hold, for many of those who did not answer probably correctly assumed that they were not qualified as area specialists. Another limitation of these observations is that of time. The data were collected in 1952: a more recent collection might yield different results. Obviously, the observations which follow share the limitations of the basic data.

Probably the most startling observation is that political science is very much concerned with Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe. We appear to be much more culture-area oriented than this writer had supposed. Of the total 3,618 political scientists in the National Registration, 13.7 per cent of our members claim to be specialists in these areas. Political science thus ranks seventh in claimed area competence. This percentage of competence is more significant than our seventh rank indicates. The first five disciplines which show a higher percentage of area competence (Table I) are archeology, anthropology, geography, biblical literature, and linguistics. All of these are disciplines which have some special historic or substantive claim to the areas considered. History ranks sixth (with 13.9 per cent of the historians claiming competence), and economics comes below political science (with 12 per cent of the economists claiming competence). Among disciplines having no historic claim to interest in these areas, then, political science ranks a very close second, being outranked by history by only .2 per cent.

The extent of our professional interest in these areas is indicated in another way. Of the eight areas considered, political science ranks first in declared competence on the Far East. This is surprising (at least to this writer) when one considers that a generation ago the number of political scientists interested in Asia could be counted on the fingers of two hands. In six other areas (Near and Middle East, Eastern Europe, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, and selected Pacific Islands) political science ranks second. Only in the study of North Asia (Soviet Asia and Manchuria) are we less well represented than economics, geography, and anthropology.

This significant concern for area studies will undoubtedly influence the character of our teaching and research for some time to come. Yet it is worthy of notice that there seems to be a lag between the immediate political importance of an area and the universities' response to its importance. Hence, in 1954, more than a decade after the height of concern for understanding Japanese, Chinese, and Korean culture, we find ourselves with what appears to be an oversupply of specialists in this area. It may well be that interest thus reflected in universities will be in areas of recent past importance rather than of anticipated future importance.

Such studies as this can be of great use to organizations like the Ford Foundation Board of Overseas Training and Research in preparing specialists for areas likely to become important in the future. These studies should be frequent and regular, perhaps annual, for the value diminishes sharply with the age of the data. It is hoped that the American Council of Learned Societies will continue these studies and make them widely available to institutions of learning and professional associations. It is reasonable to suppose that universities will find significance in such studies for planning curricular emphases. If we would keep the peace through understanding of other cultures, we might find value in empirical studies which show where the gaps in our knowledge are.—RALPH BRAIBANTI, *Duke University*.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Orville Alexander, chairman of the department of government at Southern Illinois University, has been granted a leave of absence until December, 1954 to serve as director of research for the Illinois School Problems Commission and the Ohio School Survey Committee.

Vincent M. Barnett, Jr., of Williams College, will be a visiting member of the faculty of the department of political science at Stanford University during the summer quarter of 1954, offering courses in constitutional law and in the administration of foreign aid programs.

Carl E. Bartch, Foreign Service Officer, has been transferred from the American Embassy at Caracas, Venezuela, where he has served as second secretary for the past two and one-half years, to the American Consulate General at Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Mr. Bartch entered the Foreign Service in 1948 and previously served at the American Consulate, Nicosia, Cyprus.

George C. S. Benson, president of Claremont Men's College, has taken a six months' leave of absence to serve as director of research for the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.

William W. Boyer, Jr., who received his doctorate from the University of Wisconsin, was appointed instructor in government and international relations at the University of Connecticut, effective in February, 1954.

Alfred G. Buehler, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, has been appointed by Governor Fine as Chairman of the Pennsylvania Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Professor Buehler has been serving as Chairman of the Pennsylvania Tax Study Committee.

Edward H. Buehrig served as acting chairman of the department of government at Indiana University during the past academic year.

Franklin L. Burdette has been appointed head of overseas libraries operated by the United States Information Agency. He is in charge of cultural activities in 158 libraries in 63 countries, including translations, grants, and the $10,000,000 information media guaranty program for the sale of American books abroad. The University of Maryland has granted him leave of absence from his position as head of the department of government and politics.

George P. Bush has been promoted to a full professorship in public administration at the American University.

Henry C. Bush was a visiting member of the political science staff at the University of Alabama during the past academic year.

Anthony P. Campanella has been appointed instructor of government and politics in the Iceland Center of the University of Maryland.

Edward S. Corwin, of Princeton University, was a visiting professor in the department of political science at Whittier College during the second semester of 1953–54.

Cecil Van Crabb has been promoted to the rank of professor of political science at Vassar College.

Frederick S. DeMarr has been appointed instructor of government and politics at the University of Maryland with assignment to Newfoundland centers.

Joseph Dunner has resumed his regular duties as chairman of the department of political science at Grinnell College after a year's leave of absence.

Lawrence L. Durisch, of the Tennessee Valley Authority, was a visiting professor of political science at the University of Alabama during the spring semester.

Robert E. Elder, associate professor of political science at Colgate University, spent the spring semester in Washington, D.C. in charge of the Colgate University Washington Study Group.

Mohammad Hasan El-Zayyat, cultural attaché at the Egyptian Embassy in Washington, served as a visiting associate professor of government at Columbia University during the spring session.

Ludwig F. Freund, of Roosevelt College, was a guest lecturer on international organization at Northwestern University during the winter quarter.

John D. Gerletti, Jr., of the School of Public Administration, University of Southern California, is on a year's leave of absence in New York during 1954, in order to act as the general manager for the International Fire Chiefs Association. Professor Gerletti's place is being filled by Richard Gable, recently of the Stanford political science faculty.

L. Jay Gould has been reappointed instructor in political science at the University of Vermont.

John Green, who recently received his Ph.D. degree from the University of Chicago, has been appointed assistant professor of government at the University of South Dakota.

Morton Grodzins has been appointed Dean of the Social Science Division, University of Chicago, and promoted to a full professorship in the department of political science. For the past two years he has been director of the University of Chicago Press.

Thomas T. Hammond has resumed his teaching duties as an assistant professor in the departments of history and foreign affairs at the University of Virginia after spending six months in travel and research in Yugoslavia and Trieste.

Earl T. Hanson, of Duke University, was on sabbatical leave during the second semester.

Lowell H. Hattery has been advanced to a full professorship in public administration at the American University.

Richard H. Heindel, staff deputy director of the U. S. National Commission for UNESCO, Department of State, has been appointed Dean of the University of Buffalo College of Arts and Sciences, effective July 1, 1954. During the main summer session, Dean Heindel will serve as a consultant-lecturer for Pennsylvania State University's Third Institute on World Affairs and International Cooperation.

L. Vaughan Howard, of Tulane University, will be a visiting member of the political science staff at Duke University during the 1954 summer session.

J. C. Hurewitz is on leave from Columbia University to spend the spring and summer in the Near and Middle East.

Dunning Idle has been appointed assistant professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland with assignment to the Newfoundland centers during the spring semester.

Stanton Jue, formerly of the University of California and research specialist for the Committee for Free Asia, has accepted an appointment to study acculturation and behavioral problems in San Francisco under the auspices of the International Institute.

Max M. Kampelman, recently a member of the political science faculties at the University of Minnesota and Bennington College, and now legislative counsel to United States Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, has been appointed visiting professor of political science at Howard University for 1954.

Joseph A. Kitchin, who is on sabbatical leave from Queens College, New York, and has been a Fulbright lecturer in political science in the universities in Bangkok, Thailand, since June, 1953, was appointed Executive Director of the Fulbright Foundation in Thailand on December 1, 1953, and was requested to extend his stay there through June, 1954. He will return to Queens College in September, 1954.

Frank L. Klingberg is serving as acting chairman of the department of government at Southern Illinois University.

Walter H. C. Laves has been appointed chairman of the department of government at Indiana University. He has resigned as Vice President of the Governmental Affairs Institute and will assume his new duties in the fall. In March of 1954, Professor Laves was secretary-general of a conference on "Organization and Administration of Public Enterprise in the Industrial Field," held in Rangoon, Burma, under the joint sponsorship of the UN Technical Assistance Administration, the Economic Cooperation Administration for the Far East, and the International Institute of Administrative Sciences.

Gerard J. Mangone served as acting chairman of the department of political science at Swarthmore College during the past academic year.

Charles B. McClane, formerly of the United States mission in Moscow and the University of California, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Swarthmore College.

Rodney L. Mott, director of the division of social sciences and professor of political science at Colgate University, returned to the University during the second semester after spending a year in Australia on a Fulbright grant studying problems of local self-government.

L. C. Noonan has recently returned from a special leave of absence, during which he carried on special research under a Ford Foundation grant, and has resumed his duties as assistant professor in the department of political science, University of Southern California.

Andrew E. Nuquist has been named chairman of the department of political science at the University of Vermont to succeed Professor Daniel B. Carroll, retired.

Malcolm B. Parsons has been promoted to

associate professor of public administration at the Florida State University.

Nathaniel Peffer has returned to Columbia University from Australia where he lectured at the University of Queensland, Brisbane.

J. Roland Pennock was on leave of absence from Swarthmore College during the past year under a Guggenheim grant to study American and British legislation.

Paul J. Piccard was a visiting professor in the School of Public Administration at the Florida State University during the past year.

John Plamenatz, of Oxford University, was a visiting professor in the department of public law at Columbia University during the spring session.

Elmer Plischke, of the University of Maryland, is serving as acting head of the department of government and politics while Franklin L. Burdette is on leave of absence as Chief of the Information Center Service of the U. S. Information Agency.

Robert F. Ray, of the Institute of Public Affairs of the State University of Iowa, has been appointed director of the Iowa Citizenship Clearing House.

Henry Reining, Jr., on September 1, 1953, became Dean of the School of Public Administration at the University of Southern California. He succeeded Dean Emery E. Olson who had been dean since the School was established in 1928 and was retired at his own request.

John P. Roche has been promoted to associate professor of political science at Haverford College.

Francis E. Rourke, of Yale University, served as an assistant professor in public administration at the Johns Hopkins University during the past academic year.

Eva R. Rubin has been appointed instructor of political science at the Johns Hopkins University.

Francis Shih-hao Shieh, former faculty member of Loyola College, Shanghai, China, and an alumnus of Georgetown University, has been appointed instructor at the Army Language School.

Currin V. Shields, assistant professor of political science at the University of California (Los Angeles), was on a sabbatical-in-residence leave during the spring semester.

Oliver C. Short, recently retired Director of the Office of Personnel Administration, U. S. Department of Commerce, was a visiting lecturer for a six weeks' period in the School of Public Administration, Florida State University.

Lewis B. Sims, of the U. S. Public Health Service, has been loaned to the new Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government to serve as a research analyst with the Medical Services Task Force. During the past year, Mr. Sims served as a visiting professor of political science at UCLA.

Frank M. Stewart, of the University of California at Los Angeles, who has been on sabbatical leave for the academic year 1953–54, will resume teaching in the fall semester.

William S. Stokes was on research leave from the University of Wisconson during the second semester in order to work on a volume on the nature of power in Latin-American politics.

Ronald M. Stout has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at Colgate University.

Robert Sullivant, of the University of South Dakota, has been granted a leave of absence to participate in a research project on Russian government at Georgetown University.

Carl B. Swisher, of the Johns Hopkins University, was a visiting professor of political science at Whittier College during the spring semester.

Nelson E. Taylor, Jr. was a visiting lecturer in political science at the University of Vermont during the second semester of 1953–54.

Manfred C. Vernon, formerly of the Department of State, was a visiting associate professor of political science at the University of Alabama during 1953–54.

H. O. Waldby, currently on leave of absence to teach at the University of the Philippines, has been promoted to an associate professorship of public administration at the Florida State University.

Earl Warner has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at Ohio Wesleyan University for a two-year period, beginning September 1, 1954.

S. Walter Washington, a former officer in the U. S. Foreign Service, has been appointed lecturer in the Woodrow Wilson Department of Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia.

George H. Watson is on a year's leave of absence from Roosevelt College to engage in research under a grant from the Fund for the Advancement of Education of the Ford Foundation.

J. D. Williams has been named director of the interne program in public administration which has recently been resumed at the University of Utah.

William R. Willoughby served as acting chairman of the department of history and government at St. Lawrence University during the past academic year.

Ellsworth P. Woods, formerly associate professor of political science at Western Michigan College, has returned to the campus after a year's leave of absence to become head of the newly created division of basic studies.

John J. Wuest has been appointed instructor of government and politics in the European program of the University of Maryland.

W. R. Yates has been reappointed instructor in political science at the University of Vermont.

Paul N. Ylvisaker has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at Swarthmore College. He is presently supervising a research team studying political behavior in Philadelphia, under a grant from the Social Science Research Council.

IN MEMORIAM

George Edgar McReynolds, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and formerly head of the department of government and international relations at the University of Connecticut, died on March 28, 1954, at the age of forty-four. His brief career will be remembered in the love and gratitude of his associates and students. Dean McReynolds contributed much to the growth of the University and of the department of which he was the first chairman. He saw international relations as an essential element of general education as well as a field for specialization and was instrumental in the introduction of this subject into the freshman-sophomore curriculum of the University.

Dean McReynolds secured his undergraduate education at Indiana University where he was graduated in 1931. He received his Ph.D. degree at Clark University in 1937. His special field of interest was the Far East. He served as a lieutenant commander in the United States Navy from 1942 to 1946. Dean McReynolds was editor of *Inside Asia* (1942), joint editor of *Essays in History and International Relations* (1949), and joint author of *Japan in American Public Opinion* (1937) and *China, Japan, and the Powers* (1952). He taught at the University of Maine and Indiana University as well as at the University of Connecticut, where he organized the department of government and international relations in 1947 and became Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences in 1950.—G. LOWELL FIELD.

SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS

REPORT OF NOMINATING COMMITTEE

At the coming meeting of the American Political Science Association to be held in Chicago, the Committee on Nominations (Charles B. Robson, Chairman, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) will propose the following officers for 1954–55: President-Elect, Harold D. Lasswell (Yale University); Vice-Presidents, Hubert H. Humphrey (United States Senate), Lindsay Rogers (Columbia University), Charles S. Hyneman (Northwestern University); Secretary, Harvey C. Mansfield (Ohio State University); Treasurer, Edward H. Litchfield (Cornell University); Members of the Council for two years, Gabriel A. Almond (Center of International Studies, Princeton), Stephen K. Bailey (Wesleyan University), James M. Burns (Williams College), Gwendolen M. Carter (Smith College), Samuel J. Eldersveld (University of Michigan), Avery Leiserson (Vanderbilt University), Leslie M. Lipson (University of California, Berkeley), Norman Palmer (University of Pennsylvania).

BOOK OF THE YEAR AWARDS

This year there will be only two book awards, which will be made on behalf of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Foundation (for the award in the field of Government and Human Welfare), and the Woodrow Wilson Foundation (for the award in the field of Government and Democracy). Each award carries a cash prize of $1,000 to the author, along with an appropriate citation from the Association. Only books by American authors published in the United States during the calendar year 1953 will be eligible for consideration.

For selection of the best books, a General Chairman and a panel of three members for each award have been selected from the membership of the Association. The General Chairman and members of each panel for the 1954 awards are as follows:

General Chairman: Grayson Kirk, President, Columbia University.

Panel for the Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award: Royden Dangerfield (University of Illinois), Chairman; Avery Leiserson (Vanderbilt University); and Clinton Rossiter (Cornell University).

Panel for the Franklin D. Roosevelt Foundation Award: Victor Jones (Wesleyan University), Chairman; John A. Davis (College of the City of New York); and a third member not yet chosen.

Books for the Franklin D. Roosevelt Foundation Award should deal with the ideals, aims, and purposes of government, including, for example, subjects such as civil rights, economic development, social welfare, education, labor problems, labor relations, etc. These categories are illustrative only. Books on international affairs may be included if they deal primarily with the objectives of government.

Books for the Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award should deal primarily with the organization, structure, and functioning of government, including concepts of political theory, party organization and party processes, intergovernmental relations, and comparative government, all broadly interpreted.

The Chairmen and members of the panels will be glad to receive suggestions of titles.

CONGRESSIONAL INTERNE PROGRAM

The Edgar B. Stern Family Fund of New Orleans, Louisiana, has expanded its grant to The American Political Science Association to enable the awarding of ten Congressional Interneships for the year 1954–1955. In accordance with the terms of the expanded grant, five political scientists and five journalists have been selected for the coming year. During the first year of the operation of the Congressional Interne Program, four professors of political science, one lawyer, and one journalist were chosen.

The Congressional Internes will commence their work in Washington on November 1, 1954, and continue for a nine-month period until the end of July, 1955. November 1 was selected as a starting date instead of September 1 in order to give the Internes more time in Washington while Congress is in session. However, the Internes will be given an option of starting their work on September 1 if any of them desire to participate actively in the congressional campaign this fall.

The Congressional Interneships pay $4,000 for the nine-month period in Washington. According to current information, these stipends are tax-free.

Frequent meetings of the internes are held to exchange experiences and reactions, to interview and discuss legislative problems with members of Congress, staff officials on Capitol Hill, representatives of the executive branch concerned with legislative liaison, and representatives of the leading lobby organizations. During such meetings over the past year, the Congressional Internes have met with several members of the White House staff, the leadership of both House and Senate, a large number of the committee chairmen, about one-third of the members of the Senate and an equal number of the House members, and legislative officials of the Chamber of Commerce, Congress of Industrial Organizations, American Farm Bureau Federation, and Farmers' Union. An off-the-record session with former President Truman was held during his visit to Washington early in May.

The current group of Congressional Internes have held assignments with the following since their arrival in Washington: Legislative Liaison Office of the White House, Senator Estes Kefauver (D., Tenn.), Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency, Senator Wayne Morse (Ind., Ore.), Rep. Richard Bolling (D., Mo.), Rep. Brooks Hays (D., Ark.), Rep. Richard Simpson (R., Pa., and Chairman of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee); Rep. Don Magnuson (D., Wash.), Rep. Mel Price (D., Ill.), Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Paul Douglas (D., Ill.), and Rep. Franklin D. Roosevelt (D., N. Y.). The amount of the fellowship pays the full cost of the Internes' stipends, and their services are made available free of charge to congressional committees and individual members.

The Internes have written speeches, handled constituent inquiries, conducted liaison with executive departments, assisted in the drafting of committee reports, done research needed by committees and members, held meetings with pressure group representatives to appraise their position on legislation, assisted in the drafting and introduction of legislation, monitored committee hearings and floor debates to spot loopholes and make suggestions on questions to be asked and information to be presented in future debates and hearings—and participated in scores of other legislative duties.

In nearly every case, the Internes have had access to information, and the opportunity to participate in aspects of the legislative process not ordinarily open to students or to the public in general. For example, they have attended many executive sessions of committees, have had access to the floor of the Senate, and have, in most instances, become members of the "inner circle" of congressional offices.

Close to 200 men and women initially applied under the program. The chairmen of the departments of political science at colleges and universities throughout the country, as well as the deans of Law Schools and Schools of Journalism, were each asked to nominate the one best candidate who had come to his attention. Working journalists, including newspaper and magazine writers and those active in radio and television, were encouraged to apply through their editors, and through stories announcing the program which appeared in *Editor and Publisher*, the *Guild Reporter*, and the regular news media.

These applications initially received were screened down to the 45 best written applications. The Screening Committee consisted of Professor Lowell Hattery of The American University, Professor William Johnstone, Jr. of the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, Dr. Karl Stromsem of the Department of the Interior, Jack Beal of *Time Magazine* and formerly of the United Press, and Ben Reeves of the Louisville *Courier-Journal* (one of the 1953–1954 Congressional Internes). The 45 applicants were then interviewed by ten regional boards set up by the Association in New York; Wellesley, Massachusetts; Rochester, New York; Washington; New Orleans; Chicago; Lincoln, Nebraska; Missoula, Montana; San Francisco; and Honolulu, Hawaii. The reports of the regional interviewing boards were then reviewed by the Screening Committee, which recommended the 19 best candidates to the Advisory Committee on the Interne Program for final selection.

The Advisory Committee consists of Dr. Ernest S. Griffith, Director of the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress (Chairman); Senator Irving M. Ives (R., N. Y.); Merlo J. Pusey, Associate Editor of the *Washington Post and Times-Herald;* Congressman Richard Bolling (D., Mo.); and Professor Stephen K. Bailey of the Department of Government at Wesleyan University.

The Congressional Internes selected for 1954–1955 are as follows:

Clifford D. Coover, 27, of Bozeman, Montana, night editor of the Bozeman *Daily Chronicle* since 1950. Mr. Coover received a B.A. in Journalism (*cum laude*) from the University of Minnesota in 1950, and has been with the

Bozeman *Chronicle* since that time, except for six months as news editor of an Algona, Iowa, newspaper. Mr. Coover has been active in Republican party politics in Montana.

John T. Dempsey, 29, of Detroit, Michigan, an Instructor in Political Science at the University of Detroit since 1951. Mr. Dempsey was graduated from Wayne University in Detroit, received his Master's degree from the University of Detroit, and has done work toward a doctoral degree in political science at the University of Michigan. His dissertation is entitled "Control by Congress over the Seating and Disciplining of its Members."

Louis B. Fleming, 29, of Pasadena, California, who has been a reporter on the Pasadena *Star-News* since 1948. He received his B.A. degree from Stanford University in 1947, following which he edited the San Gabriel (Calif.) *Sun*, and was valley editor of the Pomona (Calif.) *Progress-Bulletin*. He has won praise from the community for his objective reporting of explosive issues involving the Board of Education and City Hall.

William C. Gibbons, 27, of Harrisonburg, Virginia, who is completing his doctoral studies at Princeton University, where he received a master's degree in 1952. Mr. Gibbons was graduated from Randolph-Macon College in 1949, and he has served as an Assistant in instruction in the field of political science at both Randolph-Macon College and Princeton University. His doctoral dissertation is entitled "Congress and the International Information Program since the End of World War II."

Marvin A. Harder, 32, of Wichita, Kansas, currently Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Wichita. Mr. Harder received his A.B. degree from the University of Wichita in 1947 and the A.M. degree from the Department of Public Law and Government at Columbia University in 1949. He has been teaching at the University of Wichita since 1947, aside from the period of his graduate studies at Columbia University. He is a precinct committeeman, ward supervisor, and President of the Democratic Club of Wichita.

Daniel B. Jacobs, 28, of Boston, Massachusetts, since 1952 producer of public affairs programs for the Lowell Institute Cooperative Broadcasting Council in Boston (WGBH-FM). Mr. Jacobs is a graduate of Harvard College (1950), where he was a member of the editorial board of the *Harvard Crimson*.

W. Astor Kirk, 31, Chairman of the Department of Government at Huston-Tillotson College, Austin, Texas. Mr. Kirk was graduated from Howard University in 1946 *magna cum laude*, and received his Master's degree from Howard University the following year. He has done considerable work toward his Ph.D. at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and the University of Texas, being one of the first Negroes to enter the Graduate School at the University of Texas. He is also Director of the Institute of Politics at Huston-Tillotson College, in addition to his duties as departmental chairman.

Richard T. Mittauer, 26, of Omaha, Nebraska, news editor for the radio and television stations WOW in Omaha. Mr. Mittauer received B.S. and M.S. degrees in journalism from Northwestern University in 1950 and 1951, respectively. He was a news writer and reporter for WDUZ in Green Bay, Wisconsin, and a news editor for the American Broadcasting Co. in Chicago in 1951 before joining the staff of WOW.

Eli Rapaich, 28, of Lewiston, Idaho, currently completing work for Master of Laws degree at Yale Law School. Mr. Rapaich received both the Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of Laws degrees in 1953 from the University of Idaho. He also served with the Marine Corps in China.

William L. Rivers, 29, of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, an Instructor in the School of Journalism at Louisiana State University as well as a reporter, columnist, and editorial writer on the Baton Rouge *State-Times*. Mr. Rivers received his B.A. and M.A. in Journalism from Louisiana State University in 1951 and 1952, respectively. After graduation, he was a reporter and editorial columnist for the Panama City (Fla.) *News-Herald*, and has contributed some 50 popular articles to various national magazines.

As first alternate to the five awards made in the fields of political science and law, Charles L. Clapp, 31, of Berkeley, California, was named; James W. Pratt, 29, of Akron, Ohio, was named second alternate in this category.

John F. Burby, 29, of Honolulu, Hawaii, reporter for the Honolulu *Advertiser*, was designated as first alternate to the five awards made in the field of journalism. Robert P. Dorang, 29, of Buffalo, New York, a reporter with the Buffalo *Evening News*, was named second alternate in the journalism category.

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